


The proletarian revolution in Russia

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The Proletarian Revolution In Russia

By

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Edited with an Introduction, Notes
and Supplementary Chapters

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TO

*The men and women who made the proletarian revolution
in Russia; and to the men and women everywhere who are
inspired by that great event.*

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INTRODUCTION

I

History is the history of class struggles. Revolution is the culmination of the class struggle; and history, accordingly, is equally a history of revolutions, of cataclysmic epochs when the antagonisms of the class struggle flare up into revolutionary and decisive action. In these great crises of universal history, the ordinary aspects of the class struggle assume a violent, catastrophic expression, developing into war, civil war, and into the searing, magnificent upheavals of the Revolution.

Every revolution has, during its time, been characterized as the end of all things, as a reversion to savagery, as the rapacious terrorism of men become again primordial brutes; and after each revolution the "excesses" previously stigmatized assume their right proportions, and the revolution is visioned as a fundamental, dynamic expression of the onward and upward development of the world.

The French Revolution is a great exemplar of the revolutions in history. The antagonisms of class against class implacably assumed a revolutionary character, and the Revolution aroused new and more violent antagonisms. As these new antagonisms became more acute, the course of the Revolution became more violent and ruthless, until its whole aspect appeared superficially as one bloody insanity of assassination and ruthless terrorism. The culmination of this process was The Terror, which the world at that time—that is to say, the world of aristocracy and privilege — characterized as the great infamy of the ages; and yet today, the historian declares that The Terror, much maligned and even more misunderstood, saved the Revolution. As the monarchy was overthrown and a mortal blow delivered at the feudal relations of society, the bourgeois revolution was on the verge of being accomplished definitely; but the consequent antagonisms aroused the fears of the bourgeoisie, and they hesitated, paltered, temporized. Marat and

the Jacobins, representatives of the immature proletariat and the really great men of the Revolution, resorted to the drastic means of The Terror, equally against the bourgeoisie and the nobility, to continue the Revolution against all opposition. The antipathy aroused in France by the Revolution was enormous, and violent was the opposition; but the antipathy and the opposition were not confined to France: the whole world of aristocracy and privilege was aroused against the Revolution. As the Revolution verged on success, its international aspects were emphasized: if it succeeded in annihilating monarchy and feudal privilege in France, monarchy and feudal privilege in all Europe would verge on collapse. Europe, aristocratic Europe and "Commercial England," moaned over the "anarchy" in France, denounced the "mass murder," villified Marat and the Jacobins—and even the "revolutionary" conservatives—as fiends in human form, enemies of civilization and scourges of humanity. Intrigues, corruption, propaganda of the *emigres*, the organizing of counter-revolutionary plots,—all these were resorted to by England, Prussia, Russia, and Austria to crush the French Revolution from within, through the action of the people of France; and when these manœuvres failed, when the Revolution conquered in spite of all and everything, monarchical Europe attempted "intervention" in France to crush the Revolution by alien force. The answer of revolutionary France was the wonderful series of revolutionary wars and the conquests of Napoleon. The national antagonisms generated by the Revolution had become international; the class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the feudal class waged within France by means of revolution and civil war became an international class struggle waged by means of revolutionary wars provoked by the "intervention" of that feudal, monarchic Europe threatened by the French Revolution.

At Waterloo, the French Revolution, objectively expressed in Napoleon, was militarily defeated. The defeat was merely objective; it was not subjective. Metternich and the Concert of Europe, particularly the "Holy Alliance," were confident that the revolutionary ideas of France had been conquered and monarchic reaction restored. It was a characteristic error. Revolutionary France had been conquered largely by the national ideas and conditions of bourgeois emergence which it developed in Europe by its military conquests. And the fundamental purposes of the French Revolution — the overthrow of the absolute monarchy and feudal domination, the introduction of the democratic parliamentary

system, the supremacy of the capitalist class economically and politically, and the definite establishment of the nation — ultimately conquered in Europe. But during the intervening period the Revolution was maligned by scholars and historians; it appeared as the crime of the ages, a senseless orgy of primitive passions; and English history for years after Waterloo accepted Napoleon as the "Corsican Ogre." After, however, the ideas of the Revolution had become ascendant, after the major nations of the world definitely emerged as bourgeois, parliamentary republics, as democratic nations, the ascendancy of the bourgeois altered the prevailing conceptions of the Revolution. To-day, and for many years past, the French Revolution has been accepted without prejudice and distortion, as a really great event in the history of the world.

The Russian Revolution, in its determining proletarian phase, is an incomparably mightier event than any previous revolution: larger in scope and deeper in ultimate meaning than the French Revolution. Napoleon visualized Russia as a menace that might make all Europe Cossack; to-day, Capitalism visualizes the revolutionary Soviet Republic in Russia as the danger that may make Europe, and the world, all Socialist. Clearly, the antagonisms, national and international, generated by the proletarian revolution in Russia are necessarily more intense than the antagonisms of the French Revolution. *That* was a bourgeois revolution, a revolution that annihilated one form of class rule and tyranny in order to establish that of the capitalist class; it was not a fundamental social revolution, but overwhelmingly political in scope. *This* is a proletarian revolution, the *start* of the international Social Revolution against Capitalism, the purpose of which is not political reconstruction, but fundamental, intensive, economic and social reconstruction of the basis of the world. The French Revolution annihilated one form of property rights, the feudal, in order to introduce another form of property rights, the bourgeois; the proletarian revolution in Russia proposes the annihilation of bourgeois property rights, the annihilation of private property and its system of class oppression,—the end of the exploitation of man by man and class by class.

This is *the* Revolution, the initial action in the Social Revolution of the international proletariat against Capitalism and for Socialism. International Capitalism senses its great enemy in the proletarian revolution in Russia and the Soviet Republic: international Capitalism and Imperialism act accordingly. In this aspect, the parallel with the French Revolution is apparent: the Bolsheviks

are stigmatized as perpetrators of "mass murder," as enemies of civilization, as makers of anarchy, as brutish tyrants; the world, the bourgeois world of class tyranny and hypocrisy, is against revolutionary, proletarian Russia. The years to come will make the other parallel apparent: when Europe and the world emerge into Socialism, organized on the basis of the Soviet Republic, then the world will admit, what only the forward-looking Socialist now appreciates, that the proletarian revolution in Russia is mightier than the French Revolution, the greatest event in all history, — *since it initiates the coming of universal Socialism.*

: I

Bourgeois class interests and their ideology of class defense distort and misrepresent issues and events in Russia, and prejudice judgement. But in a very real sense, another circumstance is responsible for the general misunderstanding of the Russian situation, and that is the failure to appreciate the fact that *there have been two revolutions in Russia since March, 1917*, and that these two revolutions are mutually exclusive and antagonistic.

The revolution in March overthrew Czarism, the feudal absolute monarchy, and introduced the rule of the capitalist class, the bourgeois parliamentary republic. That was definitely a bourgeois revolution, — bourgeois, not in the sense that the bourgeoisie made the revolution, since the task was accomplished by the revolutionary action of the workers and peasants, but in the sense that the revolution materialized, immediately, in a bourgeois republic. The "freedoms" of bourgeois democracy were introduced; the capitalist class was politically ascendant: and the government was a bourgeois government operating in the interests of Capitalism, *imperialistic* Capitalism. This first stage of the Revolution was political, not social; it annihilated the autocracy of the Czar, but industry was still capitalist, the social system still bourgeois.

But the revolutionary breach in the old order was deepened and broadened by the war and the prevailing economic crisis. The Revolution broke through the fetters that the bourgeois government tried to rivet upon its action. Against the bourgeois republic organized the forces of a new, oncoming revolution, the revolution of the proletariat and proletarian peasantry, the forces of a *social* revolution. The revolutionary class struggle formerly directed against Czarism now marshalled its hosts against Capitalism, determined upon a *new* revolution that would expropriate the bourgeoisie politically and economically. On all fundamental issues the

two revolutions opposed each other; the struggle was one of Socialism against Capitalism; and the proletarian revolution conquered, together with its program for the expropriation of Capitalism and the establishment of a Socialist Republic.

Much noise and capital has been made by the journalistic Praetorian Guard of Imperialism of the democratic character of some of the "Provisional Governments" organized during the counter-revolutionary campaign against the Soviet Republic. The personnel of these "governments," is the argument, consist of former enemies of Czarism and members of the dispersed Constituent Assembly, and accordingly represent democracy. But there are two forms of democracy in Russia struggling each against the other. The dispersed Constituent Assembly, these "democratic Provisional Governments," represent democracy, but it is the democracy of the bourgeois order,—simply a form of authority of the capitalists over the workers; that paltry democracy which depends upon an expropriated proletariat and impoverished peasantry. This democracy is counter-revolutionary, since it struggles against the fundamental democracy of Socialism. The term counter-revolutionary as used by the Soviets includes not alone the adherents of Czarism, who are unimportant, but equally the adherent of bourgeois democracy which is in reaction against the fundamental, oncoming communist democracy of Socialism,—industrial self-government of the workers.

The proletarian revolution in Russia marks a decisive break with the revolutionary traditions and ideology of the past. To compare it with previous revolutions, fundamentally, is to miss its epochal significance and misrepresent its character and action. There are no real historic standards by which to measure the proletarian revolution in Russia; it is making its own history, creating the standards by which alone this revolution and subsequent proletarian revolutions may be measured. This circumstance is pivotal in interpreting the course of events in Russia and the meaning of the first general revolution of the proletariat.

In the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Marx declares that bourgeois revolutions hark to the past for inspiration; the old figures and ideology appear as means to intoxicate people with their revolutionary task. Cromwell and the English drew from the Old Testament the figures and the ideology for their bourgeois revolution. At one moment, the French Revolution is cloaked in the forms of the Roman Republic; at another, in the forms of Roman Empire. But, says Marx, "the Social Revolution [of the

proletariat] cannot draw its poetry from the past, it can draw that only from the future. It cannot start upon its work before it has stricken off all superstition concerning the past. Former revolutions required historic reminiscences in order to intoxicate themselves with their own issues. The revolution [of the proletariat] must let the dead bury their dead in order to reach its issue. With the former, the phrase surpasses the substance ; with this one, the substance surpasses the phrase."

It is only in minor phases, accordingly, that the proletarian revolution in Russia is comparable with previous revolutions. In one stage alone is this comparison actual, and that is the first stage, when, the proletariat having made the revolution, the Russian bourgeoisie seized power for its own class purposes, — as in the Paris Revolution of 1848. But this stage was the initial one : the subsequent stages are stages of a proletarian revolution against Capitalism, creating its own modes of action and its own standards, developing the *modus operandi* of the oncoming international proletarian revolution. The Russian Revolution marks the entry of a new character upon the stage of history — *the revolutionary proletariat in action* ; it means a new revolution, the *Proletarian Revolution*, the Social Revolution against Capitalism ; it establishes a new reality, the imminence of the Social Revolution, *the transformation of the aspiration for the Social Revolution into a fact of immediate importance to the world and the proletariat*.

The proletarian revolution in Russia is comparable only with the Paris Commune. These two great events are similar and yet vitally dissimilar. The proletarian revolution in Russia acts in accord with a fundamental canon of the Revolution developed by the Commune, — that the proletariat cannot lay hold of the ready-made machinery of the bourgeois state and use it for its purposes : the proletariat must annihilate this state, conquer power and establish a new state upon the basis of which the proletariat introduces the measures of the coming Socialist society. The Commune had neither the numbers, the disciplined class consciousness, nor the traditions of proletarian revolutionary action of the Russian proletariat ; nor did it break completely with the superstitions and ideology of the past. Industrial development in France at that period had not produced the mass of the typical industrial proletariat which constitutes the revolutionary class in Capitalism, and which is the bone and sinew of the revolution in Russia. In spite of Russia being still largely a peasant community, its industry is substantial ; and, moreover, is large scale, concentrated industry,

producing a large mass of typical and potentially revolutionary proletarians. The Commune tried to secure the support of the peasants, and failed; the proletarian revolution in Russia succeeded, at least temporarily. The Parisian proletariat, again, did not act in conjunction with the rest of France, nor did it operate in an epoch of general revolutionary crisis; the conditions of Imperialism develop a revolutionary epoch; and Soviet Russia will act, immediately or ultimately, as the signal for the *international* proletarian revolution. The Commune was the final, magnificent expression of the first revolutionary period of the proletarian movement; and while it signalized the end of an epoch, it simultaneously projected the determining phase of the oncoming Revolution,—the dictatorship of the proletariat. The proletarian revolution in Russia, while it acts in accord with this phase of the Paris Commune, projects a new epoch in the proletarian movement,—the definite revolutionary epoch, the initiation of the final struggle and the decisive victory.

III

The entry of Russia into the war in August, 1914, decreed by the government of the Czar, was signal for a great outburst of patriotic enthusiasm among the bourgeoisie, which allied itself with Czarism all along the line. Instead of using the war in the struggle against the autocratic regime, the bourgeoisie used it to promote its imperialistic interests. The Russian bourgeoisie was no longer revolutionary: it had become imperialistic; and this circumstance was a determining issue in the course of the Revolution.

The Revolution of 1905 supplemented the earlier abolition of serfdom in creating the partial conditions for the development of capitalistic industry. The bourgeoisie acquired new powers and influence, and a new ideology. Industry developed in great proportions, absorbed from without and reproducing all the features of large scale, concentrated industry. The industrial technology, not being developed slowly from within but acquired full-grown from without, did not reproduce normally all stages of the historical development of Capitalism. One consequence of this was that a large industrial middle class never developed in Russia, that class of industrial petty bourgeois which historically is the carrier of democracy and revolution. The Russian bourgeoisie was the bourgeoisie of Big Capital, of trusts and financial capital, in short, of modern Imperialism; while the "middle class" was dominantly a socially anemic class of intellectuals and professionals. (During the Revolution, the historic role of the middle class was usurped by

the soldier-peasantry, temporarily, and by the bourgeois-peasants, permanently.) You had these two extremes: on the one hand, backward, undeveloped peasant production; and on the other, the typical concentrated industry of imperialistic Capitalism.

The inner conditions of Russian Capitalism required the intensive development and exploitation of the home market. But this meant a revolutionary struggle against Czarism. The bourgeoisie rejected this policy, mortally afraid of the consequences it might have in arousing the strength and revolutionary class consciousness of the proletariat. The home market was allowed to remain largely undeveloped; and the bourgeoisie embarked upon a policy of export trade, exploiting Asia Minor, Persia and the Far East,—in short, Imperialism. The monopoly of military power, dominantly, instead of the monopoly of finance-capital, was the instrument of Imperialism. This was a policy apparently of no revolutionary consequences, and that promised, immediately, larger profits than the intensive development of the home market. But it also meant the end of the bourgeoisie as a liberal and revolutionary force, it meant immediately and ultimately a compromise with Czarism.

The revolution of 1905 marked the turning point of this development. During this revolution, betrayed and maligned by the "liberal" forces, the bourgeoisie beheld the spectre of a proletarian revolution, of a revolution that might not persist within the limits of bourgeois interests, and that might turn against the bourgeoisie,—as has actually been the case. The danger was too palpable: why take risks, particularly when the policy of Imperialism offered an apparently easy way out? But such are the contradictions of Capitalism, that the bourgeoisie inevitably digs its own grave no matter which way it may turn. The new policy had momentous consequences. It made the bourgeoisie reactionary; moreover, it assisted in clarifying the class consciousness of the proletariat by constituting it *the* revolutionary force.

The significance of Russian Imperialism in the course of the Revolution should not be confused because of the fact that Imperialism generally means the maturity of the industrial development of Capitalism. Events are not interpreted simply by formula. Japan is imperialistic in its policy, and yet it is not a fully-developed industrial country. The prevailing historical situation and modifying factors are of the first importance. The Russian bourgeoisie adopted the policy of export trade and Imperialism because of historical impulses: this Imperialism might differ in minor characteristics, but its general purposes were identical with the Imperial-

ism of the western nations. The social consequences were identical with those in other countries: the liberals and intellectuals generally became lackeys of Imperialism; democracy and liberal ideas were accepted within the limits of the new autocracy necessary to promote the interests of the imperialistic bourgeoisie. All social groups, on the whole and essentially, except the proletariat, became reactionary and counter-revolutionary.

The imperialistic bourgeoisie, accordingly, enthusiastically accepted the war against Germany and Austria, and for the Dardanelles, Constantinople, Asia Minor, and the promotion of its imperialistic interests generally as against the Imperialism of Germany. But their hopes of a profitable victory lagged, as the corrupt and inefficient beaureaucracy of the Czar bungled the management of the war. Defeat, instead of victory, stared the imperialists in the face. The bourgeoisie tried through extra-parliamentary means to avert the collapse. This was not sufficient. There was no decline in the patriotic enthusiasm of the bourgeoisie, but their representatives in the Duma began to criticize the policy of the government, —a criticism, mark you, strictly within the limits of legality, the Duma and the existing system. Not only was this criticism not at all revolutionary, it was distinctly counter-revolutionary. The bourgeoisie and the liberal land-owners, represented by the Constitutional-Democrats (the Cadets) did not want a revolution, nor did they want an overthrow of Czarism; their policy insisted upon an aggressive war against Germany, upon adequate bourgeois representation in the government, upon an international policy in accord with the Entente, upon using Czarism *for* the bourgeoisie. With the support of Anglo-French capital and the governments of the Entente, the bourgeoisie plotted to compel the abdication of Czar Nicholas, after coming to the realization of the impossibility of "reaching" Nicholas; they intrigued for a palace revolt to place upon the throne a "strong" Grand Duke who would recognize the necessity of an aggressive bourgeois policy in accord with the requirements of Russian capitalistic Imperialism.

But the bourgeoisie miscalculated. The workers and peasants *did* make a revolution against the bourgeoisie, and they definitely completed the proletarian tendency of the revolution by acting against the bourgeois republic and expropriating the bourgeoisie by means of the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. The threat of 1905 had become the reality of 1917.

IV

The persistence of Czarism in Russia after its historical necessity had ceased, its clinging to power after Capitalism had come into being, produced a dual political and social development. Within the shell of Czarism developed the bourgeoisie, the class of capitalists, and the proletariat,—a mature and aggressive proletariat. As the bourgeoisie developed power, the proletariat simultaneously developed its own power, while politically and officially Czarism retained ascendancy. When the shell of Czarism was burst by revolutionary action, Czarism disappeared as easily as a dream upon awakening, in violent and suggestive contrast to the painful and prolonged struggles required to overthrow the absolute monarchy in France, and in England; and the failure of the revolutionary movement in Germany in 1848. This unparalleled rapidity of accomplishment in Russia was directly and largely traceable to the development of the revolutionary proletariat.

Upon the overthrow of Czarism, the bourgeoisie and proletariat faced each other in battle array; where previous revolutions found the proletariat scattered and without decisive power, the Russian Revolution found the proletariat disciplined and inspired by traditions of revolutionary struggle, organized by the mechanism of capitalist production itself,—stronger than the bourgeoisie, and able to conquer for itself the power of the state.

This emergence of the proletariat, its independent class policy and class organizations, the Soviets, constitutes the decisive feature of the Russian Revolution,—an emergence definite and sufficiently aggressive to conquer power for the revolutionary proletariat.

The emergence of the proletariat is not new in the Russian Revolution; it was latent and partially expressed in the French Revolution and other bourgeois revolutions. There were two tendencies in the French Revolution,—the *bourgeois* tendency, which directed itself to a gradual transformation of the political forms, willing to satisfy itself with a compromise with the monarchy, providing that bourgeois class interests became ascendant; and the tendency of the *masses of the people*, the workers and the poorer peasants, which directed itself to a complete destruction of feudalism and the monarchy, and struggled to develop an *economic revolution* through the organization of a communistic society. Again and again the bourgeoisie compromised and dickered with the monarchy, terrified at the *revolutionary economic* aspirations of the masses;

the bourgeoisie was willing to betray the revolution, it acted against the revolution, in order to crush the revolutionary masses, the proletariat of that epoch. The masses of the people instinctively acted independently, aggressively, under the impulse of its material conditions, tried to project the revolution beyond the political form imposed upon it by the bourgeoisie, into a new form—an economic revolution. The struggle between the masses and the bourgeoisie was determined not only by purposes, but by methods: the bourgeoisie tried to limit the revolution within parliamentary bounds, conciliation and understanding with the monarchy; while the masses insisted upon revolutionary mass action, placing the centre of the revolution among the people, instead of among the parliamentary "representatives of the people." The answer of the masses to the hesitation, intrigues and betrayals of the bourgeoisie was the Jacobin terror, which preserved the revolution. The French Revolution developed into *the Great Revolution* only because of the revolutionary courage and action of the masses of the people. But while the workers and the poorer peasants were able, by an unparalleled expression of revolutionary energy and initiative to push the revolution on to a point where it became Great because it accomplished fundamental changes, they did not possess the means to definitely wrest all power permanently from the bourgeoisie. The proletariat was conquered: it had not developed to the objective power of the Russian proletariat; the white terror crushed the masses; Babeuf's conspiracy was the final desperate expression of the economic revolution of the masses of the people; but while the proletariat did not accomplish the economic revolution, it accomplished one magnificent thing—it sapped monarchy and feudalism so completely that political democracy was inevitable, and *made* the bourgeois revolution.

In the ill-fated revolution of 1848 in Germany, the proletariat again emerged, as the left wing of the revolution, as the one aggressive force in the revolution, crushed by the betrayals and cowardice of the bourgeois liberals who united with the monarchic reaction. Again, in the French Revolution of 1848, in Paris, the proletariat emerged as the carrier of aggressive revolutionary action and a program of economic revolution, but crushed ruthlessly by the bourgeois reaction.

During the struggle against Czarism the proletarian class struggle against Capitalism emerged, becoming more definite and aggressive in the measure that the bourgeois liberals approached toward a conciliation with the monarchy and Capitalism developed

in the masses the consciousness of an *economic revolution*. The original joint struggle against Czarism developed, in reality though often unconsciously, into a struggle of the masses against Czarism—Capitalism; the proletarian class struggle against the bourgeoisie did not arise during the 1917 Revolution, it has already acquired definite character and power. The struggle between bourgeois and proletarian appeared clearly during the 1905 Revolution, acquired a sharper character during the following period of Czarist—bourgeois counter-revolutionary activity, and flared up implacably in the 1917 Revolution. The period 1905-1917 may be compared, very superficially, of course, and yet suggestively, to the period 1789-1792 of the French Revolution; and 1917-1918 to 1792-1793, with this vital difference: that the masses in France met disaster, while the Russian proletariat and poor peasants conquered power.

The proletariat in the Russian Revolution acted instinctively as the proletariat acted in previous revolutions. Its infinitely larger success was determined by the prevailing historic conditions, by the fact that it had developed much more maturity than the masses during the French Revolution. Capitalism was much more developed and much more typical, the proletariat consequently much more powerful and class conscious: it was able, accordingly, because of the revolutionary breach created in the old order by the momentarily joint revolution against Czarism, to conquer the bourgeoisie, to project definitely and decisively a proletarian revolution. United with the superior material development was an uncompromisingly revolutionary Socialism, able to direct the masses of the people to the conquest of power and the introduction of forms competent to maintain and extend that conquest in the direction of a new society,—the successful expression of an *economic and social* revolution.

The proletarian revolution in Russia accordingly, is not alone in accord with the purposes of revolutionary Socialism, but it is equally the definite expression of a dynamic tendency, the revolutionary economic tendency of the masses, latent and apparent but unsuccessful in previous revolutions, characteristic of Capitalism and acquiring maturity and ascendancy as Capitalism develops.

As the tendency of action of the Russian proletariat was adumbrated in previous revolutions, so its class organizations, the Soviets, are, in general features, partially, incompletely apparent in these previous revolutions in which the proletariat instinctively tried to emerge for the conquest of power.

The revolutionary masses of the people, during the French

Revolution, particularly in Paris, organized their own forms of revolutionary struggle and government, the *sections* and the *Commune*. While the average historian dwells minutely upon the action of the various parliaments and the Clubs, the sections and the Commune of the masses were of decisive importance. These sections and the Commune were not alone instruments of revolutionary action, but usurped certain functions of government, the tendency being to place all government power in the Commune, which was simply the organized masses trying to act independently of parliamentary forms and bourgeois representatives. This tendency was expressed in a more definite form in the Paris Commune of 1871, which completely dispensed with the forms and functions of the bourgeois parliamentary state, its purpose being to unite all France by means of self-governing communes, and from which Marx derived that fundamental canon of the proletarian revolution: the proletariat can not simply lay hold of the ready-made machinery of the bourgeois state, and use it for its own purposes.

The Soviets, the Councils of Workers and Peasants, are a much higher form and definite expression of this tendency of the proletarian masses *to become the state*. Originally created as instruments of the revolution, the Soviets have become organs of government, functioning through a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat. The Soviets are revolutionary organizations of the masses; but they are more: they are forms for the creation of a new type of government, which shall supersede the bourgeois political state. Instead of being amorphous "mass organizations" as were the sections and Communes in the French Revolution, the Soviets are industrial organizations uniting the functions of industry and government. In the Soviets appears the true form of government of the proletariat, based upon the producers organized in the workshops. In the workshops lies not only the power of the workers for the revolution, but equally the groupings upon which is based the self-government of the oncoming communist society of Socialism. And the Soviets, combining temporarily political and industrial functions, are developing the forms out of which will emerge the communist, industrial "government" of the days to come. The *tendency* of previous revolutions is the dominant *fact* of the Russian Revolution.

The proletarian revolution in Russia has revealed clearly and in definite form the methods and the purposes, the action and the "state" by means of which the proletariat can conquer power and accomplish its emancipation.

The definite success of the proletarian revolution in Russia depends not alone upon the Russian masses, but much more upon the revolutionary action of the masses in the rest of Europe. The Russian Revolution cannot accomplish that which the French Revolution accomplished—wage war upon the whole of Europe. The strength and the weakness of the proletarian revolution in Russia is precisely that the other European nations are much more highly developed economically. Revolutionary France was the most advanced nation economically in Europe (except England), and this greater economic power was a source of unparalleled political and military vigor to France, making feasible a war against all of Europe. But the proletarian revolution in Russia is vulnerable to a concerted attack of European Imperialism, because the other nations of Europe can mobilize infinitely superior economic forces; simultaneously, this situation is one favorable to the Russian Revolution, since the higher stage of economic development in the other nations prepares the conditions for supplementary revolutionary action, which alone can ultimately preserve the Russian Revolution. Monarchic Europe could not produce a revolution in accord with that in France; modern Europe can produce a proletarian revolution in accord with that in Russia. The proletarian revolution in Russia requires and struggles for the Social Revolution in Europe. The revolution of the proletariat is an international revolution.

v

The proletarian revolution in Russia, the climax of the war, marks the entry of the international proletariat into a new revolutionary epoch. In this epoch the Social Revolution is no longer an aspiration, but a dynamic process of immediate revolutionary struggles.

The new epoch is an epoch of revolutionary struggles, in which the proletariat acts definitely for the conquest of power. This new revolutionary epoch has been objectively introduced by Imperialism, and subjectively initiated by the proletarian revolution in Russia. Imperialism creates a revolutionary situation, a crisis and a breach in the old order through which the proletariat may break through for action and the conquest of power.

This is an historic fact of the utmost importance. It means the preparation of the proletariat for the final struggle against Capitalism, the necessity of clear-cut, uncompromising action in the activity of Socialism;—it means, moreover, *the revolutionary reconstruction of Socialist policy and tactics*, in accord with the

imperative requirements of the new revolutionary epoch.

The proletarian revolution in Russia marks a recovery from the great collapse of Socialism upon the declaration of war in 1914, and during the war; but at the same time it emphasizes that collapse. Moderate Socialism, which during the war betrayed the proletariat and Socialism by accepting the policy of imperialistic governments, developed into a counter-revolutionary force; and it acted against and betrayed the proletarian revolution in Russia by rejecting the call to action of revolutionary Russia. After having overcome moderate, petty bourgeois Socialism in its own councils, the proletarian revolution in Russia had to struggle, must struggle against moderate Socialism throughout the world.

And by "moderate Socialism" is meant not simply the Socialism of the "right" which accepted the war, but equally the Socialism of the "centre," which either opposed the war from the start or adopted an oppositional attitude after preliminary acceptance. It was not simply the Socialism of the "right," of Plekhanov and the other social-patriots, but equally the Socialism of the "centre," of Cheidse and Tseretelli, that the revolution in Russia had to overcome. This moderate Socialism in other belligerent nations refused to act in solidarity with the revolutionary proletariat of Russia, or else camouflaged its petty bourgeois soul by means of honeyed words, while refusing to accept the struggle for deeds. The collapse of the "centre" is particularly emphasized,—that Socialism which is neither fish, flesh nor yet fowl; expressing an atrophied Marxism, which is neither revolutionary nor of Marx; in the attitude of which the phrase surpasses the substance; and which, precisely because it uses Marxist and revolutionary phrases in its criticism of the "right," is particularly dangerous. Plekhanov was not much of a problem to the Russian revolutionary proletariat: he was ignominiously cast aside; but it required much more initiative and energy to cast aside Tseretelli and Cheidse. When the proletariat of Germany acts, it will unceremoniously cast aside the Scheidemanns and the Cunows; but it may be directed into the swamps of compromise by the Kautskys and the Haases. The proletarian revolution must discard the miserable masters of the phrase and the poltroons in action.

The proletarian revolution in Russia, accordingly, in its dominant Bolshevik phase, initiates not alone a new revolutionary epoch in the proletarian struggle, but equally a new epoch in Socialism, makes mandatory the reconstruction of Socialism in accord with the policy and practice of the proletarian revolution in Russia.

There are two vital stages in the development of Socialism—the stage of its theory, and the stage of its practice.

The *Communist Manifesto*, roughly, marked the first stage. The *Manifesto*, supplemented by the general theoretical activity of Marx., provided the proletariat with a theory of its historic mission, and developed the understanding of the conditions necessary for its emancipation. This was an epochal and revolutionary fact. The proletariat, a despised and lowly class, was conceived as a class socially the only necessary class, destined to overthrow Capitalism and realize the dream of the ages—social, economic and individual freedom. Itself an oppressed class, the proletariat, through the expression of its class interests, was to annihilate all oppression. The proletariat, through the theory of Socialism, was intellectually made equal to its historic mission—socially, economically and intellectually, the proletariat was a revolutionary class upon which history imposed a revolutionary mission. The actual practice of the movement, however, was conservative, a conservatism determined by the conditions under which it operated: Socialism was only intellectually an essentially revolutionary thing—in ultimate purpose, but not as yet in immediate practice. The genius of Marx, to be sure, projected a general conception of revolutionary practice; but this part of his ideas played only a secondary role in a movement dominated by conservative policy.

The proletarian revolution in Russia, as determined by the practice and program of the Bolsheviki, marks the second vital stage in the development of Socialism—the stage of its *revolutionary practice*. The epoch of Marx developed the theory of Socialism, the epoch of Lenin is developing its practice; and this is precisely the great fact in Russia—the fact of *Socialism and the revolutionary proletariat in action*. The left wing of the Socialism of yesterday becomes through the compulsion of events *the* Socialism of revolutionary action in the days to come. As Marx is the source of Socialist theory, so the proletarian revolution in Russia is the source of Socialist practice. Its uncompromising spirit, its sense of reality, its emphasis on the general mass action of the revolutionary proletariat, its realization of the deceptive character of the parliamentary regime and the necessity of annihilating that regime, its use of all means compatible with its purposes in the revolutionary struggle—all this and more marks the proletarian revolution in Russia as peculiarly characteristic of the Social Revolution of the proletariat that will annihilate the rapacious regime of Capitalism and Imperialism.

Capitalism and Socialism are mobilizing for the great, the final and decisive struggle. The call to action of the proletarian revolution in Russia will soon—*now, perhaps*—marshal the iron battalions of the international proletariat.

* * *

The material comprised in this volume, consists largely of a mass of articles written by Lenin and Trotzky during the actual course of the Revolution; the material accordingly is not alone a record of history, *but a maker of history*—original sources. I have knit the material together by means of supplementary chapters of my own. The bulk of the material is here published for the first time in this country, either in Russian or in English; a small part has already appeared in *The Novy Mir*, *The New International* and *The Class Struggle*. I wish to express my appreciation to A. Menshoy, Nicholas I. Hourwich and Gregory Weinstein, editors of *The Novy Mir*, who provided me with a part of this material, and to John Reed, who provided me with the material comprised in Chapter III of Part One, the final chapter of Part Three, and the chapters by Trotzky in Part Six.

LOUIS C. FRANA.

October, 1918

The Proletarian Revolution in Russia

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PART ONE

**The First Stage of
The Revolution**

By N. LENIN

INTRODUCTION

The revolutionary mass action of the workers of Petrograd, their strikes, demonstrations and riots, was the force the impact of which made Czarism totter on its throne and then dragged it to the ground in ruins.

It was this irresistible mass action that smashed through the barriers of authority and rent asunder the fetters of the ideology of submission. It was this elemental action that swept away the apathy of other groups of the masses and rallied them for the Revolution. It was this proletarian action that encouraged the soldiers to revolt and secured their adhesion to the revolutionary cause. And this great action had been preparing itself throughout the agonizing years of the war, of hunger, of misery and of oppression. Hatreds and rancors develop, the forces of revolt accumulate; but the mass of the people is apathetic, feeling itself helpless before the imposing enginery of authority, until action somewhere, somehow, breaks loose and throws the whole of society up into the air. The proletariat, united by the discipline of industry, rendered conscious of class by a common life and common oppression, aware of its control of the economic process, was the only class capable of developing the initial action out of which could arise the general mass action of revolution.

It is a fact of history, and a fact that must be emphasized, that the workers of Petrograd made the Revolution; it was their revolutionary blows that shattered Czarism. The liberal bourgeoisie and the propertied classes generally did not participate in the actual making of the Revolution; their contribution was the passive one of not opposing the workers when the forces of revolt flared up into action, and of being willing to use the conquests of the workers in their own class interests. Some months before the great revolt, Paul N. Milyukov, leader of the Constitutional Democrats, the party of the bourgeoisie, declared: "If victory can be secured only by means of a revolution, then we don't want any victory." And on February 23, 1917, Milyukov, in an open letter to the press, protested against the "false use" of his name by agitators who were trying to get workers to demonstrate before the Duma at its coming opening on March 3. At the same time, the commander of the Petrograd military district appealed to the workers' patriotism to refrain from demonstrations, and backed up his appeal by threats of force. M. Milyukov and the representative of the Czar were united against the masses.

All through the month of February things were stirring. The Duma was to meet, and the people began to hope. Protopopoff, Minister of the Interior, talked of concessions to the Jews. The class of 1898, the boys of 19 and 20,

were called to the colors, emphasizing the horrible slaughter and futility of the war. Eleven members of the "Workmen's Group" of the Central Military Committee, a patriotic civilian body, were arrested, charged with belonging to revolutionary organizations and with planning to establish a "Social Democratic Republic" in Russia. Four others in Petrograd were arrested on similar charges. The people were stirring, agitators active. While the guns spat out death on all the bloody fields of Europe and the ghastly military machinery of the Czar was apparently working smoothly, while the elite of society were enjoying this best of all possible worlds, while the comfortable "representatives of the people" were still playing the old game of talk, talk, talk, the masses were thinking in their own slow, apparently dumb and yet eloquent way, an elemental calm which gradually accumulates the explosives for the great upheavals of history.

And the bourgeoisie, the liberals, the representatives of industrial and profit-yearning Russia? They were masticating the bitter herbs of approaching defeat, of the collapse of their dreams of "appropriating" Galicia and Constantinople. They were intriguing to get through the pro-German camarilla of the Czar, to approach the Czar with the request to clean out the corrupt bureaucrats responsible for Russia's defeats, and organize a new government for victory. Michael Rodzianko, president of the conservative Duma, tried to approach the Czar hat in hand, but was rudely rebuffed. The liberal representatives of the bourgeoisie were preparing a palace revolt, the "reformation" of Czarism, by means of which the Czar would recognize the right to power and rule of the bourgeoisie. These bourgeois liberals did not want to overthrow the monarchy, but to bend the monarchy to their will,—as the imperialistic bourgeoisie did in Germany. They did not want a revolution, being afraid that in that event the proletariat might seize power—and how prophetic was their fear! These liberals did not act, they pleaded and intrigued; they did not appear as the daring, magnificent makers of a new world, but as humble beggars at the gates of Czarism.

All the pleading, all the intrigues of the liberals availed them nothing, and when the Duma convened they were prepared to resume their old task of talking, while Czarism acted. The Duma was not only a conservative, even reactionary body, it was in its very nature incapable of creative action: this creative action could arise only out of the people itself. On March 4, Deputy Milyukov declared that Constantinople as the goal of Russian efforts seemed certain—"if we cannot conquer with this Government, we will conquer in spite of this Government, but we will be victorious." Deputy A. F. Kerensky demanded that the Allies should refrain from all aggressive and imperialistic schemes—and we shall see Kerensky again demanding this at a time when he was not a simple deputy, but Premier of Revolutionary Russia. Deputy N. S. Cheidse, Socialist, denounced the exploitation of the masses and the Duma's failure to intercede, accusing the government and the employers of waging a struggle against the workers and breaking the "national unity." The government was warned that relations between it and the country were unchanged, that the internal crisis was dragging along. And Deputy Kerensky declared that a conflict in "decisive form" was coming between the government and the people.

The people were in the grip of hunger, and hunger was again playing its historic role of developing revolution. The Duma was asked to vote an

extension of powers to the municipality of Petrograd to enable it to control the food supply in the district. But the Duma was not disposed to tackle the problem of food. Its sessions were wasted in futile grumblings and expressions of dissatisfaction with the government. It was more interested in a military victory than in the starving people. Nothing definite was done. The "revolutionary Duma," subsequently so much eulogized, was preparing to pass, as did its predecessors, into the years of wasted opportunity.

But suddenly a change came. The proletariat forgot the Duma and turned to its own activity in mass action. On March 8 strikes were declared in several big munition factories in Petrograd. The impetus of this stirred the people into life, and food riots began anew and on a large scale. On March 9 more and more masses marched out into the streets, antagonisms developing acutely. Cossacks patrolled the streets. General Chavaloff, commander of the Petrograd district, issued a proclamation forbidding assemblages in the streets, and warning citizens that the troops had been ordered to use their arms or any other means to preserve order. On March 9 a correspondent cabled the *New York Times* "A number of causes, working together, brought the crisis momentarily to a head, although I do not personally believe there can be serious trouble *while the Duma is sitting....* Throughout yesterday the streets were full of people, although Petrograd is heavily patrolled by Cossacks and mounted police. The general atmosphere of excitement is like a bank holiday with thunder in the air." [My italics.]

There was thunder in the air. Military orders and Cossacks could not quell the people. More strikes were declared, the workers fraternizing with the masses in the street and stimulating events. The masses were at first timid, but the women of the working class, active and implacable in all revolutions, encouraged the masses by their aggressive attitude. These women organized the food riots; they marched boldly up to the troops, alert and intrepid, and cried out, now appealingly, now tauntingly: "You wouldn't kill us really, would you? You know all we want is food. Will you obey those who starve us?" The troops were impressed. The Cossacks, most of them young and new recruits, hesitated and were not rigorous in the execution of their orders. Clashes occurred between the troops and the people, which enraged the masses and made the troops, already verging on revolt, sick of their jobs. On March 11 orders were issued to the troops to fire upon the populace, but only isolated detachments here and there obeyed. Soldiers and masses began to fraternize, the fetters of authority about to be snapped asunder. Practically every worker in the Petrograd district was now on strike. Then the people, spontaneously and as independent groups, began to fire upon the troops, barricades sprang up, and instead of "bread," the world *revolution* was on every one's tongue.

On March 12 the Revolution was definitely in action. Workers, armed and prepared for a struggle to the end, crowded out upon the streets, the unifying centre of all activity. Battles in the streets assumed formidable proportions between the masses and the loyal troops. Then came news that five celebrated regiments had joined the revolutionists, and soon practically all the troops flocked to the colors of the Revolution. The centre of resistance to the masses was the police, and the battles with them were fierce and unrelenting. Women and children were in the thick of the fighting, while others scorned the flying bullets and took care of the wounded. Soldiers

joined the revolutionary masses, their bayonets flaunting red bunting. The initial action had become general; the masses were out upon the streets, eager, aggressive, uncompromising.¹ The Revolution was in action!

The Czar, who was "in safety" with his "loyal" army, issued two ukases suspending the sittings of the Duma and the Council of Empire. The Duma might have meekly obeyed, as in former years, but the pressure of events and of the masses encouraged it and the Czar's ukase met with a refusal. On March 11, Michael Rodzianko, president of the Duma, wired the Czar: "The situation is serious. The capital is in a state of anarchy. The government is paralyzed. There is universal discontent. The streets are filled with disorderly fighting, units of the army are firing on each other. It is necessary to appoint some one immediately whom the country trusts to form another ministry. Make haste. Procrastination means death. I pray to God that the responsibility will not fall upon him who wears the crown!" The next day, Rodzianko again wired the Czar: "Affairs are worse. You must act at once. To-morrow it will be too late. This is the last hour in which to decide the fate of the country and of the dynasty."

It is apparent that the Duma "liberals" did not favor the overthrow of the Czar. Months later, Milyukov, at a convention of his party, said: "When the revolution broke out I thought it would be suppressed in a quarter of an hour, but after several days I understood that the real Russian Revolution had begun and that it could not be put down." The "revolutionary Duma" was not the instrument of Revolution, but simply tried to squeeze profit for itself out of the Revolution once it had been accomplished by the masses and could not any longer be resisted.

The Duma hesitated, and did not know what to do. It still had faith in the Czar, as proven by the telegrams of Rodzianko. But on the afternoon of March 12 the revolutionary troops appeared before the Duma and demonstrated for the revolution. This evidence of the solidarity of the soldiers with the masses decided the Duma, and only then did it appoint the "Duma Committee" to take charge of events, headed by Rodzianko.

On March 13 the final struggles with the police occurred and they were ruthlessly exterminated. The jails were opened and the prisoners freed, including thousands of revolutionary agitators. Two hundred officials of the old regime were arrested, including former Premier Boris V. Sturmer. That

1) We have got to summon all revolutionary forces to simultaneous action. How can we do it? First of all we ought to remember that the main scene of revolutionary events is bound to be the city. Nobody is likely to deny this. It is evident, further, that street demonstrations can turn into a popular revolution only when they are a manifestation of masses, that is, when they embrace, in the first place, the workers of factories and plants. To make the workers quit their machines and stands; to make them walk out of the factory premises into the street; to lead them to the neighboring plant; to proclaim there a cessation of work; to make new masses walk out into the street; to go thus from factory to factory, from plant to plant, incessantly growing in numbers, sweeping police barriers, absorbing new masses that happened to come across, crowding the streets, taking possession of buildings suitable for public meetings, fortifying those buildings, holding continuous revolutionary meetings with audiences coming and going, bringing order into the movements of the masses, arousing their spirit, explaining to them the aim and the meaning of what is going on; to turn, finally, the entire city into one revolutionary camp, this is, broadly speaking, the plan of action. The starting point ought to be the factories and the plants. That means that street manifestations of a serious character, fraught with decisive events, ought to begin with political strikes of the masses.—Leon Trotsky, "The Proletariat and the Revolution" (1904).

night the Council of Empire sent a telegram to the Czar, pleading for "the immediate convocation of the legislative bodies, the retirement of the present staff of the Council of Ministers, and the entrusting to a person deserving of the national confidence, to present to you, Sire, for confirmation, the list of a new cabinet capable of managing the country in complete accord with the representatives of the people. Every hour is precious. Further delay and hesitation threaten incalculable misfortunes." Among the signatures was that of A. F. Guchkov, a few days later to become Minister of War in the cabinet of the "revolutionary" Provisional Government.

The counter-revolutionary character of the "Duma Committee" was evident not only in its parleys with the Czar, but in the additional fact that the first act of its head, Rodzianko, was an order to disarm the masses. The Committee still hoped, even after its defiance of the Czar, to prevent the monarchy from being annihilated, and it sent Guchkov and others to the front to acquaint the Czar with the situation and again plead with him.

But the masses refused to limit the Revolution. A Council of Workers and Soldiers was organized in Petrograd, which in a proclamation on March 14 said: "All together, with united forces, we shall fight for the complete removal of the old government and the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, chosen on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage."

This accelerated and decided the course of events. On March 15 the Czar was arrested, and abdicated, naming Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitch as regent. The Duma Committee appointed the cabinet of a provisional government, with Prince Lvov as Premier, Milyukov Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guchkov Minister of War and Marine, and Kerensky Minister of Justice. On March 16 the Provisional Government issued the following declaration:

"Citizens: The Executive Committee of the Duma, with the aid and support of the troops and the people of the capital, has succeeded in triumphing over the dark forces of the old regime.

"The new cabinet will base its policy on the following principles:

"1.—An immediate general amnesty for all political and religious offences, including terrorist acts and military and agrarian crimes.

"2.—Liberty of speech and of the press, assembly, unions and strikes, with extension of political liberty to those in military service within the limits of military requirements.

"3.—Abolition of all social, religious and national restrictions.

"4.—Immediate preparation to convoke, on the principle of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage, a Constituent Assembly, which will establish the form of administration and constitution.

"5.—Substitution of a national militia in place of the police, with chiefs elected and subject to the local administrations.

"6.—Communal elections to be based on universal suffrage.

"7.—Troops which participated in the revolutionary movement will not be disbanded, but will remain in Petrograd.

"8.—While maintaining strict military discipline for troops on active service, all limitations upon soldiers in the enjoyment of public rights accorded other citizens are to be abolished.

"The Provisional Government desires to add that it has no intention to take advantage of the circumstances of war to delay the realization of the measures of reform mentioned above."

The Provisional Government, however, did not consider that the monarchy had been abolished. In a speech in Catherine Hall of the Duma, Milyukov had expressed the intentions of the new government:

"The old despot, who brought Russia to the edge of disaster, will voluntarily abdicate or be deposed. The government will pass to a regent, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitch, and the heir Alexis the Czarevitch. (Yells—"But that is the old dynasty!") Yes, gentlemen, that is the old dynasty, which perhaps you do not like and which perhaps I dislike myself. We propose a parliamentary constitutional monarchy."

But the Revolution had spread throughout Russia, and in the army; it was deemed prudent to wait upon events for a restoration of the monarchy. Grand Duke Michael declined to accept the regency, urged "all citizens to submit to the Provisional Government," and said he might accept the throne if offered by the Constituent Assembly.

Not only was the Provisional Government ideologically and politically inclined to the restoration of monarchy, it was part and parcel of all the imperialistic causes and purposes involved in the war previously organized and directed by Czarism. The urge for peace had animated the masses. But Milyukov declared on behalf of himself and his colleagues in the new government: "We assume control of the government in order to bring victory to the Russian arms." On March 17, Foreign Minister Milyukov, in a note to the representatives of Russia abroad, said: "In the domain of foreign policy the cabinet, in which I am charged with the portfolio of the ministry of foreign affairs, will remain mindful of the international agreements entered into by the fallen regime and will honor Russia's word. . . . The government of which I am a part will devote all its energy to preparation of victory." In a proclamation issued March 19, the Provisional Government emphasized the attitude of Milyukov: "The government will do its utmost to provide the army with everything to bring the war to a victorious conclusion. The government will faithfully observe all alliances uniting us to the other powers and all agreements made in the past." The determination of the Provisional Government to adhere to the rapacious foreign policy of Czarism was emphasized again and again. It conceived the overthrow of Czarism as being simply a means of more efficiently carrying out the policy of Czarism. The imperialistic bourgeoisie was in power and its predatory character was immediately manifest.

The issue of war and peace split the Revolution, and acted as an accelerator of the struggle of class against class. Class relations and class policy became the determining factors in the course of events. The circumstance that the Revolution occurred in the midst of a general imperialistic war, in which world power was at stake, made it impossible for the bourgeoisie to compromise or conceal its class interests: the imperialistic war had to be continued. But the masses wanted peace, and it was through the issue of peace, which could not be avoided or compromised, that class antagonisms developed immediately and acutely, and aroused anew the revolutionary consciousness and action of the masses. In the normal times of peace, it would have been much more difficult to drive on the bourgeoisie to the fatal conclusion of its class policy, much more difficult to deliver the masses from the deceptions and ideology of the bourgeoisie. The issue of peace assisted mightily in accomplishing the work of clarification, events proving to the masses that peace itself was a class issue: the proletariat and the impover-

ished peasantry wanted peace, the imperialistic bourgeoisie and its "liberal" sycophants clamored for war. "Peace, land, and liberty" was the slogan of the Revolution; the Milyukov-Guchkov government granted the usual "bourgeois freedoms" and promised fuller liberty and land—in future; while it prepared to wage a new and more aggressive war. The personnel of the government had been changed, but its policy was still the policy of the regime of Czarism.

At this stage, the Russian Revolution is identical with and yet dissimilar to the earlier, bourgeois revolutions. It is identical in this, that the bourgeoisie does not make the revolution but steps in and tries to direct its course and policy, assuming control of the government; it is dissimilar in that the opposition of the proletariat to the bourgeoisie is not disorganized, inchoate, unaware of means and purposes: the masses do not disintegrate, becoming the helpless prey of the bourgeoisie, but are organized and disciplined through their own class organizations and class policy. In spite of immaturity, immediate hesitations, compromises and defeats, these organizations and this class policy impulsively drive the masses onward toward future action, providing the mechanism for the development of fuller class consciousness and class action. The significant and determining fact was the formation of two governments: the government of the bourgeoisie, the imperialistic Provisional Government, and the "government" of the revolutionary masses, the Soviet, or Council, of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates. Immediate antagonisms developed between these two governments, antagonisms that acted as an educator of the masses and as a means of converting the general revolution into a revolution definitely and consciously of the proletariat and proletarian peasantry.

Councils were organized throughout the country, and in the army. These Councils were thoroughly democratic and representative institutions, consisting at first of Councils of Soldiers, of Workers, and Peasants; later the Bolsheviks organized separate Councils of the poorest peasants and of farm-workers to intensify the agrarian class struggle, and rescue the mass of the peasantry from the domination of the more prosperous and *petit-bourgeois* peasants, who naturally were conservative. The delegates to the Councils of Workers were elected directly by the workers in factories and plants, on the basis of equal male and female suffrage, each person over 20 having the right to vote. The representation at first was rather haphazard, but the principle was there and it gradually acquired more adequate expression. All delegates could be recalled immediately by their constituents. The functions of the Councils of Workers' Delegates varied with conditions and the consciousness of the masses. In certain sections they took over, even at this early stage, all the functions of government, and organized their own volunteer police of workers. Where employers shut down plants as a means of starving the workers, many of these local Councils expropriated the plants and granted the workers power to manage them directly. The Councils of Peasants' Delegates, where dominated by the radicals, began immediately to seize the land and put in operation an agrarian revolution. These Soviets acted as the centre of the elemental bursting forth of the life of the people, of their political activity and purposes. Indeed, this new life of the people, of a people awakening after the sleep of ages, was positively feverish.

In spite of the attempts of the Provisional Government to suppress them,

Councils of Soldiers' Delegates were organized in the army at the front. In the early days of the Revolution, news of events in Petrograd was scarce, but the soldiers were prepared for revolt, and, scattered and without contact with each other, Soviets of Soldiers were organized. The officers acted against these organizations, but the soldiers persisted, and recalcitrant officers were often expelled. The army Soviets were not simply propaganda groups: they often assumed the functions of commissariat and of education, and often military functions when deserted and betrayed by the officers. The basis of the army Soviets were local committees in each company, regiment, division, corps, culminating in the general Soviet of Soldiers' Delegates. These Soviets issued literature, held meetings, published newspapers, and became the means of revolutionary expression for the soldiers.

Each of the Soviets of a particular character elected delegates to an Executive Committee; and each of the Soviets, of workers, of soldiers, and of peasants, elected delegates to a Congress of All-Russian Soviets, which in turn elected a Central Executive Committee sitting permanently in Petrograd. The first All-Russian Soviet Congress was held in Petrograd in June, and it was decided to convene the Congress every three months. The Soviets comprised the actual mass of the people, the only organized expression of the Revolution, and it alone possessed a real power. It was fully admitted after the organization of the Provisional Government that it had no power except in "appeals to patriotism," and it tried to obscure all issues by appeals to the patriotic emotions of the people—"The Country is in danger!" The Councils constituted the real power; and yet they yielded all power to the Provisional Government of the imperialistic bourgeoisie.

The Soviet constituted itself as the active representative of the revolutionary masses. But it consisted, as yet, of the old revolutionary opposition, of the moderates whose "legal" propaganda had made it possible for them to acquire publicity and general reputations: the Council did not represent the new revolutionary activity and requirements. The Council dared not assume power, it dared not act aggressively. As early as the end of March a split is apparent between the Council and the revolutionary masses; the split widens under pressure of events, and upon arrival of revolutionists from Siberia and from foreign countries. Upon his arrival in Petrograd, early in April, Lenin becomes the storm-centre of the revolutionary opposition equally to the moderates in the Council and to the Provisional Government.

The Provisional Government's policy of an aggressive war and an imperialistic peace aroused the anger, the impatience and the action of the masses. A strike movement of protest against the Milyukov policy is developing, and on April 9 Premier Lvov declares, in answer to the general discussion of war aims: "Free Russia does not aim at the domination of other nations, or at occupying by force foreign territories, but to establish a durable peace based on the rights of nations to decide their own destiny." The moderates in the Council used this declaration to urge support of the war and of the Provisional Government. On the same day, Chaidse, President of the Soviet Executive Committee, proclaims: "Russia's national watchword must be unity—front and rear." But on April 10, Minister of Foreign Affairs Milyukov, in an interview, expresses himself in favor of the Russian annexation of Constantinople. On April 12, a preliminary Congress of Soviets adopted a resolution, 325 to 55, declaring it would be a good thing should the

Provisional Government make an official renunciation of any program of annexations, but as long as these conditions are unfulfilled and the war continues, the revolutionary democracy must support the war in all ways. This attitude was emphasized by the appearance at the Congress of George Plekhanov, Russian social-patriot, and Will Thorne and M. Moutet, sent by the British and French governments, who pledged Russian and Allied labor to the war. At the same time, the Congress decisively rejected a resolution of the Bolsheviks that the Soviets should assume all government power, but a proclamation was issued to the people to disregard orders of the Provisional Government where they conflicted with the Council's.

All this, of course, was in contravention of the desires of the masses and the objects of the Revolution. The Provisional Government was distinctly counter-revolutionary, and yet it was supported by the representative of the masses, the Soviet. On all issues the government adopted a reactionary policy. It did not make any effort or lay plans to convene the Constituent Assembly. It did not energetically act to provide food for the people, being restrained by its capitalistic affiliations and interests. It acted against the expropriated peasantry by protecting the interests of the large propertied owners. It retained the bureaucracy of the old regime and its attitude on all large problems of policy. It proclaimed itself the government for carrying on an imperialistic war, in spite of promises and subterfuges to the contrary. The Provisional Government allowed the institutions of the old regime to exist, and directed its activity toward the disarming of the masses and the castration of the Revolution. Minister of War Guchkov used every means and opportunity to destroy the Soviets in the army, and the Soviets behind the front were intrigued against in an effort to destroy their influence and existence. On all general problems of the Revolution the Provisional Government was reactionary; but it was its reactionary attitude on war and peace that was most manifest to the masses, provoking discontent and action.

On April 9, in answer to the universal unrest and questionings on war aims, Premier Lvov had declared in favor of "a durable peace based on the rights of nations to decide their own destiny." This was construed by the moderate Socialists as favoring the Revolution's program of "no annexations, no indemnities, and self-determination of nations." But the secret treaties of Czarism had been neither repudiated nor published: until this was done, words had not even the empty value of words. And on May 1, Minister of Foreign Affairs Milyukov, in a note to the representatives of the Provisional Government in the Entente countries, emphasized "the nation's determination to bring the war to a decisive victory. . . . The Provisional Government in safeguarding the rights acquired for our country will maintain a strict regard for its engagements with the allies of Russia."

This was the signal for the elemental bursting forth of the indignation and protests of the masses, which had been accumulating for six weeks. It was accelerated but not produced by the intensive and uncompromising propaganda of the Bolsheviks. The Council, apprehensive of the impending action of the masses, demanded that the Provisional Government withdraw Milyukov's note accepting the old treaty obligations, that the treaties should be published and active steps taken to end the war. The government declined to modify the May 1 note of Milyukov. The masses in Petrograd broke loose. On May 2 and 3 the workers demonstrated in great masses,

shouting "Down with the Provisional Government!" The streets of Petrograd swarmed with furious and indignant demonstrators, including whole regiments of soldiers. The resignation of Milyukov was demanded and refused. One regiment appeared before the Marinsky palace to arrest the ministers of the Provisional Government and depose it by force. Minor counter-revolutionary demonstrations, crying "Down with Lenin," were submerged in the general revolutionary mass action. The demonstrations continued until May 5; and, the Council having by a majority of 30 voted its confidence in the Provisional Government, the masses vented their disapproval by hostile demonstrations against the Council. The Provisional Government was tottering, but the Council came to its support, and ordered all meetings and demonstrations prohibited for two days. At a meeting of the Council, Tseretelli declared: "The trouble is now over, and the Provisional Government will remain in power." The masses, abandoned by their own representatives, met for the moment a temporary defeat.

The Provisional Government was still in power, maintained in power by the moderates in the Council of Soldiers' and Workers' Delegates; but there was, nevertheless, a profound change in the situation. The masses had been temporarily dispersed, but not appeased or suppressed. The position of the Provisional Government was insecure; the Soviet, not being responsible for the government could at any moment nullify the measures of the government. The Provisional Government, accordingly, invited the Executive Committee of the Soviets to participate in forming a coalition government, the invitation being extended through Kerensky. The Soviet at first refused, but the Provisional Government threatened to resign unless its offer of coalition was accepted. Simultaneously General Kornilov resigned as Commander-in-Chief; this action was followed by other generals and by Minister of War Guchkov as a protest against the Soviets, and particularly against the army Soviets, and as a concerted conspiratory move to frighten Russia by disorganizing the army. These events threw the Executive Committee of the Soviets into a panic, and on May 18, with a vote of 41 to 19, it decided to accept the coalition thrust upon it by the imperialistic Provisional Government. This action was approved by the Petrograd Council, against the opposition of the Bolsheviks, who, through Trotzky, declared: "Division of power will not cease with the Socialists' entry into the ministry, a strong revolutionary power is necessary." Milyukov and other ministers resigned, and on May 19 a coalition ministry was formed, which included Kerensky as Minister of War and Marine, M. I. Skobelev, vice-president of the Soviet Executive Committee, as Minister of Labor, Victor Chernov, Social-Revolutionist, as Minister of Agriculture, I. G. Tseretelli, Menshevik-Socialist, as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, and the "Populist-Socialist" Pyeshekonov as Minister of Food and Supplies. The announcement of this coalition declared that it was based "on three cardinal points upon which the Government, the Executive Committee of the Duma, and the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates have agreed," the "three cardinal points" being as follows:

"1.—The unity of the Allied fronts.

"2.—The fullest confidence of the revolutionary democracy in the reconstructed cabinet.

"3.—A plenitude of power for the Government."

In other words, the Soviets officially accepted the policy of the Provis-

ional Government, surrendered to the government, making the Soviet the government's moral apologist and physical supporter. The Provisional Government had absolutely no power by which it could maintain itself; municipal elections through Russia cast an overwhelming majority of votes for Socialist candidates, the bourgeois Cadets being everywhere swamped; and yet the Council accepted coalition with the discredited Cadets. By a simple stroke of moral courage and revolutionary spirit the Council could have constituted itself the government, discarding completely the bourgeoisie. But the *petit bourgeois* psychology of the moderate Socialists dominating the Council resulted in an acceptance of the ideology of a "democratic war," of "national unity," and a naive faith in the "necessity" of the bourgeoisie to establish the conquests of the Revolution. The representatives of the proletariat having taken the initiative, it was inevitable that the peasants should accept the coalition, as they did on May 24, through the Peasants' Congress.

The Soviets, however, were not by any means united on the problems of the day. In the Soviets were represented three groups: the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks, constituting the moderates (Cheidse, Skobeleff, Tseretelli, Chernov), and the Bolsheviks, constituting the uncompromising group (Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and, later, Trotzky, who, while not an affiliated Bolshevik, had a similar program and acted with the Bolsheviks.)

The Social-Revolutionists represented the peasantry, not the mass of agricultural workers, but largely the middle class peasantry dominated by the petty bourgeois ideology. They represented that conservative middle class which in previous revolutions had always acted against and betrayed the proletariat. The interests of this class of peasants moved within the orbit of the bourgeois regime of property, and its representatives acted accordingly. In the normal times of peace, the well-to-do, bourgeois-aspiring peasants first awoke to political consciousness, constituted the real force in the Social-Revolutionary Party, and imparted to the party its petty bourgeois ideology. For a time the peasants, and particularly the soldiers, who were mostly peasants, accepted the leadership of the Social-Revolutionary moderates; but as the Revolution developed its antagonisms and awoke to political consciousness the great mass of agricultural workers, the Social-Revolutionary Party split, and the Social-Revolutionists of the Left accepted the Bolshevik program. But at this stage, and for months after, the Social-Revolutionists and their petty bourgeois policy constituted the real governing force in Russia.

The Mensheviks represented the dominant, moderate Socialism, that moderate Socialism which directed the International straight to disaster by accepting the policy of their governments in all belligerent nations; and which, moreover, had become, in the words of Trotzky, the greatest obstacle to the revolutionary development of the proletariat. The Mensheviks represented those social elements which everywhere have dominated organized Socialism,—the intellectuals, liberal democrats, bourgeois reformers, the lower *petit bourgeoisie*, and, above all, the upper layers of the working class, the skilled workers, which everywhere are a reactionary force in the councils of Socialism, having been corrupted by Imperialism and striving to secure a place as a caste in the governing system of things. The ideology of this group was the ideology of the *petite bourgeoisie*, of the bourgeois revolution in which, according to Marx, the phrase surpasses the substance. The Mensheviks were moderate and hesitant, convinced that, the Russian Revol-

ution being a bourgeois revolution, the proletariat should support the bourgeoisie; they mistrusted the masses and the action of the masses, trying to limit the Revolution with the orbit of the bourgeois democratic regime, legality and parliamentary action. The Mensheviks used the masses only when they considered action necessary, which was when their own petty purposes were in jeopardy: the masses were a tool to be used or discarded at will; independent action of the masses was discouraged and suppressed, if necessary. Instead of encouraging the dynamic action of the masses, bringing the initiative and action of the masses to bear on all the problems of the Revolution and developing the Revolution, the Mensheviks used the masses as an instrument with which to coerce the bourgeoisie into granting petty, illusory concessions.

The Bolsheviks constituted the party of the revolutionary proletariat; in the words of Lenin, "the class conscious workers, day laborers, and the poorer classes of the peasantry, who are classed with them (semi-proletariat)." The Bolsheviks were completely revolutionary, not in the sense of revolutionary phrases, but in the sense of representing the industrial proletariat and the great masses which alone constitute the instrument of the revolution.

Representing the interests and ideology of the industrial masses, and in continual and active contact with them, the Bolsheviks developed that general, creative and dynamic mass action out of which revolutions arise and develop uncompromisingly. Bolshevism insisted that the bourgeoisie was counter-revolutionary; that precisely as the Revolution had been made by the proletariat, it could be established and continued only by the proletariat *in a merciless struggle against the bourgeoisie*; that this struggle was determined, not by any abstract considerations of whether Russia was ready for Socialism, but by the actual forces of development and the immediate problems of the Revolution; and that, accordingly, the revolutionary proletariat, acting together with the mass of impoverished peasants, must constitute itself into a dictatorship through the assumption by the Soviets of the complete power of government.

The Bolsheviks constituted a practical revolutionary movement, not a group of theoreticians and mongers of dogmas. They worked out a program, a practical program of action in accord with the immediate problems of the Revolution and out of which would necessarily arise the struggle and power for the larger, ultimate objectives. Revolutions do not rally round dogmas, but programs. The sense of reality of the revolutionist is expressed in this, that he translates his revolutionary aspirations into a revolutionary program in accord with the historic conditions, and which can rally and unite the masses for action and the conquest of power. Revolutions make their own laws, their own programs. Revolutions are the great educators and developers of class consciousness and action. It was the great merit of the Bolsheviks that they gauged accurately the prevailing forces, that they were revolutionists in action, using the situation to educate the masses and awake their consciousness and revolutionary struggles.

After the first two weeks of the struggle against Czarism, the course of the Revolution is determined by the struggles within the Soviets, between the moderates, represented by the Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviks, and the revolutionists, represented by the Bolsheviks.

The Council, dominated by the moderates, allows every opportunity of action to escape it, becomes a conservative factor in the existing system of things. The Council realizes the immense task it has to perform, but shrinks before the immensity of the revolutionary requirements, shrinks into conservatism and the acceptance of the bourgeois policy of the Provisional Government.

The Council appeals to the proletariat to overthrow the imperialistic governments, and allows its own imperialistic bourgeoisie to assume power; it calls upon the Socialists to break the "civil peace" with the ruling class, and itself acquiesces in an amorphous but disastrous "national unity;" it calls for the proletarian revolution in Europe, but denies and postpones *its own* proletarian revolution. The Council hesitates, and out of hesitancy comes compromise and an emasculation of the Revolution. It imagines that the course of the Revolution may be determined by interminable discussions among the intellectuals: it acts only under pressure of the revolutionary masses. The Council talks revolution while the Provisional Government acts reaction. It takes refuge in proclamations, in discussion, in appeals to a pseudo-theory, in everything save the uncompromising revolutionary action of the masses directed aggressively to a solution of the pressing problems of the day. The moderates in the Council are tangled and paralyzed in the coils of pseudo-Marxism: Russia's primitive capitalist development is not yet prepared for Socialism, therefore the bourgeoisie must rule, a theory completely neglecting the fact that the coming of Socialism consists of a process of struggles in which the determining factor is the maturity and class power of the proletariat. While indulging in this speculative theory, the moderates ignored the fact that the proletariat, and not the bourgeoisie, had made the Revolution; that the bourgeoisie were inimical to the Revolution; that the immediate problems of the Revolution could be solved only by the Councils, and that accordingly the Councils should assume control of the Revolution. But they who always had preached Socialism now shelve Socialism as a problem of the future, conceiving Socialism as an abstract problem of the days to come instead of as a dynamic theory of immediate revolutionary struggle. *The Revolution was a proletarian revolution in fact—this was the great circumstance.* Where revolutions do not act immediately and aggressively, particularly the proletarian revolution, reaction appears and controls the situation; and the formerly revolutionary representatives of the masses accept and strengthen this reaction. Once revolutionary ardor and action cool, the force of bourgeois institutions and control of industry weight the balance in favor of the ruling class. Revolutions march from action to action: action, more action, again action, supplemented by an audacity that shrinks at nothing,—these are the tactics of the proletarian revolution. The revolution seizes power and uses this power aggressively and uncompromisingly; it allows nothing to stand in its way save its own lack of strength. But the Council hesitates and compromises, until the day comes when the accomplished fact of reaction stares it in the face. The Council hampers and tries to control the independence and action of the masses, instead of *directing* them in a way that leaves the initiative to the masses—developing the *action* of the masses out of which class power arises. Acquiring prestige through its criticism of the government, the Council lacks the revolutionary policy and consciousness of assuming full

governmental power when conditions convert criticism into the necessity for action. Instead of action—phrases; instead of revolution—a paltering with the revolutionary tasks.

On May 3, when the masses burst forth in an elemental protest against the Provisional Government, the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates might, and should, have constituted itself the government. Its failure to do so marked the decline of its power and influence *as then constituted*; the revolutionary task now became that of revolutionizing the Council, of discarding its old policy and personnel. And this process of revolutionary transformation could develop only out of the masses, not out of the Council's intellectual representatives; these representatives had to be thrust aside, brutally and contemptuously.

* * *

The first phase of the Russian Revolution consists of the week March 8 to March 15, resulting in the overthrow of Czarism. The first stage of the Revolution ends with the formation of the coalition government on May 19,—the stage of the bourgeois revolution and the establishment of the bourgeois republic. Part One, by Lenin, deals with this first stage.

Sources: Articles in *Pravda*, the central organ of the Bolsheviks published in Petrograd: "Letters from Abroad, Number One," and "Our Position;" a lecture delivered by Lenin in Switzerland shortly before his departure for Russia; a speech to the Ismailoff regiment in Petrograd; a pamphlet, "Letter on Tactics;" and a pamphlet on "Political Parties in Russia,"—all published during March and April. Note: all dates are new style, not Russian style.

L. C. F.

THE BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION.

The first revolution arising out of the general imperialistic war has broken out. And this first revolution will certainly not be the last.

The first phase of this first revolution, namely, the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, has been completed. Nor will this first phase be the last phase of our Revolution.

How could this "miracle" happen in eight days—the period indicated by M. Milyukov in his boastful telegram to all the representatives of Russia abroad,—the "miracle" involved in the destruction of a monarchy that had maintained itself for centuries and continued to maintain itself during three years of powerful, universal class wars, the revolutionary period of 1905—1907?

In nature and in history there are no miracles; yet, every great convulsion of history, including every great revolution, presents such a wealth of events and material, such unexpectedly peculiar transformations in the forms of conflict and of the alignment of the fighting forces, that there is much that must appear miraculous to the ordinary mind.

In order that the Czarism should be destroyed in a few days, there was required the co-ordinating action of a whole series of conditions of an historical importance, and world-wide in bearing. Let us point out the principal ones.

The main condition for the realization of the "miracle" of the Russian Revolution was the series of revolutionary struggles during the years 1905—1907, slandered so much by the present masters of the situation, the Guchkovs and Milyukovs, the same gentlemen now pleased with the "glorious revolution" of 1917. But if the Revolution of 1905 had not effectively prepared the ground and shown to all parties what *action* means, exposing the supporters of the Czar in all their infamy and brutality, a rapid victory would have been impossible in 1917.

A fortunate coincidence of favorable conditions in 1917 enabled *different social forces* opposing Czarism to co-operate in one general action for power. These forces are:

1.—Anglo-French financial capital, that rules and exploits the whole world through investments and Imperialism. In 1905 it was opposed to the revolution, and helped Czarism crush the revolution by means of the big loan of 1906 (largely engineered by French capital against the despairing protest of the revolutionary democracy). But now Anglo-French finance took an active part in the revolution by organizing the *coup d'état* of the Guchkovs and Milyukovs, the bourgeois interests and the leading military groups for the overthrow of the Czar. From the standpoint of world-politics, the Provisional Government of Milyukov-Guchkov is simply the clerk of the banking firm England, France & Co., and a means of prolonging the imperialistic war.

2.—The defeats in the war waged by the government of the Czar. These resulted in clearing out the old guard in control of the army and created a new and young bourgeois group of officers.

3.—The Russian bourgeoisie in its different groups. The bourgeoisie organized itself rapidly between 1905 and 1917, and has united with the nobility in the struggle against the corrupt government of the Czar with the intention of enriching itself by exploiting Armenia, Constantinople and Galicia.

4.—The further power, which combined with the bourgeois, imperialistic forces, and the most important of all, was a strong proletarian movement, the organized and revolutionary workers. The proletariat made the Revolution by demanding *peace, bread and liberty*. It had nothing in common with the imperialistic government, and it secured the support of the majority of the army, consisting of workers and peasants.

Without the three years, 1905—1917, of tremendous class conflicts and revolutionary energy of the Russian proletariat, this second revolution could not possibly have had the rapid progress indicated in the fact that its *first phase*, the overthrow of Czarism, is accomplished in a few days. The Revolution of 1905 ploughed the ground deeply and wiped out the prejudices of centuries; it awakened to political life and struggle millions of workers and tens of millions of peasants. The 1905 Revolution revealed to the workers and peasants, as well as to the world, all the classes (and all the principal parties) in their true character, the actual alignment of their interests, their powers and modes of action, their immediate and ultimate objects. This first revolution, and its succeeding

counter-revolutionary period during 1907—1914, fully revealed the nature of the Czarist Monarchy and brought it to the verge of ruin, exposing all its infamy and vileness, and the cynicism and corruption of the Czarist circles dominated by the infamous Rasputin; it exposed all the bestiality of the Romanoff family—that band of assassins which bathed Russia in the blood of the Jews, the workers, the revolutionaries—those “first among peers,” who owned millions of acres of land and would stoop to any brutality, to any crime, ready to ruin or crush any section of the population, however numerous, in order to preserve the “sacred property rights” of themselves *and of their class*.

Without the Revolution of 1905—1907, without the counter-revolution of 1907—1914, it would have been impossible to secure so clear a self-definition of all classes of the Russian people and of all the nationalities in Russia, or so clear an alignment of these classes in relation to each other and to the Czarism, as transpired during the eight days of the March, 1917, Revolution. This eight-day revolution, if we may express ourselves in terms of metaphors, was “performed” after numerous informal as well as dress rehearsals: the “actors” knew each other, their roles, their places on the scene, their entire setting, down to the smallest detail of every significant tendency and mode of action.

But, in order that the first great revolution of 1905, which Messrs. Guchkov and Milyukov and their satellites consider “a great mutiny,” should after the lapse of a dozen years lead to the “glorious revolution” of 1917, so termed by the Guchkovs and Milyukovs because (for the present, at least) it has put power into their hands,—there was still needed a great, capable “stage manager,” who would, on the one hand, be in a position to accelerate the course of history on a grand scale, and, on the other, to release or produce the forces of universal crisis in every field: economic, political, national, international. In addition to an unusual acceleration of universal history, there were also needed particularly severe historical upheavals, so that during one of them the blood-stained chariot of Czarism might be overturned *in a trice*.

This all-powerful “stage manager,” this mighty accelerator of events, appeared in the form of the present general imperialistic war. And it can no longer be doubted that this war is universal, for the United States and China have been half-dragged in already, and to-morrow will be completely involved in the war. Nor can it any longer be doubted that the war is an imperialistic war on *both* sides; only the capitalists and their adherents, the social-patriotic “Social-

ists" who support the war and their governments and abandon Socialism, can deny or suppress this fact. Both the German and the Anglo-French bourgeoisie are waging war for the conquest of foreign territory, for the suppression of small nations, for the financial supremacy of the world, for the division and re-distribution of colonies. It is a war to save the tottering capitalist regime, by deceiving the workers in the various countries and causing disension among them.

The imperialistic war must, with manifest inevitability quicken the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, sharpen and intensify the struggle, and transform itself into a civil war between hostile classes. The transformation of the imperialistic war into a civil war has begun in Russia. This is the cause of the dual character of the Revolution, the initial phase of the first revolution arising out of the imperialistic war.

The first phase of this transformation was the March Revolution, the joint attack delivered against Czarism by two distinct forces: on the one hand, the whole bourgeois and landlord class of Russia, with all their less conscious satellites and all their conscious directors, in the persons of the Anglo-French ambassadors and capitalists; and, on the other, the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, the revolutionary Soviets.

Three political groups, three fundamental political forces emerge clearly in the eight days of the "first phase" of the Revolution: 1.—The Czarist Monarchy, the head of the feudal propertied class and of the old bureaucratic and military class. 2.—The Russia of the bourgeoisie and of the Constitutional Democratic, the Cadet, landholders, with the *petit bourgeoisie*, the middle class, floating in their wake. 3.—The Council of Workers' Delegates, its supporters being among the proletariat and the whole mass of the impoverished population.

But before going into further detail in this matter, I must come back to a factor of first importance, namely, the universal imperialistic war.

The belligerent powers, the "masters" of capitalist society and the slave-drivers of capitalistic oppression, have been shackled to each other by the war with chains of iron. One great bloody, congealed mass—that is the proper designation of the historic period through which we are now passing.

Those Socialists who deserted to the bourgeoisie at the beginning of the war and who supported the imperialistic war, all the Davids and Scheidemanns in Germany, the Plekhanovs, Gvozdyovs,

Potressovs in Russia, have been shouting lustily against the "illusions" of the revolutionists, against the "illusions" of the Basel Manifesto,¹ against the "vain farce" of urging the conversion of the imperialistic war into a civil war. They have sung hymns of praise to the strength, tenacity and adaptability which they ascribe to Capitalism, while *they* are aiding the capitalists in "adapting," taming, deceiving and disuniting the working classes of the various countries.

But, "he who laughs last laughs best." The bourgeoisie was not long able to delay the coming of the revolutionary crisis produced by the war. This crisis is growing with irresistible force in all countries. It is natural that in Czarist Russia, with its colossal lack of organization and with the most revolutionary proletariat in the world (not due to any specific characteristic of this proletariat, but because of its living in the memory of 1905), the revolutionary crisis should burst forth *earlier than anywhere else*. This crisis was called forth, or rather hastened, by a series of most serious defeats inflicted on Russia and her allies. These defeats disorganized the whole mechanism of an antiquated government and the old order of things, arousing the opposition of all classes of the people; they incensed the army and practically wiped out the reactionary officer class, consisting of the worn-out nobility and the most effete elements of bourgeois officialdom, replacing this class with a predominantly bourgeois and petty bourgeois staff of varied origin.

But, if military defeat played the role of a negative factor, hastening the outbreak, then the alliance of Anglo-French finance, of Anglo-French Imperialism, with the Octobrist-Cadet Capitalism of Russia appears as a factor that speeds the crisis after it has arrived.

This phase of the matter, for reasons that are clear, is, in spite

¹During the first Balkan War, a special Socialist Congress was held at Basel, Switzerland, November 24 and 25, 1912. Confronted by the danger of the Balkan War developing into a general European war, the Congress adopted a vigorous Manifesto declaring that such a war "cannot be justified on any pretext whatsoever of national interests." The most important formulation in the Manifesto was proposed at the Stuttgart Congress in 1907 by Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, a representative of Germany's revolutionary Socialism, and unanimously adopted at Basel: "Should war nevertheless break out, it would be their [the Socialists'] first duty to intervene in order to bring it to a speedy termination and to employ all their power to utilize the economic and political crisis created by war in order to rouse the masses of the people and thereby hasten the downfall of capitalistic class domination." The Bolsheviks in their declaration against the war issued in November, 1914, urged "the conversion of the imperialistic war into a civil war of the oppressed against the oppressors, and for Socialism."—L. C. F.

of its great importance, ignored by the Anglo-French press, and maliciously emphasized by the German press. We Marxists must face the truth soberly, being confused neither by the sweet diplomatic and ministerial lies of one group of imperialistic belligerents, nor by the sniggering and smirking of its financial and military rivals of the other belligerent group. The whole course of events in the March Revolution shows clearly that the English and French embassies, with their agents and "connections," who had long made tremendous efforts to prevent a "separate" agreement and a separate peace between Nicholas II and Wilhelm II, had at last determined to dethrone Nicholas and provide a successor for him.

The rapid success of the revolution, and, at first glance, its "radical" success, was produced by the unusual historical conjuncture, in a strikingly "favorable" manner, of *absolutely opposed* movements, *absolutely different* class interests, and *absolutely hostile* political and social tendencies. The Anglo-French imperialists were behind Milyukov, Guchkov & Co. in their seizure of power *in the interests of prolonging an imperialistic war*, with the objects of waging the war more savagely and obstinately, accompanied by the slaughter of new millions of Russian workers and peasants, that the class of Guchkov might have Constantinople, the French might have Syria, the English Mesopotamia, etc. That was one element in the situation, which united with another and opposite element,—the profound proletarian and popular mass movement, consisting of all the poorest classes of the cities and the provinces, revolutionary in character and demanding *bread, peace and real freedom*.

The revolutionary workers and soldiers overthrew the infamous Czarist *Monarchy*, down to its very foundations; and they were neither elated nor depressed by the fact that for a certain brief epoch of history, because of merely fortuitous circumstances, they were being aided by the efforts of Buchanan,² Guchkov, Milyukov & Co., who simply desired to replace one monarch by another.

Such, and such only, was the lay of the land. Such, and such only, must be the understanding of the statesman who is not afraid of the truth, and who wishes sanely to balance and evaluate the social forces that are aligned in the revolution at any given moment. This is necessary not only from the standpoint of the present peculiarities of these forces, but also from the standpoint of their more

²Sir George Buchanan was the British ambassador in Petrograd. As has been shown in the introduction, the object of Rodzianko, Guchkov, etc., was to preserve the monarchy with a new Czar amenable to their wishes.—L. C. F.

fundamental bearings, the deeper juxtaposition of the interests of proletariat and bourgeoisie, in Russia and throughout the world.

The workers and soldiers of Petrograd, as well as of the rest of Russia, self-sacrificingly set themselves to the task of fighting Czarism,—for freedom, for land for the peasants, *for peace* as against the imperialistic slaughter. Anglo-French finance, in the interest of continuing and sharpening the slaughter, engaged in court intrigues, planned conspiracies, encouraged and gave hopes to the Guchkovs and Milyukovs, and proceeded to *erect an entirely new government*, which even *obtained power* after the proletariat had delivered the first blows against Czarism. Nor is this government a fortuitous assemblage of persons.

The persons in this new government are the representatives of a new class that has risen to political power in Russia, the class of the bourgeoisie and capitalistic landowners. This class has already and for a long time been ruling our country economically; in the Revolution of 1905—1907, in the counter-revolutionary period of 1907—1914, and then, with extraordinary rapidity, in the period of the war, this new class organized itself politically, swiftly taking into its hands local administrations, popular education, conventions of every type, the Duma, the war industry committees, etc. This bourgeois class was already practically in power in 1917; therefore the first blows against Czarism were sufficient to destroy it, and to clear the ground for the bourgeoisie. The imperialistic war, requiring an incredible exertion of strength, imparted to backward Russia a tremendous acceleration. At a single stroke, at least it seemed like “a single stroke,” *we caught up with Italy, England, France almost*; we secured a “coalition,” a “national” government (which means a government to carry on the imperialistic slaughter and deceive the people),—in short, a “parliamentary” government.

The government of Guchkov-Milyukov, the government of the junkers and the capitalists, can give neither bread nor peace nor liberty to the people. It constitutes a government for the continuation of the war of conquest, which openly declares that it will respect the international treaties of the Czar. These treaties have as their purpose: robbery. This government can at most postpone the crisis, but it can not free the country from hunger; it has no power to give freedom, no matter what has been promised, because it is connected with the interests of feudal land property and of capital.

THE COUNCIL OF WORKERS AND SOLDIERS.

Alongside of the Guchkov-Milyukov government, representing the imperialistic bourgeoisie, there is developing a new, unofficial, as yet undeveloped and comparatively weak government, representing the interests of the proletariat and of the entire poorer elements of the city and country population. This is the government of the Soviets, the Councils of Workers and Soldiers' Delegates.

I

The actual facts in the political situation, on which we must base our Marxist tactics, are clear:

The monarchy of the Czar has been overthrown, but not as yet necessarily for good.

The Cadet, bourgeois government, wishing to carry on the imperialistic war "to the end," and in reality being the agent of the financial house of England, France & Co., was compelled to promise to the people the fullest measure of liberty and rights, compatible, however, with the preservation of power by this government and the carrying on of the war.

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates constitutes the form of a government by the workers, and represents the interests of all the *poorest* of our people, of nine-tenths of the population, aiming to secure peace, bread and liberty.

The conflict between these forces defines the situation as it is at present, the transition stage from the first phase of the revolution to the second.

In order that there may be a real struggle against Czarism and its restoration, in order that the newly-won freedom may really be secured, and not exist simply in words and in the promises of rhetorical "liberals," it is necessary not that the workers should support the government, but that the government should support the workers! The only *guarantee* of liberty and of a complete abolition of Czarism is the arming of the proletariat, the strengthening, broadening, and development of the role and power of the Soviets of Work-

ers and Soldiers. Accomplish this, and the liberty of Russia will be invincible, the monarchy incapable of restoration, and the republic assured.

Any other course will mean a deception of the people. Promises are cheap; promises are worth nothing. It is on promises that all the bourgeois politicians in all the bourgeois countries have been "feeding" the people and "fooling" the workers.

"Our revolution is a bourgeois revolution, *therefore* the workers should support the bourgeoisie,"—this is the cry of the worthless politicians in the camp of the "Socialist" compromiser and opportunist.

"Our revolution is a bourgeois revolution," say we Marxists, "*therefore* the Socialist workers should open the eyes of the people to the deceptive practices of the bourgeois politician, should teach the people not to believe in words, but to depend wholly on their own strength, on their own organization, on their own unity, and on their own military equipment."

The government of the Cadets, of the Guchkovs and Milyukovs, cannot give peace because it is the government for war; it is the government that wishes and prepares for a continuation of the imperialistic slaughter, the government of conquest, since it has not even hinted at renouncing the Czarist policy of conquest in Armenia, Galicia, Turkey, of capturing Constantinople, of reconquering Poland, Courland, etc. This government is bound hand and foot to Anglo-French imperialistic capital. Russian capital is merely one of the sub-divisions of the "concern" known under the firm name of "England, France & Co.," with its annual turnover of hundreds of milliards of roubles.

This government cannot give bread, since it is a bourgeois government. At best it may give the people, as the government of Germany has already done, "a magnificently organized hunger." But the people will not put up with hunger. The people will learn, and they will learn it very soon, that the bread exists and can be had, but by no other means than *refusing to bend the knee before the sacred rights of capital and of private ownership in land.*

And this government cannot give liberty, since it is a government of junkers and capitalists, who are afraid of the people and people's oppressors.

But this is a transition period. We are emerging from the first period of the Revolution into the second, from the revolt against Czarism into the revolt against the bourgeoisie, against the imperialistic war. In this transition the "order of the day" is: "Workers,

you have displayed marvels of proletarian heroism in the civil war against Czarism; you must now display marvels of proletarian organization and international action in order to secure your victory in the second stage of the revolution."

The specific task of the present period is *to organize the proletariat*, not according to the old standards of organization with which the betrayers of Socialism, the pro-war social-patriots and opportunists in all countries, are satisfied, but into a revolutionary organization. This organization, in the first place, must be general; and, in the second place, it must combine the functions of the army and the state. The Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates is developing precisely this revolutionary organization.

II

If we scrutinize the Council of Workers and Soldiers we find that it represents three groups:

The *first group* is the one nearest to the social-patriots, the betrayers of Socialism. They trust Kerensky, the master of hollow words, a tool in the hands of Guchkov and Milyukov. In harmony with the social-patriots of the western European countries, Kerensky mouths plenty of fine phrases. Actually he reconciles the workers with the continuation of the imperialistic war of conquest. Through Kerensky, the imperialistic bourgeoisie addresses the workers as follows: "We give you the republic, the eight-hour day (which actually exists in Petrograd), we promise you this and that liberty, but only because we want you to help us take away the booty from German Imperialism and turn it over to English and French Imperialism."

The *second group* is represented by our party of the "Central Committee of the S. D. P." in Russia, the Bolsheviks. On March 18th the Central Committee issued a Manifesto which contains the following demands: Democratic republic; eight hour day; confiscation of the landed estates of the nobility in favor of the peasants; confiscation of stocks of grain; immediate preparations for peace negotiations,—not through the government of Guchkov and Milyukov, but through the Council of Workers and Soldiers. This Council, according to the Manifesto, constitutes the actual revolutionary government. Peace negotiations should not be carried on by and with bourgeois governments, but with the proletariat in each of the warring countries. The Manifesto appeals to all workers and peasants to send delegates to the Council.

These are the only possible Socialist and revolutionary tactics to pursue.

The *third group* is represented by Cheidse and his friends, the Mensheviki generally. They are drifting to and fro. In refusing to join the second Provisional Government (the government of Guchkov-Milyukov) if the latter declared the war an imperialistic war, Cheidse was in harmony with the revolutionary proletarian policy. But the fact that Cheidse participated in the first Provisional Government (the Duma Committee), his demand that a sufficient number of representatives of the Russian workers participate in this government (which would mean that Internationalists would assume responsibility for a government waging an imperialistic war), and his further demand, together with Skobelev, that this imperialistic government initiate peace negotiations (instead of showing the workers that the bourgeoisie is tied hand and foot to the interests of finance, capital and incapable of renouncing Imperialism),—then Cheidse and his friends pursue the worst bourgeois policy against the interests of the Revolution.

The differences between the Bolsheviki and the Social-Revolutionists, as well as the Mensheviki, manifest themselves in three important issues,—issues that the Council of Workers and Soldiers must solve in the right way before it can carry on its revolutionary task. These issues are: the land problem, the organization of the state, and the problem of the war.

All the land must belong to the people. All the land of the large owners must be confiscated by the peasants, without compensation. But the vital tactical difference is whether the peasants should immediately and locally take possession of the land without paying any more rent to the owners, or whether they should wait for the convening of the Constituent Assembly?

Our party is of the opinion that the peasants should take immediate possession of the land. They should do this as much as possible in an organized way, without causing damage to the property, and should use all efforts to increase the production of grain and wheat, as the people suffer immensely from hunger. A temporary division of land for the coming harvest is only possible through the local Councils of Peasants' Delegates. In order that the rich peasants, who are also capitalists of a sort, shall be prevented from injuring and deceiving the day-laborers on the farms and the poorest peasant, it is necessary that these should consult, unite and co-operate apart from the others by forming their own Councils of Farm Laborers' Delegates.

The Council of Workers and Soldiers represents a new republic in the making, a republic other than the bourgeois republic, more in accord with the interest of the people. The revolutionary workers and soldiers of Petrograd dethroned the Czar and cleared the capital of the police. Having begun the Revolution, we must strengthen and complete it through the Council assuming all functions of the state. The police must not be restored. All the power of government, from the smallest villages up to Petrograd, must be vested in the Councils of Workers' and Peasants' Delegates. Neither the police nor officials not responsible to the people and placed over the people,—but the people itself shall govern the country, the people fully armed and united by the Soviets. The Soviet alone shall establish the necessary order, its power alone be obeyed and respected by the workers and peasants. Only by means of a Soviet government will Russia move forward firmly and surely to the liberation of our country and of all humanity from the horrors of this war and from the yoke of Capitalism,

Out of the experience of the Paris Commune of 1871, Marx shows that "the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made machinery of the state, and wield it for its own purposes." The proletariat must break down this machinery. And this has been either concealed or denied by the opportunists. But it is the most valuable lesson of the Paris Commune and of the Russian Revolution of 1905. The difference between us and the Anarchists is, that we admit the state is a necessity in our revolution. Our difference with the opportunists and the disciples of Karl Kautsky is, that we claim we do not need the machinery of the bourgeois state as established in the "democratic" bourgeois republics, but the *direct power of armed and organized workers*. Such was the character of the Commune of 1871 and of the Council of Workers and Soldiers of 1905 and 1917. On this basis we build.¹

¹Lenin uses Karl Kautsky, the intellectual leader of German Socialism and of the Second International that collapsed during the war, as typifying the attitude of moderate Socialism. Moderate Socialism in action conceives the present state as the starting point of the introduction of Socialism, through the extension of the industrial functions of the state, which is to be captured by the workers through political action. The Bolsheviks, and revolutionary Socialists generally, maintain that the extension of the industrial functions of the state is not and never can become Socialism, simply strengthening Capitalism; that the proletariat must overthrow the bourgeois state, with its parliamentary regime and territorial representation, and organize the new state of the organized producers functioning as a "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the preliminary stage of the Social Revolution.—L. C. F.

A revolutionary government of the Soviets alone can act properly on the problem of the war. The Provisional Government, a government of capitalists, is continuing the war in the interests of capitalists. Just as German capitalists, with their crowned robber, Wilhelm, at the head, so the capitalists of all other countries carry on the war for the division of capitalist profits and for world domination. Hundreds of millions of men, almost all the world, are drawn into this criminal war. Hundreds of milliards of capital are invested in the "profitable" enterprises of death, hunger, destruction, bringing to the people atrocious suffering and scandalously-high profits to the capitalists. In order to break away from this terrible war and conclude a really democratic peace, and not a peace of force, there is only one way: the transfer of all government power into the hands of the Councils of Workers and Soldiers. The workers and the poorest peasants, not being interested in protecting the profits of capital and the plundering of weak nations, can actually accomplish that which the capitalists only promise, namely, to end the war by a lasting peace conserving liberty to all peoples without exception.

Our program of peace is as follows:

1.—The Council of Workers and Soldiers declares that as a revolutionary government, it does not recognize any treaty of Czarism or the bourgeoisie.

2.—It publishes immediately these treaties of exploitation and robbery.

3.—It proposes at once and publicly an armistice to all participants in the war.

4.—Peace terms are: liberation of all oppressed peoples and of all colonies.

5.—A declaration of distrust in all bourgeois governments; appeal to the working class to overthrow the governments.

6.—The war debts of the bourgeoisie to be paid exclusively by the capitalists.

By means of this policy, the majority of the workers and poorest peasants can be won for Socialism and for the revolutionary dictatorship of the Soviets.

We do not doubt for a minute that these peace terms would be unacceptable not only to a monarchical Germany, but also to a republican Germany, and equally unacceptable to the capitalist governments of England and France. And in that event we would be compelled to wage a revolutionary war against the German bourgeoisie, but not *only* against the *German* bourgeoisie, and we would

take up the fight. We are not pacifists. We are against imperialistic wars waged by capitalists for profit. But we have always maintained that it is nonsense to declare that the proletariat should reject revolutionary wars, which may be necessary in the interests of Socialism.

This task would be a stupendous one and would mean a series of revolutionary class struggles all over the world. It is not our impatience and our desire to confront this issue, however, but the objective conditions resulting from the world war that put before the workers this dilemma: either sacrifice more millions of men in the destruction of European civilization, or conquer the governments through the Social Revolution. When in November, 1914, our party demanded, "conversion of the imperialistic war into a civil war of the oppressed against the oppressors, and for Socialism," the demand was considered ridiculous by the social-patriots and renegades of Socialism, as well as by the moderates of the "center." Nowadays even a blind man can see that this demand was correct.

Historic conditions have made the Russian workers, perhaps for a short period, the leaders of the international proletariat, but Socialism cannot now prevail in Russia. We can expect only an agrarian revolution, which will help to create more favorable conditions for further proletarian development. The main result of the present Revolution will have to be the creation of forces for more revolutionary activity, and to influence the more highly-developed European countries into action.

In the furtherance of its revolutionary policy, the Russian proletariat has two allies:

1.—The great majority of the population, consisting of the mass of the semi-proletarian and a part of the small peasants of Russia. This great mass needs peace, bread, liberty, land. This mass will inevitably be under the influence of the bourgeoisie, particularly of the *petit bourgeois* middle class, which it resembles rather closely owing to its conditions of life, which vacillate between those of the bourgeoisie and of the proletariat. The cruel lessons of the war, which will become all the more cruel as Guchkov, Milyukov & Co. carry on the war with greater energy, will inevitably push this mass into the proletariat, compel it to co-operate with the proletariat. We must now, taking advantage of the freedom of the new regime and making use of the Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, *enlighten and organize this mass*, above and before everything else. Councils of Peasants' Delegates, Councils of Farm-Laborers,—these are among our immediate tasks. We must

devote ourselves not only to encouraging the farm laborers to establish special Councils of their own, but to establishing organizations of the poorest peasants that shall be *distinct* from those of the more well-to-do-peasants.

2.—Another ally of the Russian proletariat is the proletariat not only of the warring countries, but all countries. At present they are in the clutches of the war, and unfortunately are being betrayed by the social-patriotic "Socialists" who have deserted to the bourgeoisie. But the liberation of the proletariat from the influence of the social-patriots was furthered by every month of the imperialistic war, and the Russian Revolution will *necessarily* accelerate this process tremendously.

The proletariat of Russia must go hand in hand with these two allies, is, in fact, already so proceeding. The proletariat must utilize the peculiar opportunity of the present moment of transition for the conquest, first, of a democratic republic and the emancipation of the peasantry, and then for the realization of Socialism, which alone can give peace, bread and liberty to the peoples exhausted by the war.

III

The papers of April 16 contain the following resolution adopted by the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Council of Soldiers' Delegates:

"Whereas, we have received from comrades information concerning the spreading of subversive propaganda, proceeding under the cover of the flag of the Revolution, and sometimes even under the flag of the Social-Democracy, and concerning particularly the propaganda of the so-called Leninites; and,

"Whereas, we consider this propaganda to be just as harmful as any counter-revolutionary propaganda from the Right; and,

"Whereas, we recognize the impossibility of taking any repressive measures against propaganda as long as it remains within the bounds of propaganda, therefore,

"We, the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Soldiers' Delegates, declare that it is absolutely necessary to take every possible step to oppose this propaganda with our own propaganda and agitation. We should aim at making our organization so strong that it will be able at any moment to oppose with our own activity every counter-revolutionary activity, no matter from what quarter it may proceed. We declare emphatically that the Executive Committee

should, to combat this subversive agitation, undertake an agitation of its own, not only in the press but also in the military units."

If we dispose of the personal issue by placing alongside of this resolution the declaration of an article in *Izvestya* of April 17 against the "dishonorable and reprehensible campaign of villification," we shall at once see what political division is actually based on the question under consideration.

The resolution declares that the propaganda of Lenin is "just as harmful as any counter-revolutionary propaganda from the Right."

Let us see wherein is the difference between (1) the counter-revolutionary propaganda from the Right; then (2) the propaganda in favor of the Provisional Government and supporting it; and finally (3) the propaganda of the Bolsheviki.

The Right desires the overthrow of the Provisional Government and a restoration of the monarchy.

The Provisional Government *has promised* to act in agreement with the Petrograd Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates.

Our propaganda is: all the power of government must pass to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants', etc., Delegates, *alone*, as these Soviets are the representatives of the great majority of the people. To attain this end we must spread "understanding" of the situation, so that the majority of the people may realize the necessity of this transfer of power to the Soviets.

The Right, therefore, is for the power of the monarch. The capitalists are for power in the hands of capitalists, the Provisional Government being a government of capitalists. The Bolsheviki want to convince the majority of the people that all power should belong to the Councils of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants.

It is more than clear that the statement stigmatizing our agitation as "just as harmful as any counter-revolutionary propaganda from the Right" is incorrect even from the standpoint of those who advocate action in agreement with the Provisional Government. For these advocates themselves claim to base their position on the majority of the people! How then can they designate as "just as harmful as the Right" our propaganda which is persuading the majority to seize all power? This is a manifest absurdity.

The Soviet of Soldiers' Delegates will hardly be able to defend very long this attitude of their Executive Committee. We are firmly convinced that the majority of the people will not call our attitude "just as harmful as any counter-revolutionary propaganda from the Right."

PARTY DIVISIONS.

The following is an attempt to formulate, first, the more important, and second, the less important, of the questions and answers characteristic of the present situation (early in April) in Russia, and of the attitude the various parties take to the present state of affairs.

Questions

1.—*What are the chief groupings of political parties in Russia?*

A (more to the *right* than the Cadets). Parties and groups more *right* than the Constitutional Democrats.

B (Cadets). Constitutional Democratic Party (Cadets, the National Liberty party) and the groups closely attached to them.

C (Social Democrats and Social Revolutionists). The S. D.'s, S. R.'s and the groups closely attached to them.

D (Bolsheviki). The party which ought properly to be called the *Communist Party*, and which is at present termed "The Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party, united with the Central Committee," or, in popular language, the "Bolsheviki."

2.—*What class do these parties represent? What class standpoints do they express?*

A. The feudal landholders and the more backward sections of the bourgeoisie.

B. The mass of the bourgeoisie, that is, the capitalists, and those landholders who have the industrial, bourgeois ideology.

C. Small entrepreneurs, small and middle-class proprietors, small and more or less well-to-do peasants, *petite bourgeoisie*, as well as those workers who have submitted to a bourgeois point of view.

D. Class conscious workers, day laborers and the poorest classes of peasantry, who are classed with the proletariat (semi-proletariat.)

3.—*What is their relation to Socialism?*

'A and B. Unconditionally hostile, since it threatens the profits of capitalists and landholders.

C. *For Socialism*, but it is too early yet to think of it or to take any practical steps for its realization.

D. *For Socialism*. The Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates must at once take every practical and feasible step for its realization. (For the nature of these steps, see Questions 20 and 22.)

4.—*What form of government do they want now?*

A. Constitutional Monarchy, absolute authority of the official class and the police.

B. A bourgeois parliamentary republic, i. e., a perpetuation of the rule of the capitalists, with the retention of the official (*chinovnik*) class and the police.

C. A bourgeois parliamentary republic, with reforms for the workers and peasants.

D. A republic of the Councils of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates. Abolition of the standing army and the police; substituting for them an armed people; officials to be not only elected, but also subject to recall; their pay not to exceed that of a good worker.

5.—*What is their attitude on the restoration of the Romanoff Monarchy?*

A. In favor, but it must be done with caution and secrecy, for they are afraid of the people.

B. When the Guchkovs seemed to be in power the Cadets were in favor of putting on the throne a brother or son of Nicholas, but when the people loomed up the Cadets became anti-monarchical.

C and D. Unconditionally opposed to any kind of monarchic restoration.

6.—*What do they think of seizures of power? What do they term "Order," and what "Anarchy"?*

A. If a Czar or a brave general seizes control, his authority comes from God; that is *order*. Anything else is *Anarchy*.

B. If the capitalists hold power, even by force, that is order; to assume power against the capitalist will would be *Anarchy*.

C. If the Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates alone are in power, *Anarchy* threatens. For the present let

the capitalists retain control, while the Councils have an "Advisory Commission."

D. Sole authority must be in the hands of the Councils of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants. The entire propaganda, agitation and organization of millions upon millions of people must at once be *directed* toward this end. (*Anarchy* is a complete negation of government authority, but the Councils of W. S. and P. Delegates are *also* a government authority.)

7.—*Shall we support the Provisional Government?*

A and B. Unquestionably, since it is the only means at this moment of guarding the interests of the capitalists.

C. Yes, but with the condition that it should carry out its agreement with the Councils of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants and should consult with the "Advisory Commission."

D. No; let the capitalists support the Provisional Government. We must *prepare* the whole people for the complete and sole authority of the Councils of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates.

8.—*Are we for a single authority or for dual authority?*

A and B. For sole power in the hands of the capitalists and landholders.

C. For dual authority. The Councils of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates to exercise "control" over the Provisional Government. But it would be pernicious to consider the possibility that this control might prove illusory.

D. For sole power in the hands of the Councils of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants, from top to bottom over the whole country.

9.—*Shall a Constituent Assembly be called?*

A. Not necessary, for it might injure the landholders. Suppose the peasants at the Constituent Assembly should decide to take away the land of the landholders?

B. Yes, but without stipulation of time. Furthermore, the learned professors should be consulted; first, because Bebel has already pointed out that jurists are the most reactionary people in the world; and second, because the experience of all revolutions shows that the cause of the people is lost when it is entrusted to the hands of professors.

C. Yes, and as soon as possible. As to the time, we have already discussed it in the meetings of the "Advisory Commission"¹ 200 times and shall definitely dispose of it in our 201st discussion to-morrow.

D. Yes, and as soon as possible. Yet, to be successful and to be really convoked, one condition is necessary: increase the number and strengthen the *power* of the Councils; organize and *arm* the masses. Only thus can the Assembly be assured.

10.—*Does the state need a police of the conventional type and a standing army?*

A and B. Absolutely, for this is the only permanent guarantee of the rule of capital, and in case of necessity, as is taught by the experience of all countries, the return from republic to monarchy is thus greatly facilitated.

C. On the one hand, they may not be necessary. On the other hand, is not so radical a change premature? Moreover, we can discuss it in the Advisory Commission.

D. Absolutely unnecessary. Immediately and unconditionally universal arming of the people shall be introduced so that they and the militia and the army shall be an integral whole. Capitalists must pay the workers for their days of service in the militia.

11.—*Does the state need an officialdom (chinovniks) of the conventional type?*

A and B. Unquestionably. Nine-tenths of them are the sons and brothers of the landholders and capitalists. They should continue to form a privileged, in fact an irremovable body of persons.

C. Hardly the proper time to put a question which has already been put practically by the Paris Commune.²

D. It does not. All officials must not only be elected by the people, but also subject to recall by them; also each and every delegate. Their pay shall not exceed that of a good worker. They are

¹The "Advisory Commission" consisted of representatives of the Petrograd Council, among them Chernov and Tseretelli, who later became members of the Provisional Government cabinet. The "Commission" tried to advise and control the government, with very slight success.—L. C. F.

²The Paris Commune armed the people and abolished completely the old class of officials, as it abolished the division of functions in the legislative and administrative departments of government. The Commune united the functions of legislature and administration within one body, as the Soviets have been doing in Russia since the revolution of November 7, which established the supremacy of the Soviets.—L. C. F.

gradually to be replaced by the national militia and its various divisions.

12.—*Must officers be elected by the so'diers?*

A and B. No, it would be bad for the landholders and the capitalists. If the soldiers cannot otherwise be contented, we must promise them this reform and afterwards take it away from them.

C. Yes.

D. Not only elected, but every step of every officer and general must be subject to control by special soldiers' committees.

13.—*Are arbitrary removals of their superiors by the soldiers desirable?*

A and B. They are very bad. Guchkov has already forbidden them, even threatening the use of force. We must support Guchkov.

C. Yes, but it remains to be decided wheather they must be removed before or after consulting the Advisory Commission.

D. They are in every respect indispensable. The soldiers will obey only the powers of their own choice; they can *respect* no others.

14.—*In favor of this war or against it?*

A and B. Unquestionably in favor, for it brings in unheard of profits to the capitalists and promises to perpetuate their rule, thanks to dissension among the workers, who are egged on against each other. The workers must be deceived by calling the war a war for national defence, with the special object of dethroning Wilhelm.

C. In general, we are opposed to imperialistic wars, but we are willing to permit ourselves to be fooled, and to call this a war of "revolutionary defense," and to support an imperialistic war waged by the imperialistic government of Guchkov, Milyukov & Co.

D. Absolutely opposed to all imperialistic wars, to *all* bourgeois governments which wage them, among them our own Provisional Government; absolutely opposed to "revolutionary defense" in Russia.

15.—*Are we in favor of or against the predatory international treaties concluded between the Czar and England, France, etc.? (For the strangling of Persia, the division of China, Turkey, Austria, etc.)*

A and B. Absolutely *in favor*. At the same time we must not

think of publishing these treaties, for Anglo-French imperialist capital does not desire it, nor do the governments, nor can Russian capital afford to initiate the people into all its dirty practices.

C. Against, but we hope that the Advisory Commission, aided by a simultaneous "campaign" among the masses, may "influence" the capitalist government.

D. Against. Our whole task is simply this: to enlighten the masses as to the utter hopelessness of expecting anything of this kind from capitalist governments, and the necessity of giving all power to the proletariat and the poorest peasants.

16.—*For annexations or against?*

A and B. If the annexations are to be accomplished by the German capitalists and their robber chieftain, Wilhelm, we are opposed to them. If by the English, we are not opposed, for they are "our" allies. If by our capitalists, who forcibly retain within the boundaries of Russia the races oppressed by the Czar, then we are *in favor*, for we do *not* use the term annexation in this connection.

C. Against annexations, but we hope it may be possible to obtain from capitalist governments a "promise" to renounce annexations.

D. Against annexations. Any promise of a capitalist government to renounce annexations is a huge fraud. To show it up is very simple: just demand that each nation be freed from the yoke of *its own* capitalists.

17.—*In favor of the "Liberty Loan" or opposed to it?*

A and B. Entirely in favor, for it facilitates the waging of an imperialistic war, that is, a war to determine which group of capitalists shall rule the world.

C. *In favor*, for our illogical attitude on "revolutionary defense" forces us into this obvious defection from the cause of internationalism.

D. Against, for the war remains imperialistic, being waged by capitalists in alliance with capitalists, in the interest of capitalists.

18.—*Shall we leave to capitalist governments the task of expressing the desire of the nations for peace, or shall we not?*

A and B. We shall, for the experience of the social-patriots of the French Republic shows best how people may be deceived by such a process: say anything you please, but in reality retain all conquests we have made from the Germans (their colonies) and take away from the Germans all conquests made by those robbers.

C. *We shall*, since we have not yet relinquished all the unfounded hopes which the *petite bourgeoisie* attaches to the capitalists.

D. No, for the class conscious worker cherishes no hopes whatever from the capitalist class, and it is our function to enlighten the masses as to the baselessness of such hopes.

19.—*Must all monarchies be abolished?*

A and B. No, certainly not the English, Italian and Allied monarchies, only the German, Austrian, Turkish and Bulgarian, for victory over them will increase our profits tenfold.

C. A certain "order" must be followed and a beginning made with Wilhelm; the Allied monarchies may wait.

D. Revolutions do not proceed in a fixed order. Only *actual* revolutionaries may be trusted, and in all countries without exception *all* monarchs must be dethroned.

20.—*Shall the peasants at once take all the land of the landholders?*

A and B. By no means. We must wait for the Constituent Assembly. Shingarev has already pointed out that when the capitalists take away the power from the Czar, that is a great and glorious revolution, but when the peasants take away the land from the landholders, that is arbitrary tyranny. A Commission of Adjustment must be appointed, with equal representation of landholders and peasants, and the chairman must be of the official (*chinovnik*) class, that is, from among those same capitalists and landholders.

C. It would be better for the peasants to wait for the Constituent Assembly.

D. All the land must be taken at once. Order must be strictly maintained by the Councils of Peasants' Delegates. The production of bread and meat must be increased, the soldiers better fed. Destruction of cattle and of tools, etc., is not permissible.

21.—*Shall we limit ourselves to the Councils of Peasants' Delegates only for the management of lands and for all village questions in general?*

A and B. The landholders and capitalists are entirely opposed to the sole authority of the Councils of Peasants' Delegates in agrarian matters. But if these Councils are unavoidable, we must adapt ourselves to them, for the rich peasant is a capitalist, after all.

C. We might for the present accept the Councils, for "in

principle" we do not deny the necessity of a separate organization of the agrarian wage workers.

D. It will be impossible to limit ourselves only to general Councils of Peasants' Delegates, for the wealthy peasants are of the same capitalist class that is always inclined to injure or deceive the farm-hands, day laborers and the poorer peasants. We must at once form special organizations of these latter classes of the village population both within the Councils of Peasants' Delegates and in the form of special Councils of Delegates of the Farmers' Workers.

22.—*Shall the people take into their hands the largest and most powerful monopolistic organizations of Capitalism, the banks, manufacturing syndicates, etc.?*

A and B. Not by any means, since that might injure the landholders and capitalists.

C. Generally speaking, we are in favor of handing over such organizations to the entire people, but to think of or prepare for this condition now is very untimely.

D. We must at once *prepare* the Councils of Workers' Delegates, the Councils of Delegates of Banking Employes and others for the taking of all such steps as are feasible and completely realizable toward the union of all banks into one single national bank and then towards a control of the Councils of Workers' Delegates over the banks and syndicates, and then toward their nationalization, that is, their passing over into the possession of the whole people.

23.—*What form of Socialist International, establishing and realising a brotherly union of all the workers in all countries, is now desirable for the nations?*

A and B. Generally speaking, any kind of Socialist International is harmful and dangerous to capitalists and landholders, but if the German Plekhanov, whose name is Scheidemann, will come to an agreement with the Russian Scheidemann, whose name is Plekhanov,^a and if they can find in each other any vestige remaining

^aGeorge Plekhanov was Lenin's chief antagonist in the Russian Socialist movement, and formerly the leader of the Menshevik faction. When war was declared in August, 1914, Plekhanov favored its prosecution and a Russian victory, as this victory would immensely develop Capitalism in Russia, which Plekhanov considered indispensable for democratic and Socialist development. The pro-war attitude of Plekhanov, together with that of Leo Deutsch and others, completely discredited him among Russian Socialists, and he was not any factor in the Revolution even during the period when the Mensheviks dominated the Council of Workers and Soldiers.
—L. C. F.

of their Socialist conscience, then we, the capitalists, must hail with delight *such an* International, of *such* Socialists, as stand by the side of *their own* governments.

C. A Socialist International is needed that will include all elements: the Scheidemanns, the Plekhanovs and the "centrists," who are those who vacillate between social-patriotism and internationalism. The bigger the mixup, the greater the "unity": long live our great Socialist unity!

D. The nations need only that International which consists of the really revolutionary workers, who are capable of putting an end to the awful and criminal slaughter of nations, capable of delivering humanity from the yoke of Capitalism. Only such people (groups, parties, etc.) as the German Socialist Karl Liebknecht, now in a German jail, only people who will tirelessly struggle with *their own* government and *their own* bourgeoisie, and *their own* social-patriots, and *their own* "centrists," can and must immediately establish that International which is necessary to the nations.

24.—*Must the fraternization between soldiers of the warring countries, at the front, be encouraged?*

A and B. No; it is bad for the interests of the landholders and capitalists, since it may accelerate the liberation of humanity from their yoke.

C. Yes, it would be good. But we are not fully convinced that such an encouragement of fraternization should be at once undertaken in all warring countries.

D. Yes; it is good and indispensable. It is absolutely necessary in all countries at war to encourage all attempts at fraternization between the soldiers of *both* warring groups.

25.—*What should be the color of the flag indicating both the nature and character of the various political parties?*

A. Black, for this is the real Black Hundred.

B. Yellow, for that is the international banner of those workers who serve capital through choice and not by compulsion.

C. Pink, for their whole policy is the policy of rosewater.

D. Red, for that is the emblem of the international proletarian revolution.

PROBLEMS IN TACTICS

On April 17, 1917, I was called upon to report on tactical problems at a meeting of Bolsheviks in Petrograd. The meeting consisted of delegates to the All-Russian Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Soviets, who were about to depart and therefore could not allow me to postpone my discussion. At the close of the meeting the chairman, Comrade Zinoviev, suggested in the name of the whole assembly that I repeat my report immediately at the meeting of Bolshevik and Menshevik delegates, who wished to consider the question of unifying the Russian Social. Democratic Workers' Party.

I there read the "theses" which were published in *Pravda* on April 20. The theses and my report created discord among the Bolsheviks themselves and the staff of *Pravda*. After a number of consultations, we unanimously concluded that it would be expedient to openly discuss our differences, thus providing material for the All-Russian Congress of our party (Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, united with the Central Committee) which was to meet in Petrograd on May 3.

Complying with this decision I published the following, making no pretension to studying the question on all sides, but wishing only to point out the principal arguments, especially those essential for the practical problems of the working class movement.

I

An Estimate of the Moment

Marxism demands of us the most exact, objective analysis of the relations of classes and the concrete peculiarities of each historic moment. We, the Bolsheviks, have always tried to be true to this demand, absolutely necessary from the standpoint of any scientific interpretation of politics.

"Our teachings are not a dogma, but a *guide* to action"—so said Marx and Engels, who always scorned mere learning and the repetition of "formulae" capable only of formulating general propositions, which necessarily vary in accord with the variations in the economic bases of the political and all other aspects of the historical process.

By means of this objective and precise analysis of facts must the party of the revolutionary proletariat be guided now in the solution of the problems and the forms of its activity.

In my first "Letter from Abroad" ("The First Stage of the

First Revolution,' printed in this book as the first chapter, "The Bourgeois Revolution") published in *Pravda*, and in my "theses," I define the prevailing "moment in Russia" as a period of transition from the first stage of the Revolution to the second. Therefore, I considered the basic slogan, the "order of the day" at that time to be: "Workers, you have displayed marvels of proletarian heroism in the civil war against Czarism; you must now display marvels of proletarian organization in order to prepare your victory in the second stage of the Revolution."

What, then, does the first stage consist of?

In the passing of the state power to the bourgeoisie.

Before the March Revolution of 1917, the state power in Russia was in the hands of the old class—the nobility and the landholders, headed by Nicholas Romanoff.

After the March Revolution, the state power passed into the hands of a new class, of another class—the *bourgeoisie*.

The passing of the state power from one class to another is the first principle of a *revolution*, not only in a strictly scientific sense, but also in a practical political sense.

To that extent, the bourgeois, or the bourgeois democratic, revolution in Russia is *completed*.

But at this point we hear the shouts of objectors, who call themselves "old Bolsheviks": "Didn't we always maintain that a bourgeois democratic revolution is ended by a 'revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry'? Is the agrarian revolution, which is a phase of the bourgeois democratic revolution, completed? On the contrary, is it rather not a fact that it has *not* yet begun?"

My answer is: Bolshevik slogans and ideas *in general* have been confirmed by history; but concretely, things have developed somewhat differently than was expected, assumed a more original, peculiar and varied form.

To ignore, to forget this fact would mean to resemble those "old Bolsheviks," who more than once have played a sad role in the history of our party by repeating senseless "learned formulæ" instead of *studying* the peculiarities of the new, the living, reality of things.

"The revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" in a certain form and, to a certain extent, is a reality of the Russian Revolution. But this "formula" foresees only a certain relation and co-operation of *these* classes and not the con-

crete political institutions which realize this relation and co-operation. "The Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates"—this is the "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" expressed in life itself.

This formula has already become old. Life has brought it out of the realm of formulæ into the realm of reality, has clothed it with flesh and blood, and by thus making it concrete has changed its aspect.

In the "order of the day" there is a new problem: the split *within* this dictatorship between the proletarian elements (the anti-war internationalists and "communists" who stand for transition to the commune), and the petty bourgeois elements (Cheidse, Tsere-telli, Stieklov, Social-Revolutionists and other "revolutionary" anti-defeatists opponents of the movement toward the commune, adherents of "support" of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois government.)

He who now speaks only of a "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" is behind the times, and because of that has *de facto* gone over to the *petite bourgeoisie* against the proletarian class struggle; he should be relegated to the museum of "Bolshevist" pre-revolutionary relics.

Revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry has already been realized, but in a very original way, with a number of new and important aspects and differences. It is now necessary to understand that incontestable truth. A Marxist must take into consideration the true facts and living reality of to-day, and not continue clinging to the theory of yesterday, which, like every other theory, at its best only outlines the fundamental and the general, only approaches a conception of the complexity of life.

"Theory, my friend, is gray, but green is the eternal tree of life."

Whoever questions the "completeness" of the bourgeois revolution from the old standpoint sacrifices living Marxism to a dead letter.

According to the old conception, it follows that *after* the rule of the bourgeoisie may and must follow the rule of the proletariat and peasantry—their dictatorship.

But in reality, it has happened otherwise: a new and novel combination of one and the other. There is in existence together and at the same time the rule of the bourgeoisie (the government of Lvov and Guchkov) *and* the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry which voluntarily relinquishes pow-

er to the bourgeoisie, voluntarily converting itself into an appendage of the bourgeoisie. For we must not forget that in Petrograd, in fact, power is in the hands of the workmen and soldiers; the new government *does not* and cannot use violence against the workmen and soldiers, as there are neither police nor militia, or a bureaucracy, despotically ruling the people. This is a fact. And this is precisely the fact characteristic of a state of the type of the Paris Commune.

This fact does not fit into the old grooves.

One should know how to adapt theory to life, but not repeat the obsolete words "dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" *in general*.

Let us approach this problem from another angle, in order the better to understand it.

A Marxist must not leave the firm ground of the analysis of class relations. The bourgeoisie is in power. But does not the mass of the peasants *also* constitute a bourgeoisie of a different type, of a different class character? Whence does it follow that *this* class *can not* come into power "completing" the bourgeois-democratic revolution? Thus often argue the "old Bolsheviki."

My answer is—it is fully possible. But a Marxist, in the consideration of the moment, must *not* consider the possible but the actual.

And reality shows us the *fact* that freely elected soldiers' and peasants' delegates freely enter the second, the accessory government, developing and strengthening it, and just as freely they yield power to the bourgeoisie—a phenomenon which does not violate the theory of Marxism, as we always knew and repeatedly pointed out that the bourgeoisie is in power *not* only by the use of violence, but by the lack of class consciousness and organization of the masses.

In the face of the reality of today, it is ridiculous to turn away from the fact and to speak of "possibilities."

It is possible that the peasantry will take all the land, and all power. Not only do I not forget this possibility, not only do I not limit my horizon to this one day, but directly and precisely I formulate an agrarian program in line with a new phenomenon: a deeper split between the workers and the poorest peasants on one side, and the peasant-owners on the other.

But another thing is possible: it is possible that the peasants will listen to the advice of the petty bourgeois party of Social-Revolutionists, which is under the influence of the bourgeoisie, which

advises waiting for the Constituent Assembly, although until now the date of its convocation has not been set.¹

It is possible that the peasants will adhere to and prolong their agreement with the bourgeoisie, an agreement concluded now by them with the aid of the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, not only formally but actually. Everything is possible. It would be the greatest error to forget the agrarian movement and the agrarian program. But it would be just as great an error to forget the *reality*, which shows the fact of *agreement*, or, using a less judicial and more exact expression, the fact of class co-operation between the bourgeoisie and the peasantry.

When this fact will cease to be a fact, when the peasantry will separate from the bourgeoisie, take the land and use their power against the bourgeoisie—then it will be a new stage of a bourgeois-democratic revolution.

A Marxist, who, in view of the possibility of the future stage, forgets his duties *now* when the peasantry is in agreement with the bourgeoisie, is liable to become a *petit bourgeois* himself. For he, in fact, would preach to the proletariat *confidence* in the *petite bourgeoisie* ("this *petite bourgeoisie*, this peasantry, must separate from the bourgeoisie even during the bourgeois-democratic revolution.") This Marxist, in view of the "possibility" of a sweet and pleasant future, when the peasantry will *not* be the tail of the bourgeois kite, will not be the ally of the Social-Revolutionists, the Cheiduses, Tseretellis, Stieklovs, will *not* be the supplement of the bourgeois government—he, in view of the "possibility" of this pleasant future, would forget the *unpleasant present*. Now, while the peasantry still remains an appendage of the bourgeoisie, the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks, still plays the role of an auxiliary of the bourgeois government, opposed to "His Majesty" Lvov.

This hypothetical Marxist would resemble the milk and water Louis Blanc, or the sugary Kautskian, but never a revolutionary Marxist!

But aren't we in danger of falling into subjectivism, into a desire to jump from an incomplete revolution of a petty bourgeois

¹In order that my words be not misinterpreted, I shall add—that I am absolutely in favor of the Peasants' and Workmen's Soviets immediately taking all the land, but that order and discipline should be strictly maintained *by them*; that sabotage and destruction of machines, buildings and cattle should be prevented; and that cultivation and the production of bread should not be stopped, but increased, because the soldiers need twice as much bread and the people must not starve.

character with traces of an incomplete peasant revolution, to "a Socialist revolution?"

If I said: "without the Czar, but a *workers'* government,"—this danger would confront me.

But I did *not* say this. I said that there *cannot* in Russia be any other government (not considering the bourgeois) than the Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates. I said that the state power in Russia can be transferred now from Lvov and Guchkov only to these very same Soviets, and it is in just these bodies that the peasants, the soldiers and the *petite bourgeoisie* predominate, to express it in Marxian terms, involving not ordinary and professional but class characteristics.

I have absolutely assured myself in my "theses" from jumping over the peasantry, or the *petite bourgeoisie*; insured myself against every kind of *adventure* in the "usurpation of power" by a workers' government, against conspiratorial Blanquism, since I have specifically pointed out to the experience of the Paris Commune. And this experience, as is well known and as was pointed out in detail by Marx in 1871, and by Engels in 1891, entirely eliminated Blanquism, completely secured the direct, immediate, unconditional rule of the *majority* and the activity of the masses only to the extent of the conscious will of this majority.

Definitely, and absolutely, I have centered my "theses" on the struggle for power . . . power within the Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates. In order not to permit even the shadow of a doubt in this regard, I have *twice* emphasized in the "theses" the necessity of patient, persistent educational work, of spreading understanding, "adapted to the *practical* needs of the *masses*."

Ignorant persons or renegade Marxists, such as Plekhanov and the like, can clamor about Anarchism, Blanquism, etc. But whoever wishes to think and learn can not fail to understand that Blanquism consists in the usurpation of power by a minority, whereas the Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates constitute the conscious, direct organization of the majority of the people. The task which is comprised in the struggle for influence *within* such an organization of the majority in the Soviets, *can not* be submerged in the swamp of Blanquism. And it can not be submerged in the swamp of Anarchism, as Anarchism is a negation of the necessity of *government and governmental power* during the period of transition from the rule of the bourgeoisie to the

rule of the proletariat. Specifically and directly, eliminating every possibility of doubt, I start with the necessity of a government for this transition period; but, according to Marx and the experience of the Paris Commune, not the usual parliamentary-bourgeois form of government, but a government *without* a permanent army, *without* a police opposed to the people, *without* a bureaucracy imposed upon the people.

If Plekhanov shouts about "Anarchism" at the top of his voice in his *Edinstvo*, this again indicates his break with Marxism. To my challenge in *Pravda* (No. 26) that he explain the teachings on government of Marx and Engels, formulated in 1871, in 1872 and 1875, Plekhanov has had and will have nothing to say, evades the question and instead vituperates in the spirit of a *petit bourgeois*.

The teachings of Marx on government are *completely* misunderstood by the former Marxist, Plekhanov. (By the way, the germs of this misunderstanding were apparent in his pamphlet on "Socialism and Anarchism.")

* * *

Let us see how Comrade Kamenev, in his article in No. 27 of *Pravda*, formulates his "disagreement" with my "theses" and my views expressed above. It will help us to understand them more clearly.

"As to the general plan of Comrade Lenin, "writes Comrade Kamenev, "it seems to us unacceptable, as it assumes that the bourgeois-democratic revolution is *completed*, and is based upon an immediate transformation of this revolution into a Socialist revolution."

Two important errors are indicated in this formulation.

First: The question of the "*completeness*" of the bourgeois-democratic revolution is incorrectly put. This question is presented in that abstract, simple, one-colored form which *does not* correspond to objective reality. Whoever *so* puts the question, whoever *now* asks the question: "is the bourgeois-democratic revolution completed?"—and *only that*—deprives himself of the possibility of understanding an extremely complex, "two-colored" reality. This is in theory. But in practice, he surrenders helplessly to the *petit bourgeois* revolutionary spirit.

Indeed, reality shows us both the transition of power to the bourgeoisie ("completed" bourgeois-democratic revolution of an ordinary type) and the existence, together with the present bourgeois government, of an accessory government, which represents the "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peas-

antry." This latter, which is "also a government," of its own accord has yielded power to the bourgeoisie and attached itself to the bourgeois government.

Is this reality included in the old-Bolshevist formula of Comrade Kamenev—"the bourgeois-democratic revolution is not completed"?

No. The formula has become old. It is good for nothing. It is dead. Vain will be all efforts to revive it.

Second: A practical question. It is uncertain whether there can be even now a *particular* "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" completely independent of the bourgeois government. It is impossible to base our Marxian tactics on the unknown.

But if it can happen, there is one road, and only one, that will lead to that accomplishment: the immediate, decisive, irrevocable separation of the proletarian, communistic elements of the movement from the petty bourgeois elements.

Why?

Because all the *petit bourgeois*, not accidentally but necessarily, turned toward chauvinism, toward a support of the bourgeoisie, toward dependence upon the bourgeoisie, toward a *fear* of trying to get along without the bourgeoisie, toward dependence upon the bourgeoisie, toward a *fear* of trying to get along without the bourgeoisie, etc.

How is it possible to "push" these *petit bourgeois* toward power, if this *petit bourgeois* element now could take power but *does not* want to?

Only by the separate and independent action of the proletarian, communistic party, only through the proletarian class struggle freed from the hesitancy and fears of the *petite bourgeoisie*, can we develop the necessary tactic. Only the unity of the proletariat, indeed, but a unity in action and not in words, is capable of "making it hot" for the petty bourgeois elements, so that under certain conditions they might be *compelled to take over all power*; and even then the possibility would not be eliminated that Guchkov and Milyukov—again under certain conditions—might strive for all power, or Cheidse, Tseretelli, Steklov, the Social-Revolutionists, who are all adherents of the petty bourgeois conception of "revolutionary defense."

He who immediately separates, and separates irrevocably, the proletarian elements in the Soviets (that is, the proletarian, com-

munistic party) from the petty bourgeois elements, correctly expresses the interests of the movement in two possible events: in the event that Russia will yet go through a specific, independent "dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry," not subordinate to the bourgeoisie, or in the event that the petty bourgeois elements will not tear away from the bourgeoisie and will always (that is, until Socialism) vacillate between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

He who is guided in his activity only by a simple formula, "the bourgeois-democratic revolution has not been completed," assumes by that very fact something like a guarantee that the *petite bourgeoisie* is surely capable of securing its independence from the bourgeoisie. By this, at the present moment, he surrenders helplessly to the mercy of the *petite bourgeoisie*.

By the way, it would not be out of place to remember that I especially emphasised in "Two Tactics" (July, 1905) two phases of the "formula" dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry:

"The revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry has, as everything else in the world, a past and a future. Its past—autocracy, bondage, monarchy, privileges; its future—struggle against private property, struggle of the wage laborer against his employer, struggle for Socialism."

The error of Comrade Kamennev is, that, even in 1917, he looks only at the *past* of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. But *in fact* its *future* has already begun, as the interests and politics of the worker have been sundered from those of his employer on such an important question as "national (or 'revolutionary') defense," and their attitude towards the imperialistic war.

And here I come to the second error in the criticism of Comrade Kamennev. He attacks my plan, as being "based upon an immediate transformation of this (bourgeois-democratic) revolution into a Socialist Revolution."

It is not true. I not only do not count upon an "immediate transformation of our revolution into a Socialist revolution," but directly warn against it, I directly state in No. 8 of my "theses":

"Not the introduction of Socialism, as our *immediate* problem."

Is it not clear that a man who counts upon the immediate transformation of our revolution into a Socialist revolution could not oppose an immediate introduction of Socialism?

Not only that. It is even *impossible* to introduce immediately a "communistic state" in Russia that is, a state organized on the

type of the Paris Commune, since it is first necessary that the *majority* of the delegates in all (or in a majority) of the Soviets should clearly understand all the defects and the harm of the politics and tactics of the Social-Revolutionists, Cheidse, Stuklov, and others. I state very precisely that I count, in this matter, only upon a "patient explanation" (is it essential to be patient in order to get a change which it is possible to realize "immediately"?)

Comrade Kamenev has been a little too "impatient" and hasty, and has repeated the bourgeois prejudices about the Paris Commune, that the Commune wanted "immediately" to introduce Socialism. It is not so. The Commune, unfortunately, was too slow with the introduction of Socialism. The actual content of the Commune, its importance and significance, is not where the bourgeois seeks, but in the creation of an original type of *state*. And such a state has already been born in Russia: the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates!

Comrade Kamenev did not go deep into the *fact*, into the significance, of the *existing* Soviets, into their identity as a type and as a social-political institution with the state of the Commune; and, instead of studying the fact, he speaks of what I "count" upon as an immediate future. Unfortunately, this is a repetition of the usual bourgeois way of considering things. From the question, *what are* the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, whether they are a *higher* type of government than the parliamentary republic, whether they are *more useful* for the people, *more democratic*, *more efficient* in the struggle against famine, etc.,—from these fundamental aspects of the question, the attention is turned aside, to consideration of a hollow, quasi-scientific, pedantic question about "the consideration of an immediate transformation."

An empty, falsely presented question. I only "count" upon the fact that the workers, soldiers, peasants will be able to master the difficult *practical* questions (as the greater production of bread, the better provisioning of the soldiers, etc.) much better than the bureaucrats and the police.

I am deeply convinced that the Soviets of Soldiers,' Workmen's and Peasants' Delegates will realize the independence of the *mass* of the people much more rapidly and much more adequately than a parliamentary republic. They will, in a better way, and more practically and correctly, decide what steps could be and should be taken towards Socialism. Control of the banks, centralization of all the banks into one, this is *not* Socialism *yet*, but a *step* towards

Socialism. Such steps are made today by the junker and the bourgeois in Germany against the people. They will be accomplished much more thoroughly to-morrow in the interest of the people by the Soviets, if the Soviets assume all government power.

And what makes *necessary* these steps?

Hunger. Disorganization of economic life. The horrors of war. The agony of the wounds inflicted upon humanity by the war.

Comrade Kamenév concludes his article with a statement that "in a broad discussion he hopes to defend his point of view as the only possible one for revolutionary Socialism, inasmuch as Socialism aims to, and must, remain to the end a party of the revolutionary masses of the proletariat, and not become transformed into a group of propagandist-Communists."

It seems to me that in these words is contained a deeply erroneous estimate of the moment. Comrade Kamenev likens the "party of the masses" to a "group of propagandists." But the "masses" have just now yielded to the "hysteria" of "revolutionary defense," of co-operation with the bourgeois government. Wouldn't it be more becoming for internationalists to be able to resist, at such a moment, the "mass" hysteria than "want to be with the masses," that is, to yield to the general epidemic? Haven't we seen in all the belligerent European countries how the social-patriots and betrayers of Socialism justified themselves by emphasizing their desire to "remain with the masses"? Is it not necessary for a certain time to be able to remain in a minority against the "mass"? Is not the task of the propagandist, just at this moment, a central point in the struggle to *liberate* the proletarian cause from the "mass" defensive-bourgeois hysteria? The fusion of the masses, proletarian and non-proletarian, without distinctions of class differences within the masses, is one of the conditions producing the "defensive" epidemic. To speak contemptuously of the "group of propagandists" of the *proletarian* cause is, as a matter of fact, very unbecoming.

II

"Theses" on the Problems of the Proletariat in The Revolution.

As I only arrived in Petrograd on the night of April 16, I could, ^{not} of course, on my own responsibility alone and without sufficient

preparation, render a report on April 17 on the problems of the revolutionary proletariat.

The only thing that I could do to explain my position, was to prepare a written "theses." I read them, and gave the text to Comrade Tseretelli. I read them twice, very slowly: first at the meeting of the Bolsheviks, then at the joint meeting of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.

I am publishing these personal "theses," provided with very short explanatory notes, which were developed in more detail in the report:

1.—In our relation to war, which, on the part of Russia and with the new government of Lvov, Guchkov & Co., unquestionably remains a predatory imperialistic war in virtue of the capitalistic character of this government, not the smallest concessions to "revolutionary defense" are permissible.

The class conscious proletariat can give its consent to a revolutionary war, which really justifies revolutionary defense, only under conditions of (a) the transference of all power to the proletariat and its ally the poorest peasantry; (b) the repudiation of annexations in fact and not in words; (c) the complete break with the interests of capital.

In view of the undoubted integrity of the mass of adherents of "revolutionary defense," who recognize war only as a necessity and not for the sake of conquests, in view of their deception by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary to explain their mistake to them in detail, to explain the indissoluble connection between capital and the imperialistic war, to prove to them that it is *impossible* to end the war by a truly democratic peace, not a peace of violence, without the overthrow of capital.

The organization of an extensive propaganda of these ideas is necessary in the active army.

2.—The peculiarity of the present moment in Russia consists in the *transition* from the first stage of the Revolution, which gave power to the bourgeoisie because of the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, to the *second* stage, which must give power to the proletariat and poorest peasantry.

This transition is characterized by the maximum of "legality" (Russia *now* is the freest of all the belligerent nations of the world), by the absence of violence of the masses, and, finally, by the masses' trustful, unconscious attitude towards the government of capitalists, the worst enemies of peace and Socialism.

This peculiarity demands of us the ability to adapt ourselves to certain conditions of partisan work among the broad masses of the proletariat, who have only now awakened to political life.

3.—No support for the Provisional Government; explanation of the emptiness of its promises, especially concerning the repudiation of annexations. The revelation of the real character of this government, instead of the illusory "demand" that *this* government, a government of *capitalists*, should *cease* to be imperialistic.

4.—Recognition of the fact that in the majority of the Soviets of Workmen's Delegates our party is in the minority, and thus far in a small minority, against the *bloc* of all the petty bourgeois opportunistic elements, who have come under the influence of the bourgeoisie and who carry this influence into the ranks of the proletariat.

It should be explained to the masses that the Soviets of Workmen, Soldiers and Peasants constitute the *only* possible form of revolutionary government, and that therefore our problem, as long as *this* government is influenced by the bourgeoisie, is to adapt our propaganda, systematic, patient, persistent, to the practical needs of the masses, to *explain* their errors and our tactics.

As long as we are in the minority, we are carrying on work of criticism and explanation of errors; preaching, in the meantime, the necessity of a transference of the whole governmental power to the Soviets, in order that the masses should rid themselves of their errors by experience.

5.—Not a parliamentary republic—(a return to it from the Soviets of Workmen's Delegates would be a step backwards)—but a Republic of the Soviets of Workmen's and Peasants' Delegates, throughout the whole country.¹

The removal of the police, army² and bureaucracy.

The salary of all government employees, who could be elected or recalled at any time, not to be any higher than the average salary of a good worker.

6.—In the agrarian program, the transfer of the center of gravity to the Soviets of Farm-Laborers' Delegates.

Confiscation of all the land.

¹That is, of a government the type of which was the Paris Commune.

²That is, the replacement of a permanent army by the general armament of the people.

Nationalization of *all* the land in the country, control of it by the local Soviets of Peasants' Delegates.

Creation of a rural economy, under the control of the farm workers' delegates, out of every large estate (100 to 400 desiatyns, according to local conditions and by the decision of the local organizations).

7.—The immediate unification of all the banks into one national bank and the introduction of control over this bank by the Soviets of Workmen's Delegates.

8.—Not the "introduction" of Socialism as our *immediate* aim, but a transition only to the "*control*" of the production and distribution of products by the Soviets of Workmen's Delegates.

9.—Party problems:

a) An immediate convention of the party.

b) Consideration of the party program, mainly: (1) On Imperialism and the imperialistic war; (2) Our relation to government and *our* demand for a "government-Commune;" (3) The alteration of our minimum program.

c) Change of the name of the party.³

10.—Revival of the International. Initiating the creation of a revolutionary International. An International against the social-patriots and the "center."⁴

³Instead of "Social Democracy," the official leaders of which in the whole world have betrayed Socialism by going over to the bourgeoisie, we must call ourselves the Communist Party.

⁴The "centre" in the international Socialist movement means those elements, e. g., Kautsky & Co. in Germany, Longuet & Co. in France, Cheidse & Co. in Russia, Turati & Co. in Italy, Macdonald & Co. in England, etc.

SUPPLEMENTARY

A determining phase of the Russian Revolution was the failure of the Socialists of the Central Powers and of the Allies to respond to the Revolution's call for international solidarity and action against war. This was a fact during the period when the moderates were in control as well as during the regime of the Bolsheviks.

In April, 1917, the Council of Workers and Soldiers through Cheidse, president of the Executive Committee, issued the following manifesto to the workers and Socialists of all countries:

"We, Russian workers and soldiers, united in the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, send you our warmest greetings and the news of great events. The democracy of Russia has overthrown the century-old despotism of the Czars and enters your ranks as a legitimate member and a powerful force in the battle for our common liberation. Our victory is a great victory of the freedom and democracy of the world. The principal supporter of reaction in the world, the 'gendarme of Europe,' no longer exists. May the earth over his grave become a heavy stone. Long live liberty, long live the international solidarity of the proletariat and its battle for the final victory!

"Our cause is not yet entirely won. Not all the shadows of the old regime have been scattered, and not a few enemies are gathering their forces together against the Russian Revolution. Nevertheless, our conquests are great. The people of Russia will express their will in the Constituent Assembly which is to be called within a short time on the basis of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage. And now it may already be said with certainty in advance that the democratic republic will triumph in Russia. The Russian people is in possession of complete political liberty. Now it can say an authoritative word about the internal self-government of the country, and about its foreign policy. And in addressing ourselves to all the peoples who are being destroyed and ruined in this terrible war, we declare that the time has come in which the decisive strug-

gle against the attempts at conquest by the Governments of all nations must begin. The time has come in which the peoples must take into their own hands the questions of war and peace.

"Conscious of its own revolutionary strength, the democracy of Russia declares that it will fight with all means against the policy of conquest of its ruling classes and it summons the peoples of Europe to united, decisive action for peace.

"We appeal to our brothers, to the proletarians of the German-Austrian coalition, and above all to the German proletariat. The first day of the war you were made to believe that in raising your weapons against absolutist Russia you were defending European civilization against Asiatic despotism. In this many of you found the justification of the support that was accorded to the war. Now also this justification has vanished. Democratic Russia cannot menace freedom and civilization.

"We shall firmly defend our own liberty against all reactionary threats, whether they come from without or within. The Russian Revolution will not retreat before the bayonets of conquerors and it will not allow itself to be trampled to pieces by outside military force. We call upon you to throw off the yoke of your absolutist regime, as the Russian people have shaken off the autocracy of the Czar. Refuse to serve as the tools of conquest and power in the hands of the kings, junkers and bankers and we shall, with common efforts, put an end to the fearful butchery that dishonors humanity and darkens the great days of the birth of Russian liberty.

"Workingmen of all countries! In fraternally stretching out our hands to you across the mountains of our brothers' bodies, across the sea of innocent blood and tears, across the smoking ruins of cities and villages, across the destroyed gifts of civilization, we summon you to the work of renewing and solidifying international unity. In that lies the guaranty of our future triumph and of the complete liberation of humanity.

"Workers of all countries, unite!"

The appeal met with repudiation among the majority Socialists of Germany and Austria. The Berlin *Vorwaerts*, the central organ of the pro-war, social-patriotic Social Democracy, rebuked the Russian Revolution for its appeal to the German proletariat to overthrow the monarchy, and *defended* the monarchy! Great strikes and demonstrations were planned by the workers for May Day; *Vorwaerts* and the majority Socialist leaders opposed and discouraged the plans. The Social Democracy was allied all along the line with the German government in an imperialistic war of conquest.

Among masses there was an impulsive reaction to the Russian Revolution's appeal, but their potential action was crushed by the Majority Socialists. Social-patriotic Socialists went to Stockholm bent upon intrigues to use the Revolution in the interests of German Imperialism, as Dr. Sudekum in the winter of 1914 went to Italy to cajole the Socialists to drag Italy into the war on the side of Germany. The German Majority Socialists' reactionary attitude was expressed by Scheidemann who said at a meeting of his party's Central Committee, in May, 1917: "To draw a comparison between German and Russian conditions is impossible. For the same reason it is out of the question to follow the Russian example." And Scheidemann bitterly criticized recent strikes of the German workers.

Nor was there any response among the majority Socialists of the allied countries, except in Italy and among minor groups of revolutionary Socialists, as in Germany.

The attitude of the majority Socialists of the Allies is revealed in the following letter addressed to the President of the Petrograd Soviet by the Secretarial Delegation for Foreign Affairs of the Organization Committee (Mensheviks) of the Social Democratic Workers' Party, which shows that the majority Socialists of Great Britain, France and Belgium were intriguing against the Revolution at a time when they did not have the alibi of the "pro-German" Bolsheviks:

"The so-called majority of the English and French Socialists have undertaken a systematic campaign for the purpose of exerting pressure on the Russian Socialist proletariat to discontinue all efforts for peace and waive any independent political policy based on international solidarity and the class struggle. Scores of telegrams have been sent for this purpose by individual representatives and by various groups. From this the Russian proletariat can clearly see the lack of real joy in view of the gigantic revolution accomplished by the Russian people and the complete willingness to sacrifice its freedom on the altar of narrow nationalist interests. They wish to force on the Russian workers a civil peace together with the imperialistic war aims of the bourgeois liberals, the same civil peace which demoralized the proletarian movement in England and France. And so incompatible is this with the task of bringing an actual and genuine democracy in Russia, that Jules Guesde demanded quite openly in his telegram: first victory, and only then the republic. In his own country, moreover, he practiced the same principle inasmuch as he betrayed the republic in favor of those who

promised victory. [Upon the declaration of war, Jules Guesde, Albert Thomas and other French Socialists entered the ministry as representatives of their party, and supported the government in all its acts.]

"At the same time that these warnings by the official representatives of Socialism in the democratic countries are being addressed to the Russian proletariat, the government officialdom of England and France are carrying on an equally systematic campaign against the Russian Revolution, against the democratic demands which have already been set up and realized by the proletariat, and primarily against the demand for a republic and the real and complete elimination of the power of the Romanoffs.

"The entire bourgeois press of England and France has been given free rein by the governments to calumniate the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates and the revolutionary army. They are trying by agitation to direct the provisional government toward a counter-revolutionary *coup d'etat*, to set aside the rule of the man in the street, and thus place the destiny of the Russian Revolution in the hands of the English embassy. They go so far as to threaten financial boycott, and set up the claim that the French creditors, who invested their money with, and participated in the plunder of, the Romanoffs, have a right to interfere in this hour of destiny, when which the Russian people is to decide its future.

"The government Socialists of France and of England have neither enough courage nor enough revolutionary consciousness to fight this reactionary activity; in fact, they lend moral support by their demonstrations to this activity, and do not even shrink from the insinuation that the Russian Social Democracy, after the manner of the Romanoff clique, is considering a separate peace with Germany against the French Republic. Thus, while the Russian proletariat is straining every nerve to destroy the reactionary powers which it has overthrown and save the country from the danger of counter-revolution, its appeal for international solidarity to wage the common fight for the salvation of all nations from the bloody butchery, is purposely misinterpreted and falsified to the workers and soldiers of England and France. The western masses, hampered by martial law, are made antagonistic to the Russians by this insidious agitation. Comrades B. Brizon, A. Blanc and Raffin-Dugens have protested in the French parliament against this despicable distortion of the truth.

"Never has the revolutionary uprising of a people been so betrayed by the very elements from which it was justified in ex-

pecting sympathy and support.

"The crowning act in this shameless campaign is the decision of the French parliamentary group of the Socialist Party to send three of its members, E. Lafont, M. Moutet and Marcel Cachin, to Russia to influence the Russian proletariat along lines of national sentiment.

"The nature of this mission is amply characterized, according to newspaper reports, by the fact that it has the sanction of the Parliamentary Commission of Foreign Affairs, whose chairman is a typical representative of French plutocracy, Georges Leygues. And this mission is sanctioned without any pretense at hiding its official nature from the Russian proletariat, by the representatives of a party whose program is the Social Revolution and International Fraternity.

"It is no more than fair to mention, however, that the members Moutet and Lafont have on several occasions in the course of the war defended the interests of Russian emigration, of the Russian Volunteers and of the Russian press in France against the ruling powers. But to avoid disturbing the civil peace with the exploiting classes they, like the party majority, never once protested in Parliament or in the public press against the despicable service that the French Republic rendered to Czarism in persecuting emigration and throttling the Socialist press. Like the majority of the party, they too avoided a break with the government at any cost, whether in connection with the execution of the eleven Russian volunteers in France, or in the case of the brutal suppression with the assistance of the French authorities of the uprising of the Russian expeditionary corps in Marseilles. They did all they could to prevent the French proletariat from learning anything of these heroic deeds of the bourgeoisie, for freedom and justice, and now that they bow down to the floor before the Russian Revolution, the Russian proletariat is fully justified in reminding them that, to the very last, they were silent accessories to the uninterrupted series of misdeeds that constituted the essence of Czarism.

"As for Marcel Cachin, it may be of value to the Russian comrades to know that he has already done similar service on an officially sanctioned mission, in going to Italy to paralyze the agitation of our glorious comrades when they tried to prevent their government from forcing the Italian people into the world-wide slaughter. The presence of this French Sudekum in the delegation and the absence of adherents of the radical minority, which really represents the majority in the party, speaks volumes, but does not

give evidence of a very high regard for the Russian proletariat nor of a very strong desire to come to an understanding with its representatives.

"In stating these things we hardly consider it necessary to emphasize that this inspired campaign travels under a false cloak in labeling itself as the solidarity of the French and English proletariat, which latter really desires peace no less than the proletariat of Russia and Germany. These conspiracies and recommendations emanate from that portion of the working class parties which are corrupted by ministerial ambitions, and if communications of a far different tenor from the other portion do not reach us, it is solely because the censorship in conjunction with nationalist spokesmen stifles all free speech. You may be sure that the international section of the French and English Socialists are deeply and honestly interested in the battle which the Council of Workers and Soldiers is waging for peace and democracy and that they believe as you do, that the Russian Revolution can attain victory only if it is not paralyzed by the poison gas of world war.

"We are firmly convinced that the French Sudekums will be given the same sort of reception by the Russian revolutionary proletariat as was accorded their prototype by the Italian comrades. . . The most worthy answer to all such plots and schemes will be the redoubled energy of the representatives of the Russian proletariat in their chosen course.

"The confusion created by this policy against the Russian Revolution in the ranks of the proletariat of western Europe, can best be brought to a complete stop if the Council of Workers' Delegates will, over the heads of the patriotic agents of Imperialism, address directly to the working class organizations throughout the world an appeal for international, united action in the direction of universal peace.

"Long live the international solidarity of the proletariat in the battle for freedom!

"Down with the agents of militarism and the advocates of murder!

"Long live the democratic Republic! Long live Revolutionary Socialism!"

L. C. F.

PART TWO

**The General Program
of the Bolsheviki**

By N. LENIN

INTRODUCTION

The important characteristic of the program of the Bolsheviks is that it is an expression of general revolutionary Socialist policy; it is particular in applying itself to the concrete problems of the Russian Revolution, but international in the scope of the universality of its general principles.

Bolshevism, as an expression of Socialism, is not a peculiar Russian product; it prevails in all nations where the proletariat and Socialism are in action, and it represents everywhere the revolutionary opposition equally to Capitalism and moderate, opportunistic Socialism. Nor is the program of the Bolsheviks a spontaneous and temporary development of the peculiar conditions prevailing in Russia during the Revolution of 1917; this program in its fundamentals was developed prior to, during, and subsequent to, the Revolution of 1905, and rigidly adhered to by the Bolsheviks. Until the Revolution of 1917, the program of the Bolsheviks was a brilliant formulation of revolutionary Marxian Socialism; during the Revolution, it was a brilliant performance in applied revolutionary tactics.

A determining phase of the Russian Revolution was the implacable struggle waged between the moderate and the revolutionary Socialists. It was the decisive struggle of the Revolution. Nor was this struggle determined by peculiarly Russian conditions; these conditions simply brought it to a violent climax. The struggle between the moderate and revolutionary Socialists is in action throughout the International Socialist movement; the movement everywhere is split into warring groups, and the struggle between the Socialist factions is often as bitter as the struggle against Capitalism itself. The fundamental issues in dispute are in general the same as the issues between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Moderate Socialism, which is dominant and which acted with the imperialistic governments during the war, represents the old labor movement, hesitant, interested in middle class reforms, controlled by reactionary skilled labor and animated by the petty bourgeois ideology; and moderate Socialism, in its extreme social-patriotic expression, represents a conscious, counter-revolutionary compromise with Imperialism. The revolutionary Socialists, on the contrary, represent the new facts of the labor movement, as determined by the epoch of Imperialism and the emergence to consciousness and action of the great industrial proletariat, the masses of unskilled labor. Imperialism, in its form of expression as State Capitalism, has united into one reactionary *bloc* all layers of the ruling class, including skilled labor; this unity has swept along with it the dominant Socialism, representing skilled labor and the small bourgeoisie. Under the conditions of imperialistic State Capital-

ism, the old conditions and ideology of democracy are passing away, and the struggle becomes the clear-cut one of Socialism against Capitalism,—the immediate struggle for the Social Revolution. This was the attitude of the Bolsheviks, the conviction that Imperialism has objectively introduced the social revolutionary era, and that the proletariat must act accordingly.

The upper and the lower bourgeoisie, which previously struggled each against the other, the strength of the lower bourgeoisie determining the expressions of radical bourgeois democracy, are now united in reaction, united by the imperative necessity of national and class solidarity in the struggles of Imperialism. This reactionary unity of the bourgeoisie is characteristic of all large nations. But in Russia this fact was at the same time emphasized and obscured by the existence of Czarism. The reactionary character of the Russian bourgeoisie was emphasized by weakening its struggle against Czarism in fear of the revolutionary proletariat, the action of which alone could overthrow Czarism, and by its desire to retain Czarism in the form of a capitalistic autocracy useful in the struggle against its proletariat and its international imperialistic rivals. The reactionary character of the Russian bourgeoisie was obscured by the fact that it was compelled to criticize Czarism in the attempt to make Czarism conform to capitalistic requirements, as the autocracy did in Germany; this developed an amorphous "liberalism" of the bourgeoisie which temporarily deceived the masses. This deception was emphasized by the moderate Socialists who argued that as the revolution was a revolution against Czarism, it was necessarily a bourgeois revolution. But the social and economic conditions of twentieth century Russia were not by any means similar to those of eighteenth century France. Then, the bourgeoisie was the consciously revolutionary force; now, it was the industrial proletariat. The historic *milieu* was a new one.

The insistence upon Russia being ripe only for the bourgeois revolution ignores a number of factors that completely alter the problem.

The central factor is the existence of Imperialism, which not only makes a national democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie in semi-feudal, capitalistic countries incompatible with the requirements of modern Capitalism, but which equally makes Europe as a whole ripe for the immediate revolutionary struggle for Socialism. Imperialism determines Capitalism in a reactionary policy; but, simultaneously, it creates the conditions under which the proletariat may express its revolutionary action for the overthrow of Capitalism.

The bourgeois democratic revolution is not an indispensable necessity at all stages of the development of Capitalism; it occurs at particular stages and under certain conditions, and may be dispensed with, as in Germany. Imperialism negates democracy, projecting a new autocracy necessary to maintain the proletariat in subjection, expressing the requirements of concentrated industry, and indispensable in the armed struggles produced by imperialistic competition. Without a revolutionary, class conscious proletariat in Russia, there would in all probability have been no overthrow of Czarism. The Russian middle class had neither the will nor the homogeneity of class to overthrow Czarism; the larger bourgeoisie wished to convert Czarism into an instrument of its own. The situation, after the abortive revolution of 1905, was shaping itself as in Germany, where the

imperialistic bourgeoisie compromised with and accepted autocracy as an instrument for promoting its brutal class interests. The requirements of Imperialism are incompatible with bourgeois democracy, with the paltry democracy of the bourgeoisie in its earlier "liberal" era. What other meaning is there in the international reactionary trend *away* from democracy and *toward* autocracy?

Distrust of the bourgeoisie and of the bourgeois liberals runs as a red thread through the policy of the Bolsheviks: *the Revolution must depend upon the proletariat and peasantry alone*. The overthrow of Czarism was a bourgeois revolution, in the sense of overthrowing a feudal regime and introducing the democratic republic; *but it was a bourgeois revolution made without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie*, made, organized and directed by the proletariat.

But the problem of whether or not the Russian Revolution was a bourgeois revolution was a practical problem, and not, as misinterpreted by the Socialist moderates, an abstract one in historical theory. It is indisputable that an agrarian revolution was in "the order of the day" in Russia, and yet the bourgeoisie did all in its power to prevent an agrarian revolution. This was simply one problem of the Revolution which determined the Revolution in a merciless struggle against the bourgeoisie, not as a matter of theory but as a matter of practice. It was through the force of these practical problems, land, peace, the organization of a democratic state, that the Russian Revolution was converted definitely and consciously into a proletarian revolution. While the pedants piled theory upon history and history upon theory to prove the impossibility of a proletarian revolution, life itself and the stress of its struggles proved the pedants conclusively wrong.

Out of these practical requirements of the Revolution arose the uncompromising, unifying slogan of the Bolsheviks—"All Power to the Soviets!" And this slogan did not arise at the moment when the Bolsheviks were the majority in the Soviets, but from the first day of the Revolution, when they were an apparently hopeless minority. This insistence of the Bolsheviks upon power to an institution in which they were a minority should dispose of the slanderous charge that their's was a "rule or ruin" policy. The slogan, "All Power to the Soviets," was an expression equally of class policy and of the facts of the Revolution, in which the Soviets constituted the only actual, durable and revolutionary power. The Revolution, operating exclusively by means of the Soviets, would proceed logically on its course of reconstruction, unhesitatingly and uncompromisingly; for the Soviets, representing exclusively workers and peasants, would be compelled by the force of circumstances to introduce revolutionary measures, as a necessity of practice and not of theory. Separate the Soviets, and consequently the workers and peasants, from an alliance with and dependence upon the bourgeoisie, emphasize the proletarian class struggle and class policy, and the Revolution was an assured success.

"All Power to the Soviets" would constitute a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat; but the dictatorship would equally have to represent the peasantry, otherwise it could not prevail. The peasantry dominated the situation. Temporarily seduced by the ideology of the *petite bourgeoisie*, the peasantry constituted the basis of support for the Provisional Govern-

ment and for the moderates in the Councils; but, should the peasantry break away from its alliance with the bourgeoisie, a dictatorship of the Soviets could prevail. The problem was whether the peasantry should accept the guidance of the reactionary bourgeoisie or of the revolutionary proletariat.

The moderates in the Councils argued that the proletariat was not strong enough of itself to direct the Revolution; that Russia with its mass of peasantry and primitive industrial development "was not yet ripe" for Socialism, and that, accordingly, a proletarian dictatorship was impossible. The Bolsheviks maintained as against this that Socialism was a problem of immediate revolutionary issues, that the proletarian revolution was a process which might consist of a series of revolutionary struggles, in which the decisive factor was the *class power* of the proletariat. The peasantry, argued the Bolsheviks, is a mass which must depend either upon the bourgeoisie or the proletariat: it is not itself capable of directing the Revolution; but it is not inevitable that the peasantry should depend upon the bourgeoisie; organize a campaign to split the mass of the peasantry by intensifying the agrarian class struggle of pauperized peasant against propertied peasant, align the proletarian peasantry with the revolutionary industrial proletariat by convincing it of the reactionary and perfidious character of the bourgeoisie, and the revolutionary proletariat will dominate the situation.

The Bolsheviks succeeded in securing the co-operation of the impoverished peasantry with the proletariat; and this is the greatest single achievement of the Revolution. The Russian proletariat succeeded in doing what the Paris Commune had attempted—the unity of proletariat and peasantry against the bourgeoisie.

The peasantry was not by any means a homogenous mass. One part consisted of prosperous owners of land, petty proprietors, an agricultural bourgeoisie created by the agrarian reform program of Stolypin which dissolved the old peasant community—a group obviously realizing its interests in a conservative, bourgeois agrarian policy introduced on the basis of the bourgeois system and capitalistic accumulation. With the abolition of serfdom in 1861, the peasants were apportioned certain lands, which remained fixed as the years passed, and diminished proportionately as the peasant population increased. The peasants were compelled to increase their holdings by purchase, and in 1882 the Czar's government organized for the purpose the State Agricultural Bank. But only the richer peasants could afford to purchase, and the mass of the peasants became more and more impoverished. These peasants were in debt, compelled to work on the great estates at ruinous wages. These conditions transformed the bulk of the peasants into an agricultural proletariat; and an industrial proletarian psychology filtered into the peasantry by means of the fact that during the winter months masses of peasants went to the cities to work in the factories. This great mass of the peasantry, designated by Lenin as "semi-proletarians," was determined in a struggle against the bourgeois peasants; and only through their awakening to consciousness and action could the agrarian revolution be assured.

The Bolsheviks in their agrarian policy emphasized means, while the other Socialist groups neglected the immediate means necessary to estab-

lish an ultimate agrarian program. The Social-Revolutionary Party, pluming itself on representing the peasantry, prated of the "socialization of the land," but neglected the fact that the agrarian revolution could be accomplished only by means of an agrarian class struggle equally against the agricultural bourgeoisie, the nobility and the financial bourgeoisie, a class struggle acting in accord with the struggle of the industrial proletariat against Capitalism and Imperialism. The Bolsheviks, accordingly, tried by all means in their power to intensify the agrarian class struggle, to awaken to consciousness and action the great mass of the impoverished, proletarian peasantry. Councils of Farm-Workers' Delegates were organized, representing the agricultural wage-workers. Other means were adopted of rescuing the mass of the peasantry from the domination of the wealthier peasants. All this, together with the chicanery of the Provisional Government on the land question, aroused the action of the peasants. And the unifying feature of this program was the slogan of the Bolsheviks calling upon the peasants not to wait for the Constituent Assembly, but to seize the lands immediately through their Soviets and put into operation the agrarian revolution.¹

This awakening of the proletarian peasantry had to be directed to the channels of co-operation with the industrial proletariat, the acceptance of the guidance of revolutionary Socialism. The Bolsheviks argued in this way: The peasants want the land, they want the abolition of hired labor on the farms. Capital, through the banks, has great financial interests in the lands that are to be confiscated without compensation; in case of a partial division on the basis of capitalist property, the financial interests of capital will inevitably get control of the land through loans, etc., and all the evils of private ownership prevail. The peasants can not get the land except through immediate seizure, the abolition of private ownership, and the nationalization of the banks and lands. This procedure, however, emphasized the Bolsheviks, means a relentless struggle against capital and the bourgeoisie, the creation of a revolutionary proletarian dictatorship representing exclusively the interests of the workers and pauperized peasants. This dictatorship would proceed with gradual measures for the complete overthrow of the rule of capital, based upon the immediate handing over of the land to the peasants and establishing workers' control over industry, and operating through a democratic state of workers and peasants, functioning, however, as a dictatorship in relation to the other classes.

The Bolshevik attitude toward peace was determined by the class struggle: they objected not to war, but to the character of the particular war being waged and to the class in control of its direction and purposes. The peace propaganda of the Bolsheviks was in accord with the policy of revolutionary Socialism; it was in no sense a pacifist propaganda, but a

¹In a report concerning a unification meeting of Socialist groups, published in 1906, Lenin argued against the confiscation of lands as a party demand. Lenin favored the seizure of lands by the peasants; later the Constituent Assembly, or a similar body, would ratify the seizure and "confiscate" the lands. Confiscation, argued Lenin, is a juridical process, and must be preceded by the revolutionary action of seizure. Lenin, accordingly, favored seizure as a general revolutionary principle of action; during the Revolution of 1917, the problem of seizure had an immediate practical importance—the resumption of agricultural production to prevent starvation and crush the conscious sabotage practised by the rich peasants.

propaganda of class war using the opportunity of an imperialistic war to develop the proletarian revolution and overthrow the bourgeoisie. Pacifism depends upon existing social relations and the bourgeois governments to introduce a democratic peace; the Bolshevik attitude emphasized that pacifism inevitably promotes Imperialism, that during a war the proletariat must use all its forces to overthrow the government and establish its own supremacy. Having established a dictatorship of the proletariat, revolutionary Socialism will then proceed to act upon the problems of war and peace according to its own policy and the facts of the prevailing situation. And the action of a proletarian dictatorship might conceivably be the promotion of a revolutionary war, or the conclusion of a temporary peace; in either case, the facts of the whole international and national situation must determine the immediate policy adopted.

The Bolsheviks proceeded upon the theory that the proletarian revolution was the only adequate Socialist answer to the imperialistic war, and one of their objectives was to assist in developing the proletarian revolution in Europe. Unlike the moderate Socialists, however, who everywhere aspired and worked for a revolution in the enemy country, the Bolsheviks struggled for *their own* proletarian revolution as the only acceptable revolutionary Socialist tactics and the only adequate means of inspiring the proletariat of the other nations to revolt. Revolutions are not determined by mathematical considerations, but by opportunity; and the Socialist must create his own opportunity and use it whether the other nations act or not.

Imperialism means, generally, Capitalism at the climax of its development, Capitalism ripe for the introduction of Socialism. The west European countries are ripe for the Socialist community; they have the material basis in the maturity of the industrial development of Capitalism which is indispensable for the complete establishment of Socialism. These countries must act for the Social Revolution; their proletariat must be encouraged to initiate the revolution against Capitalism. This is precisely what the Bolsheviks meant by "a civil war of the oppressed against the oppressors, and for Socialism." Not in Russia alone, but throughout Europe, the proletariat must be called to revolutionary action, Russian revolutionary Socialism using its power and strategic position to arouse that international proletarian class struggle which would transform itself into the Social Revolution. Two forces are necessary to establish Socialism: the material—Capitalism in the fullness of its development of the forces of production; the dynamic—a revolutionary, class conscious proletariat. The material force exists in west Europe, but not fully in Russia; the dynamic exists in Russia, but, as yet, not in west Europe. Now, consider Europe as one great social arena, as it is in fact. The revolutionary energy of the Russian proletariat, uniting with the impulse of a war that is developing intense revolutionary currents, might conceivably arouse the European proletariat to initiate the Social Revolution.

It is clear, accordingly, that the program of the Bolsheviks did not depend upon any one single feature. There are Socialists for and against the Bolsheviks, who for motives of their own separate the Bolshevik policy into two phases, internal and international, agreeing with one and disagreeing with the other, in accordance with the peculiar considerations dominant

in their purposes. This constitutes an absurdity—it is either a negation of Socialist policy or a result of unclear thinking. The policy of the Bolsheviks, internally and internationally, was determined by the requirements of Socialism and the class struggle; of the immediate requirements of the Russian Revolution and of the international struggle for peace; of the necessity for promoting the proletarian revolution in Russia and of assisting in developing the proletarian revolution in Europe as the climax of the war. It was this full-orbed character of the Bolshevik program, realized through uncompromising adherence to revolutionary Socialism and the class struggle, that, when their efforts for a revolution in the Central Empires temporarily failed, did not leave them stranded and helpless, but able to concentrate on the internal development of their own revolution as a preparation for the day when the international revolutionary struggle against Capitalism might break loose.

In action, the central feature of Bolshevik policy is its emphasis upon *mass action* as the dynamic means of the proletarian revolution. In a crisis, and it is only in a crisis that a revolution develops, the government controls rigidly all the normal methods of action; through mass action the proletariat sweeps away the barriers of authority, rallies and unites the workers for action and the conquest of power, sweeps into the maelstrom of revolt all the physical and moral forces of the proletariat. Through mass action, the masses are awakened to consciousness and action, become the arbiters of their own destiny: no revolution is a revolution unless the masses actively and consciously step forth upon the stage of events. The revolution cannot operate within the orbit of legality: legality may become the expression of the accomplished facts of the revolution, it is never the mechanics of the revolution itself. Legality is the ideology of the ruling class; action the ideology of the revolutionary class. The first requirement is action that will produce accomplished facts.—revolutionary action, the seizure of revolutionary power through dynamic and creative mass action. It is a process of struggle. Otherwise, the revolution withers with compromises.

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Sources: Chapter I, from an article on "Louis Blancism," in *Pravda* (April); II, from a pamphlet, "Aims of the Proletariat in Our Revolution;" and from an article in *Pravda* on "Workers and Peasants;" III, IV, V and IX, from "Aims of the Proletariat in Our Revolution;" VI, "The Collapse of the International," from *The Communist*, 1915; VII, "Disarmament," from the *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokratia*. Note: chapters VI and VII, written before the Revolution, are included because they are indispensable in understanding fundamental phase of the program and policy of the Bolsheviks.

L. C. F.

I

PROLETARIAN POLICY

In the Revolution of 1848, in Paris, Louis Blanc, the French Socialist, sadly distinguished himself by passing over from the position of the class struggle to the position of *petit bourgeois* illusions. These illusions, employing a phraseology not unlike that of "Socialism," actually served to strengthen the influence of the bourgeoisie. Louis Blanc expected to receive aid from the bourgeoisie; his hopes aroused hopes in others, as if the bourgeoisie *could* aid the workers in the matter of an "organization of labor"—this unclear expression was supposed to express a "Socialistic" tendency.¹

In Russia, at present, the policy of Louis Blanc has met with complete success in the "Social Democracy" of the right wing, the Menshevik Party. Chaidse, Tseretelli and many others, who are now leaders of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, have assumed precisely the position of Louis Blanc. In all the chief questions agitating the political life of our day, these leaders have accepted the *petit bourgeois* illusions of Louis Blanc. Take, for instance, the war question.

The proletarian standpoint in this matter consists of a definite *class* characterization of the war and irreconcilable hostility to an imperialistic war,—that is, to wars waged between groups of imperialistic countries, (*no matter whether they are monarchic or republican*), for a division of the capitalist spoils.

¹Upon the overthrow of the monarchy by the uprising of the Parisian masses in 1848, a Provisional Government was formed, of which Louis Blanc and other representatives of the masses of his type were members. The workers had made the revolution, but the bourgeoisie took control of the new government, Blanc and his group aiding in this consummation by their petty bourgeois policy. Blanc's great scheme was the establishment of national workshops for the unemployed; the scheme was adopted by the new government, but sabotaged for the purpose of discrediting Blanc and demoralizing the masses. Roughly, the situation in Russia during the first and second stages of the Revolution was similar; and measures proposed by the "Socialist" representatives in the government were sabotaged by the bourgeois representatives.—L. C. F.

The bourgeois standpoint consists of outright justification of the war, outright "defense of the fatherland," that is, a defense of the interests of the capitalists and their right to annexations. The *petit bourgeois* standpoint differs from this in that it renounces annexations, "condemns" Imperialism, and "demands" from the bourgeoisie that it shall cease to be imperialistic, although the *petit bourgeois* does not require the bourgeoisie to pass out of its world-imperialistic relations, or out of the capitalistic structure of society. Limiting himself to this innocent, innocuous, shallow declamation, the *petit bourgeois* as a matter of fact follows meekly *after* the bourgeoisie, "sympathizing" somewhat with the proletariat, in words, but remaining completely dependent on the bourgeoisie, being unable or perhaps unwilling to grasp the revolutionary means of removing the capitalist yoke, which is the only means that can save humanity from Imperialism.

"Demanding" from bourgeois governments that they make a "solemn declaration" renouncing annexations,—this seems to the petty bourgeois the height of audacity as well as an illustration of anti-imperialistic consistency of action. It is not difficult to see that this is the policy of Louis Blanc at its worst. Has the competent bourgeois politician ever had any difficulty in pronouncing the most "radical" and sonorous of phrases, saying little, to be sure, and binding the speaker to nothing, in discussing the matter of annexations "in general"? But when it comes to *actions*, it is always possible to walk the tight-rope, as the bourgeois *Reich* has been doing lately; in fact, this paper has recently had the effrontery to declare that Courland (recently annexed by the imperialistic robbers of the German bourgeoisie) is *not* a land annexed by Russia! This is the most shameless deception of the workers, the most intolerable misrepresentation, for any man who has even the most rudimentary political education must recognize that Courland *has always been a territory annexed by Russia*.

Admitting, if only for a moment, that the bourgeois ministers are models of righteousness and honesty, that they really believe implicitly in the possibility of a renunciation of annexations, while preserving Capitalism, and really *want* to renounce annexations,—making, for a moment, this truly Louis-Blanc admission, here is our question: Can any man of mature intellect be content with what people *think* of themselves, without verifying these thoughts by their *acts*? Is it possible for a Marxist not to distinguish between desires, assertions, objective reality? Answer: It is not.

Annexations are imposed by the bonds of capital: financial, banking, imperialistic capital,—that is the present economic foundation of annexations. From this angle, annexation means the political guarantee of profit on the millions of capital “invested” in thousands and thousands of enterprises in the annexed territories. It is impossible, even in one’s wishes, to renounce annexations *without taking decisive steps toward the overthrow of Capitalism.*

Is it true, as the Social-Revolutionary *Rabochaya Gazetta*, Plekhanov’s *Yedinstvo*, and the other Louis Blancs of our bourgeoisie are ready to infer, and actually do infer, that we must *not* take any decisive steps toward overthrowing capital? That we must be content, for the present, with reducing annexations to a minimum? No. We must energetically struggle for the overthrow of capital. The necessary measures must be introduced judiciously and gradually, and must be based on the support *alone* of the class consciousness and organized activity of the oppressed majority of the workers and of the poorest peasants. These steps must be taken. And the Soviets of Workers’ Delegates in quite a number of Russian cities have *already* undertaken them.

There is now necessary in the order of the day a decisive, irrevocable formulation of the distinctions between us and the Louis Blancs, the Cheidsses, Tseretellis, Stekloffs, the Mensheviki, the Social-Revolutionary Party, etc. We must point out to the masses that the policy of Louis Blanc will destroy and is destroying the onward success of the Revolution; that even the newly-won liberties will be lost, unless the masses understand the danger of *petit bourgeois* illusions and unite with the class conscious workers in their judicious, gradual, well-planned, yet firm and immediate, steps toward the realization of Socialism.

Outside of Socialism there is no deliverance of humanity from wars, from hunger, from the destruction of millions and millions of human beings.

II

THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM

I

It is impossible to tell at present with any degree of certainty whether a gigantic agrarian revolution will take place in the near future in Russia. We cannot say how deep the cleavage is between the two agricultural classes: hired laborers and pauperized farmers (agricultural proletariat) on the one hand, and the wealthy and well-to-do farmers (large and small capitalists) on the other. All this can only be decided by practical experience.

We are convinced, however, that the proletarian party must at once not only formulate an agrarian program, but devise ways and means of bringing about an agrarian revolution in Russia.

We must demand the nationalization of all lands, that is, the surrender of all lands in the country to a central governmental department. This department shall ascertain the area of agricultural lands, establish rules for the conservation of forests, and prevent anyone from standing between the land and those who till it, prevent every form of traffic in land. The disposition of all lands, the establishment of local rules concerning the use of land must not be left to the caprice of bureaucrats and officials, but be vested in the local Councils of Peasants' Delegates.

In order to perfect the system of bread production and increase the production in general, in order also to develop rational cultivation on a large scale, socially controlled, we must see to it that every Peasants' Council organizes out of the various estates confiscated by the community a large public estate controlled by the Council of Farm Laborers' Delegates.

To offset the petty bourgeois rant which fills the speeches of the Social-Revolutionists, the empty words concerning the "standard of consumption," the "standard of labor," the "socialization of the land," etc., the proletarian party must make it clear to the masses that the system of small property in the production of goods cannot in any way save mankind from poverty or oppression.

Without necessarily breaking up at once the Councils of Peasants, the proletarian party must show the necessity of organizing special Councils of Farm Laborers' Delegates and other Councils composed of delegates of the pauperized peasants (agrarian proletariat), or, at least, of standing committees, of delegates from these various classes, sitting as separate factions or parties within the Councils of Peasants' Delegates. Otherwise all the sonorous phraséology of the "friends of the people" on the subject of the peasants will be put to good use by the well-to-do farmers in fooling the destitute agrarian masses; for these farmers, after all, are simply another variety of capitalists.

To offset the influence of the liberal, bourgeois, or purely bureaucratic sermons delivered by many Social-Revolutionists in the Councils of Workers and Peasants, which preach that the peasants must not seize the large estates or begin any land reform until the Constituent Assembly meets, the proletarian party must urge the peasants to bring about at once an agrarian revolution and to confiscate at once the large estates upon the authority of the local Council of Peasants' Delegates. In this connection, we must insist on the necessity of increasing the production of food-stuffs, and absolutely forbid the destruction or wastage of cattle, tools, machinery, buildings, etc.

II

In No. 88 of the *Isvestyâ* of the All-Russian Council of Peasants' Delegates there are printed a number of proposed laws, which are of interest in connection with the agrarian problem in Russia. The first division of these laws deals with the general political premises, the requirements of political democracy, while the second division is concerned with the land question.

The land demands of the peasantry in these proposed laws consist, first of all, in an abolition of all private ownership of land down to the peasant holdings, without compensation; in handing over to the state or the communes all parcels of land which are under intensive cultivation; in similarly confiscating all live stock and immovables (excluding those of peasants with small holdings), and handing them over to the state or the communes; in the prohibition of hired labor; in equalizing the distribution of land among the toilers, with periodic redistributions, etc. Among the measures proposed for the transition period before the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the peasants demanded the immedi-

ate passing of laws requiring the cessation of all buying and selling of land, the abolition of laws permitting sales of land to the communes by persons intending to liquidate, or permitting the cutting down of forests, etc., for the conservation of forests, fisheries, and other preserves, etc., for the abrogation of all long-term leases, and the revision of those made for shorter periods.

A short reflection on these demands will show the absolute impossibility of securing the aid of capitalists in their realization—in fact, the impossibility of avoiding a break with the capitalist class; in short, a complete overthrow of their rule.

The confiscation of all private ownership in land means the confiscation of hundreds of millions of bank capital, with which these lands, for the most part, are mortgaged. Is such a measure conceivable unless the revolutionary plan, by the aid of revolutionary methods, shall break down the opposition of the capitalists? Besides, we are here touching the most centralized form of capital, which is bank capital, and which is bound by a million threads with all the important centers of the capitalist system of this great nation, which can be defeated only by the equally well-organized power of the proletariat of the cities. Moreover, there is the matter of handing over the highly cultivated estates to the state. Is it not clear that the only "state" which is capable of taking them over and actually administering them in the interest of the toilers, and not for the good of the *chinovniks* (officials) and of the capitalists themselves must necessarily be a proletarian revolutionary state?

The confiscation of stud-farms, etc., and then of all cattle and immovables, these measures are not only increasingly crushing blows against private ownership of the means of production; they are steps toward Socialism, for the passing over of this property "into its exclusive utilization by the state or the Communes," makes absolutely necessary a huge Socialistic system of agriculture, or, at least, a Socialistic regulation of its functioning.

But, how about "the prohibition of hired labor"? This is an empty phrase, the helpless, unconsciously naive hope of the down-trodden petty farmers who do not see how impossible it is "not to permit" hired labor in the country if it is to continue to be permitted in the cities,—in short, that the "prohibition" of hired labor can never be anything else than a step toward Socialism.

This brings us to the fundamental question of the relations of the workers to the peasants. The Socialist mass movement in Rus-

sia has been going on for twenty years (if we count the great strikes of 1896). Throughout this period, passing through the two great revolutions, there runs, a veritable red thread of Russian political history, this great question: shall the working class lead the peasantry forward toward Socialism, or shall the liberal bourgeoisie drag the peasantry back into a conciliation with Capitalism?

The revolutionary Social Democratic Party has all this time been fighting to remove the peasants from the influence of the Cadets and has offered them, in place of the utopian middle class view of Socialism, a revolutionary-proletarian path to Socialism.

"Conciliate yourself with the rule of capital, for 'we' are not yet ready for Socialism," that is what the Mensheviks say to the peasants. In other words, they misrepresent the abstract question of "Socialism" as being the concrete question of whether the wounds inflicted by the war may be healed without taking resolute steps toward Socialism.

The monarchy has been abolished. The bourgeois revolution was crowned with success, inasmuch as Russia became a democratic republic with a government consisting of Cadets, Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionists. But, in the course of three years the war has driven us thirty years ahead, has made compulsory military service universal in Europe, has led to a forced monopolization of industry and brought the most developed nations to hunger and unparalleled destruction, forcing them to take definite steps toward Socialism.

Only the proletariat and the peasantry can overthrow the monarchy—that has been the fundamental declaration of our class policy. And it was a correct position, as the months of March and April, 1917, have once more confirmed.

Only the proletariat, leading on the poorest peasants (the semi-proletariat) may terminate the war with a democratic peace, may heal its wounds, and may undertake the steps toward Socialism that have become absolutely unavoidable and non-postponable. That is the clear demand of our class policy at present.

The course of history, accelerated by the war, has made such huge strides forward that the ancient slogans have been filled with a new content. For instance: "The prohibition of hired labor." Millions of impoverished peasants, in 242 instructions, declare that they want to attack the problems of abolishing hired labor, but do not know how to go about it. But *we* know how. We know it can

only be done by co-operation with the workers, under their lead, and not "in agreement" with the capitalists.

Only the revolutionary proletariat can actually carry out the above plan of the impoverished peasants. For the revolutionary proletariat is actually going about the task of abolishing hired labor, and by the only real approach, namely, by overthrowing Capitalism, and not by forbidding the hiring of labor. The revolutionary proletariat is actually going to confiscate the lands, the property on them, the agricultural corporations—which is exactly what the peasants want.

Here is the change to be made in the outline of the workers' appeal to the peasants: We, the workers, want to give you, and do give you, that which the impoverished peasantry wants and seeks without always knowing where to find it. We, therefore, are defending our interests against the capitalists, and these interests are those of the vast majority of the peasantry.

* * *

Let me remind the reader of what Engels said, not long before his death, concerning the agrarian question. Engels emphasized the point that nothing was further removed from the minds of Socialists than the intention of expropriating the smaller peasants, and that the latter should be made to see the advantage of the machine-process, Socialist agriculture, by the force of example alone. The war has now placed before Russia, in a practical form, this very question. Of farm property there is little. Simply confiscate it, and "do not divide" the highly cultivated estates.

The peasants have begun to see this. Need made them see it. The war made them see it. The farm accessories are not worth taking. They must be husbanded. But management on a large scale means the conservation both of labor on these accessories, and of many other things.

The peasants want to retain their small holdings and to arrive at some place of equal distribution. So be it. No sensible Socialist will quarrel with a pauper peasant on this ground. If the lands are confiscated, so long as the proletarians rule in the great centers and all political power is handed over to the proletariat, the rest will take care of itself, will be a natural outcome of the "power of example"; practice itself will do the teaching. The passing of political power to the proletariat, that is the whole thing. Then all the essential, fundamental, real points of the peas-

ants' 242 instructions become realities. And life will point out with what modifications this realization is to proceed. We are not doctrinaires.

We do not pretend that Marx or the Marxist know every detail of the road which leads to Socialism. That would be folly. We know the direction of the road, we know what class forces will lead to it; but the concrete, practical details will appear in the experience of the millions when they tackle the job.

III

INDUSTRIAL AND NATIONAL.

The proletarian party cannot expect to introduce at a stroke Socialism into a land of small farmers as long as the down-trodden majority of the population does not realize the necessity of a Socialist revolution.

It is only bourgeois sophists, however, juggling with pseudo-Marxist phrases, who can use that fact to justify a policy tending to put off immediate revolutionary measures, which were resorted to frequently in a practical way when the bourgeois governments went to war, for those measures were absolutely necessary to prevent total economic bankruptcy and famine.

Such measures as the nationalization of the land, of all the banks and financial syndicates, or at least their immediate regulation by the Council of Workers' Delegates, do not mean the "introduction" of Socialism, but they must be fought for, and as far as possible applied by revolutionary means. Without the adoption of such measures, which are mere steps toward Socialism, and which can all be enforced by economic action, it will be impossible to heal the wounds inflicted by the war and to prevent the threatening bankruptcy. The proletarian party cannot remain idle in the face of the scandalous profits reaped by capitalists and bankers out of the war.

✧ [The Bolsheviki advocated workers' control over industry, functioning through Councils organized for the purpose. A practical expression of this policy was the seizure of factories by the workers and their management through shop-committees. This was made necessary by the fact that employers, in order to strike at the revolution, either closed down their factories or sabotaged production, thereby producing a terrific disorganization of the productive process. Out of this situation came the slogan, "Workers, seize the factories and operate them in conjunction with the technical staffs." The heavy taxation of profits, partial expropriation of

private capitals and the repudiation of national debts, were other measures urged by the Balsheviki.—F.]

* * *

When it comes to the question of nationalities, the proletarian party must at once grant full freedom to secede from Russia to all the races or nationalities which were driven into subjection by the Czars, forcibly annexed to Russia, or compelled to remain within the Russian Empire. Any statements, declarations or manifestoes to the effect that we renounce annexations, and which are not immediately followed by the granting of freedom to secede from Russia, is just bourgeois prattle calculated to deceive the people, or simply petty bourgeois sentimentalism.

The proletarian party is trying to build up as large a national unit as possible, for this is in the interest of the workers; it is trying to knit the nations closely together, but it does not intend to bring about that consummation by the use of force, but through the free, fraternal union of the laboring masses of all nationalities.

The more democratic the Russian republic will be, the more speedily it will organize itself into a republic of Councils of Workers and Peasants, the more powerful the force of attraction of such a republic will be for the laboring masses of all nations.

Full freedom of secession, the broadest local autonomy, full guarantees for the rights of minorities,—such is the program of the revolutionary proletariat.

This is pure anarchy—the denial of force against a non-invasive individual or group.—L.

IV

THE NEW TYPE OF GOVERNMENT.

The significance of the Councils of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates is generally misunderstood because the majority of the people do not realize their class character and meaning, the part they play in the Russian Revolution. The significance of the Councils is misunderstood for another reason, because they constitute an entirely new form of power, a new type of government.

To this day, the most perfect type of bourgeois government has been the parliamentary democratic republic: power vested in a parliament, with the usual machinery of government, the usual system and organs of administration,—a standing army, a police and a bureaucracy, practically unchangeable, privileged, and standing above the nation.

But the new revolutionary epoch, beginning with the end of the nineteenth century and determined objectively by Imperialism, has been pushing to the fore a new type of democratic government which in certain respects ceases to be a government, or, to quote Engels' words, "does not seem to be, properly speaking, a government." This is a government on the model of the Paris Commune, replacing the army and the police by an armed citizenry. That was the essential feature of the Commune, which has been so much misrepresented and slandered by bourgeois writers, who pretend among other things that the Commune was trying to put Socialism into immediate practice.

This is the new type of government which the Russian Revolution began to organize between 1905 and 1917. The Republic of the Councils of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants, united in an All-Russian Council of Councils,—this is what is already coming into being in our midst, upon the initiative of millions of people. This is the government of a democracy which is taking the law into its own hands, which relies on itself alone and will not wait

while certain gentlemen, Cadets and professors, elaborate nice little laws for a bourgeois republic of the parliamentary type, or while the pedants and routine worshippers of petty bourgeois Socialism, like Plekhanov and Kautsky, refuse to deviate from Marx' teachings in governmental matters.

The difference between Marxism and Anarchism is that Marxism admits the necessity of government and governmental power in revolutionary periods generally, and during the period of transition from Capitalism to Socialism in particular. The difference between Marxism and the petty bourgeois, opportunistic Socialism of the Plekhanov and Kautsky type is that Marxism admits the necessity during the revolutionary period of a government not of the usual bourgeois parliamentary, republican type, but one similar to the Paris Commune.

The main difference between the two types of government is this:

It is extremely easy to revert from a bourgeois republic to a monarchy (as history proves), as all the machinery of repression is left undisturbed: army, police, bureaucracy.

As in the Commune, the Councils of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates destroy that machinery, abolish it entirely.

A republic of the parliamentary bourgeois type strangles and crushes the independent political life of the masses, prevents the masses from taking a direct part in the democratic up-building of the governmental activity from below. The Councils of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants do just the opposite. They reproduce the type of government established by the Paris Commune and which Marx called the "finally open form of government in which the liberation of the workers can really take place."

People often say that "the Russian nation is not prepared for the introduction of a Commune." This was a favorite argument with the feudal lords when they explained that the peasants were not ready for freedom. The Commune, that is the Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' delegates, would not introduce, does not intend to introduce and should not introduce any reorganization which is not absolutely ripe not only in the economic activity but in the consciousness of the majority of the people. The more terrible the economic bankruptcy and the crisis produced by the war, the more we will need a perfect political form which will facilitate the healing of the wounds inflicted by the war upon man-

kind. The less experienced the Russian people is with organization the more aggressively we must proceed with the constructive organization of the people itself, not merely through bourgeois politicians and bureaucrats.

The sooner we cast off the prejudices instilled by the pseudo-Marxism of Plekhanov, Kautsky & Co., the more actively we will help the people everywhere organize Councils of Workers and Peasants.

We must expect blunders in the first attempt at structural organization of the people, but it is better to blunder ahead than to lag behind; for while we lag the bourgeois professors and jurists prepare bills for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, for the perpetuation of the parliamentary bourgeois republic and the suppression of the Councils of Workers' and Peasants' Delegates.

If we organize and conduct an energetic propaganda, not only the proletariat but nine-tenths of the peasantry will rise against the re-establishment of the police, against an immovable and privileged bureaucracy, against an army which is separate from the nation. And such will be the new type of government. The substitution of a national militia for the police is a change which results logically from the whole course of the revolution and which has been adopted in most Russian communities. We must make it clear to the masses that in the majority of revolutions of the usual bourgeois type, a change of that sort was very ephemeral and that the bourgeoisie, however democratic and republican it may have been, soon returned to the former police system, the kind of police which is alien to the people, which is commanded by bourgeois and is ready to assist in any attempt at oppression of the people.

The only way to prevent a return to the old police system is to organize a national militia and make it part of the army, the army being replaced by an armed citizenry. The militia would comprise all citizens of both sexes between the ages of 15 and 65, these age limits being selected approximately to exclude minors and old people. Capitalists should pay their employes, servants and other subordinates for days which they have to serve in the militia. Unless women feel called upon to take an active part not only in political life generally, but and particularly in continuous general social work, it is idle to speak not only of Socialism but of complete democracy. Certain special functions of the police, such as the care of the sick, of abandoned children, the supervision of foodstuffs,

etc., will never be satisfactorily discharged until women are on a footing of perfect equality with men, not only on paper but in reality.

We must not go back to the police system. To secure the influence of all organized bodies to support the project of organizing a national militia is one of the tasks that the proletariat must assume, in order to protect and strengthen the Revolution and assure its normal development.

V

WAR AND PEACE.

I

The argument of "revolutionary defense" used by the moderates to justify participation in this imperialistic war is simply one more symptom, one of the most fundamental and striking symptoms, of the petty bourgeois tide which has been swamping almost everything. It is, indeed, the worst obstacle to the furtherance of the movement and to the success of the Russian Revolution. Whoever stops short at that point, and does not dare to keep his independence, is lost to the Revolution. The masses, however, do not stop as leaders do, and they have different ways, different methods of freeing themselves.

Revolutionary defense is, on the one hand, the result of the deception practiced on the masses by the bourgeoisie, the result of the peasants' and workers' unthinking confidence; and, on the other, it is an expression of the interests and standpoint of the *petite bourgeoisie*. The bourgeoisie deceives the people by playing upon the generous pride of the Revolution and pretending that, from a social and political point of view, the character of the war changed completely from the day when the Revolution substituted the bourgeois republic for the Czar's monarchy. And the people believed this, for a while, still being in a measure the victims of old prejudices which caused them to see in the other races of Russia mere chattel slaves of Great Russia. The perversion of the Great Russian race by the Czars, who taught it to consider other races as inferior and belonging "by right" to the Great Russians, could not be straightened out all at once.

We must make it clear to the masses that the social and political complexion of the war is not determined by the good will of certain individuals or certain groups, but by the class which conducts the war, by the class policy of which the war seems to be a product,

by the alliances of capitalists, the dominant economic force in modern society, by the imperialistic character of international Capitalism, by Russia's financial and diplomatic dependence upon England and France, etc. It requires skill to make these changes clear to the masses, and none of us could do that at a stroke, without somewhat blundering in the attempt.

But such should be the trend or, rather, the real import of our propaganda, and it should not deviate a jot from it. The slightest concession we make to "revolutionary defense" is an act of treason to Socialism, an abandonment of the internationalist position, regardless of the beautiful phrases and the "practical" considerations by which we may try to justify it.

The slogan "down with the war" is fine, but just now there are other duties to assume and the masses must be approached in a different way. That slogan reminds me of another slogan, "down with the Czar," which in other days indiscreet agitators would shout in some village, after which they got thrashed.

The rank and file of the "revolutionary defense" are good, conscientious people; not as individuals, but as a group, they belong to the very class of workers and pauperized peasants which would not gain anything from annexations or the strangling of other races. They are quite different from the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals, who know quite well that it is impossible to give up the idea of annexations as long as capital is allowed to rule, and who, devoid of conscience, fool the masses with high-sounding speeches and immediate promises.

The rank and file of the "revolutionary defense" looks upon the whole thing in a simple matter-of-fact way: "I, for one, have no use for annexations, I have nothing against the Germans, I am just fighting for a good cause, not for any imperialistic interests."

That is the type of man to whom we must repeat *ad nauseam* that it is not a question of his own personal desires, but that what is at stake is the position of the masses, their class or political position, that the important thing is the connection between the war and capitalistic interests, with their international system of banks, etc. This is the only adequate way of fighting the "revolutionary defense" group, the only way which promises results, not quick results, but actual and durable results.

II

The end of the war will not come by merely wishing it. Nor because one of the two belligerent groups wishes it. We can't put an end to the war by grounding arms.

The war cannot be ended by "an agreement between the Socialists of all nations," by "a decisive step on the part of the proletarians of all nations," by "an act of will of all the nations," etc. These words are meaningless and yet they fill every article in the papers of the "revolutionary defense" group, of the half-baked internationalist groups, and the flood of resolutions, appeals, manifestoes and statements issued by the Council of Workers and Soldiers. These phrases simply express the empty, harmless, humanitarian longings of the small bourgeois.

There is nothing more dangerous than phrases like "the nation's declaration of peace," "the steps taken by the proletariat of one nation after another" (after the Russians it would be the Germans' turn)' etc. All of which is pure sentimentalism in the style of Louis Blanc, a part of the political game.

The war was not started by the sinister will of robber capitalists, although it is fought purely in their interests and is not enriching anybody else. The war was a consequence of the development of international Capitalism in the course of the past fifty years, of its endless connections and ramifications.

We cannot wiggle out of an imperialistic war, we cannot have a democratic peace, but only a peace imposed by violence, until we overthrow the power of Capitalism, until the powers of government pass into the hands of a different class, the proletarian class.

The Russian Revolution of March, 1917, was the first step in the transformation of the imperialistic war into a civil war. That Revolution took the first step toward putting an end to the war. Another step, however, is needed to realize the end of the war; the surrender of governmental powers to the proletariat. This will start the assault on the international "front line trenches," the trenches of capitalistic interests. It is only after storming these trenches that the proletariat will be in a position to save mankind from the horrors of war, and to secure for mankind the blessings of a durable peace.

In organizing the Councils of Workers' Delegates, the Russian Revolution has already given to the Russian proletariat the order to storm those trenches.

III

Resolution on War, passed by the General Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviki), May 9, 1917. All voting in favor except seven, who abstained from voting.

The present war, on the part of all the belligerents, is an imperialistic war, that is, it is fought by capitalists for the division of spoils through their domination of the world, for markets, for financial capital, for the suppression of backward nations, etc. Each day of war enriches the financial and industrial bourgeoisie and impoverishes and weakens the powers of the proletariat and the peasantry of all the belligerents, and later of the neutral countries. In Russia the prolongation of the war involves also a grave danger to the Revolution and its further development.

The passing of government authority, in Russia, into the hands of the Provisional Government, that is, the government of the landholders and capitalists, did not and could not alter the character and significance of Russian participation in the war.

This fact became particularly apparent when the new government not only did not publish the secret treaties concluded between the late Czar and the capitalist governments of England, France, etc., but even formally confirmed these secret treaties, which promised Russian capitalists a free hand in China, Persia, Turkey, Austria, etc., without consulting the Russian people. The concealment of these treaties from the Russian people completely deceived them as to the true character of the war.

For this reason the proletarian party can support neither the present war nor the present government, nor its loans, without breaking completely with internationalism, that is, with the fraternal solidarity of the workers of all lands in their struggle under the yoke of Capitalism.

No confidence is to be placed in the promises of the present government to renounce annexations, that is, conquests of foreign territory, or in the promise to renounce forcible retention within the confines of Russia of this or that nationality. For in the first place, since capitalists are bound together by the thousand threads of banking capital, they cannot renounce annexations in the present war, as they have not renounced the profits on the billions invested in loans, in concessions, in war industries, etc. And, in the second place, the new government, having, in order to deceive the people, renounced annexations, then proceeded to state, through the mouth

of Milyukov (Moscow, April 22, 1917), that it had no intentions of renouncing annexations and to confirm in the note to the Allied governments and in the elucidation of the note, the aggressive character of its policy. In warning the people against the empty promises of capitalists the Conference takes pains to point out the necessity of a sharp distinction between a renunciation of annexations in *words* and a renunciation of annexations *in fact*, that is, the immediate publication and abrogation of the secret treaties for conquest, and the immediate granting to all nationalities of the right to determine whether they wish to become independent governments or to become part of any other state.

The so-called "revolutionary defense," which in Russia has taken possession of all the nationalist parties (national-Socialists, Laborites, Social-Revolutionists, etc.), as well as the opportunist party of the Social Democratic Mensheviks (Organizing Committee, Tsereteli, Cheidse, etc.), as well as the majority of the non-partisan revolutionists, embodies in itself, by reason of its class position, on the one hand the interests and the standpoint of the wealthier peasantry and a part of the small landlords, who, like the capitalists, draw a profit from their domination over the weaker nationalities; and, on the other hand, the "revolutionary defense" is the outcome of the deception by the capitalists of part of the proletariat and semi-proletariat of the cities and villages who, by their class position, have no interest in the profits of the capitalists and in the waging of an imperialistic war.

The Conference declares that any form of "revolutionary defense" is completely intolerable and would actually mean a total break with the principles of Socialism and internationalism. As for the "defensive" tendencies present among the great masses, our party will struggle against these tendencies by ceaselessly emphasizing the truth that any attitude of uncritical confidence in the government of the capitalists at the present movement is one of the greatest obstructions to an early conclusion of the war.

As for the most important question of the manner of concluding as soon as possible the present capitalist war, not by an imposed peace, but by a truly democratic peace, the Conference recognizes and declares the following:

This war cannot be ended by a refusal of the soldiers of one side only to continue the war, by a simple cessation of warlike activities on the part of one of the warring groups only. The Conference reiterates its protests against the low intrigues circulated

by the capitalists against our party, with the object of spreading the impression that we are in favor of a separate peace with Germany. We consider the German capitalists to be the same band of robbers as the capitalists of Russia, England, France, etc., and Emperor Wilhelm to be the same crowned bandit as Nicholas II and the monarchs of England, Italy, Rumania and the rest.

Our party will explain to the people with patience and preciseness the truth that war is always bound up indissolubly with the policies of certain definite *classes*, that this war may only be terminated by a democratic peace if the governing powers of at least some of the belligerent countries are handed over to the class of the proletariat and semi-proletariat, who are really capable of putting an end to the bondage of Capitalism.

The revolutionary class, having taken into its hands the governing power in Russia, would inaugurate a series of measures to abolish the economic rule of capitalists, as well as of measures to bring about their complete political sterilization and would immediately and frankly offer to all peoples a democratic peace on the basis of a definite relinquishment of every possible form of annexation and indemnity. Such measures, and such an open offer would create a perfect understanding between the workers of the belligerent countries and would inevitably lead to an uprising of the proletariat against such imperialistic governments as might resist the peace offered them under the above conditions.

Until the revolutionary class in Russia shall have taken over the entire authority of the government, our party will consistently support those proletarian parties and groups in foreign countries as are already, during the continuance of the war, fighting against their own imperialistic government and their own bourgeoisie. Particularly, our party will encourage any incipient fraternization of the masses of soldiers at the front of all the belligerent countries, with the object of transforming this vague and instinctive expression of solidarity of the oppressed into a class conscious movement, with as much organization as is feasible, for the taking over of all the powers of government in all the belligerent countries by the revolutionary proletariat.

VI

SOCIALISM AND THE WAR

[This article was published early in 1915, but its analysis is enduring. Karl Kautsky, whose tendency is indicted herein, subsequently "seceded" with others from the Social-Democratic Party and organized in the Independent Socialist Party. While against the war the Kautsky-Haase Independents pursued a petty bourgeois policy, attacked the Bolsheviks; and during the German Revolution adopted a Menshevik, essentially counter-revolutionary policy. This chapter should be considered in connection with the final chapter of Part Two—"International Socialism."—L. C. F.]

The collapse of the International is sometimes looked upon purely from its formal side, as a rupture of the international tie between the Socialist parties of the belligerent countries—the impossibility to convene either an International Socialist Conference or the International Socialist Bureau, etc. This point of view has been adopted by the Socialists of the small neutral countries, perhaps even by the majority of their official parties, also by opportunists and their defenders.

For class-conscious workingmen Socialism is an earnest conviction and not a convenient cover for bourgeois-conciliatory and nationally-conflicting aims. By the collapse of the International they understand the flagrant treason of the majority of the official Social-Democratic parties to their convictions, to their most solemn declarations expressed in the speeches at the Stuttgart and Basel International Congresses, and in the resolutions at said Congresses, etc. Only those will not see such treason as do not want to see it, those to whom it will be disadvantageous to see it. To formulate the matter in a scientific way, i. e., from the standpoint of the relations of classes in modern society, we must state that the majority of the Socialist parties, at the head of which was the largest and most influential party of the Second International—the German party—placed themselves at the side of their general staffs, their governments, and their bourgeoisie, against the proletariat. This was an event of world-historical significance and it is impossible to pass it without a more exhaustive analysis. It has long ago been

recognized that wars with all the horrors and misery they bring, are of more or less benefit in mercilessly exposing and destroying a great deal of the rotten, defunct and the cadaverous in human institutions. The European war of 1914-15 is beginning to bring undoubted benefit, in revealing to the most advanced class of civilized countries, that in its parties has ripened a sort of disgusting, purulent abscess, and from somewhere there is being emitted an unbearable, cadaverous odor.

I

Is the treason to all their convictions and problems of the chief Socialist parties of Europe evident? It is to be understood that neither the traitors nor those who well know or vaguely guess that they will be obliged to make peace and friends with them—like to speak of this. But no matter how unpleasant it may be to various "authorities" of the Second International or their party friends among the Russian Social-Democrats, we must look things straight in the face, give them their own names, in short tell the truth to the workers.

Are there any real data as to the position taken prior to this war and in expectation of it, by the Socialist parties? Undisputably there are. They are the resolutions of the Basel International Congress of 1912, together with the resolution of the Chemnitz German Social Democratic Convention, of the same year, which live as a remembrance of "the forgotten words" of Socialism.

Summing up the propagandist and agitational literature of all countries against war the Basel resolution represents the most correct and full, the most solemn and formal exposition of Socialist views on war and of the tactics in relation to war. We can not call by any other name than treason the fact that no one of the authorities of the International of yesterday and of the social-patriotism of to-day—neither Hyndman, nor Cheidse, nor Kautsky, nor Plekhanov, dare to remind their readers of this resolution, and are either altogether silent about it or they cite (as does Kautsky) the unimportant, while they pass over the important parts of it. The most "extreme," arch-revolutionary resolutions and the most shameless neglect or repudiation of them—such is one of the striking manifestations of the collapse of the International—and at the same time of the striking proofs that to believe in "the reformation" of Socialism and in the "straightening of its line" by means of resolutions alone is a belief only of people in whom an unexampled naivete is

combined with a cunning desire to perpetuate the former hypocrisy.

The views of Guesde have lately been expressed by the Guesdist, Charles Dainas, who cites the former Socialist declarations of patriotic context (as does the German Social-Chauvinist David in his last pamphlet, on the defence of the fatherland), but who does not cite the Basel manifesto. About this manifesto Plekhanov is completely silent while offering up with an especially smug air, his chauvinistic commonplaces. Kautsky is like Plekhanov; in citing the Basel manifesto he skips all the revolutionary places (that is all which are substantial) very likely under the pretext of prohibition by the censor. The police and the military heads with their censorial prohibition against mentioning the revolution and the class struggle, have been very "handy" in helping the traitors of the Revolution. But perhaps the Basel manifesto presents some sort of an empty appeal, which has no definite content, neither historical nor factional—which may directly refer to this present war?

On the contrary the Basel resolution contains less than others of declamation, and more concrete substance. The Basel resolution deals specifically with the very same war which did come and especially of those same imperialistic conflicts of Austria and Serbia because of the Balkans, of Austria and Italy because of Albania, etc., of England and Germany because of markets and colonies in general, of Russia with Turkey, etc., because of Armenia and Constantinople—that is what the resolution of Basel, foreseeing the present war, deals with specifically. Precisely of the present war between "the great Powers of Europe" the Basel resolution states that such war "can not be justified under any pretext whatsoever of national interest"!

And if now Plekhanov and Kautsky—to take only two of the typical Socialists of authority—are searching for all sorts of "national justifications" for the war, if they, with learned air and with a stock of false citations from Marx, refer for "examples" to the wars of 1813 and 1870 (Plekhanov) or 1854, 1871, 1876-77 and 1897 (Kautsky)—then, in truth, only people without a shadow of Socialistic convictions, without the least bit of Socialistic conscience, can take such proof seriously, and not style them as unmitigated Jesuitism, hypocrisy and prostitution of Socialism. Let the German "Vorstand" of the party deliver unto damnation the new magazine of Mehring and Rosa Luxembourg (*Internazionale*) for its correct estimation of Kautsky. Let Vandervelde, Plekhanov, Hyndman & Co., with the help of the police of the "Triple Entente" treat

their opponents in the same way we will reply simply by reprinting the Basel manifesto, which convicts these leaders of their change and for which there is no other word but treason.

The Basel resolution treats not of a national, not of a people's war, examples of which have occurred in Europe, which even were typical of the period between 1789 and 1871, and not of a revolutionary war which Socialists have never renounced, but of the present war on the basis of "capitalistic Imperialism" and "dynastic interests" on the basis of "a policy of conquest" of both the belligerent groups, Austro-German as well as Anglo-French-Russian. Plekhanov, Kautsky & Co. are plainly deceiving the workers in repeating the selfish falsehoods of the bourgeoisie of all lands who strive with all their power to represent the imperialistic colonial predatory war—as a national and self-defensive war (no matter for whom), and in searching justifications for it from the sphere of historical examples of non-imperialistic wars.

The question as to the imperialistic, predatory, anti-proletarian character of this war has long ago passed from the purely theoretical stage. Not only has Imperialism been theoretically appraised in all its main characteristics as the struggle of a perishing, rotting, decrepit bourgeoisie for the partition of the world and the enslavement of "small" nations; not only have these conclusions been repeated in all the vast literature of the Socialists of all countries; not only has, for example, the Frenchman, Deleze, a representative of one of our "Allied" countries, in the pamphlet "The Inevitable War" (in the year 1911!), popularly exposed the predatory character of the present war even from the standpoint of the French bourgeoisie. That isn't enough. The representatives of the proletarian parties of all countries unanimously and formally declared at Basel their firm conviction that a war was imminent precisely of an Imperialistic character and drew tactical conclusion because of that. Therefore, in passing, all allusions as to failure to define the difference between international and national tactics must be repudiated as sophistry (cf. the last interview of Axelrod in Nos. 87 and 90 of *Nashe Slovo*). It is sophistry because a many-sided, scientific, analysis of Imperialism is one thing—an analysis which eventually is as endless as science itself, and another thing—the principles of Socialist tactics against capitalistic Imperialism explained in millions of copies of Social-Democratic papers and in decisions of the International.

Socialist parties are not debating clubs but organizations of a

fighting proletariat and when a number of battalions have gone over to the enemy they must be named and discredited as traitors, without any one being deceived by hypocritical phrases to the effect that not everybody comprehends Imperialism "in the same manner," that Chauvinist Cunow, and Chauvinist Kautsky are capable of writing volumes about it, that the question has not been efficiently discussed, etc., etc. Capitalism in all manifestations of its rapine; in all the smallest ramifications of its historical development and its national peculiarities, will never be learnt through and through. About details savants (and pedants especially) will never cease to dispute. "On this basis" to renounce the Socialist struggle against Imperialism and also the opposition to those who have been treasonable to this conflict would have been ridiculous. Yet what else do Kautsky, Cunow, Axelrod, etc., propose? No one has as yet attempted to dissect now, after the war, the Basel resolution, and prove its incorrectness!

II

But perhaps sincere Socialists favored the Basel resolution in the expectation that the war would create a revolutionary situation, but the events refuted their reasoning and the revolution became impossible.

Precisely with this sort of sophistry Cunow (in his pamphlet, "The Collapse of the Party," and in many articles) attempts to justify his entry into the bourgeois camp, and we meet hints of similar "conclusions" almost in all the Socialist Chauvinists, with Kautsky at the head. Hopes of a revolution turned out to be illusions and to defend illusions is not a function of a Marxist, reasons Cunow. At the same time he does not say a word about the Basel manifesto, but as a highly honorable man he tries to shift the responsibility on those of the extreme left, such as Pannekoek and Radek.

Let us examine the substance of the argument that the authors of the Basel resolution sincerely expected the advent of the revolution but that events refuted them. The Basel manifesto declares: (1) That the war will create an economic and political crisis; (2) that the workers will look upon their participation in it as a crime—as an iniquitous shooting at each other for the sake of Capitalist profits, the vanity of dynasties, the fulfilment of secret diplomatic agreements, that the war calls forth "indignation and revulsion" among the workers; (3) that the said crisis and the said psychological condition of the workers, Socialists should take advantage of "to rouse the people, and hasten the downfall of Capitalism";

(4) that all "governments," without exception, can not begin the war "without danger to themselves"; (5) that the governments "fear a proletarian revolution"; (6) that the governments should remember the Paris Commune (i. e., a civil war), the revolution of 1905 in Russia, etc., etc. All these are very clear ideas. There is no *guarantee* in them that the revolution will take place. In them is emphasized the precise consideration of *facts* and *tendencies*. Any one who on the basis of these ideas and arguments states that the expected advent of the revolution turned out to be an illusion, exhibits not a Marxist but a Struvist and a renegade police relation to the revolution.

For a Marxist there is no doubt that a revolution is impossible without a revolutionary situation, and moreover not every revolutionary situation leads to a revolution. What are the signs of a revolutionary situation? We will probably not err, if we cite the following three leading signs:

(1) The impossibility of the ruling classes to preserve their domination without change of form; one or another crisis "at the top," a political crisis of the ruling class, creating a breach through which the indignation and dissatisfaction of the masses bursts through. For the approach of the revolution it is insufficient that only "those on the bottom" did not want to, but also that those "on the top" no longer can live as before.

(2) The more than usual increase of the needs and misery of the exploited classes.

(3) The marked growth, because of mentioned causes, of the activity of the masses who in "peaceful periods" permit themselves to be robbed in quiet—and in stormy ones are drawn to independent, historical action, under the influence of those "at the top" as well as the entire atmosphere of crises, without these objective changes, independent of the will not only of separate groups and ~~and~~ parties, but of separate classes as well, revolution, according to general conceptions, is impossible. The conjunction of all these objective changes is what is called a revolutionary situation. There was such a situation in Russia in 1905 and during all revolutionary periods in the West. But there was the same revolutionary situation in the sixties of the last century in Germany and in 1859-1861 and 1879-1880 in Russia although no revolutions occurred at the time. Why? Because not from every revolutionary situation there arises a revolution—but only from such in which there is joined with the objective changes a subjective change as well, viz., the

capacity of the revolutionary *class* to effect revolutionary mass actions, sufficiently powerful to break down or undermine the old government which will never "fall," not even in periods of crises, if it is not "overthrown."

Such is the Marxist attitude toward revolution, which was very often expressed and acknowledged and confirmed for us Russians by the experiences of the year 1905. The question is what was expected in this connection by the Basel manifesto in 1912 and what did take place in 1914-15.

A revolutionary situation was expected, briefly described by the phrase "an economic and a political crisis." Did it take place? Undoubtedly, yes. The Socialist-Chauvinist, Lensch (who was much more honest in expressing his views, than the hypocrites Cunow, Kautsky, Plekhanov & Co.), even said that we are living through a peculiar *revolution* (vide page 6 of his pamphlet, "German Social-Democracy and the War," Berlin, 1915). The political crisis was self-evident. Not one of the governments was sure of the next day, not one was free from the danger of a financial collapse, loss of territory or expulsion from its own country (as, for instance, the Belgian government was expelled). All the governments are living at the edge of a volcano; all are making appeals to the heroism of the masses.

The political regime of Europe is completely shaken and no one will deny that we have entered (and entering further still—I am writing this on the day when Italy has entered the war.) into an epoch of great political disturbances. If Kautsky two months after the declaration of war wrote (Oct. 2, 1914, *The Neue Zeit*) that never is the government so strong and the parties so weak as at the commencement of a war, it is but one of the samples of the counterfeit historical science of Kautsky for the benefit of Sudekum and other opportunists. Never does a government require the agreement of all the parties of the ruling classes and the "peaceful subservience" to their "rule" of the exploited classes, as in times of war. "At the commencement of war," especially in a country expecting a quick victory, the government "appears" all-powerful, yet nobody, at no time, and nowhere in the world, connected the expectation of a revolutionary situation exclusively with the moment of commencement of the war, and therefore never identified "the appearance" with the actuality.

That the European war will be burdensome, beyond comparison with others, everybody knew and acknowledged. The experiences

of the war confirms this more and more. The misery of the masses is terrible, and the efforts of the governments, bourgeoisie and opportunists, to conceal the misery meet with frequent disaster. The profits of certain groups of Capitalists are scandalously high.

The intensification of contradictions is enormous. Suppressed indignation of the masses, vague longing of the stupified and lowest strata of society for kindly ("democratic") peace, the beginning of revolt "below"—all these are evident. And the more war is prolonged and intensified the more governments develop and are obliged to develop the activity of the masses, call them to exceptional, extraordinary efforts and sacrifices. The experiences of war like the experiences of every crisis in history, of every misery and catastrophe in the life of man, stupifies and breaks down some, but at the same time *hardens and enlightens others*. In general besides, in the world's history, the numbers and strength of the latter exceeds the former, with the exception of certain instances of breakdown and destruction of this or that government. The conclusion of peace not only is unable "at once" to put an end to these miseries and to all this intensification of contradictions, but on the contrary in many respects makes the misery even more burdensome, and especially more evident for the most backward masses of the people. In a word, a revolutionary condition in the majority of the leading countries and great powers of Europe is at hand. In this respect the expectations of the Basel manifesto have been fully realized. To deny this truth directly or indirectly or to be silent about it as do Cunow, Plekhanov, Kautsky & Co. means to be telling the greatest untruth, to deceive the working class and to serve the bourgeoisie.

III

How did it come to pass that the most eminent representatives and leaders of the Second International betrayed Socialism? We shall discuss this question at greater length when we review the various attempts which were made to justify that betrayal. Let us analyze the social-patriotic theory whose exponents are: Plekhanov, who likes to repeat the arguments presented by the Anglo-French chauvinists, Hyndman, and his new school, and Kautsky, whose arguments are extremely "thin" but give the appearance of great theoretical strength.

All of them resort to the argument of self-defense. We were attacked, we are defending ourselves; the cause of the proletariat de-

mands that we resist those who have disturbed the peace of Europe. This is a re-hash of the declarations made by all the governments, and of the rant published in all the bourgeois sheets of the entire world. Plekhanov even improves upon his usual Jesuitism, and says that when facing concrete facts we must first of all determine the guilty party and settle accounts with him, putting off till some other time the solution of all other problems. (See Plekhanov's pamphlet on *The War*, Paris, 1914, and a reprint of its conclusion in Axelrod's *Golos*, Nos. 86 and 87.) When it comes to sophistic dialectic Plekhanov beats all records. Sophists always manage to spirit away some of the evidence and even Hegel confessed once that one could build up an argument about anything on earth. Intellectual honesty demands that one investigates all the sides of every social phenomenon and every stage of its development, and all the visible manifestations of the various forces at work and of the class struggle. Plekhanov falls back upon a quotation from the German press saying that even the Germans recognized the guilt of Austria and Germany. And that sort of evidence is perfectly satisfactory to him.

He remains absolutely quiet on the Czarist plans of conquest in Galicia, Armenia and other parts of the world, plans which have been exposed many times by the Russian Socialists.

He does not make the slightest effort to look into the diplomatic history of even the last thirty years; that history proves incontrovertibly that the two groups of belligerents had set as their main object the seizure of colonies, the annexation of foreign lands, and the destruction of their successful competitors.¹

¹See the very interesting book, *The War of Steel and Gold*, by the English pacifist, H. N. Brailsford, who leans strongly toward Socialism. The book was published in March, 1914. The author realizes clearly that national questions are of secondary importance, that nobody bothers much with them and that the problems which interested diplomacy most were the Bagdad railroad, the supplying of rails for that road, the Moroccan ore deposits etc. (pages 35 and 36). One of the most illuminating incidents in the history of latter day diplomacy is the fight waged by the French patriots and the English imperialists to defeat Caillaux' attempts at a rapprochement with Germany in 1911, 1912 and 1913, on the basis of a division of spheres of influence and the listing of German securities on the Paris Exchange. The English and French bourgeoisie broke that agreement (pages 38-40). The aim of Imperialism is to export capital into weaker countries (page 74). The profits derived from that source in England were 90 or 100 million pounds sterling for 1899, 140 million pounds in 1909 (we may add that Lloyd-George in a recent address estimated those profits at 200 million pounds).

To obtain that object, Turkish leaders are bribed, the sons of important Hindoos and Egyptians supplied with nice little berths (pages 85-87). An

A logical analysis of war (one which is not distorted by Plekhanov's shameless bourgeois slant) leads to the conclusion that war is simply "the continuation of politics by other means" (of a violent nature). This is the definition given by Clausewitz,² one of the leading authorities on the history of wars, writing under the inspiration of the Hegelian theories.

And this was also the opinion of Marx and Engels who regarded war as the continuation of the politics of certain interested powers and of various classes within the various nations, at a certain time.

Plekhanov's primitive chauvinism stands exactly on the same theoretical plane as Kautsky's more subtle, opportunistic and watery chauvinism, when the latter approves the attitude of the Socialists of every country going over to the camp of "their" own capitalists in the following statement:

"It is everybody's right and duty to defend his country. True internationalism grants that right to the Socialists of every country, and among them to those who are at war with my country." (*Neue Zeit*, October 2, 1914, *passim*.)

This incredible statement is such a base betrayal of Socialism, that the only way to answer it would be to have a medal coined with, on one side, the portraits of William II and Nicholas II and on the other side those of Plekhanov and Kautsky. True internationalism would then justify the French workers in shooting the

²Carl von Clausewitz, *Von Kriege*, Vol. I. page 28, of his complete works. "Everybody knows that wars are caused simply by political relations between governments and between nations; but we generally imagine that at the beginning of a war those relations are interrupted and that an entirely different state of affairs obtains, regulated only by its own laws. We wish to repeat on the contrary that war is nothing but a continuation of those political relations with the introduction of different means."

insignificant minority fattens on armaments and wars, but it is backed by society and finance while the unorganized population is vainly striving for peace. (93) The pacifist who yesterday were talking for peace and disarmament, will join tomorrow a party absolutely dominated by the war contractors. (161). As soon as the Triple Entente was concluded it seized Morocco and proceeded to dismember Persia. The Triple Alliance took Tripoli, entrenched itself in Bosnia, and dominated Turkey. (167). London and Paris gave billions to Russia in March, 1906, thus enabling Czarism to crush all the revolutionary movements (225-228). Now England is helping Russia to strangle Persia. (229). Russia lit the fires of the Balkan war. (230). This is not new. This is an old story, which has been told a thousand times in the Socialist papers of the entire world. At the eve of the war, this was very obvious to an English bourgeois. But think of what rot, what hypocrisy, what miserable lies such facts reveal in the statements of Plekhanov and Potresof on Germany's guilt, or in Kautsky's "prospect" of disarmament and lasting peace under a capitalistic form of government.

German workers and the German workers in shooting the French workers.

If we examine the premises from which Kautsky draws his conclusions, we find the belief, whose absurdity Clausewitz demonstrated eighty years ago, that at the beginning of a war all the historical relations between nations and classes are obliterated and that an entirely new order of things is ushered in. There are people who were attacked and who are defending themselves, who are "simply" repelling the "enemies of their country." The oppression of a large number of nations, of over one-half of the population of the globe, by the imperialists of the great powers, the competition between the bourgeoisies of those nations for the division of profits, the endeavor of capitalists to break up and crush out the labor movements, all of those things on which Plekhanov and Kautsky wrote extensively for ten years preceding the war, seem to have disappeared entirely from their field of vision.

The two leaders of the social-patriots insult Marx by invoking him as their authority in this connection. Plekhanov points to the national wars waged by Prussia in 1813, by Germany in 1870, and Kautsky shows that Marx settled the question as to the nation, that is the bourgeoisie, whose victory was not to be wished for in the wars of 1854-5, 1859, 1870-71, and that the Marxists did the same in the wars of 1876-7 and 1897. Sophists of all times have always resorted to the same tricks: they use examples which do not apply to the case in point. The previous wars of which they speak were the continuation of a policy of many years standing, a movement of the bourgeoisie against foreign domination and against Turkish and Russian absolutism. No question could be raised then except as to the desirability of the victory of one bourgeoisie or another. In these wars, Marxists could call upon the nations to act, inflame national hatred, as Marx did in 1848, and later in the war with Russia, as Engels did in 1859 when he excited the Germans' national hatred against their oppressors, Napoleon III and the Russian Czar.³

³G. Gardenin, writing in *Zisshn*, charges Marx with revolutionary chauvinism for favoring in 1848 a war against nations which he had proved to be counter-revolutionary, the Slav and Russian nations. Such a charge shows opportunism or superficiality or both. We Marxists have always favored war against counter-revolutionary nations. For instance, if Socialism should triumph in the United States or in Europe in, let us say, 1920, and if Japan and China should then mobilize against them their Bismarcks, even only on the diplomatic field, we should join hands with the Socialistic countries in a revolutionary war. Does that seem strange to you, Mr. Gardenin?

To compare a continuation of the policy of struggle against feudalism and absolutism, the policy of the bourgeoisie that strives to free itself, with the continuation of the policy of a decrepit bourgeoisie, imperialist, predatory and reactionary, allied with feudal elements which are trying to oppress the proletariat is to compare an inch with a ton.

One might just as well compare Robespierre, Garibaldi and Zheliabo with Millerand, Salandra and Gutchkof, and say that they were all "representatives of the bourgeoisie." No Marxist can help feeling the deepest regard for the great bourgeois revolutionists who had the historical right to speak in the name of bourgeois society, and who urged millions of people in new nations to conquer a share of civilization by fighting the feudal system. Neither can a Marxist help feeling scorn for sophists like Plekhanov and Kautsky, who speak of "defending the fatherland" when the German imperialists are strangling Belgium or when the French, English, Russian and Italian imperialists are trying to rob Austria and Turkey.

Here is another social-patriot interpretation of Marxism: "Socialism will result from the rapid evolution of capitalism. The triumph of my country would hasten the evolution of Capitalism and hence the coming of Socialism in my country. Defeat of my country's arms would delay her economic development and therefore the coming of Socialism."

Struivism is not only a Russian but, as recent developments have proved, an international endeavor of the bourgeois theorists to kill Marxism with tenderness, to strangle it in a loving embrace, by accepting its "really scientific side" but discarding its elements of "agitation" of "demagogy" of "Blanquist utopia"; in other words, to take every part of the Marxian lore which is helpful to the liberal bourgeoisie in its fight for reform, everything which helps in the class war (stopping short of a dictatorship of the proletariat), to accept all the "socialist ideals" and the overthrow of Capitalism in favor of "new social strata" and to discard "merely" the live part of Marxism, its revolutionary spirit.

Marxism is the theory of the emancipation movement of the proletariat. Class conscious workers must therefore watch very carefully the process whereby Marxism is being transformed into Struivism.

The forces tending to bring about that process are many and varied. We shall only mention three of them:

The development of science offers more and more evidence favorable to Marxism. And, therefore, the fight against Marxism has to be waged in a hypocritical fashion. One cannot attack it openly but one can accept it, adulterating its essential points by sophistry, and transforming it into some sacred "ikon" which is not dangerous for the bourgeoisie.

The growth of opportunism among the Socialist parties favors this distortion of Marxism, which is only one of the many concessions made by the opportunists.

In our imperialistic times, the world is being divided up among the large privileged powers which are enslaving all the others. Some crumbs from the feast are being picked up by certain groups of bourgeois, aristocrats, office holders and even workingmen. The latter class of the people, an insignificant minority of the proletariat and of the laboring masses, gravitate toward Struvisism, for it gives them an excuse for joining hands with "their" own bourgeoisie against the exploited masses or "all" nations. We shall come back to this later, when we discuss the reasons for the collapse of the International.

IV

Kautsky's theory of "ultra Imperialism" is simply a subtle form of social-patriotism attired in scientific and international trappings. Here is a clear, precise and new analysis of it by its own author:

"The weakening of the protectionist movement in England, the adoption of lower tariff duties in America, the movement toward disarmament, the decreases in the export of capital from France and Germany in the years immediately preceding the war, finally, the closer international relations which had been establishing themselves between the various groups to financiers and capitalists, caused me to wonder whether our present-day imperialism was not in the process of being displaced by a new system, ultra-Imperialism, which in place of the strife waged among national groups of capitalists, would usher in a general exploitation of the entire world by an international alliance of capitalists. This new development of capitalism can very well be imagined. Whether it is realizable or not, we cannot very well say at the present time. *Neue Zeit*, No. 5, 30, IV, 1915, page 144.)

"The course and the outcome of the present war may supply an answer to that question. It may annihilate the weak germs of ultra-Imperialism by fostering an extreme hatred between national

groups of financiers and capitalists, bringing about an increase in armaments and the determination of certain groups to destroy certain other groups, in other words, making another world war unavoidable. Then the prophecy I made in my pamphlet, *The Road to Power*, would realize itself in terrible fashion, class antagonisms would become more acute and the moral decay of Capitalism would be at hand."

Let us notice that by that artificial expression, *Abwirtschaftung*, Kautsky simply means the hostility to Capitalism manifested by the "intermediary strata separating the proletariat from the capitalists, that is the professional classes, the small bourgeois and even some small capitalists." . . . "But the war may have different results. It may strengthen those weak germs of ultra-Imperialism. The lessons it will teach us [save the mark] may hasten developments which were overdue at the time when the war broke out. If things go that far, as far as an agreement among nations, as far as disarmament, as far as the establishment of a lasting peace, then the factors which until the outbreak of the war were the most potent in the decay of capitalism may be eliminated."

This new development, naturally, would bring in its wake, "new and perhaps worse forms of suffering for the proletariat," but "in time," ultra-Imperialism might "usher in an era of new hopes and expectations within the boundaries of capitalism" (page 145).

How does this theory justify social-patriotism?

In the following way, which to a logical mind is rather strange: The German Socialists of the left wing say that Imperialism and the wars it causes are not a fortuitous accident but a necessary result of capitalism which has enthroned financial capital. Therefore the masses must engage in a revolutionary struggle, for the era of relatively peaceful development is at an end.

The Socialist of the right wing simply say: since Imperialism is unavoidable let us all be imperialists.

Kautsky playing the part of a centre party reconciles them all:

"The extreme radicals," he writes in his pamphlet *National Power, Imperialist Power and Powers' Combines* (Nuremberg, 1915), wish to oppose Socialism to Imperialism which is inevitable, in other words, they want to oppose Imperialism not only by means of the propaganda which for half a century we have conducted against every form of capitalistic domination, but by the immediate establishment of a Socialist system. This seems very radical, but

likely to *drive those* who do not *believe* in the possibility of the immediate establishment of Socialism, into the imperialistic camp" (page 17.) (Italics mine.)

Speaking of the immediate establishment of Socialism, Kautsky takes advantage of the fact that the military censorship does not allow any talk about revolutionary activities. He knows very well that the left-wing Socialists demand from the party immediate propaganda and the preparation for revolutionary action, and not "the immediate establishment of the Socialist system."

From the inevitability of Imperialism, the left wing Socialists deduce the necessity of revolutionary action. The theory of ultra-Imperialism, is used by Kautsky to justify the opportunists, to throw such a light upon their behavior that they no longer seem to have gone over to the bourgeois camp; they were simply people who did not believe in the feasibility of establishing immediately the Socialist system, and who expected the future to bring us an era of disarmament and lasting peace.

His theory is purely and simply a means of justifying by the expectation of a new peaceful era of Capitalism the alliance of the opportunists and official Social-Democrats with the bourgeois, and their refusal to adopt a revolutionary, that is proletarian, attitude, when the actual storm broke out, in spite of the solemn promises of the Basel resolution.

Notice that Kautsky does not state that a new era *shall* result from certain conditions; he simply says: "whether there will be such a new era, I cannot state at present."

At the same time let us look at the tendencies to which Kautsky is pointing and which may bring about the new era. It is quite amazing to find among them economic facts cited by Kautsky, the trend toward disarmament. Which means that, Kautsky, unable to make certain positive facts chime with his contradictory theory, takes refuge in bourgeois babble and dreams. Kautsky's ultra-Imperialism, a word which by the way does not express accurately what he means, simply designates the blunt contradictions of Capitalism.

Kautsky writes about "The weakening of the protectionist movement in England and America;" but how does this reveal in the slightest way the coming of a new era? Having reached its climax, protectionism in America is losing its strength, but protectionism remains, as does the privileged position granted to England by the colonial custom tariffs. Let us not forget what condi-

tioned the transition from yesterday's "peaceful" Capitalism to to-day's Imperialism: the fact that unrestricted competition has been replaced by monopolistic alliances of capitalists and that the entire world has been divided up among them. It is obvious that those facts and factors have a world-wide significance. Unrestricted commerce and world-wide competition were possible and necessary when capital could without much difficulty establish new colonies and seize land in Africa and in other unoccupied parts of the world, and when at the same time the concentration of capital was only in its embryonic stage and there were no monopolistic concerns, powerful enough to dominate one entire branch of any industry.

The appearance and growth of those monopolistic concerns (a process which is still going on in England and in America, and I wonder whether Kautsky would deny that the war has hastened that process?) makes the former competition impossible, tears the ground from under it, and the division of the earth among those large monopolies brings unavoidably in its wake an armed conflict for the division of colonies and spheres of influence.

It is ridiculous to think that the weakening of the protectionist movement in two countries could change this in any way.

Kautsky also mentions a decrease in the export of capital by two countries in the past few years. Those two countries, France and Germany, exported, according to statistics for 1912, some 35 billion marks each and England alone twice as much.⁴

The increase in the export of capital never was and never could be regular under Capitalism. Whether the accumulation of capital has decreased or whether the capacity of the home market has increased owing to an amelioration in the condition of the masses, Kautsky does not try to decide. Such being the case it is impossible to predict the coming of the new era from the decrease in the export of capital in two countries.

Then Kautsky tells us about "the closer relations which are being established between groups of financiers and capitalists."

This is indeed the only general and positive tendency we have observed not for a few years only, nor for just two nations, but

⁴Conf. Bernard Harms: *Probleme der Weltwirtschaft*, Jena, 1912
George Faish: "Great Britain's Capital Investments in Colonies," in the
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. LXXV, 1910-1911, p. 187.
Lloyd-George in an address delivered at the beginning of 1915, estimates
the amount of English capital invested abroad at four billion pounds sterling.

the world over, as far as Capitalism is concerned. But why should this bring about disarmament instead of more armaments, as it has done thus far? Let us consider any of the concerns which manufacture guns and other implements of warfare, such as the Armstrong firm. The English *Economist* stated, in a recent issue (Vol. 1, 1915), that the profits of that firm, which had been 606,000 pounds sterling for 1905-06, had grown to 856,000 pounds in 1913 and to 940,000 pounds in 1914. In this field of industry we observe closer and closer relations among financiers and capitalists. German capitalists are interested in English firms; English firms build submarines for Austria, etc. International combinations of capital derive a large amount of business from armaments and wars.

To conclude, from the gradual blending of the various national capitalist groups into a single international unit, that disarmament is coming is to encourage the good old bourgeois delusion that social antinomies may grow less instead of more acute.

v

Kautsky speaks of the lessons of the war in a perfectly philistine spirit, taking those lessons to be the moral horror inspired by the sufferings due to the war. This is what he has to say on the subject: "No evidence is needed to prove that certain classes of the population are vitally interested in peace and disarmament: little bourgeois, farmers and also many capitalists and professional men whose interest in Imperialism would be more than offset by the harm caused to them by war and armaments. (Page 21).

This was written in April, 1915. We have seen all the property-owning classes, including the little bourgeois and the professional classes, flocking over to the imperialist camp, but Kautsky simply dismisses actual acts with fatuous phraseology. He determines the interests of the bourgeoisie, not from the bourgeoisie's own actions, but from statements made by a few bourgeois, statements which stand in absolute disaccord with their actions. It is as though we should gauge the real interests of the bourgeoisie not by the bourgeoisie's actual deeds, but by the unctuous sermons of some bourgeois priests who swear to us that the modern world is pervaded by Christian ideals.

Kautsky edits Marxism in such a way that it loses all its substance, and only preserves some supra-real, spiritualistic interest, as it deals no longer with economic facts, but merely voices harmless wishes for the welfare of mankind.

Marxism draws its conclusions as to the "interests" of the various classes from class antagonisms and the class struggle revealed by innumerable acts of our every-day life. The little bourgeois blabbers sentimentally about allaying class antagonisms and brings "proofs" that their accentuation would have "harmful consequences."

Imperialism is simply the subjugation of all the propertied classes by financial capital and the partition of the world among the five or six great powers, most of whom are now engaged in the war. That partition of the world by the great powers means that all their propertied classes are interested in the conquest of colonies, in spheres of influence, in the oppression of other nations, in the more or less profitable positions and privileges, which redound from belonging to a great power and to a nation capable of oppressing others.⁵

We can no longer live as we did in the past, in a quiet, cultured, peaceful environment, with Capitalism developing itself smoothly and spreading gradually over new parts of the earth, for we have entered a new era.

Financial capital is removing and will remove completely certain countries from the ranks of the great powers, taking away their colonies and their spheres of influence (as Germany's threat is in her war with England), despoiling the small bourgeois of his "great-power" privileges and his income. This is one of the things the war has taught us. This has been brought about by the accentuation of antinomies whose reality everybody admitted long ago, even Kautsky in his *Road to Power*.

And at the very time when a war is being waged for the privileges redounding from "great powerdom," Kautsky tells capitalists and petty bourgeois that war is an awful thing, that disarmament is

⁵E. Schultze states that in 1915 the total value of all the stocks and bonds in the whole world was 732 billion francs, including the loans of governments and cities, mortgages and stocks of commercial and financial enterprises. Of this amount England's share was 130 billion francs. The United States' 115, France's 100, Germany's 75; in other words, these four powers held some 420 billions or over one half of all the paper in existence. We can estimate from these data the advantages and privileges enjoyed by the large powers of the first rank, which are able to dominate, subjugate and exploit the other nations. (Dr. Emil Schultze *Das Französische Kapital in Russland in Finanz. Archiv* Berlin 1915, Vol. 38, page 127). The so-called "defense of the fatherland" when great powers are concerned is simply one defense of the right to plunder other nations. In Russia, as everybody knows, capitalist Imperialism is less powerful, but military-feudal Imperialism is stronger on that account.

a fine thing, and he accomplishes about as much as the priest who from his pulpit tells capitalists that love of one's neighbor is God's behest, a source of bliss for our soul and the moral law of civilization. What Kautsky calls the economic trend to ultra-Imperialism is a petty bourgeois attempt to tell the financiers they should not do wrong.

The export of capital? But capital is being exported in larger quantities to independent countries like the United States than into colonial lands.

To seize colonies? But they have almost all been seized and almost all of them are trying now to free themselves. "India may cease to be an English dependency, but she will never submit as an independent empire to the domination of any other nation" (page 49). Every effort made by a commercial capitalist government to create a colonial empire in order to free itself from all dependence from any other power for its supply of raw materials, is bound to unite against that government all the other capitalist governments and to drag it into endless, exhausting wars, which will not bring it any nearer to its goal. Such a policy is the shortest road to economic bankruptcy (pages 72-73).

Isn't this objugation to the financiers to avoid Imperialism pure philistine piffle? To warn capitalists against bankruptcy is like warning brokers not to gamble in stocks, for "many have in that way lost everything they had." Capital has everything to gain from bankruptcy of competing capitalists and competing nations, for this bankruptcy will cause an even more powerful concentration. And, therefore, the sharper and the more ruthless economic competition, that is, the economic urge toward bankruptcy, grows, the more eager capitalists are to drive their competitors into bankruptcy by means of a war. The fewer countries there are left into which one can export capital profitably, such as colonies and dependent nations, like Turkey (for in such cases the financier makes larger profits than by exporting capital into independent and civilized nations like the United States), the more bitter the fight is for the subjugation and the partition of Turkey, China and other countries.

Thus speak those who are observing this era of financial capital and of Imperialism. Thus speak the facts. But Kautsky injects into the whole thing his bourgeois morality: There is no use getting heated up and fighting over Turkey or India, for this thing will not last long and it is so much better to develop capital in a peaceful way.

Of course, it should be possible to develop Capitalism and to increase the markets by raising wages. This is perfectly "feasible"; one might give that advice to financiers and it would make a fine subject for a sermon. Poor Kautsky all but tell German financiers that it isn't worth their while to fight England for her colonies, as those colonies are bound very soon to regain their freedom. . . .

The amount of the Anglo-Egyptian export-import trade grew much more slowly from 1872 to 1912 than the general export-import trade of England with other nations. The conclusion which the "Marxist" Kautsky draws from that fact is the following: "We have no reason to suppose that, without a military occupation of Egypt, commercial relations with that country would have been less important if left to the sole influence of economic factors (72).

"Capital's efforts to increase its share of activity are better rewarded by avoiding the violent methods of imperialism and only resorting to peaceful democratic means" (70).

What a wonderfully earnest, scientific, marxist analysis! Kautsky improves upon this stupid story by "proving" that the English should not have taken Egypt from the French, that German financiers should not have started the war and organised the Turkish campaign, and other operations to drive the English out of Egypt. All this is rot. The English would never suspect that it would have been better for them, not to use violence in Egypt, but to resort (in order to develop the exportation of capital in true Kautskian style) to peaceful democracy.

"The bourgeois free-traders would be greatly mistaken if they thought that free trade would eliminate the economic antagonisms created by Capitalism. Neither free trade nor democracy could do away with them. But at any rate we are interested in seeing those antagonisms disappear in a struggle such as will impose upon the working class the smallest amount of suffering and sacrifice." (73)

Lord have pity on us! "What is a philistine?" Lassalle once asked. He answered the question by quoting the well known verse: "a philistine is an empty piece of gut, filled with fear and with the hope that God will take pity on him."

Kautsky has gone to an incredible length in prostituting Marxism and has made himself the priest of that new religion. He preaches to the capitalists the necessity of resorting to peaceful democracy and this is the way he builds up his argument: If in the beginning there was free trade, and then monopoly and Imperialism, why not have ultra-Imperialism and after that, free trade?

In his preacher-like way he consoles the oppressed masses by describing all the blessings of ultra-Imperialism, although he doesn't dare to affirm that there will be such a thing. Feuerbach showed clearly to those who defended religion on the ground that it offered a consolation to men, the actual reactionary meaning of such a consolation: "Whoever," he said, "consoles a slave instead of inciting him to revolt against slavery offers help to the slaveholder."

The exploiting classes in order to retain their domination need the services of two retainers: the hangman and the priest. The hangman crushes out the protests and the revolt of the oppressed; the priests depict to them the beautiful state of affairs (and he does that the more successfully if he doesn't insist on the possibility of such a state of affairs) which will diminish their sufferings and their sacrifice while the class domination is maintained; he reconciles them with this domination, he coaxes them away from revolutionary activity, he saps their revolutionary strength, he destroys their revolutionary determination. Kautsky has transformed Marxism into the same immoralizing kind of counter-revolutionary theory, into miserable priestlike rant.

In 1909, in his pamphlet *The Road to Power* he admits a fact which no one has ever tried to refute, that is, the constant, exacerbation of capitalist antagonisms, the approach of an era of war and revolutions, of a "new revolutionary era."

There cannot be, he says, a premature revolution, and it would be an absolute betrayal of our cause to refuse to count on the possibility of victory at the time of an uprising although, before the struggle begins, one cannot deny the possibility of defeat."

The war broke out. Antagonisms became even more violent. The destitution of the masses assumed terrific proportions. The war drags on and spreads more and more, and Kautsky writes pamphlet after pamphlet, meekly submitting to the pleasure of the censor, avoiding all allusions to conquest and to the horrors of war, to the scandalous profiteering of the dealers in army supplies, to the high cost of living, to the military slavery of the mobilized workers; but he keeps on consoling and consoling the proletariat, by reminding it of other wars in which the bourgeoisie showed itself revolutionary or progressive, when Marx himself wished for the victory of this or that bourgeoisie; and he offers still more consolation in the shape of columns of figures, proving the possibility of a Capitalism without colonies and without exploitation, without war and without armaments, the best evidence that "peaceful democracy" is preferable.

Not daring to deny that the sufferings of the masses are becoming more and more acute and that we are in reality facing a truly revolutionary situation (for the censor would not let him speak of such things), Kautsky toadies before the bourgeoisie and he depicts a "perspective" (about whose possibility he does not comment himself) of a form of struggle in the new era, entailing less suffering and fewer sacrifices. Franz Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg were well justified in calling Kautsky a prostitute (*Madchen fur alle*).

In August 1915 a revolutionary crisis arose in Russia. The Czar promised to the Duma "consolations" for the suffering masses. The regime which followed could be designated as "ultra-autocracy," if we can designate by the word ultra-Imperialism the refusal of the capitalists to go in for armaments and their decision to agree among themselves to insure a durable peace.

Let us suppose that tomorrow some hundred of the world's largest financiers, interested in hundreds of interlocking enterprises of colossal size, should promise to the nations that they will insist on disarmament after the war. Let us suppose that, for a minute, so as to follow better the stupid arguments of Kautsky's theory. Even then it would be a betrayal of the proletariat to advise them against revolutionary activities, for without that activity all these promises and all this beautiful perspective would be simply an idle dream.

The war has brought to the capitalists not only huge profits and the promise of new lands to exploit in Turkey, in China, etc., of new orders and of new loans at a higher rate of interest, but it has also brought to them greater political advantages, for it has divided the proletariat against itself, it has corrupted it. Kautsky has lent his help to that perversion, he has sanctioned that schism of the struggling proletarians, in the name of a union with the opportunists of his country, with the Sudekums of every water. And there are people who cannot understand that unity among the old parties simply means the alliance of the national proletariat with its national bourgeoisie and the division of the proletariat into several nations.

VI

The preceding chapter had been written when the *Neue Zeit* for May 28, 1918, came off the press, containing Kautsky's concluding remarks on the "Bankruptcy of the Social-Democracy."

Kautsky sums up all the worn out sophisms (and a new one which he brings in) intended to defend social-patriotism, in the following paragraph:

"It is not true that the war is purely an imperialistic war, and that the alternative when the war broke out was: either Imperialism or Socialism. It is not true that the Socialist parties and the proletarian masses of Germany and France and, in many respects, those of England, listened stupidly to the call of a handful of parliamentarians, threw themselves into the arms of the imperialists, betrayed Socialism and thus brought about a failure without precedent in history."

A new sophism, a new lie to deceive the workers. The war, if you please, was not a "purely" imperialistic war.

Kautsky is terribly unsteady whenever he discusses the actual character of the present war and he dodges the precise and formal declarations of the Basel and Chemnitz conferences as carefully as a thief avoids the scene of his last robbery. In his pamphlet on *National Power, etc.*, written in February, 1915, Kautsky states that "in the last analysis war is imperialistic" (page 64). Now he makes a new reservation; not "purely imperialistic." What is it then?

Well, it is "nationalistic." And Kautsky comes to that conclusion by resorting to the following Plekhanovian logic:

"The present war is a child not only of Imperialism but of the Russian Revolution." Kautsky himself foresaw as early as 1904 that the Russian Revolution would give birth to a new form of Pan-Slavism, that "democratic Russia would unavoidably arouse the desire of the Austrian and Turkish Slaves for their independence. . . . Then the Polish question would become a burning one. . . . Then Austria would collapse, for with the fall of Czarism the iron yoke would be removed which holds together many elements eager to draw away one from the other" (Kautsky himself cites the previous sentence from his article written in 1904). . . . The Russian Revolution . . . would give a new impetus to the nationalist aspirations of the East, and add Asiatic problems to the European problems. . . . *All those problems* are revealing their existence through violent symptoms during the *present* war and are exerting a powerful influence upon the temper of the *popular* masses, especially of the *proletarian* masses at a time when the ruling classes are dominated by imperialistic tendencies" (page 273, italics mine).

There is prostitution of Marxism for you! Since "democratic Russia" would arouse the desires of the Eastern-European nations

for freedom (and we will not controvert this) *then*, the present war, which will not free any nation whatever, but will cause the exploitation of many nations, whatever its issue may be, is not a "purely" imperialistic war. *Since* the failure of Czarism would bring about the disruption of Austria and of her undemocratic national structure, *then* a counter-revolutionary Czarism, having temporarily strengthened itself, conquering Austria and imposing an even heavier yoke upon the various Austrian nationalities, would not give to this war an imperialist but to a certain degree a nationalistic character.

Since the ruling classes fool dull shopkeepers and brutalized peasants by yarns about the nationalistic aims of an imperialistic war, *then*, a scientific man, an authority on Marxism, and a representative of the Second International, is justified in reconciling the masses with that deception by means of this "formula:" the ruling classes have imperialistic tendencies, but the popular classes have nationalistic aspirations.

Logic is here replaced by the lowest, most lying form of sophistry.

In the present war the nationalist element is only found in the war waged by Servia against Austria. And, by the way, mention of this is made in the resolution of the Berne conference. It is only in Servia and among the Servians that we find a movement for national emancipation dating back to many years ago and affecting millions of people, and of which the war waged by Servia against Austria is merely the "continuation."

If that war could be isolated, if it was not so intimately connected with the covetous and thievish plans of England, Russia and other nations, then all the Socialists would be "obliged" to wish for the triumph of the Servian bourgeoisie. This is the only just and unavoidable deduction based upon nationalist aspirations in the present war. But Kautsky never once dares to draw that conclusion.

Let us go further. The Marxist form of reasoning forbids us to study a subject isolated from the environment, that is to study it from a one-sided, incomplete point of view. The nationalist factor in the Servian-Austrian war cannot and could not seriously modify the character of this Pan-American war. If Germany should win she would strangle Belgium, seize a part of Poland and probably a part of France. If Russia should win she would take Galicia and a part of Poland and Armenia. In case of a draw the oppression of nationalities will go on as formerly. For Servia,

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that is for about one hundredth of the peoples engaged in the present war, this war is really "the continuation" of the bourgeois emancipation movement. For the remaining 99 per cent. the war is a continuation of the politics of the imperialistic and decaying bourgeoisie, capable of corrupting but not of emancipating any nation.

The Triple Entente, while "emancipating" Servia, betrays the interests of Servian freedom when it helps Italy to rob Austria.

This is common knowledge, but Kautsky distorts it all in order to justify opportunism. There is no phenomenon, in nature or in society, which is "purely" something and nothing else; this is revealed to us by the application of the Marxist form of reasoning which shows us that the very idea of that "purity" comes from a narrow, one-sided view of things, which does not follow all the threads to their very end and with all their intricacy. There cannot be any "pure" Capitalism showing absolutely no alloy of feudalism or commercialism.

And therefore, to come and tell us that the war is not "purely" imperialistic when we see the imperialists fooling the popular masses and carefully concealing their crudely thievish aims under "nationalistic" phrases, is to betray either infinite pedantry and stupidity or chicanery and deceitfulness. The real fact of the matter is that Kautsky actually abets the imperialists in their attempts at deceiving the nation, when he states that "for the popular masses, among them the proletarian masses, the most important factors are nationalistic problems, *while* for the ruling masses, imperialistic tendencies are foremost," (page 273) and when he strengthens that statement by mentioning "the infinite variety of activities" on page 274. Of course, activities are extremely varied, this is gospel truth. But it is nevertheless true that in that great variety there are two main currents: in its concrete essence the war is "a continuation" of the policy of Imperialism, that is the exploitation of foreign nations by the decaying bourgeoisie and the governments of the great powers; and abstract ideology amounts to "nationalistic" phrases scattered about to satisfy the masses.

The old sophism, reiterated by Kautsky, that at the beginning of the war, the only alternative according to the left-wing Socialists was: Imperialism or Socialism, has already been shot to pieces.

This presupposes a shameful mental reservation, for Kautsky knows too well that the left-wing faced an entirely different alternative: either join hands with the imperialist thieves and deceivers, or preach and prepare revolutionary action. Kautsky also knows that it is only the censor who prevents the left-wing Socialists from

exposing the miserable lies which he is spreading while toadying to all the Sudekums.

Regarding the relations between "the proletarian masses" and "a handful of parliamentarisms," Kautsky advances one of the most threadbare arguments:

"Let us not speak of the German Socialists, so that we shall not seem to be pleading our own cause; but who would seriously pretend that men like Vaillant and Guesde, Hyndman and Plekhanov turned imperialists all of a sudden and betrayed Socialism?"

Let us leave aside the parliamentarians and "competent parties" (Kautsky obviously alludes to the flood of deserved scorn which the magazine *Internationale* published by Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring poured upon the "competent parties," that is the leaders of the German Social-Democratic party, its executive committee, its parliamentary faction, etc.) "Who would pretend that four millions of class-conscious German proletarians would at the call of a handful of parliamentarians make in twenty-four hours a complete round about face to the right, and turn their backs upon all their previous aims. If that was true, it would show the terrible failure, not only of our party, but of the *masses* (*italics mine*). If the masses are so completely lacking in character then we might as well go and bury ourselves." (page 274.)

Karl Kautsky, the great political and scientific authority, had, for that matter, already buried himself under a mound of lamentable evasions. Whoever fails to see this is hopeless as a Socialist; the only attitude to assume toward Kautsky is the infinite scorn which Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring and other contributors to the *Internationale* expressed toward him.

Just think: in regard to the war, the only people who *could* express themselves with a certain freedom (that is because they had not been seized and led to the barracks, and were not in immediate danger of being shot) were *exclusively* that "handful of parliamentarians" (they could vote freely, they could vote against the war, for even in Russia a man did not get beaten, nor threatened, nor arrested for that) and a handful of officials and journalists. Now Kautsky blames the *masses* for all the treachery and lack of character of that group of the population, which Kautsky himself had for many years described as being bound up with the tactics and the ideology of opportunism.

The first and fundamental rule of scientific research in general, and of Marxian discussion in particular, is to examine closely the relations between the present strife among the various Socialist

factions (the faction which howls "betrayal" and rings the alarm bell, and the faction which is unable to see any betrayal) and the strife which went on in former years. Kautsky never says a word about it; he refuses to consider factions and tendencies. There used to be diverging tendencies hitherto. Now there are not any more. Now we only hear about big names, authorities, to whom every lackey kowtows. How handy it is for all of them to "pass the buck" to the other fellow. "What is that opportunism," Martov cried in Berne (see No. 36 of the *Social Democrat*), "when . . . Guesde, Plekhanov, Kautsky. . . ." "We must not be so ready to bandy accusations of opportunism against men like Guesde," writes Axelrod (*Golos* No. 86 and 87). "I shall not defend myself," writes Kautsky, but . . . Vaillant and Guesde, Hyndman and Plekhanov. . . ."

In the ardor of his slavish zeal, Kautsky went as far as paying homage to Hyndman, whom he not so long ago had described as standing on the side of Imperialism.

How many times had Kautsky assailed Hyndman's Imperialism in his own *Neue Zeit* and in all the papers of the Socialist party. If Kautsky would pay some attention to the political biographies of the various men he mentions by name, he would find in those biographies a mass of facts which would show that their right-about-face toward Imperialism was not accomplished in a day, but had been prepared for years. Wasn't Vaillant trailing after the Jauresista, and wasn't Plekhanov trailing after the Mensheviks and "liquidators"? Did he not see Guesdism die out before his very eyes in the columns of Guesde's paper, *Socialism*, a lifeless arid organ, unable to take any definite stand on any question? Did not Kautsky himself (we add this for those who very justly place him in the same class with Hyndman and Plekhanov) show his lack of principles in regard to Millerandism and when the struggle against Bernsteinism began?

But I do not see any scientific interest in studying the biographies of those leaders. Little we care whether in order to defend themselves they use their own arguments or the arguments generally used by opportunists and bourgeois. What gave the conduct of those leaders a serious political importance? Their own activities or the fact that they united themselves to a really active group, supported by the military organizations, that is the bourgeoisie? Kautsky doesn't even try to investigate that side of the problem. The only thing he cares for is to throw dust into people's eyes, to

din into their ears big-sounding names and to prevent them from asking him unpleasant questions.⁶

" . . . Four million people turned right-about-face at the command of a handful of politicians. . . ."

This is an untruth. The German party organization did not have four million members, but one million. Furthermore, the wishes of that mass were expressed, as they are in each and every organization by its center, the handful of men who betrayed Socialism. The handful of men was asked questions, was called upon to pass resolutions; it did pass them, it wrote articles, etc. . . . The masses were never asked for their opinion. They were not allowed to vote; they were divided up and pursued, not by a handful of parliamentarians, but by the military authorities. The military machine was united and did not have traitors in its ranks. It called upon the masses to *unite* by giving them this ultimatum: Fight (as your leaders advise you to do) or be shot. The masses could not act as an organization, for their organization was represented by that handful of men, Legien, Kautsky, Scheidemann, who had already betrayed the masses. It takes time to perfect a new organization; it takes a good deal of strength to discard the old one when it is rotten and worn out.

Kautsky tries to answer his adversaries of the left by charging them with thoughtlessness. The masses should, *in answer* to the declaration of war, have *started* a revolution in *24 hours*, and raised Socialism against Imperialism. Having failed to do that the *masses* have been guilty of *betrayal* and showed their *lack of character*. This is the worst rot, the kind of rot used against revolutionists by stupid bourgeois and secret service publications. Kautsky's opponents of the left wing know very well that one does not *start* a revolution, that revolutions grow out of certain crises when a certain point is reached (this independently of party and

⁶Kautsky's references to Vaillant, Guesde, Hyndman and Plekhanov are typical from another point of view. Outspoken imperialists, like Lentsch or Haenish (not to speak of the opportunists) always refer to Hyndman and Plekhanov when they wish to justify their attitude. And they are right in referring to them, they speak the actual truth when they say that their attitude is similar to Hyndman's and Plekhanov's. Kautsky speaks scornfully of Lentsch and Haenish, of those radicals who have gone over to the imperialist camp. Kautsky thanks the Lord that he is not like those publicans, that he does not agree with them, that he has remained a revolutionist. . . . Don't laugh. . . . But in reality, Kautsky stands exactly where those men do. He is merely a hypocritical, soft-spoken chauvinist, much more repellant than pure and simple chauvinists like Lentsch, Haenish, David and Heine.

class desires), that masses without organization have no will of their own and that the struggle against the powerful, terroristic, military organization of perfectly centralized powers is a long and arduous fight. Betrayed by their leaders at a critical moment the masses *could not* do anything. But that handful of men *could* have and should have voted against war credits, voiced their desire for the defeat of *their* government, opposed the national party truce and all attempts to justify the war, prepared an international organization for propaganda in the trenches, produced masses of "illegal" literature showing the necessity of revolutionary action, etc.⁷

Kautsky knows very well that the left wing of the German party has more or less similar plans, but cannot speak of them openly while there is a military censorship. In his desire to defend his opportunism, Kautsky is despicable enough to perch himself on the back of the censor and from that safe point of vantage, to charge the left wing men with all sorts of obvious nonsense.

VII

A serious question, a scientific and political question, which Kautsky consciously dodges by resorting to all sorts of legerdemains (an evasion which fills the opportunists with joy), is, how *could* the representatives of the Second International betray Socialism?

When I ask this question I dismiss all thought of those men's political biographies. Their biographers will have to treat the question from this point of view, but the Socialist movement doesn't care about it just now. What it wants to know is the historical origin, the significance and the strength of the social-chauvinist movement.

Where does social-patriotism come from? What gave it its strength? How can we fight it? These are the only questions we should ask. To let the discussion stray into personalities is pure sophistry.

⁷It was not necessary for every Socialist to cease publication in answer to the censor's order forbidding any mention of class hatred and the class struggle. It was low cowardice on the part of the *Vorwaerts* to accept such conditions. The *Vorwaerts* is politically dead, killed by its submissiveness. Martov was right when he pointed that out. It would have been possible to keep "lawful" papers going, by declaring that they were not party papers not Socialist papers, but devoted themselves to the technical needs of the workers, and were not therefore *political papers*. Why was it not possible to have "unlawful" Socialist literature discussing the war and "lawful" workingmen's literature barring all discussion of the war, printing no untruth but silent about the truth?

In order to answer the first question we must find out whether the essential political thought of social chauvinism is not bound up with some previous tendency observable in the Socialist movement. We must, besides, ask ourselves whether there is not some relation between the present day division of Socialists into partisans and opponents of chauvinism and the various schisms which have taken place in the history of the movement.

By social-patriotism we mean the willingness to defend one's country in this imperialistic war, to justify the alliance of the Socialists with the bourgeoisie and the governments of their *own* country, and the refusal to preach and support the revolt of the proletarians against their national bourgeoisie. It is obvious that in its essential traits, politically and intellectually, chauvinism is identical with opportunism. Both represent one and the same tendency. Opportunism placed in the special environment of the present war becomes social-chauvinism. The main idea of opportunism is that of the co-operation of all classes. The war enforces that idea to the limit, not only by the usual method of action, but by extraordinary methods as well, forcing, as it does, the disorganized masses of the population to co-operate with the bourgeoisie by threats and violence. This circumstance naturally increases the number of the partisans of opportunism, and explains why so many of the radicals of yesterday have gone over to the opposite camp.

Opportunism sacrifices the working class interests of the masses to the temporary interests of a small minority. In other words, it bands a part of the working class with the bourgeois as against the proletariat. Opportunism began to grow in the past decade, a period of capitalistic development, when the relatively peaceful and civilized existence enjoyed by privileged classes of workers, made bourgeois out of them, fed them crumbs from the profits made by their national *capital*, and rendered them indifferent to the sufferings and the revolutionary bitterness of the exploited and pauperized masses. This imperialistic war is the continuation and the climax of that process, for it is being waged to conquer privileges for certain great powers, to allow them to divide up colonial territories among themselves and to rule over the rest of the world.

When the upper middle class and the aristocracy and bureaucracy of the working class make a stand to strengthen their privileged position, we behold a furtherance of the little bourgeois-opportunists' aspirations, and of the corresponding political activi-

ties up to the time when war broke out. Here is the economic basis of the present day's social-chauvinism.*

Naturally, the force of habit, the routine of peaceful evolution, national prejudices, the fear of violent change and misgivings about them, all these things were the added factors which strengthened opportunism, and caused hypocrites and cowards to reconcile themselves to it, were it only for special reasons and motives. The war brought to the surface the opportunism which had been developing for years, raised it aloft, multiplied its degrees and varieties, increased the number of its partisans, added to its arguments a few sophisms, let many rivulets, so to speak, flow into the main stream of opportunism.

Social-patriotism is opportunism grown so ripe that the growth of that bourgeois abscess would have previously been impossible within the body of Socialism.

People who refuse to see the close and solid bonds which unite social-patriotism to opportunism, drag in "special cases"—an opportunist becoming internationalist or a radical becoming chauvinist. But this is not a serious way of discussing the evolution of

*Here are a few illustrations of the importance which imperialist and bourgeois attach to national and "great power" privileges as a means for dividing the workers among themselves and luring them away from Socialism. The English imperialist Lucas in his book *Great Rome and Great Britain* (Oxford 1912) admits the inequality between white and colored men in the British Empire. "In our Empire," he writes, "when colored laborers are working side by side with white laborers, they are not fellow workers, for the white man soon becomes the colored man's boss." (98.) Ervin Belger, former secretary of the Imperial union against Socialism, writing on "Social-Democracy after the war" (1915), praises the stand of the Social-Democrats, showing that they must remain a purely working class party, (43) the national German workingmen's party, (45) and give up all internationalist, utopian, revolutionary ideas. (44) The German imperialist Sartorius von Waltershausen in his book on *Foreign Investments* (1907) berates the German Socialists for not realizing what is good for the country, (438) that is the conquest of colonies, and he praises the English workers for their "sense of realities," for instance, for their fight against immigration. The German diplomat Rudorfer in his book on *The Basis of World Politics*, emphasizes the well known fact that the internationalization of capital does not decrease the bitterness of the struggle between capitalists of the various nations for power, influence, stock majority, (161) and he mentions that the workingmen too, are getting entangled in that bitter fight. (175) The book was published in October 1913 and the author says very frankly that the interests of Capitalism are the motives of contemporary wars, that the question of "national tendencies" is a nail impaling Socialism, and that governments need not feel nervous about internationalist manifestations which will assume a more and more national character. (103, 110, 176) International Socialism will win if it draws the workingmen away from nationalism, for isolated efforts do not accomplish anything; it will go down in defeat if the national feeling gains the upper hand. (173-4.)

X that tendency. First of all, opportunism and chauvinism in the labor movement have the same cause: the alliance between shopkeepers and the upper crust of labor, gathering in a few crumbs from the banquet at which sit their national capitalists, against the overworked and oppressed masses of the proletariat.

- In the second place, both tendencies are moved by the same thoughts and ideas. Thirdly, the division of the Socialists into opportunists and revolutionary groups, which was already observable at the time of the Second International, corresponds perfectly to their new division into chauvinists and internationalists.

To realize the truth of the foregoing one must remember that social science, like science in general, deals with mass phenomena, not with isolated cases. Take ten European nations: Germany, England, Russia, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Switzerland, France, Belgium. In the first eight nations the new split upon the question of internationalism is the same as the old split upon the question of opportunism. In Germany that citadel of opportunism, the *Soz. Monatshefte*, has become the fortress of chauvinism. The internationalist idea is only defended by the extreme left. In England, according to the last estimates, only three-sevenths of the members of the British Socialist Party are internationalists (66 for, to 84 against the internationalist resolution). In the opportunist bloc, that is, the Labour Party, the Fabians and the Independent Labour Party, less than one-seventh of the membership is internationalist.*

In Russia the center of opportunist propaganda, *Nasha Zaria*, organ of the liquidators, became the organ of the chauvinists. Plekhanov and Alexinsky make much noise, but we know from what we observed in the years 1910-1914 that they are unable to conduct a systematic propaganda among the Russian masses. The stronghold of internationalism in Russia was "pravdism" and the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, representing the advanced workers, and organized in January, 1912.

In Italy, the party of Bissolatti & Co., purely opportunist, turned chauvinist. Internationalism was represented by the Labor Party. The masses of the workers were behind that party. The oppor-

*People generally compare the Independent Labour Party with the British Socialist Party. This is not fair. It is not the form of an organization that counts but the work it does. Take the matter of daily papers. There were two of them. *The Daily Herald*, the organ of the British Socialist Party alone, and the *Daily Citizen* which did service for all the opportunist groups. It is its daily newspapers which are the best evidence of the propaganda, agitation and organization work done by a party.

tunists, the parliamentary party and the petty bourgeois were all for chauvinism. For several months, every one in Italy had a chance to make his choice, and people chose not in any haphazard way, but along the lines of class cleavage, according to whether they were proletarians or petit bourgeois.

In Holland, the opportunist Troelstra faction stand on good terms with the chauvinists. We must not be deceived by the fact that in Holland the lower, as well as the upper, middle classes hate Germany, which is in a position to swallow them. The only consistent, sincere, fiery and convinced internationalists are the Marxists led by Horter and Pannekoek. In Sweden the opportunist leader Branting is indignant when the German Socialists call him a traitor, but the leader of the left wing, Hoglund, tells us that among his followers there are men who hold the same opinion (see *S-D No. 36*).

In Bulgaria, the foes of opportunism, "the narrow ones," have accused the German social-democrats in their organ, *Novoe Vremya*, of "a filthy deed." In Switzerland, the followers of the opportunist Greulich are inclined to justify the German social-democrats (see their paper, the *National*, of Zurich), but the group led by the much more radical, R. Grimm, has opened the columns of its paper, the *Berner Tagwacht*, to the German left wing.

In the only two exceptions to that rule France and Belgium, two countries out of ten, there is a number of internationalists, but (for reasons easily understood) they are weak and crushed down. Vaillant himself confessed in his paper, *l'Humanite*, that he had received from his readers many letters inspired by an internationalist spirit, but he did not print a single one of them in its entirety.

A glance at the situation in every country is sufficient to convince us that the opportunist wing of European Socialism betrayed Socialism and went over to the chauvinist camp. What gave that power, that seemingly irresistible power to the official parties? Kautsky, who knows perfectly how to approach a historical question, when discussing ancient Rome or a similar subject, not too close to our present-day life, pretends hypocritically that this passes his understanding. But the whole thing is as clear as daylight. The opportunists derived their giant strength from their alliance with the bourgeoisie, the governments and the general staffs. We often forget that fact and we imagine that the opportunists are actually *part and parcel* of the Socialist party, that Socialist parties have always had and will always have two extreme wings, that the whole

thing was due to a desire to avoid extremes, etc., as all the philistine scribes are writing in their sheets.

In reality, the mere fact that opportunists formally belong to a labor party doesn't change that other fact, that they are obviously a section of the bourgeoisie, spreading its influence, acting as its agents in the labor movement. When the opportunist Sudekum started to demonstrate that social, class truth, some good people howled. The French Socialists and Plekhanov pointed an accusing finger at Sudekum. Now Vandervelde, Sembat and Plekhanov could stand in front of a mirror and they would see there the image of Sudekum. The German *Vorstand*, which sings Kautsky's praise and whose praise Kautsky sings, hastened to declare in guarded, modest and polite terms, that they did not agree with Sudekum, whom they did not designate by name.

This is ridiculous, for at the crucial moment, Sudekum showed himself a hundred times stronger than Haase and Kautsky, just as *Nasha Zarya* was stronger than the Brusselian bloc which was afraid of a split.

Why? Because back of Sudekum there stands the bourgeoisie, the government and the general staff of a great power. They back his policy in a thousand ways, while they oppose his adversaries in a thousand ways, too, including jail sentences and the firing squad. The voice of Sudekum is carried afar on the wings of the bourgeois papers, with their millions of copies (and so do the voices of Vandervelde, Sembat and Plekhanov), while the voice of his opponents can never be heard in the "lawful" press, for there is a military censorship.

Opportunism is not a chance phenomenon, a crime, a low deed or an act of betrayal on the part of a few individuals, but the social product of a whole period of history. But not everybody tries to realize the meaning of this fact. The labor parties between 1889 and 1914 had to take advantage of what was declared permissible by the bourgeoisie. When the crisis came their only hope lay in "unlawful" activity. This could not be done without an enormous amount of energy and determination, besides resorting to a number of tricks of warfare. One Sudekum was enough to prevent that change of tactics, for back of that one man there was all the old system of society, historically and philosophically speaking, for that Sudekum had always betrayed and will always betray to the bourgeoisie the war plans of the bourgeoisie's enemy, to use practical and political parlance.

It is a fact that the entire Social-Democratic part of Germany does only what is agreeable to Sudekum or, at least, what Sudekum can abide. Nothing else can be done in a *lawful* way.

Whatever honorable, really Socialist, action is taken by the German party, is against the wishes of its center, without the consent of its leaders, in violation of the discipline of the party, by factions, in behalf of the anonymous center of a new party, like, for instance, the anonymous appeal from the German "left" printed in the *Berner Tagewacht* for May 31 of this year. A new party is indeed in the process of organization and growth, a real labor party, a genuine social-democratic party, very different from the old and rotten national liberal party of Legien, Sudekum, Kautsky, Haase, Scheidemann and others.¹⁰

It was a deep historical truth which the hopeless conservative, who signs himself Monitor, expressed in the Prussian Yearbook, when he said that it would fare badly with the opportunists (read bourgeoisie) if the present-day social democracy should mend its ways, for the workers would get out of it. Opportunists and bourgeois need the party as it is now, "uniting" the right and left wings and officially represented by Kautsky, who knows how to reconcile all the factions by his smooth, "Marxist" phrases.

In appearance it represents Socialism and the revolutionary spirit of the nation, the masses, the workers; in reality, it is pure Sudekumism, always ready to ally itself with the bourgeoisie whenever a serious crisis arises.

I said "whenever a crisis arises," for it is not only in wartimes, but whenever a serious political strike takes place that feudal Germany and "free-parliamentary" England and France adopt under this or that name military measures of repression. No one who is of sane mind and has a good memory can gainsay this.

¹⁰What took place before the famous vote of August 4 is very characteristic. The official party threw over the affair the veil of its official hypocrisy. The majority ruled and the party voted like one man for the war. But Strebel in the review *Die Internationale* unveiled that hypocrisy and told the truth. There were in the Social-Democratic faction two groups ready with their ultimatums, that is with their dissenting resolutions. One group of opportunists numbering some 30 men, had decided to vote *yes* in any case. Another group, the left group, with some 15 men, had decided, less resolutely however, to vote *no*. When the center or "frog pond" which did not stand on firm ground, cast its votes with the opportunists the left wing saw itself beaten and submitted.

The so-called unity of the German Social-Democratic party is a piece of low hypocrisy, an attempt at concealing the fact that the whole party had to submit to the ultimatum presented by the opportunists.

How can we answer the third question: How shall we fight social-chauvinism? Social-chauvinism is opportunism so developed and so strengthened in the course of a period of relatively peaceful capitalism, so settled in its ideas and its policies, so closely allied to the bourgeoisie and the government that its presence within a workers' party is absolutely intolerable.

One may wear thin soles while walking along the sidewalks of a town, but when you climb mountains you need strong hobnailed boots. European Socialism has grown beyond the narrow confines of peaceful activity and nationalism. The war has led it into the arena of revolutionary action, and it is time it should break entirely with opportunism and drive it out of the workers' party.

Merely to mention the duties which Socialism will have to fulfill at this new stage of its world evolution, is not to decide how soon or in what way the revolutionary Socialist parties of workers in every country are going to rid themselves of all the petty bourgeois opportunists within their ranks. But we realize clearly that henceforth that process of elimination is essential and that all the policies of the workers' party will have to be shaped from that point of view. The war of 1914 marks such a turning point in the history of the world that the relations of the party to opportunism cannot remain unchanged any longer. We cannot undo what was done, we cannot blot out of the consciousness of the workers, nor out of the memory of the bourgeois, nor out of the record of our times the fact that, in a crisis, the opportunists proved to be the group around which rallied all the elements from the working class who deserted into the bourgeois camp. As far as the whole of Europe is concerned, opportunism was only in its adolescence before the war broke out. When it did break out, opportunism reached its manhood state and it will be unable to regain its youth and its innocence. There has matured a whole group of parliamentarians, journalists, bureaucrats of the labor movement, privileged employes and even a few proletarians, who cast in their lot with the bourgeoisie, and whom the bourgeoisie knew how to appreciate and to make use of.

We cannot go back or turn backward the wheels of history, we must and we can go ahead fearlessly, away from artificial, lawful, slavish opportunism and toward the sort of labor organization which will be revolutionary, which will not confine itself to so-called lawful action and will know how to rid itself of the opportunist treachery, the sort of labor organization that will set out to conquer power and to overthrow the bourgeoisie.

We see what a distorted view of the whole thing those men have who are trying to deaden their conscience and the conscience of the workers, men like the recognized leaders of the Second International, the Guesdes, the Plekhanovs, the Kautskys and their ilk.

One thing is beyond cavil: if those men cannot understand the new duties of the party they must stay out of it, or surrender to the opportunists who hold them prisoners now. If those men break their chains there will be few obstacles to their readmission to the ranks of the revolutionists.

VIII

Lawful mass organizations of the working class were one of the distinctive traits of the Socialist parties at the time of the Second International. In the German party especially they were very strong and hence the war of 1914 marks a sudden turning point, and made the problems more acute than ever.

Any revolutionary action on their part at the time would have meant the crushing out of all lawful organizations by the policy, and therefore the old crowd from Legien to Kautsky, inclusive of the latter, sacrificed the old revolutionary objects of the proletariat to the preservation of the existing lawful organizations. They waste their time denying it. They sold the revolutionary rights of the proletariat for the mess of pottage of police toleration.

Open a pamphlet by Legien, the leader of the German trade unionists, entitled *Why Trades Union Officials Should Take a More Active Part in the Inner Life of the Party* (Berlin, 1915). This is a report read by the author on January 27, 1915, before a meeting of the leaders of the trade union movement. Legien incorporated in his printed report one interesting document which might otherwise have been suppressed by the military censorship. That document called *Materials for the Delegates from the Neiderbarnim District* (a suburb of Berlin), presents the views of the left-wing social-democrats, their protest against the action of the party. The revolutionary social-democrats say in that document: that did not and could not foresee that:

"All the organized forces of the German social-democratic party and of the trade unions stood by the government which was conducting the war, and that all those forces were being used in order to crush out the revolutionary energies of the masses" (page 34 of Legien's pamphlet).

This is the absolute truth. And the following statement is just as true:

"The vote taken on August 4 by the social-democratic faction meant that the opposite view, however deeply shared by the masses, could not make itself heard through the instrumentality of the party, but against the wishes of the party's leaders, against the insuperable opposition of the party and of the trade unions" (*ibidem*).

This is true beyond doubt.

"If the social-democratic faction had fulfilled its duty on August 4, the outward form of the organization would have been destroyed, but its spirit would have lived, that spirit which kept the party alive at the time of the laws of exception and helped it to brook all hardships" (*ibidem*).

Legien's pamphlet mentions that that assemblage of "leaders" before whom he delivered his report, and who were the organizers and the officials of the trade union movement, laughed when they heard that.

It seemed to them absurd that there could and should be an unlawful revolutionary organization in existence in a crisis. Legien, the faithful watchdog of the bourgeoisie, beat his chest and shouted:

"This is a purely anarchistic thought: to destroy an organization in order to leave a decision to the masses. To my mind there is no doubt but this is an anarchistic idea."

"Correct." shouted in chorus those lackeys of the bourgeoisie who style themselves the leaders of the working class (page 37).

What an edifying picture. Men so completely perverted and dulled by bourgeois legalism, that they can no longer understand the necessity of different organizations, of unlawful ones. Men have gone so far that they imagine that lawful organizations, existing with the approval of the police, are the limit which must not be crossed, and that such organizations should be saved at the time of a crisis. There is the live logic of opportunism. The pure and simple growth of lawful unions, the pure and simple routine of stupid, though well-meaning, philistines keeping their little union books, has led those well-meaning philistines when a crisis arose, to betray, to sell and to strangle the revolutionary energy of the masses. And this is not due to mere chance happenings.

Revolutionary forms of organization are necessary, a changing historical situation demands them, this period of revolutionary action on the part of the proletariat demands them, but they can only

be brought into life, over the dead bodies of the former leaders, over the dead body of the old party, over the ruins of that party.

The counter-revolutionary philistine naturally will shout: anarchy, as the opportunist Ed. Davis did when alluding to Liebknecht. The only German Socialist leaders who have any decency left are those whom the opportunists are branding as anarchists.

Consider the army of today. There is one of the most perfect examples of organization. And that organization is perfect for the simple reason that it is flexible and knows how to inspire one single desire to the millions of which it consists. Today those millions of people are sitting in their homes, in various parts of the country, tomorrow the mobilization orders are sent out, and they all gather at the points designated to them. They stand in the trenches, perhaps months at a time. They charge the enemy. They do wonders under a hail of bullets and shrapnel. Their advanced troops may sink mines into the ground. They may rush ahead several miles under the direction of their flyers.

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This is real organization, through which millions of men, lured to the same goal, moved by one single will, change their form of association and of action, change the scene and the objects of their activity, change their tools and their weapons as the changing necessities of warfare may require.

This is the way the working class should fight the bourgeois. To-day there may not be a situation favorable to a revolution, we may not see the conditions that would leaven up the masses and increase their activities. To-day they may give you a ballot at the polls. Cast it so as to beat your enemies and not to secure a nice little job in parliament for some coward afraid of going to jail. Tomorrow they may take that ballot away from you, give you arms and a big quick firing gun of the latest type. . . . Take those instruments of death and destruction, and don't listen to sentimentalists who are afraid of war. There are too many things left on earth which should be destroyed by fire and steel before the working class can be emancipated. And if bitterness and desperation grow among the masses, if a really revolutionary crisis arises, then be ready to organize in a new way and to use the instruments of death and destruction against your own government and your own bourgeoisie. This is not an easy task. This requires difficult preparations. This requires heavy sacrifices. This is the new view of organization and struggle which we must all take. But we shall not acquire this new point of view without committing

many mistakes without occasionally going down to defeat. This view of the class struggle stands to the electoral campaigns in the same relation as a real charge stands to mere military manoeuvres, as an ordinary regimental hike stands to life in the trenches. That view of the struggle does not come up frequently in history, because its significance and its consequences make themselves felt for entire decades. The days, however, when we will be able and obliged to resort to that form of struggle will count more than any other twenty years of past history.

Let us examine Legien and Kautsky together. This is what Kautsky has to say:

"As long as the party was small, every protest against war constituted a good bit of virile propaganda. The attitude of our Servian and Russian comrades in the recent events received general commendation. But the larger the party comes to be, the more it must take into account in its decisions the practical consequences of such decisions, the more difficult it becomes to weigh properly the various motives and to choose between them. And, therefore, the stronger we become, the more easily differences of opinion may arise among us whenever we face a new, complex situation." *Internationalism and war*" (page 50).

This statement of Kautsky's differs from Legien's statements only by its hypocrisy and cowardice. Kautsky really approves of and justifies Legien's low abstention from revolutionary activity, but he does it on the sly, without committing himself, by way of allusions, paying homage now to Legien, now to the revolutionists of Russia. We Russians were accustomed to observe that attitude only among liberals. Liberals are always willing to recognize the virile stand taken by the revolutionists, but never do they depart from their arch-opportunistic tactics. Self-respecting revolutionists will not accept Kautsky's expressions of approval but reject with disgust this way of presenting the question. If the situation was not favorable for a revolution, if it was not a clear duty to preach revolutionary action, then the attitude of the Servian and Russian revolutionists would be out of place and their tactics faulty. Why can't those great fighters, Kautsky and Legien, have the courage of their opinions and speak it out frankly?

If the attitude of the Russian and Servian Socialists deserves approval then it is not permissible, it is criminal to justify the attitude of strong parties like the German and the French.

By using a very confusing expression "practical consequences" Kautsky tries to conceal the fact that the large parties were afraid

of having their organization crushed out, their funds seized, their leaders thrown into jail by the government. In other words. Kautsky justifies the betrayal of Socialism by the fear of the unpleasant consequences revolutionary tactics might bring about. Isn't this a pure and simple prostitution of Marxism.

"They would arrest us," said one of the men who voted for the credits on August 4 at a workingmen's meeting in Berlin. And the workingmen shouted back to him: "Well, what of it?"

The best thing on earth to inspire the workers of Germany and France with a revolutionary spirit and show them the necessity of preparing for revolutionary activity, would be the arrest of a representative for making a daring speech. This would be the best appeal to united revolutionary action addressed to the proletarians of all nations. That unity of action is not an easy thing to bring about. This made it the more imperative for those that stood at the head of the movement, and who were shaping its policies to assume the initiative.

It is not only in war times but whenever the political situation takes a critical turn that governments will threaten to crush out organized bodies, to seize their cash and jail their leaders, and to let them bear other practical consequences for their actions. What of it? Is this a valid ground to excuse the opportunists, as Kautsky does? This really amounts to transforming the Social-Democratic party into a national liberal party.

Socialists can only come to one conclusion: pure legalism, the legalism of the European parties has outlived its usefulness, and owing to the entrance of Capitalism into its imperialistic stage of development, has become simply a bourgeois labor policy. It must be supplemented by the adoption of an extra legal basis, by extra legal organization, extra legal Social-Democratic action, without however surrendering any of the legal positions occupied. How that can be done, experience will teach us, provided there is a firm desire for that sort of action and provided we realize clearly its absolute necessity. The revolutionary Social-Democrats of Russia showed in 1912-13 and 14 that it could be done. The labor deputy Muranof, hauled into court and sent by Czarism to Siberia, showed better than any one else that besides respectable parliamentarism of the ministerial timber (Henderson, Sembat, Vandervelde, Sudekum and Scheidemann are made of ministerial timber, but they are not allowed to take such lofty positions) there is also a revolutionary and extra legal variety of parliamentarism. The Kosovskys and Potresoffs may kowtow as much as they want to European

parliamentarism, but we shall never tire of repeating to the working class that ^{that} sort of legalism, the brand of Social-Democracy exemplified by Kautsky, Legien and Scheidemann, deserves nothing but scorn.

XI

Let us sum up. The collapse of the Second International revealed itself clearly in the betrayal of the Social-Democratic parties of Europe by the majority of their officials embodied in their declarations and their solemn resolutions of the Basel and Stuttgart congresses. But this bankruptcy which leaves opportunism victorious and has transformed the Social-Democratic party into a national liberal labor party, is simply the product of the entire period during which the Second International was in existence, the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries.

The material conditions obtaining in that period, the transition between the bourgeois and national revolutions of Western Europe and the dawn of social revolution, fostered the growth of opportunism.

In some European countries we observe in the labor and Socialist movements a cleavage along opportunist lines (in England, Italy, Holland, Bulgaria, Russia) in others we witness a longdrawn and stubborn struggle along the same line (in Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland). The crisis brought about by the great war, tore off all the veils, pricked the pus pockets, ready to break out, and showed up opportunism in its real colors, an ally of the bourgeoisie. It has become absolutely necessary to remove entirely and systematically this element from the labor movement. In imperialistic times there cannot co-exist within one party champions of the revolutionary proletariat and semi-bourgeois aristocrats of the labor movement fed on crumbs of the "greatpowerdom" enjoyed by their country. Opportunism, which was once considered as a mere emergency measure, has become the most dangerous means of deceiving the workers and the great obstacle in the path of the labor movement. Frank opportunism is not so very dangerous, for the laboring masses steer clear of it, but the theory of the golden mean, which justifies by Marxist quotations opportunistic practices, and which by dint of sophistry proves that the time has not come for revolutionary action, this is the real danger. The eminent exponent of this doctrine and the leader of the Second International, Kautsky, has shown himself to be a first-class hypocrite and a virtuoso in the art of prostituting Marxism. Among the million

members of the Social-Democratic party there isn't a decent, conscious and revolutionary Social-Democrat who does not reject with indignation that "leader" who has been profusely defended by Sudekum and Scheidemann.

The proletarian masses who lost about nine-tenths of their leaders to the bourgeois camp, found themselves isolated and impotent before rampant chauvinism, military measures and the censorship. But the revolutionary situation created by the war, and which is steadily becoming more acute and more widespread, will unavoidably foster a revolutionary spirit which will stiffen up and enlighten the proletarians of the better type, the class conscious ones. There may and there probably will develop in the mentality of the masses a state of mind similar to that which we could observe in Russia at the beginning of 1905 at the time of the Gapon incident, when out of the backward proletarian masses, there grew in a few months or even a few weeks, an army of millions of men, the vanguard of the proletariat. We cannot tell whether a powerful revolutionary movement will start soon after this war or during this war, but it is only agitation conducted with that purpose which deserves to be called Socialist agitation. The only thing that will give that agitation a center and a direction, that will unite and blend all the elements the proletariat needs in its fight against its government and its bourgeoisie, is a civil war.

In Russia the entire history of the labor movement has prepared the exclusion of the petit bourgeois opportunist elements from the revolutionary Social-Democratic elements. It is a very bad service to render to the labor movement to ignore that history and to declaim against "factionism." One thus deprives himself of the opportunity of understanding the actual growth of the labor movement in Russia, which has been for years and years waging a stubborn fight against all opportunistic tendencies.

Among all the great powers engaged in the war, Russia only has recently lived through a revolution; its bourgeois character, taking into account the decisive part played by the proletariat, could not but create a cleavage between the bourgeois and the proletarian elements in the labor party. In the twenty years from 1894 to 1914, during which the Russian Social Democracy existed as an organization, connected with the labor movement (we do not allude simply to the ideas current from 1883 to 1894) a struggle went on between the petit bourgeois opportunists and the proletarian revolutionary wing. The "economism" of the years 1894-1903 was nothing but opportunism. All its theories and arguments

were only a Struvist distortion of Marxism, references to the mass to justify opportunism, and all that phraseology of theirs reminds us of the degenerated form of Marxism propounded at present by Kautsky, Cunow, Plekhanov and others. It might be a good idea to remember the attitude assumed in those days by papers like the *Rabotshy Mysl* and the *Rabotshy Dielo* and to compare that attitude with the one assumed nowadays by Kautsky.

The Menshevism of the next period, 1903-1908, was not only in its theory but in its organization the heir of economism. At the time of the Russian revolution it introduced tactics which subjected the proletariat to the control of the liberal bourgeoisie and which reflect a purely bourgeois opportunist tendency.

When, in the following period, the main current of Menshevism gave birth to the "Liquidation," that class bias of the party was so obvious that the best representatives of Menshevism always protested against the policy of the group centering around *Nasha Zarya*.

But that group, the only one which conducted among the masses a systematic agitation against the revolutionary Marxist party in the following five or six years, revealed itself when the war broke out as made up of Social chauvinists.

And in a nation where autocracy was in power, where the bourgeoisie had not as yet completed its revolution, where 43 per cent of the population oppress the rest of the population, made up of people from other racial stocks, Russia could not escape the "European" type of evolution which enables certain strata of the petit bourgeoisie, especially the professional classes, and an insignificant minority of the workers' aristocracy to enjoy the advantages of "greatpowerdom" pertaining to their own country.

The working class and the Socialist workers' party of Russia have been prepared by their entire history to assume an internationalistic, that is a really consistent, revolutionary attitude.

VII

ARMAMENTS AND WAR

I

Certain revolutionary Socialists who are advocates of disarmament use as their main argument the claim that this demand expresses most clearly, most emphatically and most thoroughly the struggle against all forms of militarism, against every war. And this main argument constitutes precisely the fundamental mistake of all the advocates of disarmament. Socialists cannot be opposed to every war without ceasing to be Socialists.

Socialists have never been opposed to revolutionary wars, and they never can accept that attitude. The bourgeoisie of the imperialistic nations is thoroughly reactionary, and we know that the war waged at present by this bourgeoisie is a reactionary, criminal war of spoliation. If this is a fact, what about a war *against* this bourgeoisie? For example, a war of the suppressed and subject or colonial peoples against the imperialistic bourgeoisie?

In this program of the German "International Group" we read in paragraph 5: "In the period of Imperialism no national wars are possible" This is evidently wrong. The history of the twentieth century, of this century of Imperialism, is full of colonial wars. And what we, with our dirty European chauvinism, call "colonial wars" are often national wars or national revolts of oppressed peoples.

One of the essential characteristics of Imperialism is precisely that it accelerates the development of Capitalism in backward countries and with it the struggle against national oppression. This is a *fact*. And from this fact it follows inevitably that Imperialism must often breed national wars.

Junius, who defends the program of the International Group, says that in the epoch of Imperialism every national war against one of the imperialistic powers results in the action of another imperialistic power competing with the first one, and that every national war accordingly changes into an imperialistic war. This

argument, however, is also incorrect. It *may* be so, but it need not *always* be so. Different colonial wars in the period between 1900 and 1914 did not have this result; and it would be ridiculous to consider it possible, if this war ends in a general exhaustion of the warring countries, that there should not be a national revolutionary war, perhaps by China together with India, Persia, Siam, etc., against the existing world powers.

The negation of all possible national wars under Imperialism is theoretically and historically incorrect, and in practice promotes European chauvinism: we, belonging to nations that suppress hundreds of millions of people in Europe, Africa and Asia, we declare to these oppressed people that their war against "our" nation is impossible!

Civil wars are also wars. Those who accept the class struggle must accept civil wars, which, under certain circumstances, are a natural and inevitable continuance, development and accentuation of the class struggle in every society based on class divisions. All great revolutions prove this. To deny or to overlook civil wars would mean becoming a victim of the most hopeless opportunism and abandoning the Social Revolution.

The victory of Socialism in one country does not all of a sudden exclude all wars in general. On the contrary, this situation implies wars. The development of Capitalism proceeds differently in different countries: this is inevitable in a society based on the production of commodities. The result is: Socialism cannot be victorious in *all countries* at the same time. Socialism will be victorious first in one or in some countries, other countries continuing for a certain length of time on a bourgeois or pre-bourgeois basis. This will not only result in antagonisms, but will develop the direct tendency of the bourgeoisie in the other countries to crush the victorious proletariat of the Socialist country. In such cases our war would be justifiable and right, it would be a war for Socialism, for liberation of other peoples from their bourgeoisie. Engels was right when he recognized clearly, in his letter to Kautsky, September 12, 1882, the possibility of wars of defense of Socialism, meaning the defense of the victorious proletariat against the bourgeoisie of other countries.

Only after we have completely forced down and expropriated the bourgeoisie of the whole world and not of one country alone, will wars become impossible. And it is scientifically incorrect and not at all revolutionary to overlook or confuse the most important,

the most difficult task, the task that contributes most to the struggle during the period of transition of Socialism: the crushing of the resistance of the bourgeoisie. The social quacks and opportunists like to dream of the coming of Socialism peacefully: they are distinguished from the revolutionary Socialists precisely in this, that they refuse to consider and prepare for the desperate class struggles necessary to realize the beautiful future.

We should not be fooled by words. Many of us hate the phrase "defensive wars" because the opportunists try to cover up and justify with those words the lie of the bourgeoisie in this war of robbery. This is a fact, but it does not follow that we must therefore neglect thinking about the meaning of political conceptions. To accept the defense of the country in the present war of Imperialism is to declare this war a "just" war in the interest of the proletariat: a fraudulent declaration. Invasion is always possible in any war. But it would simply be stupid not to justify defense of the country by suppressed and subject people in their war against imperialistic powers, or by a victorious proletariat in its war against the bourgeois of a capitalist country.

It would be absolutely wrong, theoretically, to forget that every war is the continuation of politics by other means: the present imperialistic war is the continuation of the imperialistic policy originating and developing under the conditions of the epoch of Imperialism. But this same epoch must necessarily produce the policy of fighting against national suppression and the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie; there develops, accordingly, the possibility and inevitability, first, of revolutionary national uprisings and wars, second, of wars and revolts of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, and third, of the unity of both kinds of revolutionary wars.

II

There is, moreover, another general argument. A suppressed class that does not strive to acquire knowledge of arms, that does not possess and use arms, such an oppressed class invites being suppressed and enslaved. We should not degrade ourselves to the level of bourgeois pacifists and opportunists; we should not forget that we are in a society based on class divisions, and that no salvation is possible or imaginable other than through the class struggle.

In every class society, whether based on slavery, serfdom, or as at present on wage-labor, the ruling classes are armed. Not

only the present standing army, but also the militia, that in Switzerland not excepted, is armament of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. I consider it necessary to prove this elementary truth; it is sufficient to point to the mobilization of troops during and against strikes in all the capitalistic countries.

The armament of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat is one of the most important features of capitalist society. And with this fact in view, the revolutionary Socialist should accept the "demand" for disarmament! That would be complete abandonment of our class policy and of every thought of the revolution. We claim: armament of the proletariat to overthrow, to expropriate and disarm the bourgeoisie, as the only possible tactic prepared by, based on and forced upon us by the objective development of capitalist militarism. Only after the disarmament of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat can the latter, without betraying its world historical task, throw armaments on the scrap heap, and it will do this—but not until then.

When the social popes and the petty bourgeois point to the terror and fear in armed force, the blood and death produced by this war, we answer: *Capitalist society has always been a terror without end.* And if this most reactionary of all wars should prepare an *end of the terror* of this society, there should be no reason to despair. From an objective standpoint, the theory, the demand, or, better, the illusion of disarmament is a result at this moment of despair, since it is now clearly apparent that the bourgeoisie itself prepares the way for the only acceptable revolutionary war, the civil war against the imperialistic bourgeoisie.

Those who call this "pure theory" and "only theoretical talk" are referred to two facts in the world's history: the influence of the trusts and woman labor, and the Paris Commune and the events of 1905 in Russia. [And, again, the Russian Revolution of 1917.]

It is a necessity for the bourgeoisie to further develop the trusts and to send women and children into the factories, to torture and exploit them. We do not support this development, we do not co-operate in this horror: we fight against it. But how do we fight? We explain that trusts and woman labor are transitory periods. We want to go back neither to hand-work and pre-concentrated Capitalism, nor to the period of domestic work for women. On towards the future, beyond trusts, etc., and through them to Socialism.

The same holds, *mutatis mutandis*, for the present militarization of the people. At present Imperialism and the bourgeoisie not only militarize the whole people, but youth also. To-morrow they may, for all we care, militarize the women. We answer: so much the better! Faster, always faster—and the faster the sooner armed revolt against Capitalism. How can Socialists become frightened or discouraged by the militarization of the youth, etc., with the example of the Paris Commune in their minds? That surely was not a theory of a dream, but reality. And it would undoubtedly breed despair if Socialists, in defiance of all economic and political reality, would doubt that the imperialistic epoch and imperialistic wars must lead with elementary force and inevitably toward a repetition of the reality of the Commune.

It was a bourgeois observer of the Commune who wrote in May, 1871, in an English newspaper: "If the French nation consisted wholly of women, what a frightful nation it would be."

The women and the youth, from thirteen years up, fought during the Commune side by side with the men: and it will not be otherwise in the coming battles to subdue the bourgeoisie. The proletarian women will not look on passively while the well-armed bourgeoisie orders the badly armed or unarmed proletariat to be shot down; they will seize arms as they did in 1871. And from the now unnerved or discouraged nations, or, more accurately, from the labor movement now disorganized by the opportunists more than by the governments, will arise, sooner or later, but beyond the shadow of a doubt, an international alliance of "frightful nations" of the revolutionary proletariat.

Militarism permeates the whole public life. Militarism becomes supreme. Imperialism means bitter struggle among the world powers to divide and re-divide the world—and this, therefore, militarizes even the small and neutral countries. What will the proletarian women do against this development? Condemn all war and all militarism, and demand disarmament? Never will the women of a revolutionary class accept such a contemptible task. On the contrary, they will urge their sons: "You will soon be grown up and they will give you a rifle. Take it, and qualify in all military knowledge—that is necessary for the workers, not in order to shoot at your comrades, as is done in this war of robbery and as you have been urged to do by the traitors of Socialism, but to fight the bourgeoisie of your own country to put an end to ex-

plotation and the misery of wars, not by pious wishes, but by overpowering and disarming the bourgeoisie."

Those who refuse to carry on such a propaganda, and such a propaganda particularly in connection with the present war, should be kind enough to stop talking in grandiloquent phrases about international revolutionary Socialism, about the Social Revolution, about war against war.

III

The advocates of disarmament are opposed to the armament of the people because in their opinion, this demand might lead readily to concessions towards opportunism. We have examined the main issue: the relation of disarmament to the class struggle and the Social Revolution. Examining the relation of disarmament towards opportunism, we find that one of the most convincing arguments against the demand for disarmament is precisely the fact that this demand and the illusions it creates weakens our fight against opportunism.

The fight against opportunism is a very real issue in the International. The fight against Imperialism is empty and deceitful if it is not combined with a fight against opportunism. One of the principal mistakes of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences and one of the main reasons for the failure of these efforts toward organizing a third International, consist exactly in the fact that the question of a fight against opportunism was not even brought up openly, far less decided in the sense of a complete break with the opportunist Socialists. Outspoken opportunism works in the open and directly against the revolution and against developing revolts and revolutionary movements, and in co-operation with the governments. The clandestine opportunists, as Kautsky & Co., are much more detrimental to the workers' interests and much more dangerous, because they cover up and make attractive their coalition with the undisguised opportunists by using fine Marxian phrases and peace proposals. The struggle against both these forms of opportunism can only be waged on all issues of proletarian policy: parliamentary action, economic action, strikes, propaganda, etc. The fundamental character of both forms of opportunism consists in this, that it tries to conceal and deny or else to answer in the spirit of the police. all actual questions of the revolution and of the general connection between the present war and the revolution. And all this notwithstanding the fact that just prior to the

war, the connection between the coming war and the proletarian revolution had been demonstrated unofficially as well as officially in the Basel Manifesto! One of the principal mistakes of disarmament advocacy is that it evades all actual problems of the revolution. Or are the advocates of disarmament altogether in favor of a new kind of disarmed revolution?

Moreover, we are by no means opposed to the struggle for reforms. We will not deny the disagreeable possibility that humanity may have to pass through another imperialistic war if the Revolution, in spite of repeated outbreaks of mass resistance and mass revolts, and in spite of our own efforts, does not result from this war. We advocate a program of reforms directed against the opportunists. The opportunists would prefer that we abandoned the struggle for reforms to them, that we should retreat out of this bad reality to the castle in the air of disarmament. For disarmament means to run away from the reality and not to fight it.

In our program we should state: "The slogan, and the acceptance of, 'defense of the fatherland' in this imperialistic war is nothing else than bribing the labor movement with a bourgeois lie." Such a definite answer to a definite question would be more correct theoretically, more beneficial to the proletariat, and more annoying to the opportunists than the demand for disarmament and the rejection of *all* wars of defense. And we could add: "The bourgeoisie of all the imperialistic powers, England, France, Germany, Austria, Russia, Italy, Japan and the United States, has become so reactionary and obsessed with the struggle for world power, *that any war of the bourgeoisie of these countries must necessarily be reactionary.* The proletariat must not only oppose such a war, but must also wish the defeat of 'its own' government and use a defeat for the revolutionary uprising, if a revolt to prevent the war has failed."

As far as the system of militia is concerned, we should say: We are not in favor of a bourgeois militia, but only in favor of a proletarian militia. Accordingly, not a cent and not a man either for the standing army or for the bourgeois militia; and in the case of the bourgeois militia, all the more, as we see even in the most liberal republics, as in Switzerland, a continual Prussianizing of the militia, together with the use of troops against strikes.

We might demand: Election of officers by the rank and file, abolition of all forms of military courts, no discrimination between foreign and native workers (which is especially important in im-

perialistic countries that ruthlessly exploit and discriminate against foreign workers), and, furthermore, the right for, every hundred inhabitants of a state to select freely its military instructors, to be paid by the state, etc. In this way the proletariat would acquire military knowledge for its own use and its own interest, and not in favor of the master class. And every result of the revolutionary movement, even when only partial, as, for example, victory in a town or an industrial centre or a part of the army, as has been demonstrated by the Russian Revolution, must naturally result in the adoption by the victorious proletariat of just *this program*.

After all, it is impossible to overcome opportunism simply with paper programs; only effective action will do it. The greatest and most disastrous mistake of the collapsed second International was the separation of words and deeds, the furtherance of hypocrisy and "revolutionary" phrases. Disarmament as a social expression, that is, an idea that is not simply a personal fancy but arises out of a social condition and influences a social environment, evidently springs from the petty and accidentally "quiet" conditions of some of the small nations that lie close to the bloody war and anxiously hope to continue vegetating. It is worthwhile to examine the arguments of the Norwegian advocates of disarmament: We are a small nation, our army is small, we *cannot* defend ourselves against the world powers nor being forced into an imperialistic alliance with one or another of these powers, we want to remain quietly in our corner and carry on a corner policy, we demand disarmament, courts of arbitration with binding decisions, permanent (perhaps as exhibited by Belgium) neutrality, etc. The wish of the small nations to stay outside of great world movements, the petty bourgeois conception of living outside of the gigantic world struggle, to use its special situation to remain inactive—this is the objective social condition that secures for the policy of disarmament a certain amount of influence and following in some of the smaller nations. Such an effort is, of course, an illusion and reactionary, because in some way or other Imperialism will sweep the small nations into the whirl-pool of social development and world policy.

Objectively, disarmament only benefits the opportunistic nationalist and narrow tendency in the labor movement. Disarmament is the most nationalistic and the special national program of the small nations, not an international program of revolutionary international Socialism.

VIII

I

INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM

The State of Affairs in the Socialist International

The international duty of the Russian working class has become very evident in these days.

We see not only perfectly inactive people but even chauvinists calling themselves internationalists, men like Messrs. Plekhanov and Potresoff, even Kerensky himself. This imposes upon the proletarian party a stern obligation to draw a clear, accurate line of cleavage between lip internationalism and active internationalism.

Mere appeals to the workers of all lands, professions of internationalist faith, direct or veiled attempts to organize a progressive series of proletarian movements in the various countries at war, frantic efforts to bring about agreements between the Socialists of the belligerent countries on the subject of the revolutionary struggle, Socialistic campaigns for peace propaganda, etc., all that, when we consider its actual value regardless of the honesty of the prime movers of such enterprises is just hot air, naïve sentimentalism, which can be cleverly used by chauvinists to deceive the masses in an underhand way.

The French social-patriots, the government Socialists, most adroit and best grounded in parliamentary juggling, have broken all records for sonorous and melodious manifestoes and internationalist phraseology, coupled with the baldest betrayal of Socialism and internationalism; for they have accepted positions in a cabinet waging an imperialistic war, they have voted for all credits or loans (as Cheidse, Skobeleff, Tseretelli and Stekloff have been doing recently in Russia) and opposed the social struggle in their own country.

Good people often forget the cruel, savage paraphernalia of a world-wide imperialistic war. Phrases and naïve sentimental desires are impotent.

There is only one way of being a genuine internationalist: to strain all our energies in an endeavor to develop the revolutionary movement and speed the revolutionary struggle in our own land, to support that struggle in every way, by propaganda, sympathy, material aid, and support *only that struggle*, in every country without exception. Everything else is a snare and a delusion.

The international Socialist and working class movements the world over have in the course of the war split into three groups. Whoever understands their tendencies, has analyzed them closely and still deserts the fight for real active internationalism, is a weakling and a fraud.

1.—Social-patriots, that is, Socialists in words and chauvinists in fact, who agree to defend their fatherland in an imperialistic war and particularly in this imperialistic war. These men are our class enemies. They have gone over to the bourgeois camp. They count among their numbers the majority of Socialist leaders in every nation. Plekhanov & Co in Russia, Scheidemann in Germany, Renaudel, Guesde and Sembat in France, Bissolati & Co. in Italy, Hyndman, the Fabians and the Laborites in England, Branting & Co. in Sweden, Troelstra and his party in Holland, Stauning and his party in Denmark, Victor Berger¹ and other defenders of the fatherland in America, etc.

2.—The second group, that might be called the center, is hesitating between social-patriotism and actual internationalism. These people swear by all that is holy that they are Marxists, that they are internationalists, that they are for peace, for exerting pressure upon the government, for presenting all sorts of demands that show the desire of the nation for peace, they are peace propagandists and want a peace without annexations and they want peace with the social-patriots. The center is for union and against any sort of schism. The center is the heaven of petty bourgeois phrases of lip internationalism, of cowardly opportunism, of compromise with the social-patriots. The fact is that the center is not convinced of the necessity of a revolution against the government of its own country; it does not preach that kind of revolution; it does not wage

¹Victor Berger is against America's participation in the war, but he is still a social-patriot in the meaning of Lenin's term, having repeatedly justified the majority government Socialists of Germany, advocated three years ago the American invasion and conquest of Mexico and urged a larger navy for "national defence." His attitude against America's participation in the war is determined by peculiar motives of his own, having nothing in common with revolutionary international Socialism.—L. C. F.

an incessant fight for the revolution, and it resorts to the lowest, super-Marxist dodges to get the difficulty.

The social-patriots are the enemies of our class, they are bourgeois in the midst of the labor movement. They represent layers or groups of the working class which have been practically bought by the bourgeois through better wages, positions of honor, etc., and which help *their* bourgeoisie to exploit and oppress smaller and weaker nations, and take part in the division of capitalistic spoils.

The members of the center group are routine worshipers, eaten up by the gangrene of legality, corrupted by the parliamentary comedy, bureaucrats accustomed to nice sinecures and steady jobs. Historically and economically, they do not represent any special stratum of society; they only represent the transition from the old-fashioned labor movement as it was from 1871 to 1914, which rendered inestimable services to the proletariat through its slow, continued, systematic work of organization in a large, very large field, to the new movement which was objectively necessary at the time of the first world-wide war of Imperialism, and which has inaugurated the social-revolutionary era.

The main leader and representative of the center is Karl Kautsky, who dominated the second International (from 1889 to 1914), who has been responsible for the complete downfall of Marxism, who has showed an unherd-of lack of principles and the most pitiful hesitancy and betrayed the cause since August, 1914.

Among these centrists are Kautsky, Haase, Ledebour, and the so-called labor group in the Reichstag; in France, Longuet, Pressman and the so-called minority; in England, Philip Snowden, Ramsay MacDonald and other leaders of the Independent Labor Party, and a part of the British Socialist Party; Morris Hillquit and many others in the United States; Turati, Treves, Modigliani and others in Italy, Robert Grimm and others in Switzerland; Victor Adler & Co. in Austria; the Mensheviks, Axelrod, Martov, Cheidse, Tsere-telli and others in Russia.

It goes without saying that some individual members of these groups go unconsciously from social-patriotism to centerism, and *vice versa*. Every Marxist knows, however, that classes retain their character regardless of the free migration of people from one group to another, in spite of all the efforts which are made to blend class or harmonize tendencies.

3.—The third, truly internationalist, is most accurately represented by the so-called "Zimmerwald Left."^{*}

It is characterized by its complete schism from the social-patriots and the centrists. It has been waging a relentless war against its own imperialistic government and its own imperialistic bourgeoisie. Its motto is: "Our worst enemy is at home." It has fought ruthlessly the nice and respectable social pacifist's phraseology, for those people who are social pacifists in words are bourgeois pacifists in deeds; bourgeois pacifists dream of an everlasting peace which shall not be preceded by the overthrow of capitalist domination. They have been employing every form of sophistry to demonstrate the impossibility, the inopportunities of keeping up the proletarian class struggle or of starting a proletarian Social Revolution in connection with the present war.

The members of this group in Germany are known as the Spartacus or International Group, to which Karl Liebknecht be-

^{*}The declaration of war on August 4, 1914, swept organized Socialism into a support of the government, in Germany, France, Austria and England. After a year of war the majority Socialists retained their pro-government attitude, and the minority determined upon initiating some sort of international action. The Socialist Party of Italy, which opposed Italy's entry into war and after war was declared acted and still acts against it, on May 15, 1915, decided through its Executive Committee to take the initiative in calling an international conference of Socialist parties or groups and labor organizations opposed to the war and of whom it could be assumed that they would favor common action in resuming and carrying on the proletarian class struggle against the war. The Conference met in Zimmerwald, Switzerland, September 15, 1915. Italy, Russia, Rumania and Bulgaria were officially represented by party delegates; from Germany, France, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland only groups or minorities were represented. The majority of the delegates agreed on a social-pacifist resolution, a resolution obviously a compromise and which did not break completely with the dominant Socialism. A minority, however, dissatisfied with the spirit and resolution of the Conference, broke away and adopted a revolutionary declaration of their own. Shortly after, another Conference was held at Kienthal. Another "Zimmerwald" Conference was held in Stockholm, September 5-7, at which the Independent Socialist Party of Germany, which had refused to meet in the Stockholm Conference together with the Government Socialists of Germany, the Austrian minority, etc., and the Socialist Propaganda League of the United States were represented. The resolution adopted was much more radical than the one adopted at Zimmerwald. The Government Socialists were completely condemned: "Only a peace won and shaped by the Socialist proletariat through decisive mass actions can permanently prevent the renewal of the world-wide massacre. A capitalistic peace, no matter how it might be shaped, would lead to the shifting upon the shoulders of the working masses of the immense war debts in every country."

... The only guarantee against a return of the world war is the social republic. ... The hour has struck for beginning the great common battle in all countries for the bringing of peace, for the liberation of the peoples through the Socialist proletariat. The means for this is the international mass strike."—L. C. F.

longs. Karl Liebknecht is the best known representative of that tendency and of the new real, proletarian international.

Karl Liebknecht called upon the workingmen and soldiers of Germany to turn their guns upon their own government. Karl Liebknecht did that openly from the tribune of parliament, the Reichstag. Then he went out on Potsdamer Platz, one of the largest public squares in Berlin, with a batch of unlawfully printed proclamations to head a demonstration that shouted: "Down with the government." He was arrested and sentenced to hard labor. He is now serving his term in a German jail, like hundreds if not thousands of other real Socialists of Germany who have been jailed for waging war against war.

Karl Liebknecht attacked mercilessly in his speeches and his writings not only the Plekhanovs and the Potresofs of Germany (Scheidemann, Legien, David, etc.), but also the centrists of Germany, the German Cheidses and Tseretellis, men like Kautsky. Haase, Ledebour and others.

Karl Liebknecht and his friend, Otto Ruhle, alone among 120 Socialist deputies in the Reichstag, disregarded the party discipline, destroyed the harmonious union with the centrists and the chauvinists, and fought everybody. Liebknecht alone really represents Socialism, the proletarian cause, the proletarian revolution. The rest of the German Social Democracy, to quote the apt words of Rosa Luxemburg, also a member and leader of the Spartacus Group, is "a stinking carrion."⁸

Another group of real internationalists in Germany is gathered around the Bremen paper, *The Workers' Politics*.

In France those who stand closest to real internationalism are Lorient and his friends (Bourderon and Merrheim have gone over to the social-pacifist group), Henri Guilbeaux, who publishes in Switzerland a paper called *Demain*. In England, the supporters of the review, *The Trade Unionist*, and some of the members of the British Socialist Party and of the Independent Labor Party (for instance, William Russell, who has openly separated himself from the leaders who are betraying Socialism), the Scotch teacher and Socialist, MacLean, who has been sentenced to jail by the bourgeois

⁸When the "minority" in the German Social Democracy, captained by Kautsky and Haase, broke away and organized the Independent Socialist Party, Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring and others refused to join the new party, considering it moderate and compromising, and organized in a group of their own, a sort of German expression of theoretical Bolshevism.—L. C. F.

government for his revolutionary activity against the war; hundreds of English Socialists are in jail for the same offense. They are the only real internationalists. In the United States, the Socialist Labor Party and certain elements of the opportunistic Socialist Party which began in 1917 to publish the paper *The Internationalist*.⁴

In Holland, the party of the "Tribunists," publishing the daily paper *The Tribune* (Anton Pannekoek, Herman Gorter, Weinkopp, and Henriette Roland-Holst, who, a centrist at Zimmerwald, now has, however, joined our ranks). In Sweden, the section of the younger men and of the left with such representatives as Lindhagen, Ture Nerman, Karlston, Strom and Z. Heglund, who at Zimmerwald was personally active in the organization of the Zimmerwald Left, and who is now serving a jail term for his activity against the war. In Denmark, Trier and his friends who have left the purely bourgeois Social Democratic Party headed by Minister Stauning. In Bulgaria, the "simon-pure." In Italy, Constantino Lazzari, secretary of the Socialist Party, and Serrati, editor of the central organ *Avanti*. In Poland, Karl Radek, Ganetzky and other leaders of the Social Democracy, forming the Kraev group, Rosa Luxemburg, Tyshka and others forming the "main group" of the Social Democracy. In Switzerland, the "left," which put through the referendum of January, 1917, in order to fight the social-patriots and the center, and which at the session of the Socialist Party in the canton of Zurich on February 11, 1917, carried a revolutionary resolution against the war. In Austria, the youthful friends of Friedrich Adler, whose activity manifested itself partly through the "Karl Marx Club," now closed by the reactionary Austrian government, which imprisoned Adler for his heroic but ill-considered attempt upon the life of Premier Stuergh.

We shall not bother with the slight differences of opinion among the members of the "left." We are only interested in the general tendency as such. It is by no means easy to remain a real internationalist during a ruthless imperialistic war. Those who can

⁴Since April, 1917, *The New Internationalist*, edited by Louis C. Fraina, succeeded *The Internationalist*. It is the official organ of the Socialist Propaganda League, the American organization of the Socialism of the "left." *The New Internationalist* favored the cause of the Bolsheviki months before their triumph, at a time when the Socialist Party paper, the *New York Call*, was editorially stigmatizing the Bolsheviki and Lenin as "anarchists" while the Socialist Propaganda League was the only American Socialist organization to approve and agitate for the armistice proposal issued by the Soviet government in November, 1917.—L. C. F.

do it are rare, but in them repose all the hopes of Socialism; they alone are the leaders of the masses, not the corrupters of the masses.

The differences between reformists and revolutionists in the ranks of the Social Democrats and of Socialists in general cannot but undergo a positive change in the midst of an imperialistic war. People, however, who simply present "demands" to bourgeois governments with a view to "the conclusion of peace" or "the manifestation of the nations desire for peace," are mere reformists. For the problem of war can only be solved by revolutionary means. Nothing will end the war, nothing usher in a really democratic peace, not a peace imposed by violence, nothing will free the nations from the conspiracy of greedy capitalists fattening on the war, nothing but a proletarian revolution.

We can and we must demand all those reforms from the bourgeois governments, but it is only a mere reformist who would expect that type of men, fettered by thousands of capitalistic ties, to break those ties; until those ties are broken all the talk of war against war will remain empty, deceitful prattle.

II

The Fiasco of the Zimmerwald International

The Zimmerwald International assumed from the very first a hesitating, Kautsky-like "center" attitude which compelled the Left to stand by itself, to separate itself from the rest and to come forth with its own manifesto, which was published in Switzerland in Russian, in German and in French.

The fatal weakness of the Zimmerwald International and which brought about its fiasco (from a political and intellectual viewpoint it was already a fiasco), was its hesitancy, its lack of decision, when it came to the practical and all-important question of breaking completely with the social-patriots and with the social-patriot international headed by Vandervelde and Huysmans at The Hague.

We Russians do not as yet realize that the majority of the Zimmerwald International was dominated by Kautsky. But this is an absolute fact which can not be minimized and of which Western Europe is fully aware. A chauvinist, an extreme German chauvinist, Heilman, editor of the arch-chauvinist *Chemnitz Gazette* and contributor of the arch-chauvinist *Bell* (a Social Democrat, of course, and an ardent partisan of the Social Democratic unity) was compelled to acknowledge in writing that the "center" (or Kautski-

ans) and the Zimmerwald majority were one and the same thing.

By the end of 1916 or the beginning of 1917 this had become an admitted fact. In spite of the condemnation of social-pacifism pronounced by the Kienthal Manifesto, the whole Zimmerwald right, the Zimmerwald majority, went over to social-pacifism. Kautsky & Co. crossed the bridge in January and February, 1917; then followed in succession the Frenchmen Bourderon and Merheim, who cast their votes with the social-pacifists for a pacifist resolution of the Socialist Party in December, 1916, and of the General Confederation of Labor (the national organization of French labor unions), also in December, 1916; Turati & Co. in Italy, where the entire party assumed a pacifist attitude, Turati personally delivering himself (and not by accident) of a few nationalistic sentences in which he praised the imperialistic war in a speech on December 17, 1916; the chairman of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences, Robert Grimm, joined hands with the chauvinists of his own party, Gruelich, Pfluger, Gustave Muller and others opposed to the real internationalists.

At two conferences of Zimmerwaldists of various countries, held in January and February of 1917, this double-faced attitude of the Zimmerwald majority was stigmatized by the "left" internationalists of several countries, by Munzerberg, secretary of the internationalist organization of the Young People's Socialist groups and editor of the fine internationalist publication, *International Youth*, by Zinoviev, chairman of the executive committee of our party, by Karl Radek of the Polish Social Democratic Party (the Kraev movement), by Max Hartstein, a German Social Democrat and member of the "Spartacus Group."

The Russian proletariat has done much. Nowhere on earth has the working class developed as much revolutionary energy as it has in Russia. But much is expected from those who have accomplished much. We cannot remain with our feet in the Zimmerwald mud. There is nothing to expect from the Zimmerwald Kautskians, more or less allied with the chauvinistic International of Plekhanov and Scheidemann.

We must break away from this sort of International. We must at once organize a new, revolutionary, proletarian International, or rather, acknowledge frankly and fearlessly that the new International is organized and working. This will be the International of those who are internationalists in their deeds, and whom I have enumerated in a foregoing paragraph. They alone represent the

revolution, the masses of internationalists, and they have not tried to corrupt the masses.

Even if there are few Socialists of that type, let every Russian worker ask himself how many conscious revolutionists there were in Russia on the eve of the March Revolution in 1917.

It is not so much a question of numbers; it is a question of expressing correctly the ideas and the policy of the truly revolutionary proletariat. Never mind about "proclaiming" internationalism; the essential thing is for us to be, even when the times are most trying, real internationalists in our deeds.

We shall not allow ourselves to be deceived by agreements and international congresses. International relations will remain, as long as this imperialistic war lasts, held as in a vise by the military dictatorship of the imperialistic bourgeoisie. Remember that even the republican Milyukov, who had to submit to the "auxiliary-government" of the Council of Workers' Delegates, would not allow into Russia, in April, 1917, Franz Platen, the Swiss Socialist, secretary of the party and internationalist, a member of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences, although Platen was married to a Russian woman, although he had taken part in the Revolution of 1905 in Riga, and for that offense had served a term in a Russian jail, and who having given security to the Czar's government for his release, wanted that security returned to him. Well, if the republican Milyukov could do such a thing, in April, 1917, and in Russia, then we can see how much stock we may take in the promises and declarations made by the bourgeoisie on the subject of peace without annexations. How about the arrest of Trotzky by the English Government? How about Martov being refused permission to leave Switzerland; how about the attempt made to lure him to England, where he would have shared Trotzky's fate?

Let us beware of illusions and of self-deception.

To wait for international conferences and congresses is simply to betray internationalism. Real international Socialists are not allowed to meet at Stockholm, not even to send letters, in spite of the censorship which can be exercised on all writings.

Let us not wait, let us organize at once a third International and hundreds of Socialists imprisoned in England and in Germany will heave a sigh of relief, thousands and thousands of German workers, who are now trying to organize strikes and demonstrations, will read in forbidden sheets about our decision, about our fraternal confidence in Karl Liebknecht (and in him alone among

their Socialist leaders), about the decision we have taken to fight *now* the so-called "revolutionary defense" group; they will read all this and it will inject new strength into their revolutionary internationalism.

Much is expected from him who has accomplished much. There is no land on earth which is as free as Russia is now. Let us make use of this freedom not to prop up the bourgeoisie or the bourgeois "revolutionary defense," but to organize a third International, bold and honest and proletarian, the kind which Liebknecht would have, an International which will set its face boldly against all traitors, all social-patriots and the vacillating people of the "center."

After what I have just said, I need not waste any words to explain that a union of the Social Democrats of Russia is impossible. Rather stay alone, as Liebknecht did, that is, remain with the revolutionary proletariat, than to entertain even for a minute any thought of a union with the Mensheviks, with Cheidse and Tsere-telli, who are willing to join hands with the Potresofs who voted for the war credit in the Executive Committee of the Council of Workers' Delegates, and who have gone over to the "revolutionary defense" group.

Let the dead bury their dead.

Whosoever wants to help hesitating souls should stop hesitating himself.

III

The Communist Party

I am coming to the last question which is: what shall we call our party? We would call it the Communist Party, using Marx' and Engels' terminology.¹

We are Marxists and our policy is based upon the *Communist Manifesto* which has been perverted and disregarded by the "Social Democracy" on two important points:

- 1.—As workingmen have no country, the "defense of the fatherland" in an imperialistic war is a betrayal of Socialism.
- 2.—The Marxian theory of government has been perverted by the second International.

The term "Social Democracy" is unscientific, as Marx ex-

¹In February, 1918, the Bolsheviki, formerly simply a faction of the Social Democratic Labor Party, organized independently as the Communist Party.—L. C. F.

plained in 1875, and Engels, in a more popular form, in 1894. Mankind can only pass from Capitalism into Socialism, that is, public ownership of the means of production and the distribution of products according to individual work. Our party looks farther ahead than that: Socialism is bound sooner or later to ripen into Communism, whose banner bears the motto: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.

That is the first reason. Here is my second:

The second part of the term "Social Democracy" is scientifically wrong. Democracy is only a form of authority. We Marxists are opposed to every form of authority.

The leaders of the second International (1889-1914), Plekhanov, Kautsky and their ilk, perverted and debased Marxism. The difference between Marxism and Anarchism is that Marxism admits the necessity of some sort of authority during the transition from Capitalism to Socialism; not the kind of authority represented by a democratic, bourgeois republic and its parliamentary system, but the kind of authority represented by the Paris Commune of 1871 and the Councils of Workers' Delegates of 1905 and 1917.

There is a third reason: Life and the Revolution have already established in a concrete way (although in a form which is still weak and embryonic) a new type of authority which does not seem to be authority in the proper sense of the word. It is a question of the masses taking action and no longer of leaders indulging in theories.

Authority in the usual sense of the word is the power exercised over the masses by a group of armed men distinct from the nation. The new authority, which is now in process of being born, is also a real authority, because we, too, need groups of armed men necessary to preserve order, necessary to crush out ruthlessly all attempts at a counter-revolution, all attempts at keeping in power a Czarist, bourgeois government. But our newly-born authority isn't authority in the proper sense of the word, because those groups of armed men found in many parts of Russia are the masses themselves, the whole nation, not simply groups allowed to rule above the nation, not groups distinct from the nation, privileged individuals practically immovable.

Let us look forward, not backward; let us look away from the democracy of the usual bourgeois type, which enforces the domination of the bourgeoisie by means of an antiquated, monarchistic machinery of government, the police, the army and the bureauc-

racy. Let us look forward to the advent of the newly-born democracy, which has already ceased to be a democracy, for democracy means the people's authority and the armed masses of the nation could not exercise an authority over themselves.

The word democracy cannot be scientifically applied to the Communist Party. Since March, 1917, the word democracy is simply a shackle fastened upon the revolutionary nation and preventing it from establishing boldly, freely and regardless of all obstacles a new form of power: the Councils of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates, harbinger of the abolition of every form of authority.

There is a fourth reason: the international position of Socialism. Its position is no longer what it was between the years 1871 and 1914, when Marx and Engels adopted as a makeshift the inaccurate, opportunistic word "Social Democracy."

In the days after the defeat of the Paris Commune what was mostly needed was slow work of organization and enlightenment. Nothing else was possible. Anarchists were then, as they are now, theoretically, economically and politically wrong. The Anarchists, who did not understand the world situation, selected the wrong moment: the workers of England had been perverted by imperialistic gains, the Commune had been beaten in Paris, the National bourgeois movement was victorious in Germany, and feudal Russia was still sleeping the sleep of centuries. Marx and Engels gauged the hour accurately; they understood the international situation; they saw that the Social Revolution would have to go slowly at first.

We must in turn understand the peculiarities and the duties of our day. Let us not imitate the pseudo-Marxianists of whom Marx himself said: "I sowed dragons' teeth and I reaped fleas."

The natural development of Capitalism, evolving into Imperialism has brought forth an imperialistic war. This war has brought mankind to the brink of destruction, jeopardized all civilization, ruined and brutalized millions of human beings. There is no way out of it except through a proletarian revolution. And just when that revolution is beginning, when it is taking its first steps, awkward, weak, diffident, leaning too much as yet on the bourgeoisie, at that moment the majority of the Social Democratic leaders, of the Social Democratic parliamentarians, of the Social Democratic papers, in a word all those who could spur the masses

to action, or at least the majority of them are betraying Socialism, are selling Socialism, are going to fight the battles of their national bourgeoisie.

The masses are distracted and baffled by talk and deceived by their leaders. And should we aid and abet that deception by retaining the old and worn out party name, which is as spent as the second International?

It may be that many workers understand the real meaning of Social Democracy, but we must draw the line between what it means objectively and what it means subjectively.

Subjectively those workers are Social Democrats, true leaders of the proletarian masses. Objectively, the world situation is such that the old name of our party helps fool the masses and retards the onward march. Every day, in every paper, in every parliamentary group, the masses see leaders, that is, people whose voice carries farther, whose acts are in evidence, who call themselves Social Democrats and Socialists, and who join hands with the betrayers of Socialism, the social-patriots, who are trying to cash the promissory note issued by the Social Democracy.

Are there any reasons against the new names? Shall we mix with the communistic Anarchists? Why are we not afraid of mixing with the social-nationalists, the social liberals, the social patriots? The laboring masses, some say, are accustomed to their Social Democratic Party, they love it. That is the only reason for retaining the old name and this reason goes counter to the teachings of Marxism, disregards the revolutionary tasks of to-morrow, the objective position of Socialism the world over, the shameful fiasco of the second International, and the injury done to the cause of millions of proletarians who are "also Social Democrats." This reason is based solely on laziness and love of routine. We want to recast the world. We want to end this world war waged by imperialists in which millions of people are involved and millions of dollars are invested, a war which cannot be ended in a truly democratic way without the greatest proletarian revolution in history.

And here we are hesitating. Here we are, keeping on our backs the same old dirty shirt. It is high time we should cast off the dirty shirt and put on a new, clean one.

PART THREE

The Struggle for State Power

By N. LENIN and
LEON TROTZKY

INTRODUCTION

The great, the decisive problem of the Russian Revolution was the problem of *state power*, the problem of which class should control the state and what form the state should assume. Every phase and tendency of the Revolution is interwoven with this problem of state power, every crisis of the Revolution is a *crisis of power*. Within two weeks after the overthrow of Czarism and the organization of the Provisional Government and the Soviets of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants, the problem of state power appeared and swiftly became the determinant issue, of which all other issues were simply an expression.

The bourgeoisie, which at first desired a constitutional monarchy, reconciled itself under the pressure of events to a republic; its conception of state power was a bourgeois parliamentary republic retaining in its machinery all the essential features of the government of Czarism,—a capitalistic autocracy disguised in the mask of democratic forms. At the start, the Provisional Government was dominated by the ultra-reactionaries of the Guchkov and Milyukov type; but after the crisis of May 2-3, the government came under the control of bourgeois liberals, the Cadets and the moderate Socialists. The Cadets were avowedly imperialistic, a policy dictated by their class relations; while the moderate Socialists were compelled to acquiesce in an imperialistic policy because of their alliance with the bourgeoisie and their refusal to assume all power through the Soviets, by which means alone an independent, revolutionary policy could be formulated and put into practice.

On June 5, the Executive Committee of the Soviets issued an appeal to the Socialist and labor organizations of the world for "a determined and energetic fight against the universal slaughter," and "an agreement for the termination of the 'party truce' with imperialistic governments and classes, which makes nugatory the real struggle for peace." But this appeal was itself rendered nugatory by the Soviets' alliance with a bourgeois government, a policy fundamentally identical with the policy of the social-patriot Socialists of France, who sent their representatives into the bourgeois ministry of Viviani and Briand, of Capitalism and Imperialism.

The entry of Socialist representatives of the Soviets into the ministry was a flagrant violation of revolutionary Socialist policy and a contemptuous disregard of the prevailing situation. The only actual power in the nation was the power of the revolutionary masses, organized in the Soviets; the surrender of authority to the bourgeois government could not alter the actual relations of power nor eliminate the antagonisms between the revolutionary masses and the bourgeoisie. Coalition meant a dodging of the problem of power, not its solution. In words, the Soviet leaders might relinquish all power to the government; in fact, the Soviets were compelled

by the pressure of events and class antagonisms to limit the authority of the Provisional Government, often actually to repudiate it, to assume an attitude that prevented equally the development of a bourgeois authority and policy or of a proletarian policy and authority. The situation was intolerable: it could not promote the revolution, only chaos and reaction.

The increasing resentment against the coalition concluded on May 18 compelled the Executive Committee of the Soviets early in June to issue an explanatory declaration:

"1.—Socialist ministers were sent into the government by the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates with the definite mandate to secure a general peace by agreement between the nations and not to prolong an imperialistic war in the name of the liberation of nations.

"2.—Socialist participation in the Government does not mean a cessation of the struggle of the classes, but, on the contrary, its prolongation by political power. It was for this reason that the entry of Socialists into the Ministry with representatives of the bourgeois parties was impossible until some of the enemies of the Russian proletariat were interned and others were removed from power by the movement of the revolutionary masses of May 2nd and 3rd.

"3.—The participation of the Socialists in the Government is being carried out on conditions of the most complete liberty being enjoyed by the proletariat and the army, this liberty being entirely unaffected by martial law, political censorship or other restrictions. Organized control by the working classes of their representatives is effective enough.

"4.—The entry of its representatives into the Government does not mean for the Russian proletariat the weakening of the bonds uniting it with Socialists of all countries who are struggling against Imperialism, but, on the contrary, the strengthening of these bonds by a more intense common struggle for a general peace."

Truly, "Socialist participation in the Government does not mean a cessation of the struggle of the classes," but it did mean a strengthening of the bourgeoisie as against the proletariat, it did mean a temporary confusion and weakening of the struggle, the *conscious struggle*, of the proletariat: a conclusion amply proven by the fact that the struggle against coalition became the centre of the *revolutionary* class struggle of the proletariat and peasant masses. The purpose of coalition, directly and indirectly, consciously and unconsciously, was to castrate the revolutionary struggle by transforming it from a struggle of revolutionary mass action into the wrangles and bickerings in the ministry between the Socialist representatives and the Cadets. Instead of action, words; instead of revolution, conciliation!

But conciliation breaks down miserably under the impact of violent class antagonisms, in the stress of revolutionary events. The Menshevik and Social-Revolutionary policy might have prevailed in a pre-revolutionary period; it was utterly futile during a revolution. The policy of conciliation, of the co-operation of classes, is possible when the masses are apathetic, for then the masses do not act against the inevitable conversion of the co-operation of classes into the supremacy of the capitalist class. But in a revolution, the masses are in motion; the developments of years are compressed into months and days; class relations and class antagonisms are revealed acutely, starkly, and uncompromisingly. Conciliation requires compromise; but in a revolution, with its crises and upheavals, compromise must go to the root of things, must be fundamental: in other

words, compromise requires a surrender by one class or the other. Now, neither the proletariat nor the bourgeoisie was willing to make the necessary compromise, which would have meant abdication; and the situation necessarily resolved itself into a dual struggle against the coalition,—a struggle from the right, that of the imperialistic bourgeoisie, and a struggle from the left, that of the revolutionary proletariat and its ally, the impoverished peasantry.

The principle of conciliation supposedly animating the Coalition Ministry expressed itself in practice in one acute ministerial crisis after another. The coalition was agreed upon on May 18; on June 1, I. A. Konovalov (Cadet), Minister of Trade and Industry, resigned his portfolio owing to a complete divergence of views with Minister of Labor Skobleff (Menshevik-Socialist) concerning appropriate economic and financial measures, particularly the measures necessary to deal with the prevailing internal crisis. And this divergence was inevitable. Action to meet the internal crisis required measures limiting equally the power and the profits of the capitalist class, and the bourgeois representatives in the Ministry would never consent to these measures, even when they assumed the comparatively moderate form of measures proposed by a Menshevik. In economic policy, as on war and peace, conciliation was a broken reed that could sustain nothing.

The Coalition Government was in an untenable position: it was an impossibility in operation in a revolutionary epoch. Either it honestly tried to represent both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the revolution and the reaction, in which case it might talk but could not act, because of the antagonisms of class interests; or else, under the pressure of events, it might act, but in the interest of one or the other class. It was no accident of history that the chief personality of this government was Kerensky (and Kerensky was its guiding spirit even before he became Premier)—an orator, a master of words, an adept in the psychology of promises. Only words, only fine phrases and glittering slogans, instruments for the deception of the masses, could be the expression of a two-class government in a revolutionary situation. And where the Coalition Government acted, it acted fatedly against the Revolution. Where revolutions do not act, they are submerged in a welter of words. If the revolutionary class shrinks before the task of assuming power and reorganizing society itself, the ruling class inevitably acts in the interest of reaction. Every day that passed in the making and acceptance of phrases as a substitute for action was a defeat for the Revolution. The policy of phrases makes for reaction. The slogans of the Revolution may be used and assimilated by the time-serving politicians of the bourgeoisie and the moderate Socialists: its *action*, never.

Under the Coalition Government, in practice the government of the ruling class, industry was demoralized by the bourgeoisie using its ownership of industry to starve the proletariat and paralyze the Revolution by locking out the workers and sabotaging production. Agriculture was demoralized because the government dared not carry out the revolutionary task of expropriating and distributing the lands, as this task antagonized the interests of the bourgeoisie represented in the government. The bourgeois representatives, aided and abetted by the bureaucratic machinery of government of the old regime retained *in toto* by the new, sabotaged any radi-

cal measures of the government, when pressure compelled the government to act, which was seldom. The task of internal reorganization could be undertaken either by a strictly bourgeois government, which would have meant a reorganization dominantly in the interests of the bourgeoisie; or by a strictly revolutionary Socialist government acting through the Soviets—a "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry"—which would have meant a reorganization in the interests of the proletariat and the impoverished peasantry. The Provisional Government paltered on all the vital problems of the Revolution, declaring that these problems should be settled by the Constituent Assembly, and kept postponing the meeting of the Assembly. In the meanwhile it acted in the interests of the bourgeoisie, and tried to undermine the Soviets, particularly the Soldiers' Soviets in the army: the propaganda for an offensive was linked with the propaganda to crush the Soldiers' Soviets. Through the acceptance of coalition and the policy of bourgeois parliamentary procedure the moderates in the Soviets promoted the government's policy of reaction through inaction.

The problem of power was inescapable. The revolutionary impatience of the masses increased in the measure that the Coalition Government evaded the necessity of action and adopted an international policy that allied revolutionary Russia with the reaction and Imperialism of Great Britain, France and Italy. The Government did not simply palter on the issue of peace: it actually repudiated peace, and secretly conspired to continue an imperialistic war—a war still imperialistic, in spite of the flood of words that issued from the mouth of Kerensky about democracy and a permanent peace. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tereschenko, argued that the publication of the secret treaties and agreements concluded between the Czar and Great Britain and France would mean a rupture with the Allies: and yet the Menshevik Tseretelli argued at the All-Russian Soviet Congress in June: "We desire to hasten the conclusion of a new treaty, in which the principles proclaimed by the Russian democracy will be recognized as the basis of the international policy of the Allies." Not only were the secret treaties not published, but the Coalition Government itself used secret diplomacy in making arrangements of its own to continue the war: the policy of revolutionary Russia was made dependent upon the wishes of the Allies.¹

The words of the Coalition government promised peace, but its acts constituted war. If the publication of the secret treaty agreements would have meant a rupture with the Allies, the acceptance by the Allies in words of the peace formula of revolutionary Russia would have meant—just nothing. The policy of trying to influence the imperialistic governments of the Allies to revise and re-state their war aims in accord with Russia's formula

¹In the matter of publishing the secret treaty agreements, the Kerensky Government also took its cue from the Allies. Tereschenko, who was Kerensky's Minister of Foreign Affairs as he had been Prince Lvov's, said in a secret telegram to the Russian Charge d'Affairs in Paris, dated September 24, 1917: "... a publication of a treaty which is generally known would be completely misunderstood by public opinion and would only give rise to demands for the publication of the agreements which had been concluded during the war. The publication of these, and especially of the Rumanian and Italian treaties, is regarded by our allies as undesirable. In any case we have no intention of putting difficulties in the way of France or of placing Ribot in a still more painful position ... no obstacles will be placed in the way of publishing all agreements before or during the war, in the event of the other Allies who are parties to them consenting."

was not only a futile and petty bourgeois policy, it was insincere in that the Provisional Government secretly plotted war. The Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionists, the moderates in control of the Soviets, accepted this policy: they contributed to the delusion of a war for democracy, or a war to "defend the Revolution"—but *which* revolution?

During the period of coalition, the Council of Soldiers and Workers, in its dominant, moderate expression, was a representative of a vague democracy. "The unity of all democratic elements!"—this was the slogan of the Coalition Government, and of the Soviet moderates. But democracy under the conditions of Imperialism is an instrument of reaction, a factor in the promotion of Imperialism, a useful and necessary means of misleading the masses. The Government and Soviet moderates tried to revive the war spirit of the people by speaking of a "democratic war," a "war to defend the Revolution." But under the prevailing conditions every action toward war was counter-revolutionary: the "restoration of discipline" in the army was necessarily interpreted to mean the crushing of the Soldiers' Soviets; and, moreover, the war was waged in alliance with Anglo-French Imperialism, strengthening the bourgeoisie of Russia and its imperialistic interests. A war to defend the Revolution could be waged only after the bourgeoisie and the *petite bourgeois* "Socialists" were excluded from the government, only after the government had been converted into a "dictatorship of the proletariat"; only a revolutionary war, waged by a revolutionary proletarian government for revolutionary purposes could constitute a war "to defend the Revolution." The moderate Socialist majority in the Soviets, whose Socialism was a perversion of the class struggle and essentially an expression of the democracy of the nationalistic, liberal *petite bourgeoisie*, developed under the pressure of events into a conservative and counter-revolutionary force. The influence of the Soviet leaders was used to mislead the masses and to support the bourgeois policy of the Coalition Government. The only way out was to break the coalition by means of all power to the Soviets.²

The problem of power was very much in the order of the day at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets which convened in the middle of June, Lenin and Trotzky leading the revolutionary opposition to the policy of coalition. This was Trotzky's formulation of the problem:

"I tell you that the country is approaching an outright catastrophe, because somehow we cannot understand that the whole thing lies in the creation of a homogeneous power. In two weeks the question will become more acute. The question is—power to whom and over whom? Is it power over the Revolutionary Democracy or the power of the Revolutionary Democracy? Do not forget that at the moment of demobilization, we will need a still more powerful government, and, therefore, I say that full power must be turned over to the Democracy.

"The policy of continual postponement and the detailed preparations for calling the Constituent Assembly is a false policy. It may destroy even the very realization of the Constituent Assembly. And these black ravens of the Fourth Imperial Duma are not at all so innocent. Their

²I shall not discuss here the interesting problem in psychology, concerning the motives of the Soviet moderates. Whether they were consciously counter-revolutionary is unimportant: we may even admit that they were not. But in great social crises the motives of individuals count for little: their tendency is the determining consideration. It is not necessary to accuse veterans of the Socialist movement, such as Plekhanov, Cheldse and Tseretelli, of conscious treason to the Revolution: the fact that their attitude and general tendency acted against the Revolution is proven. The petty bourgeois policy of these men is the great curse of International Socialism, as it was of the proletarian revolution in Russia.

appointees in the Ministry are starving out the Russian Revolution practically in all spheres, while they themselves sit in the Tavrichesky Palace and wait for the time when, as Deputy Kerenaky thinks, the country itself will wish for the return of the old Octobrist Government. Then Rodzianko will come and tie us together in one bag, you from the right wing and us from the left."

In answering Trotzky, Minister Tseretelli declared that "the concentration of all forces of the country is needed to liquidate the internal and foreign crisis. This problem can be met adequately only by a government which unites the tremendous majority of the population and which rests on all the living forces of the country. The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates undoubtedly have great influence; none the less, we cannot say that they unite all the forces of the country. Except the masses, which are united by the Councils, there exists still tax-paying Russia and the propertied classes. . . . Only by actual experience will it be made clear whether the representatives of the bourgeoisie are really capable of undertaking a radical program of reforms or whether they came to sabotage this program. If the representatives of the bourgeoisie prove incapable, they will be expelled, but until that happens nobody may discredit them in advance, because exactly such a lack of confidence would bring the disorganization which is so dangerous at the present time. . . . The Bolshevik road can only lead to civil war."

It was exactly the exclusion of the propertied classes that was necessary to a permanent, energetic and revolutionary government; it was exactly the necessity for excluding the bourgeoisie from the government that was a central feature of the policy of all power to the Soviets. A revolutionary Socialist would know that the bourgeoisie would prove incapable, a thing that Tseretelli was willing to learn only from experience; and when experience had proven the incapacity and treachery of the bourgeoisie beyond the shadow of a doubt, Tseretelli and other Mensheviks still opposed all power to the Soviets.

It was precisely confidence in the Coalition Government and its bourgeois policy that disorganized the country and weakened the morale of the Revolution. The problem of state power was a realistic problem: either all power to the Government or all power to the Soviets alone could cope with the situation. The duality of power simply intensified the crisis and prevented the organization of the internal forces. The moderates desired to have the Soviets play the role of opposition, the role of the opposition party in a parliamentary government—a policy expressing neither audacity nor an understanding of the revolutionary requirements of the situation. The policy of the moderate majority in the Soviets would have, if successful, produced a permanent, strongly bourgeois government; and this would have meant the ultimate destruction of the Soviets and their potential revolutionary mission. The policy of the Bolsheviks, all power to the Soviets and the abolition of the old state and its bureaucratic machinery of government, was a realistic policy determined by the immediate practical requirements of the Revolution; and it was a policy, moreover, that by the stress of events and necessity would convert itself into the policy of the proletarian revolution in Russia.

But the All-Russian Soviet Congress, still dominated by the moderates, persisted in the suicidal policy of coalition. Against the votes of the Bol-

sheviki and part of the Menshevik-Internationalists it adopted a resolution approving coalition: "(1) That under the conditions created as a result of the first ministerial crisis, the passing of all power to the bourgeois elements would deal a blow at the cause of the Revolution; (2) that the transfer of all power to the Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates at the present moment of the Russian Revolution, would greatly weaken her powers by prematurely driving away from her elements which are still capable of serving the Revolution and would threaten its ruin." After expressing "full confidence" in the "Comrade-Ministers," the resolution proceeds:

"The Congress calls upon the Provisional Government to carry out more resolutely and consistently the democratic platform adopted by it, and, in particular: (a) to strive persistently for the speediest conclusion of a general peace without annexations or indemnities, on the basis of self-definition of nationalities; (b) to carry out the further democratization of the army and to strengthen its fighting power: (c) to undertake, with the direct participation of the toiling masses, the most energetic measures for combating the financial-economic disruption and disorganization of the food supply produced by the war and made acute by the policy of the propertied classes; (d) to conduct a systematic and resolute fight against counter-revolutionary attempts; (e) to bring about the speediest realization of the measures affecting the questions of land and labor, in accordance with the demands of the organized toiling masses and dictated by the vital interests of public economy, greatly sapped by the war; (f) to aid in the organization of all forces of the Revolutionary Democracy by means of rapid and radical reforms in the systems of local government and autonomy on a democratic basis, and the speediest introduction of Zemstvos and Municipal autonomy, where there is none as yet: (g) particularly does the Congress demand the speediest convocation of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly."

Just one demand in this resolution could be accepted sincerely and enthusiastically by the Provisional Government—the demand to strengthen the fighting power of the army. The rest of the program was persistently and consistently sabotaged by the government: it was a program that could be introduced only by a Soviet government. Fettered by the coalition, afraid of revolutionary audacity and power, the Soviets were directed by the moderate majority into the sterile policy of words and demands. But the reaction scored, and prepared itself for the day when it could contemptuously disregard the Soviets, even in words, and overthrow them completely.

The attitude of the All-Russian Congress solved nothing and settled nothing. The answer to the policy of hesitation was given by the revolt in Sebastopol, where the sailors deposed Admiral Kolchak, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and by demonstrations in Viborg, which cried, "Down with the capitalists! Long live the Social Republic!"

But the real answer to the policy of hesitation, an answer symptomatic of the widening split between the masses and the hesitating Soviet majority, was given by the masses of Petrograd. It was an answer that characterized equally the revolutionary impatience of the masses and the counter-revolutionary character of the Soviet moderates. The masses of Petrograd, aware of the counter-revolutionary trend of events, disgusted with the policy of hesitation, decided on June 18 upon a formidable demonstration. The All-Russian Congress united with the Provisional Government against the proposed demonstration. The Government posted placards calling upon the people to be calm, and declaring that any attempt at violence would be

suppressed. The Congress declared against the demonstration (a demonstration to voice the attitude and purposes of the masses) and sent delegates to all the factory districts to counteract the agitation of the Bolsheviks and to prevent the demonstration. Tseretelli accused the Bolsheviks of intentions to overthrow the government by *armed force*. Tseretelli had become definitely counter-revolutionary, had constituted himself the guardian of a government that betrayed the hopes of the masses, had become a master mechanic forging fetters with which to shackle the action of the masses. Overthrow the government by armed force! Is this not a method of revolution? What an accusation, what a terrible indictment, coming from a revolutionist who had himself applauded the armed force that overthrew Czarism!

The Soviet Congress itself issued the following appeal against the proposed demonstration:

"Comrades, Soldiers and Workmen! The Bolshevik Party is calling upon you to go out into the streets.

"This appeal is made without the knowledge of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, the All-Russian Congress, or all the Socialist Parties. It is sounded just at the moment of supreme danger when the All-Russian Congress has called upon our comrades, the workers in the district of Viborg, to remember that demonstrations in these days may hurt the cause of the Revolution. . . .

"At this dangerous moment you are called out into the streets to demand the overthrow of the Provisional Government, to which the All-Russian Congress has just found it necessary to give its support.

"And those who are calling you cannot but know that out of your peaceful demonstration chaos and bloodshed may result.

"Knowing your devotion to the cause of the Revolution, we tell you: You are being called to a demonstration in favor of the Revolution, but we know that counter-revolutionists want to take advantage of your demonstration. We know that the counter-revolutionists are eagerly awaiting the moment when strife will develop in the ranks of the Revolutionary Democracy and will enable them to crush the Revolution.

"Comrades! In the name of all the Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' delegates, in the name of the Council of Peasants' Delegates, in the name of the acting Army and the Socialist Parties, we tell you: Not a single division, not a regiment, not a group of workers must go out into the street tomorrow. Not a single demonstration should be held today. . . ."

As in the stormy days of May 2-3, the moderate majority in the Councils restrained and fettered the action of the masses. Opposed by the government, opposed by the Soviets, still unaware of its mighty strength, the Petrograd masses abandoned the proposed demonstration.

The Congress' declaration against the demonstration says that it was called without consultation with the other parties and without the sanction of the Soviets. Precisely; and it is precisely this circumstance which is important: the revolutionary struggle was now definitely and fundamentally a struggle between the right and left wings of the Revolution, between the moderates and the radicals in the Soviets. The problem of the Revolution was not to overthrow the Provisional Government, but to overthrow the domination of the moderates in the Soviets by securing the adhesion of the masses to a revolutionary program. The Provisional Government would collapse immediately and of itself the moment the radicals secured control of the Soviets, since the Soviet moderates alone sustained the Government.

All these events of June conspired to hearten the Provisional Government, particularly as the All-Russian Congress had decided in favor of a

vigorous prosecution of the war and declared that "the question of an offensive must be decided exclusively from the point of view of purely military and strategic considerations." Kerensky as Minister of War made all the necessary preparations, and on July 1 the offensive was launched against the Austro-German lines in Galicia. The offensive was temporarily successful, but then came the counter-attacks of the enemy and the offensive was smothered in its own insufficiency. The offensive was a military adventure of the most deplorable character; under the circumstances, it was sheer murder of the Russian soldiers, who were unprepared. In spite of the declaration of the All-Russian Congress, that an offensive was "purely military and strategic," the offensive of July 1 was determined by political considerations. It was a maneuver to restore "discipline" in the army, to strike at the revolutionary opposition and strengthen the hands of the Provisional Government. It was, moreover, determined by diplomatic considerations: relations between Russia and the Allies were being strained by Russia's apparent refusal to fight. The pressure of the Allies and the necessity of securing their financial assistance determined the inauguration of the offensive. The Bolshevik organ *Pravda* openly asserted this character of the offensive. And, to be sure, the Provisional Government was in an *impasse*, because of its bourgeois and imperialistic policy.

The political results of the offensive were important. On July 18 the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates approved the offensive. The reaction was strengthened and moderates and government became more thoroughly one and reactionary. On July 15 a ministerial crisis flared up, resulting in the resignation of five Cadet members from the Cabinet on the issue of Ukrainian autonomy. This was a challenge to the Soviets and a repudiation of the government's liberal policy.

But, simultaneously, the masses were aroused, determined upon action to defend the Revolution. The trend of events was too definitely counter-revolutionary to be accepted silently. And again the masses of Petrograd, always actively on the aggressive, determined to act. On July 15 the Government ordered the Petrograd Machine-Gun Regiment to the front; it refused to go, declaring it would not fight for Anglo-French Imperialism, and would obey only if the Government published the secret treaties. Two other regiments acted similarly. A demonstration was agreed upon and organized for July 17. All parties, including the Bolsheviks, tried to prevent the demonstration, the Bolsheviks because they knew counter-revolutionary gangs were prepared to provoke a clash, which under the conditions they considered premature. The Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets issued a proclamation against the demonstration, mentioning that several detachments of soldiers had demanded that it "take over all power." But the determination of the masses of workers and soldiers was inflexible, and in spite of all opposition a demonstration was agreed upon, and an armed demonstration, moreover, symbol of their purpose to use force if a peaceful demonstration was unsuccessful. The Bolsheviks, realizing the strength of the masses' sentiments, participated in the demonstration as the party of the revolutionary masses. As was anticipated, the peaceful demonstration was converted into an armed uprising by the armed interference and provocation

of counter-revolutionary forces, and after two days of savage fighting the uprising was crushed by means of Cossacks and large numbers of reliable troops. A veritable counter-revolutionary reign of terror ensued. The Mensheviks and Social revolutionists actively co-operated with the government in imprisoning the Bolsheviks and disarming the masses, establishing "revolutionary order" by crushing the left wing of the Revolution. This formidable uprising, however, in spite of its defeat, went far toward preserving the Revolution and energizing the morale of the masses: its defeat paved the way for the overthrow of the moderates in the Soviets, which occurred completely a few months later.

Events had demonstrated the necessity of ministerial reconstruction, and on July 20 Prince Lvov resigned as Premier, Kerensky being appointed the new Premier, but retaining his portfolio as Minister of War and Marine. On July 20 Kerensky issued a proclamation to the army and navy, accusing the sailors of Cronstadt and the Baltic Fleet of being tools of "German agents and provocateurs," and ordering:

"1.—The Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet to be immediately disbanded, a new one to be elected in its place.

"2.—To declare to all crews and vessels of the Baltic Fleet that I call upon them immediately to remove from their midst suspicious persons who are inciting disobedience to the Provisional Government and agitating against an advance, and to bring them for investigation and trial to Petrograd.

"3.—To the crews of Cronstadt and the ships of the line, 'Petrovsk,' 'Republica' and 'Slava,' whose honor is stained by counter-revolutionary acts and resolutions: I order the arrest within 24 hours of all the ring leaders and that they be sent for investigation and trial to Petrograd, and be ordered to give assurance of full obedience to the Provisional Government. I declare to the crews of Cronstadt and the above-mentioned ships that in case of failure to comply with my present order they will be declared traitors to the country and the Revolution and that the most resolute measures will be taken against them."

This was the first act of the "revolutionary" Premier Kerensky—an act directed against the courageous and revolutionary sailors of Cronstadt and the Baltic Fleet, who had been most active factors in the first stage of the Revolution and throughout its subsequent course, and who were now stigmatized because they adhered to the revolutionary program of "all power to the Soviets." On July 25 the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets adopted a resolution, 300 to 11, insinuating that Lenin and Zinoviev had received money from German sources and demanding that the Bolsheviks repudiate their leaders. An order for the arrest of Lenin was issued, who went into hiding; hundreds of Bolsheviks were imprisoned.³

³Trotsky was not directly affiliated with the Bolsheviks, and capital was made of this fact to create dissension among the revolutionary opposition. After the order was issued for the arrest of Lenin et al. Trotsky, in an open letter to the Ministry, declared: "My principles are the same as those of Lenin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, and I have always publicly defended these principles in my paper 'Vpered' and in all my speeches. The fact that I do not belong to the 'Pravda' and the organization of the Bolsheviks does not result from differences in politics, but is caused by circumstances which divided the parties in the past, but have lost at present every meaning. . . . What I have here stated shows clearly that there is no logical reason whatever to omit me from the warrant to arrest Zinoviev, Lenin and Kamenev, which arrest is only the result of counter-revolutionary despotism." This letter was published in "Pravda," as an expression of solidarity.

On August 3 there was a new ministerial crisis, Minister of Agriculture Chernov resigning, and on August 7 Premier Kerensky announced the new Cabinet, including Chernov and representatives of the Cadets, who agreed to participate in the new government.

The resignation of the Cadets from the Ministry on July 15, and of Prince Lvov on July 20, was an offensive manoeuvre against the Soviets, an attempt to thrust power upon the Soviets, which the Cadets knew very well would be declined. Premier Kerensky made his peace with the Cadets by means of concessions, and the consequence of these concessions was a definite swing to the right by the new government, the adoption of a general policy making consistently for reaction. On July 22, the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets, proclaimed the Kerensky Government "the Government of National Safety," and declared: "That unlimited powers be accorded the Government for re-establishing the organization and discipline of the Army for a fight to the finish against the enemies of public order and for the realization of the whole program of the Government." The dictatorship was used against "the enemies of public order," enthusiastically, rigorously and systematically; but the "realization of the whole program" still remained a thing of the future. The death penalty was restored in the army. The dictatorship was in action, a counter-revolutionary dictatorship. But whose dictatorship? The fatal weakness of the whole regime was that it was based on compromise, that behind it was no class capable of sustaining a dictatorship; and the inevitable consequence was the creation of a situation in which either an individual would become dictator, or the whole system would collapse. Kerensky did try to become dictator; he essayed the role of Bonaparte, but he was not even a mediocre Napoleon the Great, simply a shabby, theatrical imitation of Napoleon the Little. Kerensky talked and fumed and threatened, while the bourgeoisie patiently awaited for the moment when they could march in and assume all power. The internal crisis became still more acute, disintegration the order of the day. Over the mass of misery, of oppression, poured the golden flood of Kerensky's eloquence; but the flood obliterated neither the sufferings of the masses nor the counter-revolutionary plots of the bourgeoisie.

Reaction was to have its day. The Moscow Conference, the Fall of Riga, the Kornilov-Kerensky rebellion, the reactionary "Democratic Congress"—through all these reaction was to express itself in a last, desperate spasmodic struggle; and all the while the masses were preparing for the final action—and victory.

* * *

Sources: Chapter I and II, from Lenin's pamphlet, "Aims of the Proletariat"; Chapters VII and VIII from Lenin's pamphlet, "Lessons of the Revolution"; Chapters VII and IX from Lenin's pamphlet, "At the Moment." All the chapters of Trotzky appeared as articles in Trotzky's paper *Vperiod* during June and July.

L. C. F.

I

CLASS CHARACTER OF THE REVOLUTION

(Lenin)

The historical period through which we are passing is characterized by the following fundamental features:¹

1.—The Imperial government, which represented only a small group of large landholders having in its control all the machinery of power, army, police and bureaucracy, has been defeated and overthrown, but not entirely done away with. Monarchism, as such, has not been destroyed. The Romanoff coterie is still engaged in monarchistic intrigues. The grip of the large landholders on the land has not been definitely broken.

The powers of government in Russia have passed into the hands of a new *class*: the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois-inclined landholders. To that extent the bourgeois democratic revolution in Russia is a closed chapter.

The bourgeoisie in power concluded an alliance with purely monarchistic elements which, from 1906 to 1914, had shown themselves unusually faithful to Nicholas the Bloody and Stolypin the Hangman. The new bourgeois government of Lvov and his associates (Guchkov and other politicians more conservative than the Cadets) actually initiated negotiations with the Romanoffs aiming at a restoration of the monarchy in Russia, while using the revolutionary vocabulary. And that government has appointed to positions of authority partisans of the old regime.

All the governmental machinery, army, police and bureaucracy, is being turned over to the bourgeoisie by this government with the least possible modifications and reforms.

The new government is trying to prevent by every means at its disposal the development of mass action and the assumption of power from below by the people, which alone would insure the success of the Revolution.

¹This chapter describes the situation prevailing until the end of April, 1917.—L. C. F.

The government has not as yet announced the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. Neither does it interfere with the landholding machine, the solid foundation of feudal Czarism. The government is not considering investigating or regulating the financial organizations of a monopolistic character, large banks, syndicates, trusts, etc.

The most important and influential cabinet posts in the new government, the ministry of the interior and the ministry of war, that is, the direction of the army, police and bureaucracy and of the whole machinery for the oppression of the masses, have been given to well-known monarchists and supporters of the large landholding system.

The Cadets, the republicans of yesterday, republicans much against their inclination, have been offered positions of secondary importance, in no way affecting the ruling of the nation and the machinery of government. Kerensky, a representative of the Laborites and "also a Socialist," does very little besides lulling the people asleep with well-sounding phrases and causing them to relax their attention and their watchfulness.

For all these reasons, the new bourgeois government does not deserve the proletariat's confidence in the field of national politics and is not worthy of any confidence.

In the domain of foreign politics, which for obvious reasons is very much to the front, the new government stands for the continuation of an imperialistic war waged in concert with imperialistic nations, England, France, and others, a war waged to secure a share of the imperialistic booty and aiming at the strangling of smaller and weaker nations. The new government is subservient to the interests of Russian capitalists and of their powerful protectors and masters, the capitalists of England and France, the wealthiest in the world. It turns a deaf ear to the desires expressed by the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, expressing a clear majority of the Russian people, and has neglected to take any genuine measures to end the international slaughter organized in the interests of Capitalism.

The new government has failed to publish the secret agreements of frankly predatory character, which, as everybody knows, have been concluded between Russia and the imperialistic and predatory capitalists of England and France. It has confirmed the agreements concluded by Czarism, a system which in the course of several centuries overpowered and oppressed more nationalities than any other system of tyranny and despotism, and which has

brutalized and demoralized the Great-Russian people, transforming it into a tormentor of other races.

The new government, having confirmed those shameful and piratical agreements, refuses to suggest to all the belligerents an immediate armistice, in spite of the wishes of the large majority of the Russian people voiced by the Council of Workers and Soldiers. It has evaded the issue by confining itself to solemn, sonorous, platitudinous phrases and declarations, all of them perfectly empty but of the kind which bourgeois diplomats have always used to deceive the gullible and naive masses of oppressed nations.

And, therefore, the new government does not deserve the slightest confidence in the domain of international politics.

Moreover, it would be a waste of time to expect the government to make known the peace hunger of the peoples of Russia, or to renounce all annexations; for this would simply deceive the people, awaken in them hopes which cannot be fulfilled, retard their intellectual enlightenment, and gradually reconcile them with the idea of a continuation of the war. Socially, the present war is not characterized by any noble aims; it only reflects the class character of the government waging it, the alliance between the class represented by that government and the imperialistic financiers of Russia, England and France, and the actual policy of their class.

II

THE DUAL AUTHORITY

(Lenin)

The most peculiar feature, the distinguishing mark of our Revolution is the condition of *dual authority* it has established. This is a primary fact on which there must be clarity; without an understanding of this fact no progress is possible. The old "formulas" of Bolshevism, for instance, must be rounded out and corrected, for while they were true in general, their actual working out *has been shown* to be different. No one could have been aware, before the fact, of the condition of dual authority.

This dual power manifests itself through the existence of two different governments: the main, actual government, the government of the bourgeoisie, the Provisional Government, which holds in its hands all the machinery of power, and a supplementary, secondary, "controlling" government, the Councils of Workers and Soldiers, which does not have at its disposal any of the machinery of state power but which has the immediate and indubitable support of the majority of the nation, of the armed workers and soldiers.

The Revolution that overthrew Czarism and placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie almost led to a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. And this second government, the government of the Councils, representing the proletariat and the peasantry, is a revolutionary dictatorship, that is, its authority rests directly on revolutionary usurpation exercised through the immediate pressure of the masses from below, *not on laws* promulgated by some central government power. The source of power is not in laws previously discussed and passed by parliament, but, as in the Paris Commune, in the direct pressure and action of the masses; the preservation of order is no longer the function of an army and police, but of the workers and peasants themselves, of the armed nation.

But this power, and this is another peculiar and a most important feature of the Russian Revolution,—enjoying the full confi-

dence of the people,—has, both by a direct understanding with the Provisional Government and by a series of virtual concessions, voluntarily placed the powers of the state in the hands of the bourgeoisie and a bourgeois government. It is still surrendering positions to the bourgeoisie, has voluntarily accepted the domination of the bourgeoisie and agreed to support it, limiting itself to the role of a supervising body. Why? Is it because Cheidse, Tseretelli, Steklof & Co. are making a "mistake"? No such thing. A philistine may think that way, not a Marxist. The reason is to be found in the *insufficient class consciousness and organization* of the workers and peasants. The "mistake" of the leaders mentioned lies in their *petit bourgeois* position, in their inspiring the workers with bourgeois illusions instead of fighting to destroy these illusions, in their strengthening the influence of the bourgeoisie over the masses instead of liberating the masses from this influence.

This most peculiar situation, unparalleled in history, has led to the simultaneous existence and co-action of two dictatorships: a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, the Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, and a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, for the Provisional Government is not based on statutes nor on the expressed will of the nation, but was simply the assumption of power by a definite class, the bourgeoisie.

There is not the slightest doubt but that such a combination can not last long. There can not be any dualism of authority in the government. One of the two powers is bound to dwindle to nothing, and the bourgeoisie is already straining all its energies in an endeavor to weaken and finally annihilate the Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates and concentrate all authority in a bourgeois government.

The Provisional Government must be overthrown. It is an oligarchical, bourgeois government, not a popular one. It must not be overthrown at once, for it is being maintained by a straight and clear agreement, in form and in fact, by the Soviets, chiefly with the principal Soviet, that of Petrograd. It must not be "overthrown" in the customary manner, for it is based on the "*support*" of the *second* government, the government of the Soviets, and this second government is the only possible revolutionary government, since it expresses directly the consciousness and the will of the great majority of the workers and peasants. In order to become a power, the class conscious workers must win over a majority to their side: as you cannot resort to force against the masses, there is no

other way to lead them on. We are not *Blanquists*,¹ we do not stand for a seizure of power by the minority. We are Marxists, and therefore advocates of the proletarian class struggle as against the *petit bourgeois* vaporings and illusions, against the chauvinism of the "national defense" attitude, against a dependence on the petty bourgeoisie.

Let us form a proletarian communistic party, the elements for which have already been provided by the best advocates of Bolshevism; let us unite for the proletarian class war, and from among the proletarians, from among the poorest peasants, we shall draw to our cause an ever-increasing host. For life itself will destroy more and more of the *petit bourgeois* illusions of the "Social Democrats" Chaidse, Tseretelli, Steklof, etc., of the "Social-Revolutionists," and of the petty bourgeoisie in its more regular expressions. The *petite bourgeoisie*—the "Social Democrats," Social-Revolutionists, and others—stagger and hesitate, and thus muddle the work of enlightenment and liberation. That is the actual *class* relation between the forces that determine the outlines of our tasks.

The condition of dual authority is merely a transitional symptom in the development of the Revolution, which has gone farther than the usual bourgeois democratic revolution, but not as yet far enough to establish a complete dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

The class significance and class explanation of this transitional and unstable situation will be understood when we bear in mind the following:

Like every other revolution, our Revolution demanded the greatest heroism and self-sacrifice on the part of the masses in the struggle against Czarism, and set in motion an unusually large number of human beings. One of the chief symptoms, from the point of view of science and practical politics, of every real revolution is the unusually brusque and sudden increase in the number of just plain people who cease to remain indifferent and assume an active, individual, efficient role in political life, in the upbuilding of the state.

This is the case of Russia. Russia is in a state of ebullition. Millions of people who politically had been asleep for the past ten

¹Blanqui was a French "Socialist" whose conception of the Revolution was a conspiracy of a few resolute, intelligent spirits who would suddenly and arbitrarily seize the powers of the state and then drag the masses along with them.—L. C. F.

years, either lashed by the political whip of Czarism or doomed to slave labor on farms or in factories, *awoke* and threw themselves into the political strife. And who were these millions of people? Mostly small landlords, petty bourgeois, half way between capitalists and workers. Russia has a larger proportion of small middle class people than any other European nation. This gigantic middle class tide drowned everything, overwhelmed the class conscious proletariat not only by sheer superiority of numbers but also modifying the proletariat's point of view, that is, instilled in huge masses of workers the political ideals of the petty bourgeoisie.

The petty bourgeoisie in real life is dependent upon the bourgeoisie, living as an employing, not as a working class (as far as its position in social production is concerned). Its thinking processes are those of the bourgeoisie.

An attitude of unreasoning confidence in the capitalists, the worst foes of peace and Socialism—such is at present the attitude of the Russian masses, such is the feeling which has been growing with revolutionary speed on the social-economic soil of the most middle-class nation of Europe. Such is the basis for the agreement existing between the Provisional Government and the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates; and when I say "agreement," I do not mean a formal agreement but a tacit understanding, a practical support, a naively trustful relinquishment of power. [This describes the situation before the Soviets accepted coalition on May 18.—F.] This sort of agreement has given to Guchkov a fat job and actual power, and to the Council . . . promises, a position of dignity (for the time being), flattery, beautiful phrases, assurances, and other marks of esteem on the part of the various Kerenskys.

The weakness of the proletariat in point of numbers, its lack of class consciousness and of organization,—such is the reverse of the medal in Russia.

All popular parties, with the exception of the revolutionary Socialists, have been parties of the small middle class. The same is true of the party of the Mensheviks (Cheidse, Tsereteli, etc.). Independent revolutionists (Steklof and others) floated with the tide and did not succeed in stemming it.

Owing to the peculiar situation I have described, it behooves Marxists to resort to special emergency tactics, for Marxists do not consider personalities but merely objective facts: masses and classes.

This peculiar situation makes it imperative "*to pour vinegar and bile into the sweetened water of revolutionary democratic elo-*

quence," to quote the apt words of my fellow-committeeman Teodorovitch at the All-Russian Convention of railroad workers in Petrograd. We must formulate criticisms and expose the mistakes of the petty bourgeois parties, the Social-Revolutionary and Social Democratic parties; we must train and bring together what will be the elements of a class conscious proletarian communistic party, we must rescue the proletariat from its mental asphyxiation by bourgeois ideas.

In appearance this is nothing more than propaganda work. In reality, this is the most practical form of revolutionary activity, for a revolution can not possibly get anywhere when it stops, gets drunk on words, treads everlastingly the same spot, handicapped as it is not by opposition from the outside or by bourgeois repression (Guchkov is only talking of taking stern measures against the soldiers), but simply by the unthinking confidence of the masses.

It is only by destroying this unthinking confidence (and we can only destroy it by education), it is by resorting to intellectual persuasion, by pointing out the teachings of life itself, that we will succeed in emancipating ourselves from this continuous spree of mere revolutionary words. Then only will we be able to move forward, then will we behold a real proletarian consciousness, mass consciousness, a courageous and resolute spirit of initiative in every local group; then the people will take the law in their own hands and bring forth, develop and fortify freedom, democracy and the principle of national ownership of land.

Bourgeois and feudal governments have developed a sort of international technique for keeping the people enslaved. They employ two methods. The first is violence. Nicholas I, the man with the club, and Nicholas II, the Bloody, showed to the Russian people how far one could go in the use of the hangman's noose. But there is another method employed most cleverly by the English and French bourgeoisie, who gained their experience through a series of great revolutions and revolutionary convulsions among the masses. It consists in fooling the people, in flattering them, in using big words, in making them innumerable promises, in doling out to them insignificant sops called reforms, in making them unimportant concessions for the sake of retaining the essential things.

And this is what gives to the present situation in Russia its peculiar interest: we are witnessing a vertiginous change from one method to the other, from violent oppression of the people to flattery and deceitful promises. . . . The cat listens, and continues its meal.

Milyukov and Guchkov retain the power, protect the capitalists' profits, conduct an imperialistic war in the interests of Anglo-French Capitalism. and silence by promises, eloquence and impressive declarations "blunderbusses" like Cheidse, Tseretelli, Steklof, who threaten, exort, conjure, beseech, demand, make statements. . . . The cat listens, and continues its meal.

But from day to day the unthinking confidence and the gullible thoughtlessness of the people will dwindle away, especially among the proletarians and poorest peasants, whom their very life, their social and economic position, has taught to distrust capitalist assurances.

The leaders of the petty bourgeoisie "must" teach the people to trust the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois government. Proletarians must be taught to distrust them.

III

PEACE AND REACTION

(Trotzky)

In a session of the National Duma held March 3, 1916, M. Milyukov replied as follows to a criticism from the left: "I do not know for certain whether the government is leading us to defeat—but I do know that a revolution in Russia will unquestionably lead us to defeat, and our enemies, therefore, have good reason to thirst for it. If any one should say to me that to organize Russia for victory is equivalent to organizing her for revolution, I should answer: It is better, for the duration of the war, to leave her unorganized, as she is." This quotation is interesting in two ways. It is not only a proof that, as late as last year, M. Milyukov considered pro-German interests to be at work not in internationalism alone, but in any revolution at all; it is also a typical expression of Liberal sycophancy. Extremely interesting is M. Milyukov's prediction: "I know that revolution in Russia will unquestionably lead us to defeat." Why this certainty? As an historian, M. Milyukov must know that there have been revolutions that led to victory. But as an imperialistic statesman, M. Milyukov cannot help seeing that the idea of the conquest of Constantinople, Armenia and Galicia is not capable of arousing the spirit of the revolutionary masses. M. Milyukov felt, and even knew, that in *his* war, revolution could not bring victory with it.

To be sure, when the revolution broke out M. Milyukov at once attempted to harness it to the chariot of Allied Imperialism. That is the reason why he was greeted with delight by the sonorous, metallic reverberations of all the banking-vaults of London, Paris and New York. But this attempt met with the almost instinctive resistance of the workers and soldiers. M. Milyukov was thrown out of the ministry: the Revolution, evidently, did not mean victory for *him*.

Milyukov went, but the war stayed. A coalition government was formed, consisting of *petit bourgeois* democrats and those rep-

representatives of the bourgeoisie that had hitherto concealed, for a time, their imperialistic claws. Perhaps nowhere did this combination display its counter-revolutionary character better than in the domain of international politics, that is, above all, in the war. The capitalistic bourgeoisie sent its representatives to the Cabinet in the name of "an offensive on the front and unalterable fidelity to our allies" (resolution of the Cadet Conference). The *petit bourgeois* democrats, who call themselves Socialists, entered the Cabinet in order, "without tearing themselves away" from the capitalistic bourgeoisie and their world allies, to conclude the war in the quickest possible manner and with the least possible offense to all the participants: without annexations, without indemnities and contributions, and even with a guarantee of national self-determination.

The capitalist ministers renounced annexations, until a more favorable time; in return for this purely verbal concession they received from their *petit bourgeois* democratic colleagues a binding promise not to desert the ranks of the Allies, to re-invigorate the army and make it capable of resuming the offensive. In renouncing Constantinople (for the moment) the imperialists were making a rather worthless sacrifice, for, in the course of three years of war, the road to Constantinople had become not shorter, but longer. But the democrats, to compensate the purely platonic renunciation of a very doubtful Constantinople by the liberals, took over the whole heritage of the Czarist government, recognized all the treaties which that government had concluded, and put all the authority and prestige of the Revolution in the service of discipline and the offensive. This bargain involved, first of all, a renunciation, on the part of the "leaders" of the Revolution, of any such thing as an independent international policy: this conclusion was only natural to the petty bourgeois party, which when it was in the majority, willingly surrendered all its power. Having handed over to Prince Lvov the duty of creating a revolutionary administration; to M. Shingariiev the task of re-making the finances of the Revolution; to M. Konovalov, that of organizing industry; the *petit bourgeois* democracy could not help handing over to Messrs. Ribot, Lloyd George and Wilson the charge of the international interests of revolutionary Russia.

Even though the Revolution, in its present phase, has not therefore altered the character of the war, it has nevertheless exerted a profound influence on the living agent of the war, namely, the army. The soldier began asking himself what it was for which he was shedding his blood, upon which he now set a higher price that un-

der Czarism. And immediately the question of the secret treaties came up and became imperative. To restore the "preparedness" of the army under these circumstances meant breaking up the revolutionary-democratic resistance of the soldiers, putting to sleep again their newly-awakened political sense, and, until the "revision" of the old treaties should be announced as a principle, placing the revolutionary army in the service of the same old objects. This task was more than a match for the Octobrist-Bourbon Guchkov, who broke down under it. Nothing less than a "Socialist" would do for this purpose. And he was found in the person of the "most popular" of the ministers, Kerensky.

Citizen Kerensky exposed his theoretical equipment at one of the first sessions of the All-Russian Congress. One can hardly imagine anything more insipid than his provincial, complacent truisms on the French Revolution and on Marxism. Citizen Kerensky's political formulas were characterized neither by originality nor by depth. But he possesses, indisputably, the talent of bestowing upon philistine reaction the necessary revolutionary trimmings. In the person of Kerensky, the intelligent and semi-intelligent bourgeois recognize *themselves*, in more "representative" form, and in surroundings which are not those of every day, but rather the trappings of melodrama.

By lavishly exploiting his popularity in accelerating the preparedness for an offensive (on the entire imperialistic front of the Allies), Kerensky naturally becomes the darling of the possessing classes. Not only does Minister of Foreign Affairs Tereschenko express himself approvingly of the high esteem in which our Allies hold the "labors" of Kerensky; not only does *Rech*, which so severely criticizes the ministers of the left, continually emphasize its favoritism toward the minister of the Army and Navy, Kerensky; —but even Rodzianko considers it his duty to point out "the noble, patriotic endeavors which our Minister of the Army and Navy, Kerensky, is engaged in: "this young man" (to quote the words of Rodzianko, the Octobrist chairman of the Duma) "experiences (?) daily a new lease of life, for the benefit of his country and of constructive work." Which glorious circumstance does not, however, in any way prevent Rodzianko from hoping that when the "constructive work" of Kerensky shall have attained a proper eminence, it may be succeeded by Guchkov's labors instead.

Meanwhile, Tereschenko's Department of Foreign Affairs is endeavoring to persuade the Allies to sacrifice their imperialistic

appetites on the altar of revolutionary democracy. It would be difficult to imagine any undertaking more fruitless, and—in spite of all the tragic humiliation of it—more ridiculous than this! When M. Tereschenko, in the manner of the provincial newspaper editorial of the democratic variety, endeavors to explain to the hardened ring leaders of the international plunderbund that the Russian Revolution is really a “powerful intellectual movement, expressive of the will of the Russian people in its struggle for equality . . .” etc., etc.,—when he furthermore “does not doubt” that “a close union between Russia and her Allies (*the hardened ring-leaders of the international plunderbund*) will assure in the fullest measure an agreement on all the questions involved in the principles proclaimed by the Russian Revolution,”—it is difficult to free one’s self from a feeling of disgust at this medley of impotence, hypocrisy and stupidity.

The bourgeoisie secured for itself, in this document of Tereschenko’s, it appears, all the decisive words: “unflinching fidelity to the general cause of the Allies,” “inviolability of the agreement not to make a separate peace,” and a postponement of the revision of the aims of the war until “a favorable opportunity;” which amounts to asking the Russian soldier, until this “favorable opportunity” arrives, to shed his blood for those same imperialistic aims of the war which it seems so undesirable to publish, so undesirable to revise. And Tseretelli’s whole political horizon is revealed in the complacent smugness with which he recommended to the attention of the All-Russian Congress this diplomatic document in which “there is clear and open speech, in the language of a revolutionary government, concerning the strivings of the Russian Revolution.” One thing cannot be denied: the cowardly and impotent appeals addressed to Lloyd George and Wilson are couched in the same terms as the appeals of the Soviet Executive Committee addressed to Albert Thomas, the Scheidemanns and the Hendersons. In both there is all along the line an identity of purpose, and—who knows?—perhaps even an identity of authorship.¹

¹In the first flush of the Revolution, the moderates in the Soviets through the Executive Committee appealed to the Socialists and the proletariat of the belligerent countries to break with their imperialistic governments; but gradually this revolutionary policy was abandoned, and the Executive Committee co-operated with the infamous gathering of the social-patriots at Stockholm, against the protest of the Bolsheviks. It required only this to emphasize the non-revolutionary character of the Executive Committee, that they joined hands with Scheidemann, Albert Thomas, of France, Henderson, of England, and the other social-patriots. Moderate Socialism acted as the *comis voyageur* of bourgeois diplomacy. One of the secret documents published after the Bolsheviks came into power shows the true character of the

A perfect appreciation of these latest diplomatic notes of the Tereschenko-Tseretelli combination we shall find in a place where we might at first not expect to find it, namely, in *L'Entente*, a newspaper published in French in Petrograd, and the organ of those very Allies to whom Tereschenko and Chernov swear an "unflinching allegiance." "We readily admit," says this paper, "that in diplomatic circles the appearance of this note was awaited with a certain concern." . . . In fact it is not easy, as this official organ admits, to find a formulation of the conflicting aims of the Allies. "As far as Russia is concerned, particularly, the position of the Provisional Government was rather delicate and full of danger. On the one hand, it was necessary to reckon with the standpoint of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, and, as far as possible, to represent this standpoint: on the other hand, it was necessary to handle with kid gloves the international relations and the friendly powers, upon whom it was impossible to force the decision of the Council."

"And the Provisional Government has come out of this quandary shining and stainless." . . .

In the document before us, therefore, we have the main points of the revolutionary catechism set down, registered and sealed with the authority of the Provisional Government. There is no lack of any essential. All the lovely dreams, all the fine words of the dictionary, are properly mobilized. You will find there equality, liberty and justice in international relations—*Donc tout y est!*—at least in words. The reddest of the comrades can make no reply; from this quarter the Provisional Government has nothing to fear. . . .

"But—how about the Allies?" asks *L'Entente*. "With the aid of close study and reading between the lines (!), with the aid of good will and friendship for the young Russian democracy, the Allies will be able to find at various points in the note . . . certain pleasant words which are of a nature to reassure their somewhat waning confidence. They well know that the position of the Pro-

Stockholm Conference, with which, by the way, the Independent Socialists of Germany refused to have any dealings. It is a telegram dated August 18, 1917, from the Russian Ambassador in Stockholm to the Provisional Government, reporting a conversation with Branting, one of the social-patriotic arrangers of the Conference, who declared that he was willing to drop the Conference if Kerensky considered it untimely, and that Branting would use his influence with the Dutch-Scandinavian committee to this end. The telegram concludes by asking secrecy, in order not to compromise Branting, as otherwise a valuable source of information would be lost. A Socialist Conference the willing tool of diplomacy! No wonder it was a miserable failure.—L. C. F.

visional Government is not an easy one, and that its efforts in prose must not be taken too literally. . . . The fundamental guarantee that the government gives to the Allies consists in the fact that . . . the agreement signed at London on September 5, 1914 (pledging no separate peace) is not to be revised. That completely satisfies us for the present."

And us too. As a matter of fact it would be different to utter a more contemptuous judgment on the Tereschenko-Tseretelli "prose" than that published by the official *L'Entente*, which draws its inspiration from the French Embassy. This estimate, while it is by no means unfriendly to Tereschenko or to those who stand behind him, is positively murderous to the "constructive labors" of Tseretelli, who has so warmly recommended to us the "plain, open language" of this document. "Nothing has been left out," he swears before the Congress, "it will satisfy the conscience of the reddest comrades."

But they are mistaken, these adepts in diplomatic prose: they don't satisfy anybody. Isn't it significant that the facts of actual life should answer the appeals of Kerensky and the remonstrances and threats of Tseretelli with such an awful blow as the revolt of the Black Sea sailors? We had been previously told that *there* among these sailors was Kerensky's citadel, the home of the "patriotism" that demanded an offensive. The facts once more administered a merciless correction. By adhering to the position of the old imperialistic agreements and obligations in external politics, and, in internal politics, capitulating before the propertied classes, it was impossible to unite the army through a combination of revolutionary enthusiasm and discipline. And Kerensky's "big stick" has fortunately thus far been too short.

No, this path, truly, leads nowhere.

IV

THE FARCE OF DUAL AUTHORITY

(Trotzky)

The war conditions are twisting and obscuring the action of the internal forces of the Revolution. But none the less the course of the Revolution will be determined by these same internal forces, namely, the classes.

The revolution which has been gathering strength from 1912 on, was, at first, broken off by the war, and later, owing to the heroic intervention of an infuriated army, was quickened into an unprecedented aggressiveness. The power of resistance on the part of the old regime had been, once for all undermined by the progress of the war. The political parties which might have taken up the function of mediators between the monarchy and the people suddenly found themselves hanging in the air, owing to powerful blows from below, and were obliged at the last moment to accomplish the dangerous leap to the secure shores of the Revolution. This imparted to the Revolution, for a time, the outward appearance of complete national harmony. For the first time in its entire history, bourgeois liberalism felt itself "bound up" with the masses—and it is this that must have given them the idea of utilizing the "universal" revolutionary spirit in the service of the war.

The conditions, the aims, the participants of the war did not change. Guchkov and Milyukov, the most outspoken of the imperialists on the political staff of the old regime, were now the managers of the destinies of revolutionary Russia. Naturally, the war, the fundamental character of which remained the same as it had been under Czarism—against the same enemy, with the same allies, and the same international obligations—now had to be transformed into a "war for the Revolution." For the capitalist classes, this task was equivalent to a mobilization of the Revolution, and of the powers and passions it had stimulated, in the interests of Imperialism. The Milyukovs magnanimously consented to call the "red rag" a sacred emblem—if only the working masses would show

their readiness to die with ecstasy under this red rag, for Constantinople and the Straits.

But the imperialistic cloven hoof of Milyukov was sticking out too plainly. In order to win over the awakened masses and guide their revolutionary energy into the channel of an offensive on the external front, more intricate methods were required—but, chiefly, different political parties were needed, with platforms that had not yet been compromised, and reputations that had not yet been sullied.

They were found. In the years of counter-revolution, and particularly in the period of the latest industrial boom, capital had subjected to itself and had mentally tamed many thousands of revolutionists of 1905, being in no wise concerned about their Laborite or Marxist "notions." And among the "Socialistic" intellectuals there were therefore rather numerous groups whose palms were itching to take part in the checking of the class struggle and in the training of the masses for "patriotic" ends. Hand in hand with this *intelligentsia*, which had been brought into prominence in the counter-revolutionary epoch, went the compromise-workers, who had been frightened definitely and finally by the failure of the 1905 Revolution, and had since then developed in themselves the sole talent of being agreeable to all sides.

The opposition of the bourgeois classes to Czarism—upon an imperialistic foundation, however—had, even before the Revolution, provided the necessary basis for a *rapprochement* between the opportunist Socialists and the propertied classes. In the Duma, Kerensky and Cheidse built up their policy as an annex to the progressive *bloc*, and the "Socialistic" Gvozdyevs and Bogdanovs merged with the Guchkovs on the War Industry Committees. But the existence of Czarism made an open advocacy of the "government" patriotism standpoint very difficult. The Revolution cleared away all obstacles of this nature. Capitulating to the capitalist parties was now called "a democratic unity," and the discipline of the bourgeois state suddenly became "revolutionary discipline," and finally, participation in a capitalist war was looked upon as a defense of the Revolution from external defeat.

This nationalistic *intelligentsia*, which the social-patriot Struve had prophesied, invoked and trained, in his paper *Vyekhi*, suddenly met with an unexpectedly generous support in the helplessness of the most backward masses of the people, who had been forcibly organized as an army.

It was only because the Revolution broke out in the course of a war that the *petit bourgeois* elements of city and country at once automatically took on the appearance of an organized force, and began to exert, upon the *personnel* of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, an influence which would have been far beyond the powers of these scattered and backward classes in any but war times. The Menshevist-populist *intelligentsia* found in this great number of backwoods, provincial, for the most part as yet hardly awakened persons, a support that was at first entirely natural. By leading the petty bourgeois classes on to the path of an agreement with capitalist liberalism, which had again beautifully demonstrated its inability to guide the masses of the people independently, the Menshevist-populist *intelligentsia*, through the pressure of the masses, acquired a certain position even among the proletarian sections, which had been momentarily relegated to a secondary position by the numerical impressiveness of the army.

It might at first seem that all class contradictions had been destroyed, that all social fixtures had been patched up with fragments of a populist-Menshevist ideology, and that, thanks to the "constructive labors" of Kerensky, Cheidse and Dan, a national *Burgfrieden* truce between the classes had been realized. Therefore, the unparalleled surprise and wonder when an independent proletarian policy again asserted itself, and therefore the savage, in truth, disgusting wail against the revolutionary Socialists, the destroyers of the universal harmony.

The *petit bourgeois* intellectuals, after they had been raised by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates to heights for which they were entirely unprepared, were frightened more by the idea of responsibility than by anything else, and therefore respectfully handed over their power to the capitalist-feudal government which had issued forth from the womb of the Duma of June 3. The organic terror of the *petit bourgeois* in the presence of the sanctity of state power, which was transparent in the case of the populists (Laborites), was veiled, in the case of the Menshevik-patriots, by doctrinaire notions as to the inadmissibility of having Socialists assume the burden of power in a bourgeois revolution.

Thus there came about the "dual authority," which might with much more truth be termed a *Dual Impotence*. The capitalistic bourgeoisie assumed authority in the name of order and of a war for victory; yet, without the Soviets, it could not rule; the latter's relation to the government was that of an awed half-con-

fidence, combined with a fear lest the revolutionary proletariat, in some unguarded gesture, might upset the whole business.

The cynically provocative foreign policy of Milyukov brought forth a crisis. Being aware of the full extent of the panic in the ranks of the *petit bourgeois* leaders when confronted with problems of power, the bourgeois party began availing itself, in this domain, of downright blackmail: by threatening a government strike, that is, to resign any participation in authority, they demanded that the Soviet furnish them with a number of decoy Socialists, whose function in the coalition ministry was to be the general strengthening of confidence in the government on the part of the masses, and, in this way, the cessation of "dual authority."

Before the pistol-point of ultimatum, the Menshevist patriots hastened to slough off their last vestiges of Marxist prejudice against participation in a bourgeois government, and brought on to the same path the Laborite "leaders" of the Soviet, who were not embarrassed by any supercargo of principle or prejudice. This was most manifest in the person of Chernov, who came back from the Zimmerwald and Kienthal Conferences where he had excommunicated Vandervelde, Guesde and Sembat out of Socialism—only to enter the ministry of Prince Lvov and Shingariiev. To be sure, the Russian Menshevik patriots did point out that Russian ministerialism had nothing in common with French and Belgian ministerialism, being an outgrowth of very exceptional circumstances, as had been foreseen in the resolution against ministerialism of the Amsterdam Socialist Congress (1904). Yet they were merely repeating, in parrot fashion, the arguments of French and Belgian ministerialism, while they continued constantly invoking the "exceptional nature of the circumstances." Kerensky, under whose wordy theatricality there is, nevertheless, some traces of reality, very appropriately classed Russian ministerialism in the same category as that of western Europe, and stated in his Helsingfors speech, that thanks chiefly to him, Kerensky, the Russian Socialists had in two months travelled a distance that it had taken the west-European Socialists ten years to accomplish. Truly Marx was not wrong when he called revolution the locomotive of history!

The coalition government had been sentenced by History before it was established. If it had been formed immediately after the downfall of Czarism, as an expression of the "revolutionary unity of the nation," it might possibly have held in check, for a time, the struggle of the forces of the Revolution. But the first

government was the Guchkov-Milyukov government. It was permitted to exist only long enough to expose the full falsity of "national unity" and to awaken the revolutionary resistance of the proletariat against the bourgeois propaganda to prostitute the Revolution in the interests of Imperialism. The obviously makeshift coalition ministry could not, under these circumstances, stave off a calamity; it was itself destined to become the chief bone of contention, the chief source of schism and divergence in the ranks of "revolutionary democracy." Its political existence—for of its "activities" we shall not speak—is simply one long dissolution, decently enveloped in vast quantities of words.

To contend against a complete breakdown on the economic and, particularly, on the food question, the Economic Department of the Executive Committee of the Soviets worked out a plan for an extensive system of state management in the most important branches of industry. The members of the Economic Department differ from the political managers of the Soviet not so much in their political tendencies as in a serious acquaintance with the economic situation of the country. For this very reason they were led to conclusions of a profoundly revolutionary character. The only thing their structure lacks is the driving force of a revolutionary policy. The government, for the most part capitalistic, could not possibly give birth to a system that was diametrically opposed to the selfish interests of the propertied classes. If Skobelev, the Menshevik Minister of Labor, did not understand this, it was fully understood by the serious and efficient Konovalov, the representative of trade and industry.

Konovalov's resignation was an irreparable blow to the coalition ministry. The whole bourgeois press gave unmistakable expression to this fact. Then began anew the exploitation of the panic terror of the present leaders of the Soviet: the bourgeoisie threatened to lay the babe of authority at their door. The "leaders" answered by making believe that nothing special had happened. If the responsible representative of capital has left us, let us invite M. Buryshkin. But Buryshkin ostentatiously refused to have anything to do with surgical operations on private property. And then began the search for an "independent" minister of commerce and industry, a man behind whom stood nothing and nobody, and who might serve as an inoffensive letter-box, in which the opposing demands of labor and capital might be dropped. Meanwhile the economic expenses continue on their course, and the

government activity assumed the form, chiefly, of the printing of paper-money, *assignats*.

Having as his senior colleagues Messrs. Lvov and Shingariev, it turned out that Chernov was prevented from revealing, in the domain of agrarian matters, even the radicalism of words only, which is so characteristic of this typical representative of the *petite bourgeoisie*. Fully aware of the role that was assigned to him, Chernov introduced himself to society as the representative, not of the agrarian revolution, but of agrarian statistics! According to the liberal bourgeois interpretation, which the Socialist ministers also made their own, revolution must be suspended among the masses in a passive waiting for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and as soon as the Social-Revolutionists enter the ministry of the landholders and manufacturers, the attacks of the peasants against the feudal agricultural system are stigmatized as anarchy.

In the field of international policy, the collapse of the "peace programs" proclaimed by the coalition government came about more swiftly and more catastrophically than could possibly have been expected. M. Ribot, the Premier of France, not only categorically and unceremoniously rejected the Russian peace formula and pompously reiterated the absolute necessity of continuing the war until a "complete victory" should be secured, but also denied the patriotic French Socialists their passports to the Stockholm Conference, which had been arranged with the co-operation of M. Ribot's colleagues and allies, the Russian Socialist ministers. The Italian government, whose policy of colonial conquests has always been distinguished by exceptional shamelessness, by a "Holy Egoism," replied to the formula of a "peace without annexations" with its separate annexation of Albania. Our government, and that includes the Socialist ministers, held up for two weeks the publication of the answers of its allies, evidently trusting in the efficacy of such petty devices to stave off the bankruptcy of their policy. In short, the question as to the international situation of Russia, *the question of what it is that the Russian soldier should be ready to fight and die for*, is still just as acute as on the day when the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs was dashed from the hands of Milyukov.

In the Army and Navy Department, which is still eating up the lion's share of the national powers and of the national resources, the policy of prose and rhetoric holds undisputed sway.

The material and psychological causes for the condition of the army are too deep to be disposed of by ministerial prose and poetry. The substitution of General Brussilov for General Alexiev meant a change of these two officers, no doubt, but not a change in the army. The working up of the popular mind and of the army into an "offensive," and then the sudden dropping of this catchword in favor of the less definite catchword of a "preparation for an offensive," show that the Army and Navy Ministry is still as little capable of leading the nation to victory as M. Tereschenko's Department was of leading the nation to peace.

The picture of the importance of the Provisional Government reaches its climax in the labors of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which, to use the words of the most loyal Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, "with partiality" filled the officers of the local administrations with feudal landholders. The efforts of the active portion of the population gain for them the communal self-governments, by right of conquest, and, without waiting for the Constituent Assembly, are immediately stigmatized in the state-police jargon of the *Dans* as *anarchy*, and are greeted by the energetic opposition of the government which, by its very composition, is fully protected against all energetic action when it is really of creative character.

In the course of the last few days, this policy of general bankruptcy has found its most repulsive expression in the Cronstadt incident.¹ The vile and out-and-out corrupt campaign of the bourgeois press against Cronstadt, which is for them the symbol of revolutionary internationalism and of distrust in the government-coalition, both of which are emblems of the independent policy of the great masses of the people, not only took possession of the government and of the Soviet leaders, but turned Tseretelli and Skobelev into ringleaders in the disgusting persecution of the Cronstadt sailors, soldiers and workers.

At a moment when revolutionary internationalism was systematically displacing patriotic Socialism in the factories and work-

¹Early in June the sailors of the Baltic Fleet and the Cronstadt masses generally rose against the Provisional Government; the mildest epithet used against them, in the Russian and the foreign press, was "anarchists." The Cronstadt Council of Workers and Soldiers had, by a vote of 210 to 40, repudiated the Provisional Government, declaring it recognized only the authority of the Petrograd Council. This action was distorted into an attempt to secede from Russia. The Baltic sailors were an active revolutionary force in all stages of the Revolution,—against the Czarism, against the Provisional Government, and in the overthrow of Kerensky by the Bolsheviks.—L. C. F.

shops and among the soldiers at the front, the Socialists in the ministry, obedient to their masters, were risking the hazardous game of overthrowing the revolutionary proletarian advance-guard with one single blow, and thus preparing the "psychological moment" for the session of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. *To rally the peasant-petit-bourgeois democracy around the banner of bourgeois liberalism*, that ally and captive of Anglo-French and American capital, *politically to isolate and "discipline" the proletariat*,—that is now the principal task in the realization of which the government bloc of Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionists is expending all its energies. An essential part of this policy is found in the shameless threats of bloody repressions and the provocations of open violence.

The death-struggle of the coalition ministry began on the day of its birth. Revolutionary Socialism must do everything in its power to prevent this death-struggle from terminating in the convulsion of civil war. The only way to do this is not by a policy of yielding and dodging, which merely whets the appetite of the fresh-baked statesmen, but rather a policy of aggressive action all along the line. We must not permit them to isolate themselves: we must isolate them. We must answer the wretched and contemptible actions of the Coalition government by making clear even to the most backward among the laboring masses the full meaning of this hostile alliance which masquerades publicly in the name of the Revolution. To the methods of the propertied classes and of their Menshevik-Social-Revolutionist appendage in dealing with the questions of food, of industry, of agriculture, of war, we must oppose the methods of the proletariat. Only in this way can liberalism be isolated and a leading influence be assured to the revolutionary proletariat over the urban and rural masses. Together with the inevitable downfall of the present government will come the downfall of the present leaders of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates. To preserve the authority of the Soviet as a representative of the Revolution, and to secure for it a continuance of its functions as a directive power, is now within the power only of the present minority of the Soviet. This will become clearer every day. The epoch of Dual Impotence, with the government not able and the Soviet not daring, is inevitably culminating in a crisis of unheard-of severity. It is our part to husband our energies for this moment, so that the question of authority may be met with in all its proportions.

DEMOCRACY, PACIFISM AND IMPERIALISM (Trotzky)

There have never been so many pacifists as at this moment, when people are slaying each other on all the great highways of our planet. Each epoch has not only its own technology and political forms, but also its own style of hypocrisy. Time was when the nations destroyed each other for the glory of Christ's teachings and the love of one's neighbor. Now Christ is invoked only by backward governments. The advanced nations cut each other's throats under the banners of pacifism . . . a league of nations and a durable peace. Kerensky and Tseretelli shout for an offensive, in the name of an "early conclusion of peace."

There is no Juvenal for this epoch, to depict it with biting satire. Yet we are forced to admit that even the most powerful satire would appear weak and insignificant in the presence of blatant baseness and cringing stupidity, two of the elements which have been released by the present war.

Pacifism springs from the same historical roots as democracy. The bourgeoisie made a gigantic effort to rationalize human relations, that is, to supplant a blind and stupid tradition by a system of critical reason. The guild restrictions on industry, class privileges, monarchic autocracy—these were the traditional heritage of the middle ages. Bourgeois democracy demanded legal equality, free competition and parliamentary methods in the conduct of public affairs. Naturally, its rationalistic criteria were applied also in the field of international relations. Here it hit upon war, which appeared to it as a method of solving questions that was a complete denial of all "reason." So bourgeois democracy began to point out to the nations—with the tongues of poesy, moral philosophy and certified accounting—that they would profit more by the establishment of a condition of eternal peace. Such were the logical roots of bourgeois pacifism.

From the time of its birth pacifism was afflicted, however, with

a fundamental defect, one which is characteristic of bourgeois democracy; its pointed criticisms addressed themselves to the surface of political phenomena, not daring to penetrate to their economic causes. At the hands of capitalist reality, the idea of eternal peace, on the basis of a "reasonable" agreement, has fared even more badly than the ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity. For Capitalism, when it rationalized industrial conditions, did not rationalize the social organization of ownership, and thus prepared instruments of destruction such as even the "barbarous" middle ages never dreamed of.

The constant embitterment of international relations and the ceaseless growth of militarism completely undermined the basis of reality under the feet of pacifism. Yet it was from these very things that pacifism took a new lease of life, a life which differed from its earlier phase as the blood and purple sunset differs from the rosy-fingered dawn.

The decades preceding the present war have been well designated as a period of *armed peace*. During this whole period campaigns were in uninterrupted progress and battles were being fought, but they were in colonies.

Proceeding, as they did, in the territories of backward and powerless peoples, these wars led to a division of Africa, Polynesia and Asia, and prepared the way for the present world war. As, however, there were no wars in Europe after 1871—in spite of a long series of sharp conflicts—the general opinion in *petit bourgeois* circles began gradually to behold in the growth of armies a guarantee of peace, which was destined ultimately to be established by international law with every institutional sanction. Capitalist governments and munitions kings naturally had no objections to this "pacifist" interpretation of militarism. But the causes of world conflicts were accumulating and the present cataclysm was getting under way.

Theoretically and politically, pacifism stands on the same foundation as does the theory of the harmony of social interests. The antagonisms between capitalist nations have the same economic roots as the antagonisms between the classes. And if we admit the possibility of a progressive blunting of the edge of the class struggle, it requires but a single step further to accept a gradual softening and regulating of international relations.

The source of the ideology of democracy, with all its traditions and illusions, is the *petite bourgeoisie*. In the second half

of the nineteenth century, it suffered a complete internal transformation, but was by no means eliminated from political life. At the very moment that the development of capitalist technology was inexorably undermining its economic function, the general suffrage right and universal military service were still giving to the *petite bourgeoisie*, thanks to its numerical strength, an appearance of political importance. Big capital, in so far as it did not wipe out this class, subordinated it to its own ends by means of the applications of the credit system. All that remained for the political representatives of big capital to do was to subjugate the *petite bourgeoisie*, in the political arena, to their purposes, by opening a fictitious credit to the declared theories and prejudices of this class. It is for this reason that, in the decade preceding the war, we witnessed, side by side with the gigantic efforts of a reactionary-imperialistic policy, a deceptive flowering of *bourgeois democracy* with its accompanying reformism and pacifism. Capital was making use of the *petite bourgeoisie* for the prosecution of capital's imperialistic purposes by exploiting the ideological prejudices of the *petite bourgeoisie*.

Probably there is no other country in which this double process was so unmistakably accomplishing itself as in France. France is the classic land of financial capital, which leans for its support on the *petite bourgeoisie* of the cities and the towns, the most conservative class of the kind in the world, and numerically very strong. Thanks to foreign loans, to the colonies, to the alliance of France with Russia and England, the financial upper crust of the Third Republic found itself involved in all the interests and conflicts of world politics. And yet, the French *petit bourgeois* is an out-and-out provincial. He has always shown an instinctive aversion to geography and all his life has feared war as the very devil—if only for the reason that he has, in most cases, but one son, who is to inherit his business, together with his chattels. This *petit bourgeois* sends to Parliament a radical who has promised him to preserve peace—on the one hand, by means of a league of nations and compulsory international arbitration, and, on the other, with the co-operation of the Russian Cossacks, who are to hold the German Kaiser in check. This radical *député*, drawn from the provincial lawyer class, goes to Paris not only with the best intentions, but also without the slightest conception of the location of the Persian Gulf, and what is the use, and to whom, of the Bagdad Railway. This radical—"pacifistic" *bloc* of deputies gives

birth to a radical ministry, which at once finds itself bound hand and foot by all the diplomatic and military obligations and financial interests of the French bourse in Russia, Africa and Asia. Never ceasing to pronounce the proper pacifistic sentences, the ministry and the parliament automatically continue to carry on a world policy which involves France in war.

English and American pacifism, in spite of the differences in social and ideologic forms (or in the absence of such, as in America), is carrying on, at bottom, the same task; it offers to the *petite* and the middle *bourgeoisie* an expression for their fears of world cataclysms in which they may lose their last remnants of independence; their pacifism chloroforms their consciences—by means of impotent ideas of disarmament, international law and world courts—only to deliver them up body and soul, at the decisive moment, to imperialistic capital, which now mobilizes everything for its own purposes: industry, the church, art, bourgeois pacifism and patriotic "Socialism."

"We have always been opposed to war: our representatives, our ministry have been opposed to war," says the French *citoyen*, "therefore the war must have been forced upon us, and in the name of our pacifist ideals we must fight it to the finish." And the leader of the French pacifists, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, indorses this pacifist philosophy of an imperialistic war with a pompous *jusqu'au bout* ("to the end.")

The English Stock Exchange, in its prosecution of the war, had need first of all of pacifists of the Asquith (liberal) and Lloyd George (radical demagogue) type. "If this people go in for war," say the English masses, "right must be on our side." Thus a responsible function is allotted to pacifism in the economy of warfare, by the side of suffocating gases and inflated government loans.

More evident still is the subordinate role played by *petit bourgeois* pacifism with regard to Imperialism in the United States. The actual policy is there more prominently dictated by banks and trusts than anywhere else. Even before the war the United States, owing to the gigantic development of its industry and its foreign commerce, was being systematically driven in the direction of world interests and world policies. The European war imparted to this imperialistic development a speed that was positively feverish. At a time when many well-meaning persons were hoping that the horrors of the European slaughter might inspire the American bourgeoisie with a hatred of militarism, the actual influence of

European events was bearing on American policy not in psychological channels, but in material ones, and was having precisely the opposite effect. The exports of the United States, which in 1913 amounted to 2,466 millions of dollars, rose in 1916 to 5,481 millions! Of course the lion's share of this export fell to the lot of the war industries. The sudden breaking off of exports to the allied nations after the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare meant not only the stoppage of a flow of monstrous profits, but threatened with an unprecedented crisis the whole of American industry, which had been organized on a war footing.

It was impossible for this thing to go on without some resistance from the masses of the people. To overcome their unorganized dissatisfaction and to turn it into channels of patriotic cooperation with the government was therefore the first great task for the internal diplomacy of the United States during the first quarter of the war. And it is the irony of history that official "pacifism," as well as "oppositional pacifism," should be the chief instruments for the accomplishment of this task: *the education of the masses to military ideals.*

Bryan rashly and noisily expressed the natural aversion of the farmers and of the "small man" generally to all such things as world-policy, military service and higher taxes. Yet, at the same time that he was sending wagonloads of petitions, as well as deputations, to his pacifist colleagues at the head of the government, Bryan did everything in his power to break the revolutionary edge of the whole movement. "*If war should come,*" Bryan telegraphed on the occasion of an anti-war meeting in Chicago last February, "*we will all support the government of course;* yet at this moment it is our sacred duty to do all in our power to preserve the nation from the horrors of war." These few words contain the entire program of *petit bourgeois* pacifism: "to do everything in our power against the war" means to afford the voice of popular indignation an outlet in the form of harmless demonstration, after having previously given the government a guarantee that it will meet with no serious opposition, in the case of war, from the pacifist faction.

Official pacifism could have desired nothing better. It could now give satisfactory assurance of imperialistic "preparedness." After Bryan's own declaration, only one thing was necessary to dispose of his noisy opposition to war, and that was, simply, to declare war. And Bryan rolled right over into the government camp.

And not only the *petite bourgeoisie*, but also the broad masses of the workers, said to themselves: "If our government, with such an outspoken pacifist as Wilson at the head, declares war, and if even Bryan supports the government in the war, it must be an unavoidable and righteous war." . . . It is now evident why the sanctimonious, Quaker-like pacifism of the bourgeois demagogues is in such high favor in financial and war industry circles.

Our Menshevist and Social-Revolutionist pacifism, in spite of apparent differences, is, in reality, playing the same part as American pacifism. The resolution on war passed by the majority of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants, condemns the war not only from a pacifist standpoint, but also because of the imperialistic character of the war. The Congress declares the struggle for an early conclusion of the war to be "the most important task of revolutionary democracy." But all these premises are merely mobilized so that they may lead to the conclusion: "until such time as the war may be ended by the international forces of democracy, *the Russian revolutionary democracy will be obliged in every possible way to co-operate in strengthening the fighting power of our army and rendering it efficient for both offensive and defensive action.*"

The revision of the old international treaties the Congress, like the Provisional Government, would make dependent on a voluntary agreement of allied diplomacy, which, in its very nature, neither desires nor is it able to relinquish the imperialistic aims of the war. The Congress, following its leaders, makes the "international forces of democracy" depend on the will of the social-patriots, who are bound by iron chains to their imperialistic governments. Voluntarily restricting themselves in the question of "an early end of the war" to this charmed circle, the majority of the Congress naturally arrives at a very definite conclusion in the domain of practical politics: *an offensive on the military front.* This "pacifism," which solidifies and disciplines the *petit bourgeois* democracy and induces it to support an offensive, ought manifestly to be on most friendly terms not only with the Russian imperialists, but also with those of the allied nations.

Milyukov says: "In the name of our fidelity to our allies and to the old (diplomatic) treaties, we must have an offensive."

Kerensky and Tseretelli say: "Although the old (diplomatic) treaties have not yet been revised, we must have an offensive."

The argument may differ; the policy is the same. Nor could

it be otherwise, since Kerensky and Tseretelli are indissolubly bound up in the government with the party of Milyukov. As a matter of fact, the social-patriotic pacifism of the Dans, as well as the Quaker pacifism of the Bryans, are both operating in the service of Imperialism.

In view of this state of affairs, the chief task of Russian diplomacy is not to make allied diplomacy refrain from this act or that or to revise this thing or that, but to make allied diplomacy believe that the Russian Revolution is safe and sound and solvent. The Russian Ambassador, Bakhmetieff, in his speech before the Congress of the United States, delivered on June 10, characterized the Provisional Government chiefly from this point of view.

"All these circumstances," said the Ambassador, "point to the fact that the power and significance of the Provisional Government are growing day by day, that with each passing moment the Provisional Government is becoming better able to cope with all those elements that mean disaster, whether they take the form of reactionary propaganda or that of an agitation by the members of the extreme left. *At the present time the Provisional Government is determined to take the most drastic steps in this direction, resorting to force, if need be, in spite of its constant endeavors for a peaceful solution of all questions.*"

There is no doubt that the "national honor" of our "defenders" remains absolutely unruffled while the Ambassador of "revolutionary democracy" fervently persuades the parliament of the American plutocracy of the readiness of the Russian government to pour out the blood of the Russian proletariat in the name of "order," the chief ingredient of which is its fidelity to allied Capitalism.

And at the very moment when Bakhmetieff stood hat in hand, a humiliating speech passing over his lips, in the presence of the representatives of Capitalism, Tseretelli and Kerensky were explaining to the "revolutionary democracy" how impossible it was to dispense with armed force in its fight with "the anarchy of the left," and threatening to disarm the workers of Petrograd and the regiment which made common cause with them. We know that these threats came just in the nick of time; they served as a strong argument in favor of the Russian Loan in Wall Street. You see Mr. Bakhmetieff was in a position to say: "our revolutionary pacifism differs in no respect from your own brand of pacifism, and if you put your faith in Bryan, there is no reason why you should distrust Tseretelli."

There remains to us only the necessity of putting one question: How much Russian flesh and Russian blood will it take, on the external front as well as in the interior, in order to secure the Russian Loan, which, in its turn, is to guarantee our continued fidelity to the Allies?

VI

THE JULY UPRISING

(Trotzky)

Blood has flowed in the streets of Petrograd. A tragic chapter has been added to the Russian Revolution. Who is to blame? "The Bolsheviki," says the man in the street, repeating what his newspapers tell him. The sum total of these tragic happenings is exhausted, as far as the bourgeoisie and the time-serving politicians are concerned, in the words: Arrest the ringleaders and disarm the masses. And the object of this action is to establish "revolutionary order." The Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki, in arresting and disarming the Bolsheviki, are prepared to establish "order." There is only one question: What kind of order, and for whom?

The Revolution aroused great hopes in the masses. Among the masses of Petrograd, who played a leading role in the Revolution, these hopes and expectations were cherished with exceptional earnestness. It was the task of the Social-Democratic Party to transform these hopes and expectations into clearly-defined political programs, to direct the revolutionary impatience of the masses in the channel of a planful political action. The Revolution was brought face to face with the question of *state power*. We, as well as the Bolshevik organization, stood for a handing over of all power to the Central Committee of the Councils of Workers', Soldiers and Peasants' Delegates. The upper classes, and among them we must include the Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki, exhorted the masses to support the Milyukov-Guchkov government. Up to the last moment, that is, up to the time when these more distinctly imperialistic figures of the first Provisional Government resigned, both the above mentioned parties were firmly united with the government all along the line. Only after the reconstruction of the government did the masses learn from *their own* newspapers that they had not been told the whole truth, that they had been deceived. They were then told that they must trust the new "coalition" gov-

ernment. The revolutionary Social Democracy predicted that the new government would not differ essentially from the old, that it would not make any concessions to the Revolution and would again betray the hopes of the masses. And so it came to pass. After two months of a policy of weakness, of demands for confidence, of verbose exhortations, the government's position of beclouding the issues could no longer be concealed. It became clear that the masses had once more—and this time more cruelly than ever before—been deceived.

The impatience and the mistrust of the great body of workers and soldiers in Petrograd was increasing, not day by day, but hour by hour. These feelings, fed by the prolonged war, so hopeless for all participating in it, by economic disorganization, by an invisible setting up of a general cessation of the most important branches of production, found their immediate political expression in the slogan: "All power to the Soviets!" The retirement of the Cadets and the definite proof of the internal bankruptcy of the Provisional Government convinced the masses still more thoroughly that they were in the right as opposed to the official leaders of the Soviets. The vacillations of the Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviks simply added oil to the flames. *The demands, almost persecutions, addressed to the Petrograd garrison, requiring them to inaugurate an offensive, had a similar effect.* An explosion became inevitable.

All parties, including the Bolsheviks, took every step to prevent the masses from making the demonstration of July 16; but the masses did demonstrate, and with weapons in their hands, moreover. All the agitators, all the district representatives declared on the evening of July 16 that the July 17 demonstration, since the question of power remained unsettled, was bound to take place, and that no measures could hold back the people. That is the only reason why the Bolshevik Party, and with it our organization, decided not to stand aloof and wash its hands of the consequences, but to do everything in its power to change the July 17 affair into a peaceful mass demonstration. No other was the meaning of the July 17 appeal. It was, of course, clear, in view of the certain intervention of counter-revolutionary gangs, that bloody conflicts would arise. It would have been possible, it is true, to deprive the masses of any political guidance, to decapitate them politically, as it were, and to leave them by refusing to direct them, to their fate. But we, being the Workers' Party, neither could nor would follow Pilate's tactics: we decided to join in with the masses and to stick to them, in order to introduce into their elemental turmoil the

greatest measure of organization attainable under the circumstances, and thus to reduce to a minimum the number of probable victims. The facts are well known. Blood has been spilled. And now the "influential" press of the bourgeoisie, and the other newspapers serving the bourgeoisie, are attempting to put on our shoulders the entire burden of responsibility for the consequences—for the poverty, the exhaustion, the disaffection and the rebelliousness of the masses. To accomplish this end, to complete this labor of counter-revolutionary mobilization against the party of the proletariat, there issue forth rascals of anonymous, semi-anonymous, or publicly branded varieties, who circulate accusations of bribery: blood has flowed because of the Bolsheviks, and the Bolsheviks were acting under the orders of Wilhelm.

We are at present passing through days of trial. The steadfastness of the masses, their self-control, the fidelity of their "friends," all these things are being put to the acid-test. We are also being subjected to this test, and we shall emerge from it more strengthened, more united, than from any previous trial. Life is with us and fighting for us. The new reconstruction of power, dictated by an inescapable situation, and by the miserable half-heartedness of the ruling parties, will change nothing and will solve nothing. We must have a radical change of the whole system. We need revolutionary power.

The Tseretelli-Kerensky policy is directly intended to disarm and weaken the left wing of the Revolution. If, with the aid of these methods, they succeed in establishing "order," they will be the first—after us, of course—to fall as victims of this "order." But they will not succeed. The contradiction is too profound, the problems are too enormous to be disposed of by mere police measures.

After the days of trial will come the days of progress and victory.

VII

AFTER THE UPRISING

(Lenin)

The recent suppression of *Pravda*, until now, was only an "incidental" fact, not sanctioned by the legal action of the government; now, after the 16th of July, *Pravda* is formally suppressed by the government.

When this suppression is regarded from a historical point of view, in relation to the whole course of events and the process of preparing and realizing this measure of suppression, it sheds a remarkably brilliant light upon the "constitutional" aspect of Russia, and upon the danger of constitutional illusions.

It is known that the Cadet party, with Milyukov and the paper *Retch* at the head, has been demanding the repression of the Bolsheviks since April. In the most varied form, from the "governmental" articles of *Retch* to the repeated demands of Milyukov to "make arrests" (of Lenin-and-the-other-Bolsheviks) this demand for repression constituted one of the most important, if not the most important, measures in the political program of the Cadets during the Revolution.

Long before the intentional and fabricated, the abominable and slanderous accusations of Alexinsky & Co., the accusations made in June and July of the Bolsheviks being German spies and receiving German money; long before even the slanderous accusations of "armed resistance" and of mutiny, which were contradicted by universally known facts and published documents—long before all that, the Cadet party was making a systematic, persistent demand for the repression of the Bolsheviks. If this demand is now realized, what opinion must we have of the honesty and conceptions of those people who forget or pretend to forget the actual class and party origin of this demand? How can we help stigmatizing it as rank falsification or as unbelievable political stupidity, if the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks now attempt to present the situation as if they believe that the opportunity appearing on

July 16 for the repression of the Bolsheviks was merely "incidental" or "unusual?" After all, there are limits to the corruption of unquestionable historic truths.

It is sufficient to compare the movement of May 2 and 3 with that of July 16 and 17, to be convinced immediately of their similarity: the mass outburst of dissatisfaction, the impatience and action of the masses, the provocative shots from counter-revolutionary gangs, the dead on the Nevsky, and especially the howls of the bourgeoisie and Cadets that "those Leninites were shooting on the Nevsky;" the acute and bitter character of the battle between the proletarian mass and the bourgeoisie; the complete confusion of the petty bourgeois class, Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks, the hesitation in their politics and on the question of political power in general—all these objective facts characterize both the movement of May 2-3 and the movement of July 16-17. And events in June and the July offensive show us in another form the same class alignment. The course of events is perfectly clear: the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie becoming continually more acute, particularly because of the influence on the masses of the *petite bourgeoisie*, and in connection with it the most pertinent historic events determining the dependence of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks upon the counter-revolutionary Cadets. These events are: the coalition ministry of May 18 in which the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks have proved to be servants of the bourgeoisie, involving themselves more and more in compromise and agreements with the bourgeoisie and in a thousand "favors" to them; postponing the most urgent revolutionary measures: and, again, the resumption of the offensive at the front. The offensive meant an unavoidable resumption of the imperialistic war, a gigantic strengthening of the influence, power and *role* of the imperialistic bourgeoisie, the extensive growth of chauvinism among the masses, and, last but not least, the transfer of power, first the military and then the political power in general, to the counter-revolutionary heads of the army.

Such is the course of historic events, deepening and sharpening class antagonisms, from May 2-3 to July 16-17, and permitting the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie to carry out, after the 17th of July, that which on May 3 was indicated with such clarity as its program and tactics, its immediate aim and its "clean" means for attaining this aim.

There is historically nothing more petty, theoretically nothing

more pitiful, and practically, nothing more ridiculous, than the middle class sobs concerning the 17th of July (indulged in, by the way, by L. Martov), concerning the fact that the Bolsheviks contrived to bring about their defeat, and so on and so forth. All these sobs, all the conclusions that "there should not have been" any participation in the July 16-17 movement (participation which was for the purpose of imparting a "peaceful and organized" character to a perfectly legal state of discontent and activity of the masses!)—all this verges on apostasy if emanating from the Bolsheviks, or is characteristic if emanating from the *petite bourgeoisie*, the manifestation of its habitual indecision and intimidation. In fact, the movement of July 16-17 was a development of the movement of May 2-3 and its subsequent period, as inevitable as that summer follows spring. It was the unquestionable duty of the proletarian party to remain with the masses, trying to give a more peaceful and organized expression to their just demands and action, not to sweep aside, not to wash their hands of it all, in the manner of Pontius Pilate, on the pedantic pretext that the masses were not organized to the last man and that excesses might follow. (As if there were no excesses on May 2-3! As if there was ever in the history in the world a single mass movement without excesses!)

After July 17 the Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviks were so completely involved and entangled with the bourgeoisie that they could no longer disguise the fact that they were prepared for cooperation with the counter-revolutionary Cadets (for purposes of repression, slander and the hangman's policy). The Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviks were completely swallowed in the swamp of counter-revolution because their actions during May and June, their acceptance of the coalition ministry and support of the policy of the offensive, led directly to the swamp.

I have somewhat digressed, apparently, from my theme of the suppression of *Pravda* to the historic evaluation of the 17th of July: but that is only apparently, since in reality we cannot understand the one without the other. The suppression of *Pravda*, the arrests of Bolsheviks and other persecutions, represent nothing more or less than the realization of the program of counter-revolution and the Cadets in particular, if we consider the main aspect of the affair and the course of events.

It is most instructive, now, to consider just by *whom* and by *what* means this program was realized.

Consider the facts. On July 15 and 16 the movement gathers

strength, the masses are agitated and inflamed by the inactivity of the government, the high cost of living, the collapse of the July offensive. The Cadets leave the ministry, playing for time and issuing an ultimatum to the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks, leaving it to those "who are in power," though possessing no power, to liquidate the military defeat and the discontent of the masses.

The Bolsheviks, on July 15-16, abstain from action. This was acknowledged *even* by the representative of *Dyelo Naroda* in relating the incidents of July 15 in the Grenadier regiment. In the evening of July 16, the movement gets beyond bounds, and the Bolsheviks issue a proclamation about the necessity of imparting to the movement "a peaceful and organized" character. On July 17, the provocative shots of counter-revolutionary gangs increase the number of victims on both sides. We must emphasize that the promise of the Soviet Executive Committee to investigate the events, to issue bulletins twice daily, etc., remained an empty promise! Exactly nothing was done by the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks, who did not even publish a casualty list of both sides.

On the night of July 17, the Bolsheviks issued a proclamation concerning the cessation of hostilities, and the same night it was published in *Pravda*. But, the same night, there arrives a counter-revolutionary army at Petrograd (evidently at the call or with the sanction of the Social-Revolutionists, Mensheviks and their Soviets, concerning which "delicate" point there has been a strict silence after the necessity of secrecy had passed). And on the same night, there begin massacres of the Bolsheviks by companies of Junkers, etc., acting under the instruction of the commander Polovtzev and the General Staff. On the night of July 18, they suppress the *Pravda*, on the 18th and 19th they destroy its printing shop, kill a worker, Voynoff, in broad daylight.

They hunt for and arrest the Bolsheviks and disarm the revolutionary regiments.

Who did all this? Neither the government nor the Soviets, but a counter-revolutionary military band gathered around the General Staff, acting in the name of "counter-espionage," putting into circulation the fabrications of Pereverdeff and Alexinsky to "arouse the savagery" of the troops, etc. The government is nowhere. The Soviets are nowhere. They tremble for their own fate: they receive a series of communications that the Cossacks may come and massacre them.

The "Black Hundred" and the Cadet press having instituted or-

ganized persecutions of the Bolsheviks, begin a persecution of the Soviets. The Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks bound themselves hand and foot to these counter-revolutionary policies; and, like chained men, they called or "permitted a call" of counter-revolutionary troops to Petrograd and that bound them still more. They sank completely into the detestable counter-revolutionary swamp. Like cowards, they dismiss their own committee appointed to investigate the "affairs" of the Bolsheviks. They delivered the Bolsheviks to the counter-revolution. They participate, meekly, in the funeral of the dead Cossacks, and thus kiss the hands of the counter-revolutionists. They are chained men; they are at the bottom of the swamp. They toss about desperately: they give the Premier's portfolio to Kerensky; they arrange a "Zemstvo Assembly," or the "coronation" of a counter-revolutionary government in Moscow; Kerensky discharges Polovtzev.

But these tossings remain tossings, not in the least changing the *situation*. Kerensky discharges Polovtzev, but at the same time legalizes and makes formal Polovtzev's *measures*, his policy. Kerensky suppresses *Pravda*, introduces the death penalty for soldiers, forbids the right of assemblage at the front, continues the arrests of Bolsheviks (including even Alexandra Kollontay)—all according to the program of Alexinsky.

The "constitutional" condition of Russia is defined with amazing clarity: the offensive at the front and the coalition with the Cadets in the rear sweep the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks into the swamp of counter-revolution. In fact, the government power passes into the hands of the counter-revolution, into the hands of a military band, with the government of Kerensky, Tseretelli and Chernov as merely a screen for it: the government is forced indirectly to legalize the measures and the policy of the military counter-revolution.

The compromise of Kerensky, Tseretelli and Chernov with the Cadets has a secondary, if not a very remote significance: whether the Cadets will gain by this compromise; whether Chernov and Tseretelli will hold out "alone," the question will not be changed. The basic and decisive fact remains: the turning of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks to the counter-revolution, the direct consequences of their whole policy since May 18.

The cycle of party development is completed. The Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks tumbled down from step to step—from "confidence" in Kerensky during the period March 12 to May 18,

who chained them to the counter-revolution, to the 18th of July when they landed at the bottom.

A new stage opens. The victory of the counter-revolution causes disappointment among the masses in the parties of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, and opens the way for their accepting the policy of the revolutionary proletariat.

VIII

ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS!

(Lenin)

The most important problem in every revolution is the problem of state power. In whose hands is this power—that is decisive in all things. And if *Dyelo Naroda*, the newspaper of the main government party in Russia, the Social-Revolutionary Party, complains as it did recently that while arguing about power the question of bread is forgotten,—then this is their answer: You have yourselves to blame, since it is precisely the hesitation and indecision of *your party*, more than anything else, that is to blame both for the ministerial delays and the never-ending postponements of the Constituent Assembly; you are to blame for the dropping of the decisive measures to establish state monopoly of bread, thus destroying the country's chances of obtaining bread.

The problem of power can not be set aside or evaded, as that is precisely the fundamental question determining all conditions in the development of the Revolution, in its external and internal policies. That six months of our Revolution have been “spent in vain” hesitating about the arrangements of power is a fact which one can't argue about; it is a fact determined by the hesitating policy of these parties that was, in the long run, defined by the class position of the *petite bourgeoisie* and its economic instability in the struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie.

The whole question now is this: Has the *petit bourgeois* democracy learned anything during these six vital months of the Revolution, or has it not? If not, then the Revolution is doomed, and only the victorious uprising of the proletariat can save it. If yes, then it is necessary to begin anew with the immediate creation of a stable power and end the period of vacillation.

In a popular revolution, that is, a revolution brought about by the masses, the majority of workers and peasants, the only power that can be permanent and decisive is a power based consciously and without reservation on *the majority* of the people. Up until

this time the government power in Russia has been, in fact, and still is, in the hands of the bourgeoisie, which is obliged only to make private concessions (and taking them back the very next day), to issue promise after promise, to fool the people with the semblance of an "honest coalition," etc. In words, the government is popular, democratic, revolutionary; in deeds it is against the people, anti-democratic, counter-revolutionary, bourgeois. This is the contradiction prevailing in the government, and which is the source of the complete instability and vacillation of power, the source of the "ministerial leap-frog game" which Messrs. the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks played, with, for the people, such an unfortunate zeal.

Either the dissolution of the Soviets and their inglorious death, or all power to the Soviets,—that is what I said before the All-Russian Congress of Soviets early in June and the history of July and August unqualifiedly confirm the accuracy of my contention.

"Power to the Soviets" alone can make power stable, permanent, because based consciously on the majority of the people, in spite of how the lackeys of the bourgeoisie, Potresof, Plekhanov, etc., may lie and declaim that an actual handing over of power to an insignificant minority of the people, the bourgeoisie, the exploiters, is really a "broadening of the basis" of power. Only the Soviet power can be a stable power, it alone could not be overthrown even in the most stormy period of our stormy revolution, only this power could assure a constant and broad development of the Revolution and the peaceful party struggles within the Soviets. Until all power is in the Soviet, indecision, instability and hesitation are inevitable, never-ceasing "crises of power," the inescapable comedy of the "ministerial leap-frog game," explosions from the right and the left, etc.

But the slogan, "Power to the Soviets" is very often, if not in the most cases, absolutely misunderstood in the sense of "a ministry of the parties of the Soviet majority." This profoundly erroneous view requires consideration in detail.

A "ministry of the parties of the Soviet majority" means simply a change in the personnel of the ministry, with the retention and inviolability of the old apparatus of government power, an apparatus thoroughly bureaucratic and unable to carry out serious reforms which are of importance even in the programs of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks.

"Power to the Soviets" means a radical and complete change in the old government apparatus, a bureaucratic apparatus choking the expression of democracy. This apparatus must be abolished

and one truly democratic must be substituted,—the popular apparatus of the Soviet, an organized and armed majority of the people, workers, soldiers and peasants. The Soviet state would assure and deepen the initiative and independence of the people; the people would actually express their initiative, not only in the election of delegates, but in the management of the government and in the work of re-organization and reform.

To make this point of difference clearly evident, let us remind you of a very valuable confession made some time ago by *Dyelo Naroda*, the organ of the government party, the Social-Revolutionary Party. Even in those ministries, wrote that paper, which contain Socialist ministers, the whole apparatus of government remains antiquated and hinders all work. Quite right. The whole history of bourgeois parliamentary, and in more significant measure of bourgeois constitutional countries, proves that a change of ministers means very little, as the actual work of government is in the hands of a gigantic army of bureaucrats. And this army is permeated through and through with an anti-democratic spirit, bound up by thousands and millions of threads with landowners and capitalists, and dependent upon them in all ways. This army is in an atmosphere of bourgeois relations and breathes this atmosphere; it has become rigid and has not the power to escape—it is unable to think, feel and act other than in the old manner. This bureaucratic army is enslaved by considerations of rank and precedence, of respect for the well-known privileges of "government" service. The upper layers of this army, by means of stocks and banks, are completely subservient to financial capital, and, moreover, themselves furnish to a certain extent agents and promoters of the interests and influence of financial capital.

To attempt, by means of *this* government apparatus, to introduce such reorganization as the abolition of private ownership of land, without re-purchase, or a state monopoly of bread, etc., is the greatest illusion, the greatest self-deception and deception of the masses. This apparatus can serve the republican bourgeoisie to create a republic in the sense of "a monarchy without a monarch," as the Third Republic of France; but it is absolutely unfit to introduce reforms, not to abolish, but simply to seriously repress and limit the rights of capital, the rights of "sacred private property."

The inevitable outcome of "coalition" ministries, therefore, participated in by Socialists, is that these Socialists, even under absolutely conscientious agreement of individual members of their class, become in fact empty ornaments or screens of the bourgeois

government, buffers against the indignation of the masses against the government, instruments of deception of the masses. It was so with Louis Blanc in 1848; so it has been dozens of times since then, in England and France, when Socialists participated in the ministry; so it has been with Chernov and Tseretelli; so it has been and so it will be as long as the bourgeois system remains and the old bureaucratic apparatus of government is preserved intact.

The Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates are especially valuable in that they represent a new, immeasurably higher and incomparably more democratic *type* of government. Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks have done all that was possible and impossible to turn the Soviets (especially the Petrograd Soviet and the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets,) into empty talking machines, occupied under the guise of "control" in the promulgation of impotent resolutions and desires, which the government postpones until doomsday with a most courteous and polite smile.

But there was quite enough of the "fresh wind" of Kornilovism, promising a good storm, to blow away everything musty in the Soviet. The initiative of the revolutionary masses began to proclaim itself as something great, mighty and invincible. Let those of little faith learn from this historical example. Let those be ashamed who say: "We have not the means to change the old, oppressive government apparatus, which necessarily inclines to defend the bourgeoisie." The means exist—the Soviets. Don't be afraid of the initiative and independence of the masses. Trust yourself to the revolutionary organization of the masses, and you will behold in *all* fields of government activity an expression of the imposing power and invincible will of the workers and peasants. Distrust of the masses, fear of their initiative and independence, is directly counter-revolutionary.

"Power to the Soviets" alone can break the opposition of the landowners and capitalists; an opposition that also realizes itself in the government of Kerensky (a government, in fact, absolutely bourgeois and Bonapartist), and in the direct and indirect pressure of Russian and "allied" financial capital.

Audacity and resolution were lacking in our government through all its changes of personnel. Revolutionary democracy ought not to wait; it should itself take the initiative and act efficiently to end the economic chaos. If they are necessary anywhere, then firmness of course, audacity and decisive power are necessary here. The truth is the truth—these are golden words. But the question of

firmness of course, audacity and resolution, is not a personal question: it is a question of the *class* which is capable of showing courage and decision. That class is the proletariat, and the proletariat alone. Courage and resolution, firmness of course and power, mean nothing else than the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the poorest peasants.

Just what would such a dictatorship mean? Simply that the opposition of counter-revolutionary Kornilovism would be broken, and the democratization of the army re-established and perfected. Of the soldiers, 99 per cent would be enthusiastic participants in such a dictatorship two days after its establishment. The dictatorship would give the land to the peasants and full power to the local peasant committees. How can one in his senses doubt the fact that the peasants would support a dictatorship of the proletariat? That which the Social-Revolutionist Pyeshekhonov, simply promised, "the opposition of the capitalists is broken" (the exact words of Pyeshekhonov in his celebrated speech before the Congress of Soviets) would be really accomplished by this dictatorship, would be translated into reality, without in any way pushing aside the already developing democratic organizations for the control of production, of the food supply, of administration, etc. On the contrary, a dictatorship of the proletariat would support and strengthen these organizations, brushing aside all obstacles to their work. Only this dictatorship of the proletariat and poorest peasants is capable of destroying the opposition of the capitalists, of actively displaying marvels of courage and stability of power, of securing a triumphant and unlimited, truly heroic support of the masses, both in the army and among the peasants.

Power to the Soviets—that alone can assure the further development of the Revolution, in accordance with the experience and decisions of the majority of the masses.

Power to the Soviets signifies the complete handing over of the government and the control of its functions to the workers and peasants, whom no one would dare oppose; a government of the Soviets, which would quickly learn by experience and its own practice to distribute land, products and bread.

IX

CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS

(Lenin)

Constitutional illusions is a term designating the political error comprised in people accepting as existing, normal, regular, legal, in short, as "constitutional," an order which, in reality, does not exist. At first glance, it would seem that in Russia at present, in July, 1917, when there is not, as yet, any such thing as a constitution, that there could be no question of constitutional illusions being formed. But that is a grave mistake. In fact, the key to the present political situation in Russia lies in the circumstances that exceedingly large masses of the people are permeated with constitutional illusions. It is utterly impossible to understand anything in the present political situation without having grasped this fact. It is impossible to take a single step toward properly stating the tactical problems of the present unless we first systematically and unsparingly expose these constitutional illusions, disclosing their very roots, in order to secure a proper political perspective.

Let us consider the most important aspects of contemporary constitutional illusions, analyzing them carefully.

The first aspect: Our country is on the eve of a Constituent Assembly. That is why everything that is now happening has a temporary, transitory and indecisive character. Everything will soon be changed and definitely determined by the Constituent Assembly. The second aspect: That certain parties, for instance, the Social-Revolutionists or the Mensheviks, or their allies, have an evident and undeniable majority among the people or in "influential" organizations, such as the Soviets; and for that reason the will of these parties or organizations, being in general the will of the majority of the people, cannot be overcome or, more than that, violated in a republican, democratic, revolutionary Russia.

I

The convoking of the Constituent Assembly was promised by the Provisional Government of the first period, of Lvov-Guchkov. It acknowledged as its principal aim precisely the Constituent As-

sembly. The Provisional Government of the second period, of coalition, decided that the Constituent Assembly should meet on September 30. The Provisional Government of the third period, of Premier Kerensky, after the 17th of July, most solemnly affirmed that the Constituent Assembly should meet on September 30.

And yet there are ninety-nine chances out of a hundred that the Constituent Assembly will not be convoked on that date.¹ And should it be convoked on that date—again there are ninety-nine chances out of a hundred that it will be just as powerless and worthless as the first Duma—until the second revolution is victorious in Russia. To become convinced of this fact, it is necessary to turn our attention for a brief moment away from the tinsel of the phrases, promises and trivialities which clog the brain, and to glance at the basic, the determining factor in all social relations—at the class struggle.

It is evident that the bourgeoisie in Russia has allied itself most intimately with the land-owners. The whole press, all the elections, all the politics of the Cadet party and the parties to the right of them, are proof of this alliance.

The bourgeoisie understands perfectly well that which is incomprehensible to the petty bourgeois babblers of the Social-Revolutionists and the left Mensheviks, namely: that it is *impossible* to abolish private ownership of land in Russia—and, still more, without compensation—without a giant economic revolution, without placing the banks under public control, without the nationalization of the syndicates (trusts), without a series of the most merciless measures against capital. The bourgeoisie understands that perfectly. And at the same time it cannot be ignorant of, it cannot blind itself to, it cannot fail to perceive the fact, that a large majority of the peasants would not only declare now for the confiscation of the land, but show itself considerably more left than Chernov. For the bourgeoisie knows better than we do the frequent and partial concessions that were made by that man, Chernov; for example, from May 18 to July 15, on the questions of protracting and curtailing different demands of the peasants; also the great effort it required for the *right* Social-Revolutionists (for Chernov is

¹Lenin was right—the Provisional Government of Kerensky postponed the convocation of the Assembly to November 29; and in the meantime, the counter-revolution prepared itself to disperse the Assembly by armed force should its decisions prove "radical" and "democratic." The Constituent Assembly was the centre of a converging attack—the counter-revolutionary attack from the right, and the revolutionary proletarian attack from the left.—L. C. F.

considered a centrist by the S.-R.'s!) at the Peasants' Convention and at the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Delegates to "soothe" the peasants and to feed them with promises.

The bourgeois class differs from the *petite bourgeoisie* in that it acquires from its economic and political experience a knowledge of the conditions for the preservation of "order" (that is, the subjugation of the masses), under the capitalistic regime.

The bourgeois class is composed of business people,—people with large commercial interests, accustomed to approach even political problems from a strictly business standpoint, with distrust of words and with the ability to take the bull by the horns.

The Constituent Assembly in Russia at present would give a large majority to the peasants, who are more left than the Social-Revolutionists. The bourgeoisie knows this. Knowing this, it cannot help but struggle more strenuously against an early convocation of the Constituent Assembly. To conduct an imperialistic war in the spirit of the secret treaties concluded by Nicholas II, to uphold the private control of land or to make compensation for its "confiscation"—to do all this is an impossible or unbelievably difficult task through the Constituent Assembly. The war cannot wait. The class struggle cannot wait. This was visibly demonstrated even during the short period of time from March 12 to May 2.

From the very beginning of the Revolution, two points of view on the Constituent Assembly were discernible. The Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks, who are saturated through and through with constitutional illusions, viewed the problems with the confidence of the petty bourgeois, unwilling to recognize the class struggle. The Constituent Assembly will convene, and—enough! After that, the devil only knows!

And the Bolsheviks declared: only insofar as the power and authority of the Soviets are strengthened, only to that extent will the convocation and the success of the Constituent Assembly be assured.

The Mensheviks and the Social-Revolutionists place the centre of gravity in the juridical act: in the proclamations, promises and declarations concerning the Constituent Assembly.

The Bolsheviks place the centre of gravity in the class struggle: if the Soviets are victorious, the Constituent Assembly will be assured; if they are not, it will not be assured.

So it happened. The bourgeois conducted a continuous strug-

gle, at times hidden, at times open, but ceaselessly and uncompromisingly, against the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. That struggle was expressed in the desire to postpone its convocation until the end of the war. That struggle was expressed by a series of postponements of the designated day of convocation of the Constituent Assembly. When finally, more than a month after the formation of the coalition ministry, the date was set for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, a Moscow bourgeois paper announced that it was done under the pressure of Bolshevik influence.

After the 17th of July, when the subservience and the timidity of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks secured a "victory" for the counter-revolutionists, there slipped into the *Retch* a brief but highly significant expression: "as soon as possible" let the Constituent Assembly be convened!

But on July 29, there appeared in the *Volya Naroda* and in the *Russkaya Volya*, an article stating that the Cadets demand a postponement of the convocation of the Constituent Assembly upon the pretext that it is "impossible" to call it in so "short" a time, and the Menshevik Tseretelli, fawning before the counter-revolutionists, has already agreed, according to that article, to postpone the Assembly until December 2.

There is no doubt that such a statement could have slipped in only against the desires of the bourgeoisie. It could not afford such "revelations." But the cat was out of the bag. The course of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie after July 17 is accompanied by an immediate step (and an extremely serious step) *against* the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.

This is a fact. And this fact exposes all the emptiness of constitutional illusions. Unless there is a new revolution in Russia, unless the people refuse to place their trust in the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties—parties which ally themselves with the bourgeoisie—the Constituent Assembly will either never be called or will result in a "Frankfort Chaterbox," a powerless, worthless assembly of petty bourgeois who are frightened to death by the war and by the prospect of the "boycott of power" by the bourgeois class, and who are helplessly vacillating between their fears.

The question of the Constituent Assembly is subordinate to the question of the cause and outcome of the class war between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. It will be remembered how *Rabo-*

chaya Gazeta once let slip^{that} the Constituent Assembly would be a convention. That is an example of the empty, petty, contemptible bragging of our Menshevik lackeys of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. In order that it shall not resolve itself into a "Frankfort chatterbox" or a first Duma, in order that it be a convention, the Constituent Assembly must have the courage, the ability, the power to strike merciless blows at the counter-revolution, and not to give in to it. In order that it succeed, it is necessary that power should be in the hands of the most radical, the most resolute, the most revolutionary class in a given epoch. It is necessary that it be supported by the whole mass of the town and village poor (semi-proletariat). For that purpose, it is necessary, above all, to wage a decisive war against the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. u

Such are the real, the class conscious and material conditions of a convention. It is sufficient simply to enumerate these conditions precisely and clearly, to understand how laughable is the bragging of *Rabochaya Gazeta*, how profoundly ridiculous are the constitutional illusions of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks concerning the Constituent Assembly in contemporary Russia.

II

In attacking the petty bourgeois "Socialists" of the year 1848, Marx particularly and violently condemned their uncontrolled phrasemongery about "the people," and the majority of the people in general.

That recollection is very appropriate in considering the second aspect of constitutional illusions, in analyzing the conception of "majority."

In order that the majority should really rule in a country, it is necessary to have definite, actual conditions, namely: it is necessary that such a form of government be established, such a governmental authority, as would furnish the opportunity to have affairs decided by a majority and to assure the development of that opportunity into reality. From another point of view, it is necessary that the majority, in accordance with its class composition and in relation to any other class within that majority (or outside of it) should be able to direct government co-operatively and successfully. It is evident to every Marxist that these two real conditions play a decisive role in the question of the majority of the people, and in the course of governmental affairs in accordance with the will of this majority. Nevertheless, all the political literature of the Social-

Revolutionists and Mensheviki, and more than that, all of their political activity, discloses a complete lack of understanding of these conditions.

If the power of government is in the hands of a class whose interests coincide with the interests of the majority, the administration of the government can then be, in reality, identical with the will of the majority.

If, on the other hand, the government power is in the hands of a class whose interests diverge from the interests of the majority, then every attempt to govern inevitably becomes a fraud upon or a subjugation of that majority. Every bourgeois republic furnishes us with hundreds and thousands of examples of this.

In Russia the bourgeoisie reigns politically and economically. Its interests, especially during an imperialistic war, diverge most acutely from the interests of the majority. That is the reason why the key to this question, when stated from a materialistic Marxian point of view and not from a formalist-judicial one, lies in revealing that divergence, in fighting against the deception of the masses by the bourgeoisie.

But our Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki have completely proven and revealed their real *role* as instruments for the deception of the masses (majority) by the bourgeoisie, being leaders and assistants in this deception. No matter how sincere some individuals among the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki may be, their fundamental political principles—imagining that it is possible to proceed from an imperialistic war to “a peace without annexations and indemnities” without dictatorship of the proletariat and the victory of Socialism; imagining that it is possible to transfer the land to the people without compensation and to impose “control” over production in the interests of the people without proletarian dictatorship and Socialism—these fundamental political (and, naturally, economic) principles of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki present objectively in themselves the self-deception of the petty bourgeois, or, what amounts to the same thing, the deception of the masses (majority) by the bourgeoisie.

Here is our first and primary “correction” of the phrasing of the question of majorities by the petty bourgeois democrats, Socialists of the Louis Blanc type, Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki: why discuss the question of majority when the majority itself is only a formal moment, a temporary condition, whereas materially

and in reality this majority is the majority of the party which is realizing the deception of the majority by the bourgeoisie?

And, surely—here we come to the second “correction,” to the second of the fundamental conditions previously indicated—surely, it is possible to interpret that deception properly, if only we clear out its class roots and reveal its class meaning. It is not an individual deception, it is not “trickery” (I express myself roughly), it is a deception and idea which results from the economic environment of the class. A petty bourgeois finds himself in such an economic situation, his life conditions are such, that he cannot help deceive himself; he vacillates involuntarily and inevitably between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. There cannot be any ~~any~~ such thing as an independent course *economically* for the petty bourgeois. His past draws him to the bourgeoisie, his future to the proletariat. His reason urges him to the latter course, his prejudice (according to a well-known Marxian expression) to the former. That the majority govern the state, be the real beneficiary of the majority interests, the real guardian of its rights, etc., a definite class condition is necessary: the coalition of the majority of the *petite bourgeoisie*, at least during the decisive moment and at the decisive place, with the revolutionary proletariat.

Without this class condition, the majority is a fiction, which may exist for some time, shine, sparkle, make noise, win laurels, but which is destined to crash to disaster with absolute inevitability. That, by the way, is precisely the disaster awaiting the majority of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks, as determined by the Russian Revolution in July, 1917.

Let us proceed. A revolution differs from “the ordinary condition” of affairs in government in that disputable questions concerning society are of necessity solved by the class struggle and the mass struggle until the moment of establishing its definite and determining forms. There is no other alternative if the masses are free and armed. From that basic fact it follows that, in a real revolution, it is not enough to announce “the will of the majority”—no, it is necessary to prove yourself stronger at the decisive moment and at the decisive place; it is necessary to conquer. Beginning with the peasants’ revolts in the middle ages in Germany and continuing through all the great revolutionary movements and epochs up to 1848 and 1871, to the year 1905, we see countless examples of how the better organized, the more conscious, the better armed minority imposes its will upon the majority and defeats it.

Frederick Engels placed special emphasis on the lesson to be learned from the experience unifying to a certain extent the peasant uprisings of the 16th century and the revolution of 1848 in Germany, namely: the lack of unity of action and of centralization among the oppressed masses, due to their petty bourgeois form of life. And, from this point of view, we come to this conclusion: the simple majority of the *pettybourgeois* mass does not, as yet, decide anything and cannot decide anything, as long as the organization, the political consciousness and its centralization (inevitable for victory) is such that it gives the millions of petty bourgeois *only* the position of serving as the instrument either of the bourgeoisie or of the proletariat.

Finally, as we know, the problems of social organization are solved by the class struggle in its most aggressive, most violent form, namely, in the form of civil war. And in this civil war, as in every war the deciding factor—which as a fact and in principle is disputed by no one—is economic. It is extremely characteristic and significant that neither the Social-Revolutionists nor the Mensheviks deny this in principle, and, acknowledging the capitalistic character of contemporary Russia, dare not soberly look the truth in the face. They fear to acknowledge the truth, the fundamental division of every capitalistic country, Russia included, into three fundamental and decisive divisions: the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The first and the third are universally spoken about, universally acknowledged. The second—which happens to be the majority in point of number—is refused sober recognition from an economic, from a political, from a military point of view.

The truth is painful—that is the conclusion to which the fear of self-analysis of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks leads.

X

LESSONS OF THE REVOLUTION

(Lenin)

Every revolution means a sudden break in the lives of great masses of people. Unless such a break matures, no real revolution can take place. And, just as every break in the life of an individual teaches him something, causes him new experiences and new sensations, so a revolution imparts to the whole people in a short time lessons of great import and value.

In revolutionary epochs, millions and tens of millions of people learn more in a week than in a year of ordinary, every-day somnolent existence. For, a sharp crisis in the life of a whole people shows with exceptional clarity which classes exist and what ends they pursue, what forces they may utilize in their work, and by what means of action they proceed.

Every class conscious worker, soldier and peasant should seriously consider the lessons of the Russian Revolution, particularly now, when, early in August, it is perfectly clear that the first phase of our Revolution has ended disastrously.

I

What were the masses of the workers and peasants after when they accomplished the Revolution? What did they expect from the Revolution?

It is clear that the workers and peasants expected liberty, peace, bread and land.

But what did they get?

Instead of liberty, we see the former tyranny being re-established. The death penalty is introduced for soldiers at the front. Peasants are haled to court for undertaking, of their own accord, to seize the land of the landholders. The printing offices of the workers' papers are wrecked. Bolsheviki are being arrested, either

on no charges at all, or on charges that are manifestly framed-up.¹

The defense is offered that it is not the Bolsheviki who are being prosecuted, but only certain definite persons and on definite accusations. But these declarations are deliberately and manifestly untrue, for how can printing offices be wrecked for the transgressions of individual persons, even if these persons have been found guilty and duly sentenced in court? Unless, indeed, the government should legally have found guilty the whole Bolshevik party, its views and its tendencies. But the government of free Russia could not, and never did, do anything of the sort.

The clearest exposure of the fictitious character of the accusations directed against the Bolsheviki is in the fact that the newspapers of the landholders and the capitalists have been rabidly denouncing the Bolsheviki for their agitation against the war, against the landholders and against the capitalists, and demanding the arrest and prosecution of the Bolsheviki—*before even a single accusation had been lodged against even one Bolshevik.*

The people want peace. But the "revolutionary" government of Russia continued to wage a war of conquest, on the basis of the same secret treaties which the late Czar Nicholas II concluded with the English and French capitalists, in the interests of the subjection of foreign races by the Russian capitalists. The government of free Russia has been very prolific in its excuses, but it has not offered a righteous peace to all the nations.

We have no bread. Hunger again approaches. Everybody knows that the capitalists and the wealthy are cheating ruthlessly on the prices of war materials, are making unheard-of profits out of high prices, but nothing at all has been done toward a serious study of the production of commodities and their distribution by the workers. The capitalists are becoming more and more impudent, even throwing the workers out of the factories into the streets, and that at a time when there is a famine of manufactured articles among the people.

The great majority of the peasants have declared loudly and plainly, in a long series of congresses, that they consider the feudal ownership of land to be unjust—mere usurpation. But a government styling itself revolutionary and democratic continues for

¹This pictures the situation after the July uprising, when the Provisional Government and the moderates in the Soviet co-operated to disarm and crush the "left wing" of the Revolution, Trotzky was under arrest and Lenin in hiding—in Petrograd, from whence he continued to direct the agitation of the Bolsheviki!—L. C. F.

months to hoodwink the peasants and deceive them with promises and excuses. The capitalists for months do not permit the Chernov ministry to issue laws prohibiting the transfer of land by sale.² And no sooner is this law finally promulgated than the capitalists begin a vile and baseless legal hounding of Chernov, and continue it up to the present time. In its defense of the landholders, the government was even bold enough to bring peasants to court for their "irresponsible" seizure of land.

The peasants are hoodwinked and persuaded to wait for the Constituent Assembly. But the capitalists continue to postpone the opening of this Assembly. Now, when at last the Assembly is summoned for the 30th of September, the capitalists raise a howl and declare that it is "impossible" to convene the Constituent Assembly in so short a time and demand another postponement of its convocation. The most influential members of the capitalist and landholding party, the "Cadet" Party, for example, openly advocate postponing the Constituent Assembly until after the war.

Land? Wait for the Constituent Assembly. . . . Constituent Assembly? Wait until after the war. . . . End of the war? Wait until we have reached a victorious conclusion.

That is the satisfaction we get. The capitalists and landholders, who have their majority in the government, thus make sport of the peasants.

But how is it possible for such things to go on in a free country, a country that has overthrown its Czar?

After the downfall of the Czarist power, state power passed into the hands of the first Provisional Government. The party of the revolutionary workers, the Bolsheviks, demanded a transfer of all state power to the Soviets. The greater number of delegates in the Soviets were on the side of the Mensheviks or with the Social-Revolutionists, who were against a transfer of power to the Soviets. Instead of brushing aside the bourgeois government and substituting a Soviet government in its place, the Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionists advocated support of the bourgeois government and a coalition with it, in other words, the formation of a new government composed of representatives of the bourgeoisie, Mensheviks

²Chernov was the Social-Revolutionist Minister of Agriculture in the Coalition Cabinet of the Provisional Government. He resigned in June, becoming again a member in August in the Cabinet of Premier Kerensky. The prohibition of the transfer of land by sale was a very important measure, as through these sales the bourgeois and feudal agrarians schemed to draw the teeth out of the proposed distribution of land by the Constituent Assembly—when the Constituent Assembly finally *did* meet!—L. C. F.

and Social-Revolutionists. This policy of coalition with the bourgeoisie, on the part of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks, who enjoyed the confidence of a majority of the people, contains the gist of the whole course of the Revolution in the five months that have elapsed since its inception.

An agreement of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks with the capitalists has been manifest, in one form or another, at every stage of the Russian Revolution.

When the people, in March, had barely won their victory and Czarism had been overthrown, the Provisional Government of the capitalists added to their number the "Socialist" Kerensky. As a matter of fact, Kerensky had never been a Socialist; he had simply been a Laborite, and counted himself a "Socialist-revolutionary" only since March, 1917, when the thing was already safe and valueless. It was through Kerensky, in his capacity of Vice-Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, that the Provisional Government of the capitalists now tried to win over and domesticate the Soviet. The Soviet, that is, the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks who controlled it, permitted themselves to be soft-soaped, and agreed, immediately after its formation, to "support" the Provisional Government of the capitalists, "provided" it would carry out its promises.

The Soviet considered itself to be a sort of auditing commission, checking up the activities of the Provisional Government. The heads of the Soviets established the so-called "Consulting Committee," that is, a committee to secure contact and understanding with the Government. Through this Consulting Committee, the Social-Revolutionist and Menshevik leaders of the Soviet conducted continual conversations with the government of the capitalists, since they were, properly speaking, in the situation of ministers without portfolios, unofficial ministers.

Most of March and all of April passed with this state of affairs prevailing. The capitalists, in order to gain time, took refuge in delays and subterfuges. During this time the capitalist government did not take a single step of any consequence for the advancement of the Revolution. Even in its most elementary duty, the calling of the Constituent Assembly, the government did absolutely nothing, not even proposing the question of time and place nor appointing a central committee to consider the question. The government was concerned with one thing only, namely, to renew, surreptitiously, the predatory international treaties which the Czar had concluded with the capitalists of England and France; and to block the Revolution as carefully and imperceptibly as they could, to pro-

mise everything and deliver nothing. The Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks in the Consulting Committee played the part of simpletons who are fed on fine phrases, promises, "lunches"; the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks, like the raven in the fable, lent a willing ear to flattery, delightedly swallowing the assurances of the capitalists that they would not undertake a single step without consulting the Soviets, esteeming the Soviets, of course, very highly.

As a matter of fact, time was passing, and the government of the capitalists had done absolutely nothing for the Revolution. But *against* the Revolution—they had already succeeded in renewing the secret predatory treaties, or rather, in emphasizing and "resurrecting" them by means of supplementary agreements, just as secret, with the diplomats of Anglo-French Imperialism. *Against* the Revolution—they had already succeeded in laying the foundations of a counter-revolutionary organization (or, at least, understanding) of the generals and officers of the old army. *Against* the Revolution—they had already begun to organize captains of industry, owners of factories and works, who, under the blows of the workers, had been compelled to make one concession after another, but who were now beginning to sabotage production and prepare for its absolute stoppage, merely waiting for an appropriate moment.

But the organizing of the advanced workers and peasants into Soviets was proceeding inexorably. The best among the oppressed classes felt that the government, in spite of the agreement with the Petrograd Soviet, in spite of the eloquence of Kerensky, in spite of the "Consulting Committee" remained an enemy of the people, an enemy of the Revolution. The masses felt that if they did not break the resistance of the capitalists, the cause of peace, of freedom, of the Revolution would be lost forever. The impatience and ill-will of the masses was daily increasing.

II

On May 2 and 3 the masses burst forth. The cataclysm came with a sort of elemental fury, for no one had expected it. It appeared all the more distinctly directed against the government since one regiment marched out armed and appeared at the Marinsky Palace in order to arrest the ministers. To every one it was clear, to the point of axiomatic truth, that the government could not hold on. The Soviets could (and should) have taken the state power into their hands, without the slightest opposition from any side whatever. Instead of which the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks supported the tottering government of the capitalists, entan-

gled themselves more completely with the government by means of further agreements, and took other, even more fatal, steps to the complete undoing of the Revolution.

Revolution teaches all classes with a rapidity and thoroughness never possible in ordinary, peaceful times. The capitalists, being better organized and more experienced in the class struggle and in class policy, learned more quickly than the others. Seeing that the position of the government was insecure, they resorted to a method that has been practiced by the capitalists of other countries through all the decades since 1848, to hoodwink, disunite and weaken the workers. This method is the method of "coalition," that is, a ministry formed by combining bourgeois elements with renegades from Socialism.

In countries characterized more than others by the presence of liberty and democracy side by side with a revolutionary working class movement, namely, in England and France, capitalists have frequently resorted to "coalition" with great success. "Socialist" leaders who enter a bourgeois ministry inevitably become mere figure-heads, puppets, capitalist camouflage, tools for the deception of the workers. The "democratic and republican" capitalists of Russia put this same device into practice. The Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki simultaneously permitted themselves to be fooled, and on May 19 the "coalition" ministry, including Chernov, Tseretelli & Co., became a fact.

The dupes of the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevist parties love to bask in the light of the ministerial haloes of their leaders. The capitalists rubbed their hands in glee when they found they had obtained accomplices against the people in the persons of the "Soviet leaders," who had promised they would support "an offensive at the front," that is, a renewal of the war of imperialistic aggression that had been suspended. The capitalists were aware of the puffed-up impotence of these leaders; they were aware that the promises made by the bourgeoisie (concerning the control and even organization of industry, the policy of peace, etc.) never would be kept.

And so it transpired. The second phase of the Revolution, from May 19 to June 18, fully justified the calculation of the capitalists as to the ease with which they could deceive the Social Revolutionists and Mensheviki.

As soon as Pyeshekhonov and Skobeleff began fooling themselves and the people with fine phrases to the effect that they would take 100 per cent profits away from the capitalists, that the resis-

ance of the capitalists was broken, etc., the capitalists began to take heart. No one, absolutely no one, was at that moment occupied in curbing the capitalists. Ministers recruited from Socialist deserters made good talking machines to divert the oppressed masses, but the entire apparatus of state supervision actually remained in the hands of the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie. The celebrated Palchinsky, an associate of the Minister of Industry, was a typical representative of this system: he sidetracked every attempt to curb the power of the capitalists. The ministers continued their emissions of hot air, but conditions remained unchanged.

Particularly was Minister Tseretelli used by the bourgeoisie to act against the Revolution. He was sent to "placate" Cronstadt when the revolutionists there had the colossal cheek to remove a commissioner appointed by the Provisional Government. The bourgeois press launched out into an incredibly base, malicious, insane campaign of deception and persecution against Cronstadt, accusing the city of a desire to "secede from Russia," repeated absurdities of this and similar varieties in a thousand forms, terrifying the *petite bourgeoisie* and the philistines. Tseretelli, who is the most typical representative of the dull, intimidated philistines, fell most good-naturedly of all for the bait of the bourgeois persecution, and, more angrily than anyone else, "berated and calmed" Cronstadt, being in no way aware that he was playing the role of a flunkey to the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. The outcome was that he became the instrument for bringing about an "agreement" with revolutionary Cronstadt, providing that the Cronstadt commissioner was not to be appointed by the government, but elected by the city and *confirmed* by the government. In the accomplishment of such miserable compromises the ministers who deserted from Socialism to the bourgeoisie are now spending their time.

There are situations in which no bourgeois minister would dare to come out in defense of the government before the revolutionary workers or in the Soviets. But in such places there appeared (or rather, was sent by the bourgeoisie) a "Socialist" minister, a Tseretelli, Chernov, Skobelev, or some other, who would willingly carry out the bourgeois task and work himself into a fury defending the ministry, would whitewash the capitalists and deceive the workers by grinding out promises, promises, promises, and advising the workers to wait, wait, wait.

Minister Chernov was particularly busy trading with his bourgeois colleagues. Up to the very month of July, up to the new

"crisis of power" which was developing at that time, after the movement of July 16-17, up to the departure of the Cadets from the Cabinet, Minister Chernov was constantly occupied with the useful, interesting, profoundly working class task of "wheedling" his bourgeois colleagues, trying to persuade them to agree at least to abolish transactions of purchase and sale of land. This abolition was solemnly promised to the peasants at the All-Russian Congress (Soviet) of Peasants' Delegates at Petrograd. But the promise simply remained a promise. Chernov was unable to carry out the measure either in May or in June, and not until after the revolutionary wave, in the elemental uprising of July 16-17, simultaneously with the departure of the Cadets from the ministry, which provided the possibility of carrying out such measures. But even then this measure remained isolated and impotent to introduce any serious improvement in the peasants' struggle for land against the landholders.

At the same time at the front, the counter-revolutionary task of renewing the imperialistic predatory war, which Guchkov, hated by the people, had not succeeded in achieving, was accomplished brilliantly by the "revolutionary democrat" Kerensky, the newly-baked member of the Social-Revolutionary Party. Kerensky intoxicated himself with his own oratory, while the capitalists burned incense in his honor, worshiped him while using him as a puppet. And the reason was simple: Kerensky had been a true and faithful friend of the capitalists, persuading the "revolutionary troops" to consent to a renewal of the war, as a means of carrying out the treaties signed by Czar Nicholas II with the capitalists of England and France, a war having as its object the conquest, for the capitalists, of Constantinople and Lemberg, Erzerum and Trebizond.

Thus passed the second phase of the Russian Revolution, from the 19th of May to the 18th of June. The counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie was being strengthened and invigorated under the cover and with the active defense of the "Socialist" ministers, who had prepared an offensive both against the external enemy and the enemy within, the revolutionary workers.

III

On June 18 the party of the revolutionary workers, the Bolsheviks, prepared a demonstration in Petrograd in order to afford an organized expression to the irresistibly growing dissatisfaction and indignation of the masses. Fettered by their agreements with the bourgeoisie, entangled in the imperialistic policy of an offensive, the

Social-Revolutionist and Menshevist leaders were beside themselves in terror when they felt they were losing their influence over the masses. A great howl was raised against the demonstration, a howl joined in by counter-revolutionary elements as well as such as were Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks. Under the leadership of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks, as a result of their policy of agreement with the capitalists, the inclination of the *petit bourgeois* masses to ally themselves with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie was further stimulated, until it was made strikingly manifest as an accomplished fact. This is the historical significance, the class interpretation, of the crisis of June 18.

The Bolsheviks called off the demonstration, having no desire to lead the workers, at the appointed moment, into a desperate slaughter, against the united Cadets, Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks. But the latter, in order to preserve what shreds they still held of the confidence of the masses, were obliged to call a general demonstration for the 1st of July. The bourgeoisie, enraged and rightly considering this to be a vacillation on the part of the *petit bourgeois* democracy toward the side of the proletariat, decided upon an offensive on the front in order to paralyze the action of democracy.

As a matter of fact, the 1st of July afforded a remarkably imposing victory to the revolutionary proletariat and its slogans, the slogans of the Bolsheviks, among the Petrograd masses; and on the 2nd of July the bourgeoisie and the Bonapartist Kerensky solemnly announced that an offensive had been started on the 1st.³

The offensive of July 1 actually meant a renewal of the predatory war in the interest of the capitalists and was opposed to the will of the great majority of the workers. Inevitably connected with the offensive, consequently, was a gigantic outburst of chauvinism and a passing of the military (and, of course, the national) power into the hands of the Bonapartist war clique; and a resort to force in dealing with the masses, a persecution of the internationalists, prohibition of the freedom of agitation, the arrest and execution of all opposed to the war.

If the 19th of May attacked the Social-Revolutionists and Men-

³Bonapartism, from the name of the two French emperors, is a name applied to a government that attempts to be impartial, thus availing itself of the extremely sharp conflict between capitalists and workers. In reality serving Capitalism, a "Bonapartist" government deceives the workers worse than any other by means of promises and petty concessions.

sheviki to the victorious chariot of the bourgeoisie with ropes, the 1st of July bound them with chains to serve the capitalists.

The anger aroused in the masses by the renewal of the war of conquest naturally increased more rapidly and became very powerful. On July 16-17 their indignation vented itself in an explosion, which the Bolsheviki had tried to restrain, and which it was their duty to organize.

The Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, faithful slaves of the bourgeoisie, chained to their masters, agreed to everything,—the sending of reactionary troops to Petrograd, the re-establishment of the death penalty in the army, the disarming of the workers and the revolutionary troops, arrests and persecutions, closing up the newspapers without trial. The bourgeoisie could not entirely assume power in the government and the Soviets did not want to take it; and this power, accordingly, was seized by the war clique, the Bonapartists, fully supported, of course, by the Cadets and the Black Hundreds, the landholders and the capitalists.

The thing went on step by step. Once moving along the inclined plane of an agreement with the bourgeoisie, the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki slid downward without stopping until they reached the bottom. On March 12 they promised, in the Petrograd Soviet, a conditional support of the bourgeois Provisional Government. On May 19 they saved themselves from ruin and consented to transform themselves into servants and defenders of the government, consenting to an offensive. On June 18 they united with the counter-revolutionary bourgeois in a crusade of insane malice, falsehood and libel against the revolutionary proletariat. On July 2 they approved the renewal of the predatory war, already accomplished. On July 16 they agreed to a summoning of the reactionary troops against the workers,—the beginning of a complete cession of power to the Bonapartists.

This disgraceful finale of the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevist party is not an accident, but the natural result, often seen in the experience of Europe, of the economic position of the petty employers, of the *petite bourgeoisie*. Every one must have observed how the petty business man exhausts himself to make his way in the world, to become a real business man and a "substantial" owner, a real bourgeois. Under the rule of Capitalism there is no other choice for the petty business man: either he must himself advance to the position of the capitalists (and in the most favorable circumstances this may be possible, for one in a hundred), or he must drop into

the class of has-beens, the semi-proletariat, later the proletariat. In politics, also, the *petit bourgeois* democracy, particularly in the persons of its chiefs, leans towards the bourgeoisie. The leaders of the *petit bourgeois* democracy pacify the masses with promises and assurances of the possibility of coalition with the great capitalists, and, under the most favorable conditions, they may, for an exceedingly short time, obtain concessions from the capitalists for the not very numerous upper layers of the working masses; but in all decisive matters the *petit bourgeois* democracy has always been an appendage of the bourgeoisie, an impotent satellite, an obedient tool in the hands of the captains of finance. The experience of England and France has confirmed this.

The experience of the Russian Revolution, from March to July, emphasizes the old Marxist truth concerning the instability of the *petite bourgeoisie*, very clear and comprehensibly, particularly when events, under the influence of the imperialistic war and its consequent profound crisis, began to develop with unusual rapidity.

The lesson of the Russian Revolution is this: There is for the toiling masses no way out of the iron ring of war, of hunger, of enslavement to the landholders and capitalists, except in a complete break with the parties of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks, in a clear understanding of the treacherous role they have played, in the renunciation of every kind of coalition with the bourgeoisie, in a decisive stand by the side of the revolutionary workers. The revolutionary workers alone, if they are supported by the poorest peasants, will be in a position to break the resistance of the capitalists, lead the people to a seizure of the land without compensation, to full liberty, to a victory over hunger and over war, and to a just and permanent peace.

Prophecy.
Will it
be true?
12-3-16.

* * *

POSTSCRIPT

1917. This article, as may be seen from the text, was written early in August. Its arguments have been fully confirmed by the history of the Revolution since. And then the Kornilov uprising produced a new turn in the Revolution, making evident to the whole nation that the Cadets, in alliance with the counter-revolutionary generals, are aiming to disband the Soviets and re-establish the monarchy. How powerful is this new turn in the Revolution, whether it will succeed in finally putting an end to the disastrous policy of coalition with the bourgeoisie—this the near future will show.

September 19, 1917.

N. Lenin.

PART FOUR

The Revolution in Crisis

By

LEON TROTZKY

INTRODUCTION

The events of August marked the lowest depth of the Revolution. Reaction had scored heavily, and, behind the screen of the dictatorship of the "Socialist" Kerensky, the Cadets, and other still more sinister forces of the imperialistic bourgeoisie, were preparing for the *coup d'état* that would annihilate the Soviets—and the Revolution. The moderate Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets had approved of Premier Kerensky; but this was insufficient, as it was necessary for Kerensky's purposes to secure a mandate from "all the classes;" and, accordingly, the Government convoked a National Conference which convened at Moscow on August 26. The Conference was not only to "broaden the base" of the Provisional Government, it was equally an expression of Kerensky's Bonapartist policy.¹ The composition of the Conference was overwhelmingly conservative, reactionary and counter-revolutionary.

The delegates to the National Conference were carefully chosen, the Bolsheviks, naturally, being excluded. The four Dumas—and their character is clear, being expressions of the timid opposition legally allowed under the Czar—were represented by 188 members; the other delegates included 100 representatives of the Peasants, 229 representatives of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers' Delegates, 147 delegates from the Municipalities, 113 representatives from the banks and industrial organizations of capital, 313 representatives of co-operative organizations, and 176 representatives of trades unions.² The delegates of the Soviets consisted of moderates from the Menshevik and Social-Revolutionary parties.

At the Conference a concerted attack was made upon the Soviets and the Revolutionary Democracy, although it was not driven to a conclusion. It was a preliminary offensive. The representatives of the Soviets were on the defensive. Kerensky, in opening the Conference, declared:

"The Provisional Government has not called you together here to discuss questions of program, or, still less, to allow any attempts, from whatever sources they may come, to take advantage of the present Conference or the exceptionally difficult position of the Russian State, or to encourage any attempts to undermine or to undermine the power of the Provisional Government."

But the plea of Kerensky—for in spite of its assuming the form of an ultimatum, it was nothing but a plea—was unavailing. His speech was a

¹In an article in "Pravda," at the time, Zinoviev pointed out that the Cadets were at first suspicious of the Moscow Conference, considering it a part of Kerensky's Bonapartist policy, the policy of a dictatorship merging both forces in himself. And this was precisely the purpose of the Conference, although the Cadets finally participated.

²These are the figures given in A. J. Sack's "The Birth of Russian Democracy," from which source also are quoted extracts from the speeches delivered at the Conference (with the exception of the final quotation from Kerensky.)

mass of generalities, attacks upon the Right and Left alternating with concessions to the Right and Left; and his statement, "We are determined that Russia shall be ranked among the World Powers" evoked boisterous applause.

Minister of Finance Nekrasov made an attack upon the Revolution's evil influence upon the finances, declaring that the money being expended by the Food Supply Committees and for wage increases was ruining the state and country, and should be stopped. General Kornilov, Commander in Chief of the armies, emphasized the disintegration of the army, and urged drastic measures to restore discipline, among these measures being the practical abolition of the soldiers' committees. He attacked the measures of the Provisional Government introducing democracy into the army, and concluded with a covert threat of allowing an invasion of the country in order to compel the introduction of the necessary measures:

"If decisive measures for the improvement of discipline at the front followed as a result of the devastation of Tarnopol and the loss of Galicia and Bukovina, we must not allow that order in the rear should be a result of the loss of Riga, and that order on the railroads be restored at the price of surrendering Moldavia and Bessarabia to the enemy."

General Kaledine, of the Cossacks, was even bolder than Kornilov, making direct attacks upon the Socialist ministers, and suggested the following measures:

"1.—The army must be kept out of politics. All meetings and assemblies with their party antagonisms must be absolutely forbidden at the front.

"2.—All councils and committees in the army must be abolished at the front as well as behind the lines, except those of the regiments, companies, divisions and other military units, and their rights and duties must be strictly limited to the management of the soldiers' economic affairs.

"3.—The Declaration of Soldiers' Rights must be revised and amplified by a declaration of his duties.

"4.—Discipline in the army must be restored and strengthened by the most decisive measures.

"5.—To insure the fighting capacity of the army, the front and the rear must be recognized as one whole, and all measures required for strengthening discipline at the front must also be applied to the rear.

"6.—The disciplinary rights of superior officers must be restored to them. (Applause from the Right.)

"7.—The army leaders must have their full authority restored.

"8.—At this terrible hour of great reverses at the front and complete disintegration springing from political and economic disruption, the country can be saved from final ruin only by placing full power in the hands of firm, experienced and skilled people not bound by narrow party or group programs, (Loud applause on the Right.) not hampered by the necessity of turning back after every step in order to find out whether the various committees and councils approve or disapprove of their acts, (Restlessness on the Left. Applause on the Right.) and who fully recognize that the people as a whole and not separate parties or groups are the sources of sovereign power in the State.

"9.—The Central, as well as local, Government must be undivided. A stop must be put immediately and abruptly to the usurpation of power by the

central and local committees and Councils." (Vigorous protest on the Left. Shouts: "Down with him!" "Counter-Revolutionist!" Enthusiastic applause from the Right.)

Cheidse, president of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Soviets, answered Kaledine and defended the Soviets, declaring that the revolutionary democracy "has always placed the interests of the country and the Revolution above the interests of separate classes and groups. . . . Only due to the revolutionary organizations has the creative spirit of the Revolution been preserved; that is saving the country from dissolution and anarchy." But Cheidse's answer was not an answer to the problem, since the *status quo* was itself responsible for the prevailing situation: the *status quo* had to be destroyed either by the bourgeoisie or by the revolutionary proletariat. The measures proposed by General Kaledine were unavoidable if the army was to be restored, but the introduction of these measures, under the prevailing conditions, would have necessarily meant the abolition of the Soviets as the active force of the Revolution, the conversion of the army into a counter-revolutionary instrument, and a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The attacks upon the Provisional Government emphasized that the end of the Soviets equally meant the end of the "liberal" government of the imperialistic bourgeoisie: the Provisional Government itself assailed by the Right. The lament of the former Minister of War Guchkov that the Provisional Government without power revealed the situation clearly: the Soviets had the power and the Provisional Government could have power only with the destruction of the Soviets.

It was this abolition of the Soviets that was being engineered. The Cadets challenged the Soviets to assume full responsibility for the government, or else cease their "advisory" function. But the Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionists cravenly evaded the challenge: neither a dictatorship of the proletariat *nor* a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Milyukov and Nabokov refused to participate in the Ministry, feeling that the annihilation of the Soviets was first necessary.

The Moscow Conference was called as a pledge of national unity and to promote national unity: it simply revealed the acute disunity and intensified the antagonisms. Nothing of a practical character was accomplished by the Conference, and Kerensky's final address indicated the depth of the failure: "The Government does not regret having called this Conference, for although it has not secured practical results, it has given an opportunity to all Russian citizens to say openly what they have on their minds. And that is essential for the state."

* * *

Sources: All the chapters of Part Four are from Trotsky's pamphlet, *What Next?* published in Petrograd in September, 1917. The following is Trotsky's preface to the pamphlet, which he calls "Instead of a Preface:"

"Since the July 1st offensive on the external front there begins a retreat of the Revolution on the internal front. This retreat, led by the official democracy, assumed, after the events of July 16-17, the character of a panic. At this moment it presents a somewhat more orderly appearance, without, however, ceasing its flight. The war is devouring the Revolution before our

eyes. And as the generals control the war, they attempt to take all actual power into their own hands.

"At what point is this to stop? The making of a prognosis requires that we ask ourselves what is the nature of the forces that are engaged in a struggle on the political stage, or are—surrendering without a struggle. That is the object of this study.

"The first two chapters were written before the Moscow Conference. We have not altered them in any way. In our attempt to prognosticate the function and consequences of the Moscow solemnity, we proceeded, not from the statements of leaders and the declarations of newspapers (never, it seems, have leaders and newspapers lied as they lie now,) but from class interests and political activities: the latter method, which has the recommendation of Marx, is infinitely more reliable.

"Even after the Provisional Government had disarmed revolutionary Petrograd, and set up the Cossack 'Landes' over the red banners, it did not dare enrage the workers by the sight of a Conference which was stigmatized as of Government, not to say 'anti-popular.' The 'live wires' were invited to pious and peaceful Moscow. But the Moscow proletariat received the uninvited guests with a strike of protest and contempt. And, thus vindicated, the proletariat of Petrograd breathed freely on that day.

"With the permission of the Moscow Worker-Comrades, I am dedicating this brochure to them."

L. C. F.

I

WHAT HAS HAPPENED?

No one can explain satisfactorily why there is to be a Conference at Moscow. More than that: all those who are to take part in the Conference declare, truthfully or otherwise, that they do not know what can be the purpose in inviting them to Moscow. At the same time, almost all express themselves in terms of suspicion and contempt when speaking of the Conference. But just the same they are all going. What can be the reason?

If we omit the proletariat, which occupies a position of its own, the participants in the Moscow Conference may be divided into three groups: the representatives of the capitalist classes, the *petit bourgeois* organization, and the government.

The propertied classes have their most complete representation in the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Cadets. Backing them are the great landholders, the organizations of trade-industrial capital, the financial cliques, the university faculties. Every one of these groups has its own interests and its own political prospects. Yet the common danger that threatens them all is from the masses of the workers, peasants and soldiers, and this danger drives the capitalist classes into one great counter-revolutionary union. Without suspending their monarchistic intrigues and conspiracies, the court, bureaucratic and general staff circles nevertheless consider it to be at present imperative that they should support the Cadets. And the bourgeois liberals with suspicious glances askance at the monarchistic clique, at present place a very high value on their support against the Revolution. In this way the Cadet party is becoming a sort of general representative for all varieties of greater and lesser property interests. All the demands of the propertied classes, all the extortions of the exploiters, are at present blended in the capitalistic cynicism and the imperialistic insolence of Mil-yukov. His policy is to lie in wait for all the false steps of the revolutionary regime, all its faults and mishaps, availing himself for the present of the "collaboration" of the Menshevik Socialists and

the Social-Revolutionists, to compromise them by this collaboration, and to bide his time. And, behind Milyukov's back, the Czarist Gourko is biding *his* time.

The pseudo-democracy of the Social-Revolutionist and Menshevik type rests on the peasant masses, the *petite bourgeoisie* of the cities and the more backward workers. On this connection it should be noted that the further events develop, the clearer it becomes that the strength of the combination is in the Social-Revolutionists, while the Mensheviks are the fifth wheel on the wagon. Being led by these two parties, the Workmen's and Soldiers' Soviets, which were elevated to tremendous heights by the cataclysmic convulsions of the masses, are rapidly losing their importance and retrograding to oblivion. And why? Marx has pointed out that when History bestows a heavy punch on the nose of the petty "big guns" of the Philistines, they never seek the cause of their undoing in their own insolvency, but invariably uncover someone's malice or intrigue. Accordingly, Tseretelli grasps at the "conspiracy" of July 16-18, as the "straw" that explains the miserable failure of his whole policy. When the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik Liebers, Getzes and Voitinskys preserved order from "anarchy," which, by the way, was not being threatened, these gentlemen firmly believed that, like unto the geese that had saved the Capitol, they should be given a reward. And, when they observed that the contempt the bourgeoisie showed them increased in direct proportion to their peace-making zeal toward the proletariat, they were dumfounded. Tseretelli, the same Tseretelli who was such an accomplished juggler with trite commonplaces, found himself cast to the waves as too revolutionary an incumbrance. It was perfectly plain: the Machine-Gun Regiment had "spoiled" the Revolution [by refusing to obey Kerensky's order to march to the front except under certain conditions and by participating in the events of July 16-17].

And if Tseretelli and his party appeared in the ranks of the counter-investigators, of Polovtsov and the military cadets, helping them to disarm the workers in the interests of the counter-revolution, the fault cannot lie with Tseretelli's political game, but rests on the shoulders of the Machine-Gun Regiment which the Bolsheviks had led astray. Such is the philosophy of history professed by the political bankers of the Philistines!

As a matter of fact, the days of July 16, 17 and 18 became a turning-point in the development of the Revolution, for the reason that they exposed the complete inability of the leading parties of

the *petit bourgeois* democracy to take power into its hands. After the miserable breakdown of the coalition government, there appeared to be no other alternative than an assumption of power by the Soviets. But the Mensheviki and Social-Revolutionists hesitated. To assume power, they reasoned, would mean a break with the bankers and diplomats,—a dangerous policy. And when, in spite of the ominous meaning of the events of July 16-18, the leaders of the Soviet continued running after the Efimovs, the propertied classes could not fail to understand that the policies of the Soviet were waiting upon them very much as a little storekeeper waits upon a banker, namely, with hat in hand. And that is what put courage into the counter-revolution.

The whole previous history of the Revolution is in the so-called *dual authority*. This designation, given by the liberals, is, in truth, very superficial. The matter is not exhausted when you say that beside the government stood the Soviet, which discharged a considerable number of government functions; for the Dans and Tsere-tellis did all in their power to annihilate, "painlessly," this division of power, by handing over everything to the government. The fact really is that behind the Soviets, and behind the government, there stood two different systems, each resting upon different class interests.

Behind the Soviets stood the workers' organizations, which were displacing, in every factory, the autocracy of the capitalist, and establishing a republican regime in industry, which was incompatible, however, with the capitalist anarchy and demanded an irrevocable state control of production. In defence of their property rights the capitalists sought assistance from above, from the government, pushed it with ever-increasing energy against the Soviets, and compelled it to accept the conclusion that it did not possess an independent apparatus, i. e., instruments of repression against the working masses. Hence the lamentations over "dual authority."

Behind the Soviet stood the electoral organization in the Army, and all the rest of the administration of the soldier democracy. The Provisional Government, keeping step with Lloyd George, Ribot and Wilson, recognizing the old obligations of Czarism, and proceeding by the old methods of secret diplomacy, could not but meet with the active hostility of the new army regime. The opposition from above had pretty nearly lost its effect by the time it reached the Soviet. Hence the complaints of "dual authority," especially on the part of the General Staff.

Finally, the Peasant Soviet, also, in spite of the miserable op-

portunism and the crude chauvinism of its leaders, was subject to an increasing pressure from below, where the confiscations of land was assuming a form that became all the more threatening, the more the government opposed them. To what extent the latter was playing the role of a representative of Big Capital is best of all illustrated by the fact that the last prohibitive police ordinance of Tsere-telli differed in no respect from the ordinances of Prince Lvov. And wherever, in the provinces, the Soviets and Peasant Committees would attempt to install a new agrarian regime, they would find themselves involved in a bitter conflict with the "revolutionary" authority of the Provisional Government, which was turning more and more into a watchdog of private property.

The further development of the Revolution resolved itself into the necessity of all power passing into the hands of the Soviet, and the use of this power in the interests of the workers against the property-owners. And the deepening of the struggle against the capitalist classes makes it absolutely necessary to assign the leading role among the toiling masses to their most resolute section, namely, to the industrial proletariat. For the introduction of control over production and distribution the proletariat could appeal to very valuable precedents in Western Europe, particularly in the so-called "war Socialism" of Germany. But as, in Russia, this labor of organization could only be accomplished on the basis of an agrarian revolution and under the supervision of an actually revolutionary power, the control over production and the gradual organization of the latter would necessarily assume a direction that was hostile to the interests of capital. At a moment when the propertied classes were striving, through the Provisional Government, to establish the rule of a "strong" capitalist republic, the full power of the Soviets, as yet by no means synonymous with "Socialism," would in any case have broken the opposition of the bourgeoisie, and in alliance with the existing productive forces and the situation in Western Europe, would have imposed a direction and a transformation upon economic organization, that would have been in the interests of the toiling masses. Casting aside the chains of capitalistic power, the Revolution would have become *permanent*, that is, continuous; it would have applied its state power, not to the perpetuation of the rule of capitalist exploitation, but, on the contrary, to its undoing. Its ultimate accomplishments on this field would have depended on the successes of the proletarian revolution in Europe. On the other hand, the Russian revolution might give an all the greater impetus to the revolution in Western Europe, the more resolutely and cour-

ageously it put down the opposition of its own bourgeoisie. Such was and such remains the *sole and only actual* prospect for the further development of the Revolution.

To the phantasts of the philistines, however, this outlook was "utopian." What did *they* want? They have never been able to say themselves. Tseretelli talked a lot about "revolutionary democracy," without understanding what it really is. It was not only the Social-Revolutionists who formed the habit of coasting on the billows of a democratic phraseology; the Mensheviks also cast aside their class criteria as soon as these criteria too clearly exposed the *petit bourgeois* character of their policy. The rule of "revolutionary democracy" clears up everything and justifies everything. And when the old Black Hundred stick their dirty fingers into the pockets of the Bolsheviks, they do it in the name of no less an authority than that of the "revolutionary democracy." But let us not anticipate.

Representing, as they did, the power of the bourgeoisie, or rather the neutralization of power by the means of coalition, the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik democracy actually beheaded the Revolution. On the other hand, by defending the Soviets as their organs, the *petit bourgeois* democracy actually prevented the government from creating any administrative apparatus in the provinces. The government was not only powerless to do good, but rather weak in working evil. The Soviets, full of ambitious plans, were not able to carry out one of them. The capitalist republic, which had been planted down from above, and the workers' democracy which has been shaped from below, paralyzed each other. Wherever they clashed, therefore, innumerable quarrels arose. The minister and the commissaries suppressed the organ of revolutionary self-government, the commanders fumed in rage at the army committees, the Soviets were kept running to and fro between the masses and the government. Crisis followed upon crisis, ministers came and went. The discontent among the masses increased as the repressive measures of authority became more and more fruitless and systemless. From above, all life must have seemed a boiling torrent of "anarchy."

It was evident that the timid dualism of the rule of the *petit bourgeois* "democracy" was internally insolvent. And the more profound became problems of the Revolution, the more painfully manifest did this insolvency become. The whole state structure was standing on its head, or rather, on its two or three heads. An un-

guarded move on the part of Milyukov, Kerensky, or Tseretelli threatened to upset the whole business. And daily the alternatives appeared with greater and greater inevitability: either the Soviet must assume power, or the capitalist government will sweep aside the Soviet. An external shock was all that was needed to destroy the equilibrium of the whole structure. This external shock to a system that was doomed from within came in the form of the events of July 16-18. The *petit bourgeois* "idyl," constructed on an "amicable" union of two mutually exclusive systems, received its death-blow. And Tseretelli was enabled to set down in his memoirs that his plan for the salvation of Russia had been thwarted by the Machine-Gun Regiment.

II

ELEMENTS OF BONAPARTISM

Your little shopkeeper is a sober-minded man; his chief abhorrence is "taking a risk." Yet he has at the same time a gorgeous imagination: every little shopkeeper expects to become a Rothschild. This combination of an anaemic sobriety with an impotently riotous imagination is the very essence of the *petit bourgeois* policy. It would be erroneous to think, wrote Marx, that the representatives of the *petite bourgeoisie* are invariably grasping hagglers. Far from it, on their own mental level they are greatly superior to the wretched philistine. Yet, "they are made representatives of the ideas of the *petit bourgeois* by the fact that their thoughts do not transcend the sphere in which their *lives* are cast, and that, therefore, they arrive, in theory, at the same problems and the same solutions, to which the *petit bourgeois* arrives in practice."

Sancho Panza is the incarnation of base cowardice. Yet romanticism is by no means foreign to his disposition: otherwise he would never have become the companion of Don Quixote. The cowardice of the *petit bourgeois* policy is expressed in its most offensive form, in the person of Dan. Tseretelli represents the fusion of this cowardice with romanticism. Tseretelli said to Martov: "Only a fool fears nothing!" The well-intentioned philistine policy, on the other hand, is afraid of everything: they are afraid of arousing the ire of their creditors; they are afraid that the diplomats may take their "pacifism" seriously; but most of all they are afraid of power. Just as a "fool fears nothing," so the *petit bourgeois* policy deems it expedient to insure itself against folly by a game of cowardice on all fronts. Yet they do not relinquish their hopes of becoming Rothschilds: having stuck two or three words in Terechenko's diplomatic note, they think they have brought peace nearer; they hope to instill into Prince Lvov their own most loyal mediation against the civil war. But the great *petit bourgeois* peacemaker concludes by disarming the workers, without in any way disarming Polovtsev of Kaledin, the counter-revolution. And when

this whole policy falls to pieces under the first serious blow, Tsere-telli and Dan explain to all who have any desire to believe them, that the Revolution was frustrated, not by the inability of the *petit bourgeoisie* to take all power into its hands, but by the "insurrection" of the Machine-Gun Regiment.

In the course of many years of controversy concerning the character of the Russian Revolution, the Mensheviks have maintained that the true bearers of revolutionary power in Russia have been the *petit bourgeois* democrats. We always have pointed out that the *petit bourgeois* democracy is incapable of solving this problem, and that the only power than can guide the revolution to its goal is the proletariat, drawing its strength from the masses of the people. Now History has so decreed that the Mensheviks appeared as the political representatives of the *petit bourgeois* democracy, in order that they might in their own persons exemplify their complete inability to cope with the problems of power, that is, to assume the leading role in the Revolution.

In *Rabochaya Gazeta*, that organ of counterfeit, Danified, Danicizing "Marxism," the attempt is made to fix upon us the label of "July Sixteen Men." We have every reason to assert that in the July 16th movement, all our sympathies were absolutely with the workers and soldiers, and not with the military cadets, the Polovtsevs, Liebers, and the "sniffers."¹

We would deserve contempt were it otherwise. But let the bankrupts of the *Rabochaya Gazeta* not be too loud in invoking the 16th of July, for that was the day of their political self-destruction. The label "Sixteenth of July Men," if I may use a very mixed metaphor, may be turned against them as a two-edged sword, for on July 16 the rapacious cliques of Czaristic Russia accomplished a *coup d'etat* with the purpose of placing all the authority of state in their hands. On the 16th of July, 1917, at the moment of the most serious crisis of the Revolution, the *petit bourgeois* democrats vociferously declared that they were incapable of taking over the state power. Turning their backs with hatred on the revolutionary workers and soldiers, who demanded from them the discharge of their most elementary revolutionary duty, the Sixteenth of July men

¹The "sniffers" were a secret service organization created by the military governor of Petrograd, Col. Polovtsev, with the aid of V. Burtzeff and G. Alexinsky, formerly active in the movement against Czarism, but aligned with the counter-revolutionary moderates during the Revolution itself. The purpose of the "sniffers" was to crush the Bolsheviks.—L. C. F.

made an alliance with the Sixteenth of June men, with the object of curbing, disarming, and jailing the Socialist workers and soldiers. The treachery of the *petit bourgeois* democracy, its shameful capitulation to the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, it is *that* which disturbed the alignment of power, and not for the first time in the history of the Revolution.

Under these circumstances the last ministry was created, which was designated "the government of Kerensky." The irresolute, powerless, shaky regime of the *petit bourgeois* democracy was transformed into a personal dictatorship.

Under the name of "a dual authority" there went on a struggle between irreconcilable class tendencies; the imperialistic republic and the workers' democracy. While the issues of this struggle remained unsolved, it paralyzed the Revolution and inevitably produced symptoms of "anarchy." Being led by politicians who are afraid of everything, the Soviet did not dare assume power. The representative of all the propertied cliques, the Cadet party, *could not* yet assume power. What was needed was a great conciliator, a mediator, an impartial referee.

Already in the middle of May, at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, Kerensky had been called "the mathematical point of Russian Bonapartism." This characterization shows, at the very start, that it is not Kerensky that matters, but rather his historical function. It might be somewhat superficial to declare that Kerensky is made of the same stuff as the first Bonaparte; to say the least, it has not been proved. Yet his popularity seems to be more than an accident. Kerensky seemed closer to the understanding of all the Pan-Russian philistines. A defender of political prisoners, a "social-revolutionist," who headed the laborites, a radical not connected with any Socialist school, Kerensky reflected most fully the first phase of the Revolution, its "national" vagueness, the engaging idealism of its hopes and its expectations. He talked about land and liberty, about order, about the peace of nations, about the defence of the fatherland, about the heroism of Liebknecht, about the fact that the Russian Revolution would astonish the world with its greatness of soul, all the while waving a red silk handkerchief. The half-awakened philistine listened to these speeches with ecstasy: to him it seemed as if he were himself up on the platform talking. The army hailed Kerensky as a deliverer from Guchkov. The peasants heard that he was a laborite, a delegate of the muzhiks. The extreme moderation of his views, beneath his confused radicalism of phrase,

was enough to take in the liberals. Only the more enlightened workers kept at a distance. But their Soviets successfully dissolved into a "revolutionary democracy."

His freedom from any doctrinal impediment permitted Kerensky to be the first of the "Socialists" to enter the bourgeois government. He was the first to apply the name of "anarchy" to the increasingly insistent social demands of the masses: already in May he had threatened the Finns with the sharpest of reprisals and uttered his high-sounding phrase about "risen slaves," which came as a balm to the hearts of all the injured property-holders. In this way his popularity soon involved a veritable tangle of contradictions, thus properly reflecting the vagueness of the first stage of the Revolution and the hopelessness of the second. And when History was obliged to fill a vacancy in the office of referee, there was no more appropriate man at her disposal than Kerensky.

"The historic night session" in the Winter Palace was only a repetition of the political humiliation which the "revolutionary" democracy had prepared for itself at the Moscow Conference. In these transactions all the trumps were in the hands of the Cadets: The Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik democracy, which was gaining successes in all the democratic elections, without exception, and which was frightened to death by these successes, humbly begs the privileged liberals for their collaboration in the government! As the Cadets had not feared on the 16th of July to thrust power on the Soviets, and as, on the other hand, the liberals were not afraid of assuming the power altogether, it is plain that they were the masters of the situation.

If Kerensky was the last word of the impotent Soviet hegemony, it was now necessary for him to stand as the first word of the liberation from that hegemony. For the time being, we shall take Kerensky, but only under the condition that you will sever the umbilical cord connecting him with the Soviet!—such was the ultimatum of the bourgeoisie.

"Unfortunately, the debate at the Winter Palace was mere talk and uninteresting talk at that"—was Dan's complaint in his report to the Soviet.

It is difficult to appreciate the full depth of these complaints on the part of the parliamentarian of "revolutionary" democracy, who left the Tauride Palace in the evening, still at the helm, and came back empty-handed in the morning. The leaders of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks respectfully laid their share of

power at the feet of Kerensky. The Cadets accepted this gift graciously: in any event, they regarded Kerensky, not as a great impartial referee, but only as an intermediary agent. To take all power into their hands at once would have been too dangerous in view of the inevitable revolutionary resistance of the masses. It was much more sensible to hand over to the at present "independent" Kerensky, with the collaboration of the Avksentieffs, Savinkovs, and other Social-Revolutionary moderates, the task of paving the way for a purely bourgeois government, with the aid of a system of more savage repressions.

The new coalition ministry—"the Kerensky government"—was formed. At first glance it differed in no wise from the other coalition government, which had so ignobly collapsed on July 16. Shingarev departed, Kokoshkin arrived; Tseretelli stepped out, Avksentieff stepped in. All the losses in personnel merely emphasized the fact that both sides regarded the Cabinet simply as a stepping stone. But much more important was the radical alteration in the "significance" of the two groups. Formerly—at least "in idea"—the "Socialist" ministers had been considered representative of the Soviets controlled by the Soviets: the bourgeois ministers acted as screens between them and the Allies and the capitalists. Now, on the other hand, the bourgeois minister entered, as a subordinate group, into the personnel of the frankly counter-revolutionary *bloc* of the propertied classes (the Cadet Party, the leaders of trade and industry, the landowners' league, the Provisional Committee of the Duma, the Cossack Circle, the General Staff, the Allied diplomacy) and the "Socialist" ministers serve simply as a screen against the masses of the people. Meeting with the silence of the Executive Committees of the Soviets, Kerensky succeeded in obtaining ovations by promising not to permit a restoration of the monarchy. So low had fallen the requirements of philistine democracy! Avksentieff called upon all for "sacrifices," lavishly distributing half-Kantian, half-revival meeting drivel, which was his great stock in trade; and as is proper for an idealist in power, in this categorical imperative, he constantly dragged in the Cossacks and the military cadets. And the surprised peasant deputies cast their eyes about in wonderment, observing that before they had a chance to take away the land from the landholders, something was taking away their influence over the power of the state.

The counter revolutionary general staffs, everywhere supplanting the army committees, were making a very general use of them

at the same time for reprisals against the masses, and in this way undermining the authority of the soldier organizations and preparing their downfall. The bourgeois counter-revolution has at its disposal for this purpose its "Socialist" ministers, but the latter drag with them in their dizzy fall the same Soviets of which they are now independent, but which are still dependent on the ministers, as before. Having renounced power, the democratic organizations should also have liquidated their authority. Thus all prepared for the advent of Milyukov. And behind him General Gurko is bidding his time.

The Moscow Conference obtains all its importance in connection with this general tendency of the political movement in upper circles.

In the last few days the attitude of the Cadets toward the meeting was not only not enthusiastic, but even full of distrust. Ill-concealed hostility to the pilgrimage to Moscow was also the attitude of *Dyelo Naroda*, the organ of that party which was represented in the Government by the Kerenskys, Avksentieffs, Savinkovs, Chernovs, and Lebedieffs. "If we must go, we'll go," *Rabochaya Gazeta* wrote, with a sigh, like the parrot whom the cat was dragging by its tail. The speeches of the Ryabushinskis, Alekseeffs, Kaledins, etc., and of the ruling "band of charlatans," were by no means indicative of a readiness for the sacrifice of an embrace with Avksentieff. And finally the government, so the papers said, did not attach any decisive importance to the Moscow Conference. *Oui prodest?* In whose interest and for what, was this Conference called?

It was clear as the light of day that it was absolutely directed against the Soviets. The latter are not *going* to the Conference, they are being dragged thither by lassoes. The meeting is necessary to the counter-revolutionary classes as an aid in finally putting down the Soviets. Why, then, do the responsible organs of the bourgeoisie observe such an attitude of holding-off with regard to the Conference? Because it is necessary first of all to establish the "classless" position of the supreme impartial referee. Milyukov is afraid that Kerensky may depart from the Conference with his position too strongly entrenched, and that consequently Milyukov's political vacations may be too unpleasantly prolonged. Thus each patriot is preserving the fatherland in his own manner.

As a consequence of the "historic" night in the Winter Palace was born the regime of Kerensky, of sophomoric Bonapartism, let

us say. But the Moscow Conference, in its personnel and in its objects, is a reproduction of this historic night in the light of day, so to speak. Tseretelli is fated once more to explain to all Russia that the passing of power into the hands of the revolutionary democracy would be the misfortune and ruin of the Revolution. After this solemn declaration of their own bankruptcy, the representatives of revolutionary democracy will be privileged to listen to a dreadful indictment directed against them, and previously drawn up by Rodzianko, Ryabushiniki, Milyukov, General Alekseieff, and the other "live wires" of the country. Our imperialistic clique, to whom the government will assign the place of honor at the Moscow Conference, will come out with the slogan: "all power should be given to us!" The Soviet leaders will come face to face with the rapacious appetites of the propertied classes, which threaten them with an uprising of those same workers and soldiers whom Tseretelli disarmed with the catchword "all power to the Soviets!" In his capacity as Chairman, Kerensky will merely be able to register the actual existence of "disagreement," and to call the attention of the "interested parties" to the fact that they cannot get along without an impartial referee. *Quod erat demonstrandum.*

"If I were in the Soviet Central Executive Committee," confessed the Menshevik Bogdanov, at a meeting of the Soviet Executive Committee, "I should not have called this meeting, for the government will not reach at this meeting the ends at which it is aiming: the strengthening and broadening of its foundation." It must really be admitted that these "Realpolitikers" actually do not know the things that are going on with their own active co-operation. After the disintegration of the coalition of July 16, the refusal of the Soviet to assume power *precluded* the possibility of the creation of a government on a broad foundation. The Kerensky Government, exercising no control, is in its very nature a government without a social foundation. It was consciously constructed *between* two possible foundations: the working masses and the imperialistic classes. In that lies its Bonapartism. The Moscow Conference has the purpose, once the privileged and democratic parties have been thrown aside, to perpetuate the personal dictatorship, which, by a policy of irresponsible adventurism, will undermine all the achievements of the Revolution.

For this purpose it is as necessary to have an opposition on the left as an opposition on the right. It is only important that they should approximately counterbalance each other and that the social

conditions should maintain this equilibrium. But that is just the thing that is lacking.

The early Czarism had arisen out of a struggle between classes in the midst of a free society; but beneath all the warring factions and their Czar there was a stable substructure of laboring workers. The new Czarism seeks the support that is necessary to its existence in the passive inertia of the peasantry; the chief instrument of Bonapartism meanwhile being a well disciplined army. But in our country not one of these conditions has as yet been realized. Our society is permeated with open antagonisms, which have been carried to a point of the highest intensity. The struggle between the workers and the capitalists, the peasants and the landholders, the soldiers and the general staff, the suppressed nationalities and the central state power, do not give the latter any elements of stability, unless the government will firmly resolve to link its fortunes with one of the struggling forces. Up to the completion of the agrarian revolution, the attempts at a "classless" dictatorship must of necessity remain of ephemeral nature.

Milyukov, Rodzianko, Ryabushiniki want power to be finally lodged with them, that is, to be transformed into a counter-revolutionary dictatorship of the exploiters over the revolutionary workers, peasants and soldiers. Kerensky wants to frighten the democracy by means of counter-revolution, and to frighten the counter-revolution by means of democracy, and then to assure the dictatorship of personal power, out of which the masses will get nothing. But he is reckoning without his host. The revolutionary masses have not yet spoken their last word.

III

THE ARMY IN THE REVOLUTION

The same struggle is going on, from the very first days of the Revolution, in the matter of war and peace: between the democracy of the workers and peasants, which was taking shape from below, and the imperialistic republic, which the propertied classes were trying to construct from above.

The illustrious generals hastened to "recognize" the republic—at least for the time being—firmly expecting that the republic would recognize and perhaps even extend their generalship, by eliminating the Archduke *faineants*. The "national" revolution meant, in their eyes, a court *coup d'état* to depose Nicholas and his Alice, but to preserve in their entirety class discipline and the military hierarchy. A few days before, the telegraph had announced that the Greek "leader" Venizelos had declared Greece "a republic crowned by a king"! The Brussilevs, Guchkovs, Rodziankos, and Milyukovs, on the contrary, wished to continue Russia as a monarchy, minus the Czar. But evolution proceeded by other, deeper paths. The March uprising of the Petrograd regiments was not the fruit of a conspiracy: it resulted from a universal spirit of mutiny in the whole army and the masses of the people in general. And the uprising of the workers and soldiers was directed not only against a decaying and incompetent Czarism, unable to conduct a war which it had itself conjured up, but against the war itself. The profound break, which the Revolution called forth in the mind and in the conduct of the soldiers threatened not only the directly imperialistic aims of the war, but also the very instrument of those aims, the old army, which had been built upon the theory of orders from above, and unquestioning obedience in the ranks.

Now the generals, colonels, the politicians, the bourgeois scribblers rave and rage against Order No. 1 [issued by the first Provisional Government, establishing democracy in the army and allowing Soldiers' committees.] In their opinion, the order was not an outcome of an all-pervading ferment in the army, but, on the cont-

rary, the ferment was produced by the order. As a matter of fact, it was only yesterday that the soldiers were still obeying orders and today they have ceased to: is it not clear that they have submitted to some new "order," which is recorded in the books as "No. 1"? This general-staff idiocy is at present substituted in the most extensive bourgeois circles for a real historical point of view.

The so-called disintegration of the army found its expression in the Soldiers' disobedience of superiors and a refusal to recognize this war as their war. It was just because of these circumstances that Kerensky hurled in the face of the awakening army his phrase: "risen slaves." If the bourgeoisie believed that it was enough to substitute Guchkovs for Sukhomlinovs, in order to harness the army anew to the chariot of Imperialism, then Kerensky, in his philistine superficiality and self-complacency, thought it would be sufficient to remove Guchkov in order to make the army once more the obedient tool of the government. In truth these were illusions!

The Revolution, from the standpoint of mass psychology, is an application of the standard of reason to inherited institutions and traditions. All the hardships, sufferings and humiliations, which the war brought in its train to the people, and, more particularly, to the army, were crowned and sanctioned by the will of the Czar. If in Petrograd the Czar himself had been deposed, what was there to prevent the soldiers from shaking off the autocracy of those officers who had been the most zealous and debased of the advocates of the whole system of Czarism? Why should the soldiers not ask themselves the question as to the sense and the object of the war, when the very man on whom formerly had depended the question of peace had been deposed?

The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates appealed, in a manifesto early in April, to the peoples of Europe, summoning them to the struggle for a democratic peace. This was "Order No. 1" as far as questions of world-policy were concerned. At the time when the manifesto appeared as an answer to the burning, irresistible question: Shall we fight on, and if so, for what?—the imperialists were making believe that, had it not been for this manifesto, this question would never have occurred to the minds of the soldiers, who had been awakened by the thunder of the Revolution.

Milyukov anticipated that revolution would awaken criticism and independence in the army, and would consequently involve a threat to the imperialistic aims of the war. In the Fourth Duma he had therefore come out openly against revolution. And when

Milyukov now hisses venomously about the "Order," about that Manifesto, and about the Zimmerwald Socialist Conference, saying that these things poisoned the army, it is at least in his case a deliberate lie. Milyukov knows very well that the chief "poison" is concealed not in any of the "orders" of the Soviet, which are at best moderate enough, but in the Revolution itself, which afforded to the sufferings of the masses an expression in the shape of protests, demands, and open contests of force.

The process of internal reconstruction of the army, and the political orientation of its soldier masses, burst forth in a fierce catastrophe at the front. The ultimate cause of this catastrophe is in the contradiction between the imperialistic policy, which made use of the Provisional Government as its tool, and the longing of the masses for an immediate and "just" peace. A new discipline and a genuine enthusiasm in the army can be evolved only out of the Revolution itself, out of a courageous solution of its internal problems and its definite struggle with external obstacles. The people and the army, if they felt and were convinced that the Revolution was their revolution, that the government was their government, that the latter would stop at nothing in the defense of their interests against the exploiters, that it was pursuing no external aims of oppression or conquest, that it was not curtsying to the "Allied" financiers, that it was openly offering the nations an immediate peace on democratic foundations, the toiling masses and their army would, under these conditions, be found to be inspired with an indissoluble unity, and if the German revolution would not come in time to aid us, the Russian army would fight against the Hohenzollerns with the same enthusiasm that the Russian workers showed in defending the gains of the popular movement against the onslaughts of the counter-revolution.

The imperialists feared this path as they feared death, and they were right. The picayune policy of the *petit bourgeois* did not believe in this method any more than the little shopkeeper believes in the possibility of the expropriation of the banks. Renouncing all "Utopias," that is, the policy of the further development of the Revolution, the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks continued the very same ruinous dual policy that was to bring about the catastrophe.

To the soldier it was said, and truthfully said, that this was an imperialistic war, on both sides, that the Russian Government was bound hand and foot by financial, diplomatic and military agreements, which were hostile to the interests of all the nations; and

then they added: "But for the present go on fighting on the basis of the old treaties, hand in hand with the old allies." But the soldier, going under fire "for the present," meets with death. To go forth to make this supreme sacrifice is possible only for the soldier who has been carried away by the fire of collective enthusiasm; but this state is attainable only in a condition of complete faith in the righteousness of one's cause. The Revolution did away with the mode of thought of the unreasoning "sacred cannon-fodder." No Kornilov, no Kaledin can turn back the course of History and restore the old hangman's discipline, even temporarily, without frightful repressions, tantamount to a prolonged period of bloody chaos. The army can only be preserved in a condition of war-time efficiency by giving it new aims, new methods, a new organization. It was necessary to make all the deductions from the Revolution. The ambiguous, irresolute regime which the Provisional Government, aided by the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks, had prepared for the army, bore within it the germs of certain catastrophe. The army had been armed with certain standards and given an opportunity for open criticism. At that moment new goals were set for the army, which manifestly would not bear the stress of revolutionary criticism, and in the name of these goals it was demanded that the army, exhausted, hungry, and unshod as it was, should put forth superhuman efforts. Can there be any doubt of the result, when we remember, in addition, that certain generals of the staff were consciously working for a Russian defeat?

But the Provisional Government intoxicated itself with bombast and empty words. *Messieurs les ministres* regarded the soldier masses, who were in a state of profound ferment, as the raw material out of which could be made all that was needed in the interests of the imperialists who had crippled our unhappy, devastated country. Kerensky besought them, he threatened, he went down on his knees, but he did not give the soldiers an answer to a single one of their serious problems. Having fooled himself with cheap oratory, he made sure in advance of the support of the Congress of Soviets, where there prevailed a supercilious *petit bourgeois* democracy, supercilious in spite of its "watchfulness," and ordered an offensive. This was, in the literal sense of the word, "Order No. 1" of the Russian counter-revolution.

On the 17th of June, we internationalists openly declared ourselves in the Congress of Soviets, on the subject of the offensive which was being gotten under way, and, together with a funda-

mental criticism, we pointed out that in the present state of the army an offensive was a military adventure, which threatened the very existence of the army itself. It transpired that we had seen only too clearly. The government had discounted nothing and foreseen nothing. The government party of Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki had been hurling denunciations at us instead of availing themselves of our suggestions.

Naturally, as the Bolsheviks had foretold this disaster, blame was put upon—the Bolsheviks. Behind the tragedy which was brought forth by ignorance and irresponsibility, there loomed cowardice in all its wretchedness. All the moulders of our destinies felt no more urgent duty than to find a scape-goat on whom to put the blame. The semi-official speeches and articles of these days will stand forever as monuments to human baseness.

The hounding of the Bolsheviks may, to be sure, still confuse the issue for a time in the minds of the people. But it cannot eliminate nor in any way weaken the significance of the question of the responsibility of the government. Whether the Bolsheviks are guilty or not, how is it that the government foresaw nothing? It appears to have had no understanding of the very army it had sent into battle. Without for a moment considering whether the army was capable of understanding an offensive, they ordered the army to move forward. And those at the head of the government were not Bolsheviks. Whatever may have been the facts with regard to the latter, the full weight of the responsibility for the tragic adventure of the offensive is upon the shoulders of the government of Kerensky, Tseretelli and Chernov.

This responsibility is increased by the fact that the warning voices do not at all appear to have come from the camp of the internationalists. The imperialistic *Novoye Vremya*, which is in close relations with the reactionary general staff, had the following to say, on August 5th, concerning the preparations for the offensive:

"The cautious Alekseiëff, because he did not wish to hurl unprepared forces into slaughter, because he did not wish to jeopardize for questionable results, the gains already made,—was retired. The illusion of success, the longing for an early peace, which Germany should be forced to accept from the Petrograd ringleaders, brought Brussilov to the top of the wave, and promptly submerged him when the billows broke."

These eloquent lines explain and confirm the confused remarks of *Retch*, at the time of Alekseiëff's resignation, concerning

the departure of this "vigilant strategist," in whose place there is put the "cavalryman" who knows no such thing as reflection. By forcing an offensive, the Cadets saved themselves in time from an imputation of cavalry policy or strategy, and prepared for their ostentatious departure from the July 15th Ministry. And the "Socialist" ministers explained in confidential whispers addressed to the ear of the "revolutionary democracy," that the change in military leaders which actually resulted from the gamble of the offensive, meant a substitution of the "true democrat" Brussilov for the "monarchist" Alekseeff. Thus is History made!

After having "hurled unprepared forces into slaughter"—to use the language of *Novoye Vremya*,—and having come into collision with the frightful consequences, there was nothing left for it but to entrust to Dan, Liber, and the other patriotic gentlemen, the task of inaugurating a systematic pogrom against the Bolsheviks. This is a portion of that same "creative labor" for national defense which is so well adapted to the shoulders of the afore-mentioned "leaders." In their effort to outdo all the bourgeois rowdies, the Dans and Libers fumed against the "demagogues" who scatter among the "ignorant masses of the soldiers" such slogans as the publication of the secret treaties, a complete break with the imperialists, etc. "That's right," the bourgeois rowdies contemptuously corroborate them, "but that applies just as well to Order No. 1 and to the manifesto of April, which were demagogically circulated by you among the ignorant masses of the soldiers." And when the Dans and Libers, wiping the cold sweat from their brows, strain every effort to recall the most elementary principles of revolutionary thought in defense of the sins of their youth, they discover to their terror that they need only to repeat our words. And that is a fatal point: for our slogans contain nothing but the necessary inferences from the development of the Revolution, in the course of which Order No. 1 and the manifesto of the Soviet are merely the first milestone.

But the most remarkable thing about the whole business is, at first glance, that in spite of the frightful results of the offensive the "Socialist" ministers continue to set it down to the credit side of their account, and, in their conferences with the bourgeoisie, to refer to the offensive as their great patriotic contribution.

"I ask of you," shouted Tseretelli at the Moscow Conference, "who could more easily have moved forward the forces of revolu-

tionary Russia,—Minister of War Guchkov, or Minister of War Kerensky?" (Shouts of "bravo!" and applause).

Tseretelli is thus openly boasting of the fact that Kerensky is carrying out the very work that Guchkov would have carried out, but which, as the latter did not have the credit of "revolutionary" democracy to draw on, turned out to be too much for him. And the bourgeoisie in spite of the catastrophe that was called forth by the offensive, gladly recognizes the services of Kerensky.

"We know and we shall remember," declared the Cadet Nabokov, at the Moscow Conference, "that the great burst of enthusiasm in the Russian army two months ago, which in those horrible days added a new glorious page to our history, was inspired by the man who now stands at the head of the Provisional Government. History will never forget his service at this moment."

It is consequently quite clear that the "glorious page" of the offensive of the 1st of July has no relation whatever to national defense, for the military efficiency of Russia, as the consequence of the offensive, had simply been made worse. If the bourgeoisie nevertheless speaks of the offensive in terms of appreciation, it is for the simple reason that the cruel blow inflicted upon our army as a result of Kerensky's policy created favorable conditions for the spread of panic and for counter-revolutionary schemes. All the authority of the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik democracy had been exerted in the direction of forcing an offensive, and the latter completely wiped out that regime of contradictions and insolvency, to the support of which the philistine leaders had applied all their narrow-minded ingenuity.

Both the offensive and the question of peace are now being considered by the bourgeoisie and its generals from the angle of internal politics, that is, for the advancement of the counter-revolution. This was most clearly expressed at the Moscow Conference by General Kornilov. "Peace cannot at present be attained," he said, "if only for the reason that we are not in a position to carry out demobilization. We must first elevate the prestige of the officers." In the army there had been concentrated too many persons armed by the government, who were directing demands to the government, that were all too radical. Only a continuation of the war, regardless of the chances of success, would provide a possibility for "elevating the prestige of the officers," for regaining control of the military masses, and for assuring a demobiliza-

tion of such nature as would not enable the soldiers to threaten the pillars of property and of imperialistic government. And if, in the pursuit of this object, a separate peace should be required, the bourgeoisie would conclude such a peace, without turning an eyelid.

From the 1st of July on, the counter-revolution takes great forward strides, with absolute self-confidence. And it will not stop until a heavy blow is landed on its solar-plexus.

IV

WHAT NEXT?

There is hardly any room for doubt that the present government, which is the incarnation of uncertain and malevolent incompetence, will not hold out against the Moscow attack, and will suffer new changes. It is not in vain that General Kornilov explains that we need not fear a new crisis of power. Such a crisis at the present moment can be most quickly overcome by a new swing to the right. Whether Kerensky will obtain, under these circumstances, an additional degree of independence from the organized control of the democracy, which will be replaced by an all the more real "unseen government" of the imperialistic cliques; whether the new government will stand in some definite relation with that general staff of the propertied classes which will be created without a doubt by the Moscow Conference; what is to be the share of the "socialistic" Bonapartists in the new government combination,—all these are questions of secondary importance. But even if the bourgeois attack should be repulsed and the Moscow Conference should culminate in a new stepping out from the government on the part of the Cadets, the arrogated power of the "revolutionary democracy" would be by no means equivalent to a real revolutionary-democratic power. Bound hand and foot by their obligations against workers and soldiers in reserve, the official leaders of the Soviet would be obliged to continue their policy of double-dealing and opportunism. By leaving the ministry, Konovalov simply shifted his mission to the shoulders of Skobelev. The Kerensky-Tseretelli Ministry, even without the Cadets, would continue to carry out a semi-Cadet program. The elimination of the Cadets is but a drop in the bucket; what is needed is new blood and new methods.

The Moscow Conference in any event closes and summarizes that entire phase of the Revolution in which the leading role was played by the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik tactics of co-operation with the bourgeoisie, a co-operation which was based on a renunciation of the independent aims of the Revolution, on

their subordination to the idea of a coalition with the enemies of the Revolution.

The Russian Revolution is a direct product of the war. The war created for it the necessary form of a nation-wide organization, the army. The greater part of the population, the peasantry, at the moment of the revolution, had been forced into a condition of organization. The Soviets of Soldiers' Delegates called upon the army to send its political representatives, whereupon the peasant masses automatically sent in to the Soviets the semi-liberal intellectuals, who translated the indefiniteness of their hopes and aspirations into the language of the most contemptible quibbling and hair-splitting opportunism. The *petit bourgeois intelligentsia*, which is in every way dependent on the greater bourgeoisie, obtained the leadership over the peasantry. The Soviets of soldier-peasant representatives obtained a distinct majority over the representatives of the workers. The Petrograd proletarian advance-guard was declared to be an ignorant mass. The flower of the Revolution was revealed in the persons of the March Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks of the "provincial" intellectuals, leaning on the peasants. Over this foundation there rose, through the agency of double and triple elections, the Central Executive Committee. The Petrograd Soviet, which, in the first period, discharged nation-wide functions, stood from the outset under the immediate influence of the revolutionary masses. The Central Committee, on the contrary, dwelt in the clouds of the revolutionary bureaucratic heights, cut off from the Petrograd workers and soldiers, and hostile to them.

It is sufficient to recall that the Central Committee considered it necessary to summon troops *from the front* for putting down the Petrograd demonstrations, which at the moment of the arrival of the troops, had actually been already disposed of by the demonstrating persons themselves. The philistine leaders committed political hara-kari when they failed to see anything but chaos, anarchy, and riot in the tendency—which was a natural outcome of the whole lay of the land—to equip the Revolution with the apparatus of authority. When they disarmed the Petrograd workers, and soldiers, the Tseretellis, Dans and Chernovs disarmed the advance-guard of the Revolution and inflicted irreparable injury on the influence of their own Executive Committee.

At present, face to face with the encroachments of the counter-revolution, these politicians talk of re-establishing the authority and

the significance of the Soviets. As a catch-word of the moment, they prate of organizing the masses around the Soviets. Yet putting the question in this empty fashion is a profoundly reactionary procedure. Under an ostensible call for organization it attempts to circumvent the question as to the political aims and methods of the struggle. To organize the masses in the name of "elevating the authority" of the Soviets is a wretched and useless undertaking. The masses had faith in the Soviets, followed them, and elevated them to an immense height. As a result they witnessed the surrender of the Soviets to the worst enemies of the masses. It would be childish to suppose that the masses could or would repeat for the second time an historical experiment already disposed of. In order that the masses, having lost their confidence in the present dominant centre of democracy, should not also lose their confidence in the Revolution itself, they must be supplied with a critical estimate of all the political work previously accomplished in the Revolution, and this is tantamount to a merciless condemnation of all the labors of the Social-Revolutionist and Menshevik leaders.

We shall say to the masses: they blame the Bolsheviks for everything, but how is it that they were powerless to fight the Bolsheviks? On their side was not only the majority in the Soviets, but all the authority of the government, and yet they managed to get themselves defeated by a "conspiracy" on the part of what they call an insignificant band of Bolsheviks.

After the events of July 16-18, the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks in Petrograd grew weaker and weaker, while the Bolsheviks grew stronger and stronger. The same thing took place in Moscow. This clearly demonstrates the fact that by its policy Bolshevism gives expression to the actual demands of the revolution as the latter progresses, while the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik "majority" simply perpetuates yesterday's helplessness and backwardness of the masses. But today, this mere standing-pat is played out; it must, therefore, be re-inforced by the most savage repression. These persons are struggling against the logic which is inherent in the Revolution, and for that reason you find them in the same camp with the class-conscious enemies of the Revolution. For just that reason we are in duty bound to weaken the confidence in them,—in the name of the day of Revolution that is our tomorrow.

The complete emptiness of the catchword, "strengthen the Soviets," comes out most clearly in the mutual relations of the

Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet. In view of the fact that the latter, taking its support from the advanced ranks of the working class, and the soldiers who made common cause with them, was advancing more and more resolutely to the position of revolutionary Socialism, the *Central Executive Committee systematically undermined the authority and significance of the Petrograd Soviet*. For whole months it was not convoked. As a matter of fact, they took away its organ, the *Izvestya*, in whose columns the thoughts and the life of the Petrograd proletariat now find no expression at all. When the infuriated bourgeois press slanders and dishonors the leaders of the Petrograd proletariat, *Izvestya* hears nothing and sees nothing. Under these circumstances, what can possibly be the significance of the slogan, "strengthen the Soviets"? One answer only can be given: To strengthen the Petrograd Soviet *against* the Central Executive Committee, which has been bureaucratized, and whose membership remains unaltered. We must gain for the Petrograd Soviet the complete independence of its organization, its protection, and its political functioning.

This is the most important question, and the settling of it is the first order of the day. The Petrograd Soviet must become the centre of a new revolutionary mobilization of the masses of the workers, soldiers and peasants,—in a new fighting for power. We must support with all our strength the initiative of the Conference of Factory Workers' Committees at the convocation of the *All-Russian Congress of Workers' Delegates*. In order that the proletariat may win over to its activity the impoverished masses of soldiers and peasants, its policy must be definitely and inexorably opposed to the tactics of the Central Executive Committee. From the above it must be clear how impotently reactionary and utopian is the idea originating in *Novaya Zhizn* concerning a union between us and the Mensheviks. This condition may be attained only if the proletariat as a class will reorganize its central organization on a nation-wide scale. It is impossible for us to predict all the twists and turns of the path of history. As a political party, we cannot be held responsible for the course of history. But we are all more responsible to our class; to render it capable of carrying out its mission in all the deviations of the historical journey—that is our fundamental political duty.

The ruling classes together with the Government of "Salvation" are doing everything in their power to force the political

problems of the revolution to the attention not only of the workers, but also of the army and of the provinces, in as acute a form as possible. Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki have done and are doing all they can to reveal before the widest sections of the toiling population of the country, the complete insolvency of their tactics. It is now incumbent on our party, on its energy, its solicitude, its insistence, to draw all the inexorable conclusions from the *present* situation, and, at the head of the disinherited and exhausted masses, to wage a determined battle for their revolutionary dictatorship.

V

THE CHARACTER OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

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The liberal and S.-R.-Menshevik scribes and politicians are much concerned over the question of the sociological significance of the Russian Revolution. Is it a bourgeois revolution or some other kind of a revolution? At first glance, this academic theorizing may appear somewhat enigmatical. The liberals have nothing to gain by revealing the class interests behind "their" revolution. And as for the *petit bourgeois* "Socialists," they do not as a general rule, make use of theoretical analysis in their political activity, but rather of "common sense," which is simply another name for mediocrity and lack of principle. The fact is that the Milyukov-Dan estimate, inspired by Plekhanov, as to the bourgeois character of the Russian Revolution, contains not a single grain of theory. Neither *Yedinstvo*, nor *Retch*, nor *Den*, nor *Rabochaya Gazeta*, its head seriously affected, take any pains to formulate what it understands by a bourgeois revolution. The intention of their manoeuvres is purely practical: to demonstrate the "right" of the bourgeois revolution to assume power. Even though the Soviets may represent the majority of the politically trained population, even though in all the democratic elections, in city and in country, the capitalist parties were swept out with éclat,—“so long as our revolution is bourgeois in character,” it is necessary to preserve the privileges of the bourgeoisie, and to assign to it in the government a role, to which it is by no means entitled by the alignment of political groups within the country. If we are to act in accordance with the principles of democratic parliamentarism, it is clear that power belongs to the Social-Revolutionists, either alone, or in conjunction with the Mensheviks. But as “our revolution is a bourgeois revolution,” the principles of democracy are suspended, and the representatives of the overwhelming majority of the people receive five seats in the ministry, while the representatives of an insignificant minority get twice as many. To Hell with democracy! Long live Plekhanov’s Sociology!

"I suppose you would like to have a bourgeois revolution without the bourgeoisie?" asks Plekhanov, slyly, invoking the support of dialectics and of Engels.

"That's just it!" interposes Milyukov. "We Cadets would be ready to relinquish power, which the people evidently do not wish to give us. But we cannot fly in the face of science." And he refers to Plekhanov's "Marxism" as his authority.

Since our Revolution is a bourgeois revolution, explain Plekhanov, Dan, and Potressov, we must bring about a political coalition between the toilers and their exploiters. And in the light of this Sociology, the clownish handshake of Bublikov and Tseretelli is revealed in its full historical significance.

The trouble is merely this, that the same bourgeois character of the Revolution which is now taken as a justification of the coalition between the Socialists and the capitalists, has for a number of years been taken by these very Mensheviks as leading to diametrically opposite conclusions.

Since, in a bourgeois revolution, they were wont to say, the governing power can have no other function than to safeguard the domination of the bourgeoisie, it is clear that Socialism can have nothing to do with it, its place is not in the government, but in the opposition. Plekhanov considered that Socialists could *not under any conditions* take part in a bourgeois government, and he savagely attacked Kautsky, whose resolution admitted certain exceptions in this connection. "*Tempora leagusque mutantur*"—the gentlemen of the old regime so expressed it And that appears to be the case also with the "laws" of the Plekhanov Sociology.

No matter how contradictory may be the opinions of the Mensheviks and their leader, Plekhanov, when you compare their statements before the Revolution with their statements of today, one thought does dominate both expressions, and that is, that you cannot carry out a bourgeois revolution "without the bourgeoisie." At first blush this idea would appear to be axiomatic. But it is merely idiotic.

The history of mankind did not begin with the Moscow Conference. There were revolutions before. At the end of the 18th century there was a revolution in France, which is called, not without reason, the "Great Revolution." It was a bourgeois revolution. In one of its phases power fell into the hands of the Jacobins, who had the support of the "Sans-culottes," or semi-proletarian workers of the city population, and who set up between

them and the Girondistes, the liberal party of the bourgeoisie, the Cadets of their day, the neat rectangle of the guillotine. It was only the dictatorship of the Jacobins that gave the French Revolution its present importance, that made it "the Great Revolution." And yet, this dictatorship was brought about, not only *without* the bourgeoisie, but *against* its very opposition. Robespierre, to whom it was not given to acquaint himself with the Plekhanov ideas, upset all the laws of Sociology, and, instead of shaking hands with the Girondistes, he cut of their heads. This was cruel, there is no denying it. But this cruelty did not prevent the French Revolution from becoming Great, within the limits of its bourgeois character. Marx, in whose name so many mal-practices are now perpetrated in our country, said that the "whole French terror was simply a *plebeian* effort to dispose of the enemies of the bourgeoisie." And as the same bourgeoisie was very much afraid of the same plebeian methods of disposing of the enemies of the people, the Jacobins not only deprived the bourgeoisie of power, but applied a rule of blood and iron with regard to the bourgeoisie, whenever the latter made any attempt to halt or to "moderate" the work of the Jacobins. It is apparent, therefore, that the Jacobins carried out a bourgeois revolution without the bourgeoisie.

Referring to the English Revolution of 1648, Engels wrote: "In order that the bourgeoisie might pluck all the fruits that had matured, it was necessary that the revolution should go far beyond its original aims, as was again the case in France in 1793 and in Germany in 1848. This to be sure, is *one of the laws of the evolution of bourgeois society*." We see that Engels' Law is directly opposed to Plekhanov's ingenious structure, which the Mensheviki have been accepting and repeating as Marxism.

It may of course be objected that the Jacobins were themselves a bourgeoisie, a *petite bourgeoisie*. This is absolutely true. But is that not also the fact in the case of the so-called "revolutionary democracy" headed by the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki? Between the Cadets, the party of the larger and lesser propertied interests, on the one hand, and the Social-Revolutionists on the other hand, there was not, in any of the elections held in city or country, any intermediate party. It follows with mathematical certainty that the *petite bourgeoisie* must have found its political representation in the ranks of the Social-Revolutionists. The Mensheviki, whose policy differs by not a hair's breadth from the policy of the Social-Revolutionists, reflect the same class

interests. There is no contradiction to this condition in the fact that they are also supported by a part of the more backward or conservative-privileged workers. Why were the Social-Revolutionists unable to assume power? In what sense and why did the "bourgeois" character of the Russian Revolution (if we assume that such is its character) compel the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks to supplant the plebeian methods of the Jacobins with the gentlemanly device of an agreement with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie? It is manifest that the explanation must be sought, not in the "bourgeois" character of our revolution, but in the miserable character of our *petit bourgeois* democracy. Instead of making the power in its hands the organ for the realization of the essential demands of History, our fraudulent democracy deferentially passed on all real power to the counter-revolutionary, military-imperialistic clique, and Tseretelli, at the Moscow Conference, even boasted that the Soviets had not surrendered their power under pressure, not after a courageous fight and defeat, but voluntarily, as an evidence of political "self-effacement." The gentleness of the calf, holding out its neck for the butcher's knife, is not the quality which is going to conquer new worlds.

The difference between the terrorists of the Convention and the Moscow capitulators is the difference between tigers and calves of one age,—a difference in courage. But this difference is not fundamental. It merely veils a decisive difference in the personnel of the democracy itself. The Jacobins were based on the classes of little or no property, including also what rudiments of a proletariat were then already in existence. In our case, the industrial working class has worked its way out of the ill-defined democracy into a position in History where it exerts an influence of primary importance. The *petit bourgeois* democracy was losing the most valuable revolutionary qualities to the extent to which these qualities were being developed by the proletariat which was outgrowing the tutelage of the *petite bourgeoisie*. This phenomenon in turn is due to the incomparably higher plan to which Capitalism had evolved in Russia as compared with the France of the closing 18th century. The revolutionary power of the Russian proletariat, which can by no means be estimated by its numerical strength, is based upon its immense productive power, which is most of all apparent in war time. The threat of a railroad strike again reminds us, in our day, of the dependence of the whole country on the concentrated labor of the proletariat. The *petit bourgeois*-peasant party, in the

very earliest stages of the revolution, was exposed to a crossfire between the powerful groups of imperialistic classes on the one hand, and the revolutionary-internationalist proletariat, on the other. In their struggle to exert an influence of their own over the workers, the *petit bourgeois* continued constantly harping on their "statesmanship," their "patriotism," and thus fell into a slavish dependence on the groups of counter-revolutionary capital. They simultaneously lost the possibility of any kind of liquidation even of the old barbarism which enveloped those sections of the people who were still attached to them. The struggle of the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki for influence over the proletariat was more and more assuming the form of a struggle by the proletarian party to obtain the leadership of the semi-proletarian masses of the villages and towns. Because they "voluntarily" handed over their power to the bourgeois cliques, the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki were obliged to hand over the revolutionary mission definitely to the party of the proletariat. This alone is sufficient to show that the attempt to decide fundamental questions of tactics by a mere reference to the "bourgeois" character of our Revolution can only succeed in confusing the minds of the backward workers and deceiving the peasants.

In the French Revolution of 1848, the proletariat is already making heroic efforts for independent action. But as yet it has neither a clear revolutionary theory nor an authoritative class organization. Its importance in production is infinitely lower than the present economic function of the Russian proletariat. In addition, behind 1848 there stood another great revolution, which had solved the agrarian question in its own way, and this found its expression in a pronounced isolation of the proletariat, particularly that of Paris, from the peasant masses. Our situation in this respect is immensely more favorable. Farm mortgages, obstructive obligations of all kinds, oppression, and the rapacious exploitation by the church, confront the Revolution as inescapable questions, demanding courageous and uncompromising measures. The "isolation" of our party from the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, even an extreme isolation, even by the method of single chambers, would by no means be synonymous with an isolation of the proletariat from the oppressed peasant and city masses. On the contrary, a sharp opposition of the policy of the revolutionary proletariat to the faithless defection of the present leaders of the Soviets, can only bring about a salutary differentiation among the

peasant millions, remove the pauperized peasants from the treacherous influence of the powerful Social-Revolutionist muzhiks, and convert the Socialistic proletariat into a genuine leader of the popular, "plebeian" revolution.

And finally, a mere empty reference to the bourgeois character of the Russian Revolution tells us absolutely nothing about the *international* character of its *milieu*. And this is a prime factor. The great Jacobin revolution found opposed to it a backward, feudal, monarchistic Europe. The Jacobin regime fell and gave way to the Bonapartist regime, under the burden of the superhuman effort which it was obliged to put forth in order to maintain itself against the united forces of the middle ages. The Russian Revolution, on the contrary, has before it a Europe that has far outdistanced it, having reached the highest degree of capitalist development. The present slaughter shows that Europe has reached the point of capitalistic saturation, that it can no longer live and grow on the basis of the private ownership of the means of production. This chaos of blood and ruin is a savage insurrection of the mute and sullen powers of production, it is the mutiny of iron and steel against the dominion of profit, against wage slavery, against the miserable deadlock of our human relations. Capitalism, enveloped in the flames of a war of its own making, shouts from the mouths of its cannons to humanity: "Either conquer over me, or I will bury you in my ruins when I fall!"

All the evolution of the past, the thousands of years of human history, of class struggle, of cultural accumulations, are concentrated now in the sole problem of the proletarian revolution. There is no other answer and no other escape. And therein lies the tremendous strength of the Russian Revolution. It is not a "national," a bourgeois revolution. Anyone who conceives of it thus, is dwelling in the realm of the hallucinations of the 18th and 19th centuries. Our fatherland in time is the 20th century. The further lot of the Russian Revolution depends directly on the course and on the outcome of the war, that is, on the evolution of class contradictions in Europe, to which this imperialistic war is giving a catastrophic nature.

The Kerenskys and Kornilovs began too early using the language of competing autocrats. The Kaledins showed their teeth too soon. The renegade Tseretelli too early grasped the contemptuously outstretched finger of counter-revolution. As yet the Revolution has spoken only its first word. It still has tremendous

reserves in Western Europe. In place of the handshake of the reactionary ringleaders with the good-for-nothings of the *petite bourgeoisie* will come the great embrace of the Russian proletariat with the proletariat of Europe.

VI

INTERNATIONAL TACTICS

The class-political groupings in the Russian Revolution have come out with unparalleled clearness, but equally unparalleled is the confusion which prevails in the field of our ideology. The belated character of Russia's historical development permitted the *petit bourgeois intelligentsia* to adorn itself with the peacock's feathers of the loveliest Socialist theory. Yet these fine feathers will answer no other purpose than to cover its withered nakedness. The fact that the Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki did not assume power early in March, nor on May 16th, nor on July 16th, has nothing at all to do with the "bourgeois" character of our Revolution and the impossibility of putting it over "without the bourgeoisie," is due to the fact that the *petit bourgeois* "Socialists," being completely enveloped in the meshes of Imperialism, are not yet capable of performing one-tenth of the work that the Jacobins accomplished a century and a quarter ago. Chattering about the defense of the Revolution and of the country, they will nevertheless surrender to the bourgeois reaction one position after the other. The struggle for power, therefore, becomes the first and the foremost problem of the working class, and we shall find the Revolution simultaneously divesting itself completely of its "national" and its bourgeois raiment.

Either, we shall see a tremendous backward sweep, in the direction of a strong imperialistic regime, most probably culminating in a monarchy; the Soviets, the land committees, the army organizations, as well as many other things, will go to pieces, and the Kerenskys and Tseretellis will pass into the discard. *Or*, the proletariat, dragging with it the semi-proletarian masses and pushing aside its leaders of yesterday (in this case also the Kerenskys and Tseretellis go into the discard), will establish the regime of the workers' democracy. The further successes of the proletariat will then depend first and foremost on the European, particularly of the German, Revolution.

Internationalism in our eyes is not an abstract notion, existing only to be betrayed at every moment (that is for Tseretelli and Chernov), but an immediately dominant, profoundly practical principle. Permanent, decisive successes are not conceivable for us without a European Revolution. We cannot therefore purchase partial successes at the price of such procedures and combinations as may put obstacles in the path of the European proletarian movement. Just for this reason an uncompromising opposition to the social-patriots is for us the condition *sine qua non* of all our political work.

"International comrades!" cried one of the speakers at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, "postpone your Social Revolution for another fifty years!" Needless to say, this well meant advice was greeted with the self-complacent applause of the Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionists.

It is just at this point, in the matter of their relation to the Social Revolution, that the difference between the various forms of opportunistic *petit bourgeois* utopianism, on the one hand, and proletarian Socialism, on the other, becomes important. There are not a few "internationalists" who explain the crisis in the International as a temporary chauvinistic intoxication due to the war, and who believe that sooner or later the former condition will be restored, and the old political parties will again take up the old path of the class struggle, of which they have lost sight for the moment. Childish and petty hopes! The war is not an external catastrophe, destroying the equilibrium of capitalist society against the uprising of the expanding forces of production in this society, against the restrictions of the national boundaries and the forms of private ownership. Either we shall see continued convulsions of the forces of production, in the form of repeatedly recurring imperialistic wars, or we shall see a Socialistic organization of production: that is the question History is placing before us.

Similarly, the crisis in the International is not an external, irrelevant phenomenon.

The Socialist parties of Europe were formed at a time of comparative capitalist equilibrium and of a reformist adaptation of the proletariat to national parliamentarism and the national market. "Even in the Social-Democratic Party," wrote Engels in 1877, "*petit bourgeois* Socialism has its defenders. Even members of the Social-Democratic Party who recognize the fundamental concepts of scientific Socialism and the practical nature of the de-

mand that all means of production should pass over into social ownership, declare that the realization of this demand is a possibility of the remote future, the precise time of which is practically impossible to determine." Thanks to the long-drawn out character of the "peaceful" period, this *petit bourgeois* Socialism actually became dominant in the old organization of the proletariat. Its limitations and its insolvency assumed the most offensive forms, as soon as the peaceful accumulation of contradictions gave way to a tremendous imperialistic cataclysm. Not only the old national governments, but also the bureaucratized Socialist parties that had grown up with them, showed that they were not equal to the demands of further progress. And all this might have been more or less foreseen.

"The task of the Socialist Party," we wrote twelve years ago, "consisted, and still consists, in revolutionizing the consciousness of the working class, as the development of Capitalism has revolutionized social relations. But this labor of agitation and organization has its internal difficulties. The European Socialist parties—particularly the most powerful of them, the German—have already attained a certain conservatism, which is all the stronger where the most numerous masses have embraced Socialism, and where the organization and discipline of these masses is the most advanced. In view of this, the Social-Democracy, as an organization expressive of the political experience of the proletariat, may, at a given moment prove to be an immediate obstacle on the path of an open struggle between the workers and the bourgeois reaction. In other words, the propagandist-Socialist conservatism of the proletarian party may, at a given moment prevent the straight fight of the proletariat for power (*Nasha revolutsia*, 1906, P. 285). But if the revolutionary Marxists were far from being fetishists with regard to the parties of the Second International, no one could foresee that the destruction of those giant organizations would be so cruel and so catastrophic.

New times demand new organizations. In the baptism of fire, the revolutionary parties are now being everywhere created. The numerous ideologico-political offspring of the Second International have not, it appears, been in vain. But they are passing through an internal purification: whole generation of "realistic" philistines are being cast aside, and the revolutionary tendencies of Marxism are for the first time being recognized in their full political significance.

Within each country the task is not so much to support an organization that has outlived itself, as to bring together the genuinely aggressive revolutionary elements of the proletariat, who are already, in the struggle against Imperialism, gravitating into the front ranks. On the international field, the task is not to coalesce and "conciliate" government-Socialists at diplomatic conferences (as at Stockholm!), but to secure a union of the revolutionary internationalists of all countries and the pursuit of a common course of action in the Social Revolution within each country.

To be sure, the revolutionary internationalists at the head of the working class at present constitute, throughout Europe, an insignificant minority. But we Russians ought to be the last to take fright at such a state of affairs. We know how quickly, in revolutionary moments, the minority may become a majority. As soon as the accumulating resentment of the working class finally breaks through the crust of government discipline, the group of Liebknecht, Luxemburg, Mehring, and their adherents will immediately assume a leading position at the head of the German working class. Only a social-revolutionary policy can justify a division in the organization,—but at the same time, it makes such a division inevitable.

The Menshevik internationalists, those who are of like mind with Comrade Martov, in opposition to us, deny the social-revolutionary character of the political task. Russia, they declare in their platform, is not yet ready for Socialism, and our function is necessarily limited to the founding of a democratic bourgeois republic. This whole attitude is based on a complete rejection of the international problems of the proletariat. If Russia were alone in the world, Martov's reasoning would be correct. But we are engaged in carrying out a world revolution, in a struggle with world Imperialism, with the tasks of the world proletariat, which includes the Russian proletariat. Instead of explaining to the Russian workers that the destinies of Russia are at present inextricably bound up with the destinies of Europe, that the success of the European proletariat will assure us a swifter realization of a Socialist society, that on the other hand, a defeat of the European proletariat will hurl us back into a condition of imperialistic dictatorship and monarchy, and finally into the status of mere colonies of England and the United States, instead of subordinating all our tactics to the general aims and objects of the European proletariat, Comrade Martov looks upon the Russian Revolution from a narrow nationalistic standpoint and reduces the task of the Revolution to that of

creating a bourgeois democratic republic. This formulation of the question is fundamentally false, for over it there hovers the curse of narrow-minded nationalism, which led to the downfall of the Second International.

By limiting himself, in practice, to a national outlook, Comrade Martov secures the possibility of living in the same camp with the social-patriots. He hopes, with Dan and Tseretelli, to pass through the "miasma" of nationalism unharmed, for the latter will disappear with the war, and then he intends to come back, together with them, into the "regular" channels of the class struggle. Martov is bound to the social-patriots, not by a mere empty party tradition, but by their profoundly opportunistic attitude on the Social Revolution, for they regard it as a remote goal, which should have no share in the formulation of the problems of today. And that is what separates them from us.

The struggle for obtaining power is not, for us, merely the next step of a national democratic revolution. No, it is the fulfillment of our international duty, the conquest of one of the most important positions on the whole front of the struggle against world Imperialism. And it is this standpoint that determines our relation to the so-called question of defending the fatherland. A temporary shifting of the front to one side or the other cannot halt and cannot turn aside our struggle, which is directed against the very foundations of Capitalism, which seems bent on the mutual imperialistic destruction of the peoples of all nations.

An unceasing revolution against this unceasing slaughter! That is our fight; and the stakes are the destinies of humanity.

PART FIVE

The Proletarian Revolution Conquers

By LOUIS C. FRAINA

THE KORNILOV REVOLT

The openly counter-revolutionary character of the Moscow Conference, emphasized by the reactionary proposals of Kaledine, Kornilov, Guchkov & Co., created a revulsion of feeling among the revolutionary masses. The re-appearance upon the stage of the extreme reactionary forces pushed the Soviets into the extreme Left, and made inescapable a repudiation of its moderate policy. The Soviets could no longer play the role of the centre. The assertions of the Bolsheviki, that the Coalition Government was an instrument of reaction, were confirmed by the openly organizing forces of the counter-revolution. The events of September and October accelerated the acceptance of a revolutionary policy by the masses, and led inexorably to the Bolshevik Revolution in November and the assumption of all power by the Soviets.

On September 2 the German troops launched an offensive on the Dvina front and on September 3 Riga was captured. All the evidence shows that the fall of Riga was maneuvered by General Kornilov and his staff in order to strike terror in the heart of Russia. By means of contradictory orders and the desertion of the staffs the Riga front was opened to the Germans, who poured through; it was only the activity of the soldiers' committees that prevented a fuller disaster. The documents published by the Bolsheviki offer conclusive proof of the conspiracy and deliberate treachery: General Kornilov's covert threat made at the Moscow Conference had become a reality.

It appeared for a time as if the Germans would press the offensive, and by means of army and fleet capture Petrograd.¹ Ap-

¹At the time when a German attack upon Petrograd appeared imminent, the Second Congress of the Baltic Fleet was in session, and issued the following proclamation, which is an inspiring answer to the infamous slanders hurled at the Fleet:

"To the Oppressed in all Countries, Comrades: In the fatal hour in which the signals of war and of death ring in our ears, we repeat and emphasize our appeal to you. We send you our greetings and our last testament.—Attacked by the powerful German fleet, our warships are doomed in an unequal struggle.—Not one ship will refuse to fight, not one sailor will desert

prehension was general, and particularly in Petrograd. The psychology of "The Country is in danger!" provided an excellent opportunity for a counter-revolutionary military *coup*. With Boris Savinkov as the intermediary, Kerensky and Kornilov plotted drastic action against the Petrograd masses, the centre of the proletarian revolution. The dictator Kerensky required power, the annihilation of the revolutionary masses, and the military *coup* was to provide the power without which his dictatorship was a mere pose. It was agreed that Kornilov was to march upon Petrograd, crush and disarm the masses; and Kornilov, with Cossacks and other reliable troops, marched upon Petrograd. But the Soviet intervened and compelled the weakling Kerensky to issue an order for the arrest of Kornilov.² The result was not the submission of Kornilov, but his determination to march upon Petrograd for purposes of his own, and crush both the Provisional Government and the Soviets, erecting a military dictatorship. The danger was acute. A general

his ship.—Our much-abused Fleet will do its duty—toward the great Revolution.—We consider it our duty to defend Petrograd. We will fulfill our self-imposed obligation.—Not because of the request of a pitiful Russian Bonaparte (Kerensky) who retains power simply because of the unlimited patience of the Russian Revolution. Nor because of the treaties made by our government with the Allies, treaties intended to smother the Russian Revolution.—We follow the call of our revolutionary sentiments.—We go into death with the name of the great Revolution in our hearts and on our unfaltering lips.—The Russian Fleet has always stood in the front lines of the Revolution. The names of its sailors are written in the book of the history of the struggle against Czarism. In the earliest days of the Revolution the sailors marched in the front ranks, our ultimate aim being deliverance from all misery.—And this life and death struggle with our own oppressors gives us the right to appeal to you, proletarians of all countries, with a strong voice, with the voice of those who look into the eyes of death in the revolt against the exploiters.—Break the chains, you who are oppressed! Rise in revolt!—We have nothing to lose but our chains!—We believe in the victory of the Revolution, we are full of this belief.—We know that our comrades in the Revolution will fulfill their duty on the barricades to the bitter end.—We know that decisive moments are coming. A gigantic struggle will set the world afire. On the horizon the fires of the revolt of all oppressed peoples are already glowing and becoming stronger.—At the moment that the waters of the Baltic will become red with the blood of our comrades, will close forever over their bodies, at this moment we call upon you.—Already in the clutch of death, we send our warm greetings and appeal to you:—Proletarians of the world, unite! Rise in revolt, you who are oppressed.—All hail, the World Revolution!—Long live Socialism!"

²Even the arch-apologist of Kerensky, A. J. Sack, admits in his *Birth of the Russian Democracy*, that Kerensky knew of the original movement of Kornilov's troops and was not averse to it: "Many details of the Kornilov episode are still missing and many important documents must still be published before the public will be able to come to an impartial and fair judgment. Several things, however, are almost certain. The first is that Kerensky knew about the movement of several detachments of troops from the front towards Petrograd, and it is probable that as Prime Minister and Minister of War, realizing the growing Bolshevik danger, he called for them."

mobilization of the revolutionary masses of Petrograd was immediately accomplished, the Bolsheviks imprisoned during and after the July uprising were released, and they marched out to meet Kornilov's troops, who were definitely defeated on September 15, on which day the Provisional Government went through the empty formality of officially declaring Russia a republic.

The aftermath of the Kornilov rebellion was swift and certain. The counter-revolution was active, the Soviets in danger—and the Bolsheviks everywhere rapidly became the majority. Leon Trotsky was elected President of the Petrograd Soviet, the most influential of all, and as a protest Cheidse, Skobelev and Tseretelli resigned. The period of compromise was definitely at an end, and throughout Russia the Soviets recognized the necessity of revolutionary proletarian action and policy. Life itself was making Bolshevism the accepted policy of the revolutionary masses.

These events isolated the Provisional Government. Its mandate had hitherto been the support of the Soviets; the attempt to secure a new and more general mandate through the Moscow Conference had failed; and Kerensky tried the desperate means of convoking a Democratic Congress to dispel the isolation of the Provisional Government and secure a mandate for its acts. The Congress met on September 27, and immediately it was rent with disputes. Capital punishment and coalition were discussed bitterly amid riotous disturbances. Trotsky appeared and issued a declaration of civil war in the event that the counter-revolution should oppose all power to the Soviets. Against the protest of the Bolsheviks, who bolted the Congress, and by a wavering majority, coalition was approved, a new cabinet formed; and it was decided to convene a Preliminary Parliament, to sit until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. Kerensky badgered the Congress into approving all his acts by threatening to resign and by picturing tragically the situation of the country.

The Preliminary Parliament opened on October 8, and in spite of the fact that the elections everywhere showed an overwhelming majority for the Socialist candidates, the bourgeoisie was amply represented in the Parliament, out of all proportion to its numbers. The Parliament, officially designated as "The Council of the Russian Republic," demanded that the Provisional Government should be responsible to it, but the Government refused absolutely, and the demand was withdrawn: the Parliament was simply to have "advisory" functions. Turmoil and impotence marked the activity of the Parliament; recriminations made deliberations impossible;

not a single measure of any importance was passed. At the first session, Trotzky, speaking on behalf of the Bolsheviks, charged that the propertied classes were represented out of all proportion to their numbers, and declared that the Parliament was against the Revolution. The Menshevik Cheidse was elected President, and against the protest of the Bolsheviks and Social-Revolutionists of the Left, it was decided to discuss in secret the constitution of the government. Instead of the Preliminary Parliament providing a mandate for the Provisional Government, it provided a new instrument for the offensive against coalition. And throughout the country the moderates were being ousted from control of the Soviets, the Bolsheviks becoming ascendant.

II

BOLSHEVISM CONQUERS

The Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets, after the Kornilov affair, was still in the control of the moderates, as a Congress had not been held since the June session, and the members of the Committee were hang-overs. The masses had, however, deserted the moderates, and the Executive Committee was becoming as isolated, as helpless as the Provisional Government itself. The Committee determined upon a final manœuvre to preserve its prestige, a final desperate attempt to "compel" the Allies to accept the peace terms of revolutionary Russia. It adopted a series of peace terms, specifying concretely the meaning of "no annexations and no indemnities," as follows:

"1.—Evacuation by the Germans of Russia, and autonomy of Poland, Lithuania, and the Lettish provinces.

"2.—Autonomy of Turkish Armenia.

"3.—Solution of the Alsace-Lorraine question by a plebiscite, the voting being arranged by local civil authorities after the removal of the troops of both belligerents.

"4.—Restoration to Belgium of her old frontiers and compensation for her losses from an international fund.

"5.—Restoration of Serbia and Montenegro with similar compensation, Serbia to have access to the Adriatic, Bosnia and Herzegovina to be autonomous.

"6.—Disputed Balkan districts to receive provisional autonomy, followed by a plebiscite.

"7.—Rumania to be restored her old frontiers on condition that she grant Dobrudja autonomy and grant equal rights to the Jews.

"8.—Autonomy for the Italian provinces of Austria to be followed by a plebiscite.

"9.—Restitution of all colonies to Germany.

"10.—Re-establishment of Greece and Persia.

"11.—Neutralization of all straits leading to inner seas and

also the Suez and Panama Canals. Freedom of navigation for merchant ships. Abolition of the right to torpedo merchant ships in war time.

"12.—All belligerents to renounce war contributions or indemnities in any form, but the money spent on the maintenance of prisoners and all contributions levied during the war to be returned.

"13.—Commercial treaties not to be based on the peace treaty; each country may act independently with respect to its commercial policy, but all countries to engage to renounce an economic blockade after the war.

"14.—The conditions of peace should be settled by a peace congress consisting of delegates elected by the people and confirmed by Parliament. Diplomats must engage not to conclude separate treaties, which hereby are declared contrary to the rights of the people, and consequently void.

"15.—Gradual disarmament by land and sea, and the establishing of a non-military system."

The Executive Committee, which still placed emphasis on diplomacy and not on revolutionary action, delegated former Minister of Labor Skobelev to present these terms as its delegate to the Conference of the Allies at Paris. But the Provisional Government secretly advised the Allies against Skobelev,¹ and Jules Cambon, of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declared that "the Allied governments will absolutely refuse to consent to M. Skobelev's taking part in the deliberations" of the Conference; and it was declared, moreover, that the Conference would discuss only military problems, and not problems of peace terms. The attitude of the Allies caused an immediate reaction in the Revolutionary Democracy, destroying completely the influence of the moderates and establishing firmly the ascendancy of the Bolsheviks, who ten days later realized their program of "All power to the Soviets."

¹On October 29, Tereschenko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Kerensky government, sent a secret telegram (subsequently published by the Bolshevik government) to the Russian Ambassador in London, reading in part as follows: "With regard to your conversation with Balfour, I deem it important to confirm that in our opinion the forthcoming Allied Conference shall have for its problem an appraisal of views of the Allies with regard to the same. At the same time the Conference should determine the means of further conduct of the war and mutual assistance which the Allies must show to each other. With regard to the participation at the Conference of a person [Skobelev] having the confidence of our Democracy, it is important to bear in mind that this person will be one of the personnel of the Russian government delegation, in whose name only its head will speak officially." The hint was enough. This is proof that the Provisional Government conspired secretly with imperialistic governments to continue the war and intrigued against the Revolutionary Democracy.

All through these days of storm and upheaval, in which the forces of a new revolution were accumulating strength, the Provisional Government was shifting toward the Right, and the more it drifted in that direction the greater became its isolation and its impotence. No action was taken on the pressing problems of the Revolution, on peace, on land, on reconstruction in general. The thunderbolt of complete chaos was about to shatter Russia. The government was a government of words, its policy the empty eloquence of Kerensky. The more the Government wavered, the firmer became the revolutionary policy of the Soviets. The fictitious "unity of the parties" was rent asunder; compromise snapped under the impact of antagonisms that could no longer brook compromise. Two movements were converging upon the Provisional Government, bent upon its destruction: the movement from the Left, the Soviets, and the movement from the Right, the imperialistic bourgeoisie. Kerensky, helpless, dazed, sickly, and a weakling, scolded alternately the Right and the Left, unaware that the issue was now definitely joined, that the basis of his dictatorship was destroyed; and Kerensky, moreover, scolded the Allies for their unsympathetic attitude towards Russia's inability to fight. The climax of these events had come when the Bolsheviks bolted the Preliminary Parliament, and determined to convene an All-Russian Congress of Soviets to act independently and decisively upon the vital problems of the Revolution.

These two simple decisions were epochal. It was clear that they meant the overthrow of the Provisional Government, and it was so interpreted by all. As the Bolsheviks bolted the Preliminary Parliament, curses and imploring cries soared in a chorus throughout the hall. The decision to convene an All-Russian Congress struck consternation among the moderates. The Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets refused to call a new Congress, compelling the Petrograd Soviet to take the initiative,—and this was a symbol of the waning power of the moderates and the calm, stern confidence of the revolutionary masses. This was in the middle of October, and as the Bolsheviks prepared for the Congress, the reactionary forces of the imperialistic bourgeoisie openly prepared a *coup* against the Soviets and the Provisional Government. But the chief campaign was against the convocation of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets: this was the decisive event. The Executive Committee declared against it, and sent instructions to the local Soviets not to participate; while its organ, the *Isvestya*, directed an energetic campaign against the Congress. All the forces

of the counter-revolution, from the Centre to the Right, prepared to destroy the coming Congress, the imperialistic bourgeoisie by means of a military *coup d'état*.

The prevailing situation and the logic of events compelled the Bolsheviks to supplement their program for the Congress with a movement for an insurrection to overthrow the Provisional Government. At first, this proposal met with small response; but Lenin,² basing himself upon facts, declared in a systematic press campaign in *Pravda* that armed insurrection was absolutely necessary to assure the convocation of the Congress and to thwart the plans for a *coup d'état* being organized by the reactionary forces. The Provisional Government was planning the evacuation of Petrograd, Rodzianko declared the loss of Petrograd would dispose of the revolutionary workers and the Baltic Fleet. Realizing that the Petrograd troops were with the Bolsheviks, Kerensky on October 27 ordered the garrison to the front; the troops refused, and retaliated by organizing the Military Revolutionary Committee, which played such an important part in the events culminating in the revolution of November 7. The action of the troops was ratified by the Petrograd Soviet. It was then discovered that the General Staff was formulating plans to seize Petrograd with the aid of reactionary regiments and forcibly prevent the meeting of the Soviet Congress; and insurrection became inevitable, reinforced by the argument of Lenin that the insurrection should not wait until the Congress met, but that the Congress should be confronted with the accomplished fact of the overthrow of the Provisional Government.

On November 6, the day before the insurrection, Kerensky appeared before the Preliminary Parliament, and made a statement "authorised by the Provisional Government." Part of the statement follows:

"I considered it my duty to cite for you the most definitely phrased passage from a number of proclamations published in the local paper *Rabochy Put*³ in the form of 'Letters to the Comrades' by Ulyanov-Lenin, the much-sought offender against the state who is now in hiding. This said offender against the state called upon the proletariat of Petrograd and upon the troops to repeat the experiment of July 16-17, and argued in favor of the necessity of an

²Lenin, at this time, was still in hiding, the warrant for his arrest issued after the July uprising being still in force. But during all this time he directed the activity of the Bolsheviks; and, it is said, most of the time he was in Petrograd receiving delegations and issuing instructions.

³This was the new name of the organ of the Bolsheviks, *Pravda* having been suppressed.

immediate uprising. Thus, for example, in one of the issues containing the first of a series of these proclamations, Ulyanov-Lenin wrote: 'On the 16th of October, in the morning, I learned that at a very important Bolshevik meeting in Petrograd the question of the uprising was being discussed in detail. At that meeting were present all who were prominent in the Bolshevik activities in the Capital, and only a negligible minority—two comrades—disapproved of the uprising. It is necessary to analyze their arguments and expose the grounds for their hesitation in order to prove how disgraceful they are.' I shall not expatiate on the arguments in favor of an immediate armed uprising, but I must say that this same proclamation ends in the following way: 'What are you going to wait for? Are you waiting for a miracle? Are you waiting for the Constitutional Assembly? Are you waiting, you who are hungry! Kerensky has promised to call the Constitutional Assembly.' In the next appeal the very same Ulyanov definitely puts the question of an immediate uprising, and says that procrastination in this matter is equivalent to death.

"Simultaneously with these appeals, a series of statements were issued by other leaders of the Bolsheviks at a number of meetings at which they called for an immediate armed uprising. In this respect, especially noteworthy are the speeches made by the President of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates of Petrograd, Mr. Bronstein-Trotsky, and by some other organizers of the revolt.

"Thus, before the Preliminary Parliament I must state that a certain part of the population of Petrograd is now in a state of insurrection. (Remarks from the Right: "Is that what we have come to!") I have already proposed that a judicial investigation be started at once. (A noise.) I have ordered that arrests be made." (Disturbance on the extreme Left.)

After this speech, the Preliminary Parliament passed a vote of confidence in Kerensky by the small majority of 123 to 102. That night Kerensky ordered the suppression of the extreme radical and the extreme conservative papers, and reactionary soldiers seized the offices of Bolshevik papers. But that was all. The storm broke the next day, November 7, and the insurrection of the revolutionary masses, directed by the Military Revolutionary Committee, dispersed the Preliminary Parliament and swept the Provisional Government into oblivion. There was some bitter fighting; the Bolsheviks seized the telephone and telegraph wires, and besieged the members of the Provisional Government in the Winter Palace;

but there was never any doubt of the outcome. The revolutionary masses secured a complete victory, the ministers of the Provisional Government were arrested, and Kerensky fled from Petrograd to the front to secure the adhesion of "loyal" troops, march upon Petrograd and crush the revolution.

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets convened at the Smolny institute, confronted with the accomplished fact of the Provisional Government's overthrow. The Bolsheviks and the Social Revolutionists of the Left, representatives of the peasants who accepted the Bolshevik program, dominated the Congress. While the armed revolutionary masses were completing the work of overthrowing the government and preparing to meet the attack of any troops that Kerensky might hurl at Petrograd, the Congress heatedly debated the problem of all power to the Soviets. A number of delegates, a small number, wished to ignore the successful revolution of the proletariat, and yield all government power to the Constituent Assembly, the Congress, in the meanwhile, to suspend its sessions while a new bourgeois-coalition government was organized.⁴ But their arguments were brushed aside, and the Congress decreed that the Soviets should be constituted as the government of Russia. The Congress elected a ministry in the form of a Council of People's Commissaires, with Lenin as President of the Council (Premier) and Trotsky as Commissaire of Foreign Affairs.

In the meanwhile, Kerensky had succeeded in rallying some

⁴L. A. Martov, on behalf of the Menshevik-Internationalists, proposed the following resolution:

Whereas, *First*, the *coup d'état* which placed all authority in Petrograd in the hands of the Military Revolutionary Committee but a single day before the opening of the Congress, was accomplished by the action of the Bolshevik Party alone, and by means which were exclusively military in their nature; and,

Whereas, *Second*, this *coup d'état* threatens to produce bloodshed, civil war and a triumph of the counter-revolution which will drown in blood the entire proletarian movement and thereby destroy all the achievements of the Revolution; and,

Whereas, *Third*, the sole remedy for this situation, which might still prevent the outbreak of civil war, is an agreement between the insurgent section of the democracy and the remaining democratic organizations, concerning the formation of a democratic government that would be recognized by the whole revolutionary democracy and to whom the Provisional Government could hand over its authority without a struggle;

Therefore, the Menshevik Fraction calls upon the Congress to recognize officially the absolute necessity of an amicable settlement of the crisis thus produced, by forming a government composed of representatives of all the democratic elements; and the Menshevik-Internationalists, with this purpose in view, offer the Congress to appoint a delegation to consult with the other organs of democracy and with all the socialistic parties.

And, until the results of the work of this delegation shall become apparent, the Menshevik-Internationalist Fraction proposes to the Congress that it discontinue its labors.

troops and marched upon Petrograd, simultaneously issuing proclamations. The revolutionary troops and masses marched out to meet the invaders, armed with tons of revolutionary literature. There was some fighting and more fraternizing and discussion; Kerensky's "army" melted away, and seeing that all was lost, Kerensky fled, against the advice of his officers who urged that he appear in Petrograd even should he be placed under arrest.

The proletarian revolution had conquered. But it still had to pass through a period of civil war and international complications that was to test its capacity, virility and integrity. Upon the basis of its magnificent achievements culminating in the events of November 7, the proletarian revolution prepared confidently and resolutely to meet coming events.

The problem of the Revolution, that each development and each crisis emphasized, was: the destruction of the Soviets, or all power to the Soviets. But all power to the Soviets necessarily meant a proletarian revolution, the assumption of power by the revolutionary proletariat, leading on the poorest masses of the peasantry. And, considering the Russian Revolution retrospectively and in whole, we realize that its fundamental aspect is the development, through hesitation, compromise, temporary defeat and ultimate victory, of a proletarian revolution.

The rapidity of events should not obscure their developmental character. As a revolutionary process, the proletarian revolution in Russia developed through all the necessary stages. The overthrow of Czarism resulted in the establishment of the imperialistic bourgeois republic of the Milyukov-Guchkov government. But the frankly imperialistic character of this government was incompatible with the stage on which it operated. Imperialism was undermined by the oncoming proletarian revolution, and Imperialism had to camouflage itself in the colors of radical democracy to promote its purposes and preserve Capitalism. The camouflage assumed the form of the "radical-Socialist" government of the coalition and of Kerensky. This is a significant development. That period comes in Capitalism when, shaken by the oncoming proletarian revolution, it adopts as a last bulwark of defense the "radical democracy" of the moderate labor and Socialist movement, which is dominantly the movement of skilled labor and the *petit bourgeoisie*. This phenomenon assumed the form of "laborism" in Australia, where the "labor" government became the centre of Imperialism and bourgeois reaction against the revolution. It seems, apparently, that a similar development may occur in England, where the Labor Party,

through its slogan of a "democratic peace," promoted the war and reaction, and is the party of social-imperialistic State Capitalism as against the proletarian revolution. Democracy serves to promote Imperialism, and democracy may serve to prevent, temporarily, the proletarian revolution. The "radical" bourgeois republic of the Menshevist-Kerensky government was precisely of this character—the final stage of the republic of Capitalism. Pluming itself as revolutionary, it acted against the Revolution; it put pacifism in the service of Imperialism; it used Socialism to deceive the masses; it incorporated within itself the "revolutionary democracy" of moderate Socialism to provide Capitalism with a new lease of life. But this final stage of Capitalism multiplies the inherent contradictions of Capitalism, and is temporary. The "Socialism" of a bourgeois government is in the very nature of things mere camouflage, and being such it acts as a developer of class consciousness and revolutionary Socialism. The oncoming proletarian revolution in Russia, passing through a series of defeats which alternately weakened Capitalism and strengthened the Revolution, finally annihilated the bourgeois-"Socialist" republic. The proletarian revolution in Russia was not an isolated or arbitrary seizure of power, as was the Paris Commune; it was the outcome of an historical development characteristic of the proletarian revolution as a process of action and development.

* * *

Proclamation issued by Lenin, as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissaires, November 18, 1917.

Comrades: Workers, Soldiers, Peasants, All who Toil!

The workers' and peasants' Revolution has finally been victorious in Petrograd, scattering and capturing the last remnants of the small bands of Cossacks duped by Kerensky. In Moscow the Revolution was successful even before a few trainloads of our fighting forces arrived there from Petrograd. In Moscow the Junkers and other Kornilovites have accepted the conditions of peace: the disarming of the Junkers, the dissolution of the "committees of safety." From the front and from the provinces there flows in, daily and hourly, news of the support by the overwhelming majority of the soldiers in the trenches and by the peasants in their villages of the new government and its decrees on peace and giving the land to the peasants. The success of the Revolution of workers and peasants is assured, for the majority of the people have already come out in its favor.

It is quite clear that the landholders and capitalists, the *chinovniks* (bureaucracy) and office-holders, closely connected with the bourgeoisie, in a word, all those who are rich or who are aiding the rich, will be hostile to the new Revolution, will oppose its success, will threaten to cease the activity of the banks, will disorganize or stop the work of certain institutions, will spread confusion and sabotage in every way, directly and indirectly. Every class conscious worker knows very well that we must inevitably meet with such opposition, that the higher officials are opposed to the people and will not surrender their charges to the people without opposition. The toiling classes are in no way intimidated by this opposition, not for a moment do they tremble before the threats and sabotage of the supporters of the bourgeoisie.

Behind us are the majority of the people. Behind us are the majority of the toilers and the oppressed of all the world. We are fighting in the cause of justice, and our victory is certain.

The opposition of the capitalists and of the higher officials will be broken. Not a man will be deprived by us of his possessions without a special law for the nationalization of the banks and syndicates. This law is being drawn up. Not a single worker will be deprived of a copek; on the contrary, aid will be given him. Without establishing any new imposts, for the present, the Government will first take up the task of a strict supervision and control of the collection of taxes already established, without any concealment whatever.

In the name of these just demands, the vast majority of the people have rallied around the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government.

Comrades and Toilers: Remember that it is you who now control the government. No one will help you unless you yourself unite and take all government functions into your hands. From now on your Soviets are the organs of government power, fully authorized, decisive organs.

Rally around your Soviets. Strengthen them. Take hold yourselves of this task, from below, and wage relentless warfare on all attempts at anarchy on the part of drunkards, hooligans, counter-revolutionists, Junkers, Kornilovites.

Introduce strict control over production and an inventory of products. Arrest and bring before the revolutionary tribunals of the people, all persons who injure the cause of the people, whether this injury takes the form of sabotage (destruction and interruption) of production, or that of hoarding supplies of grains or products,

or that of holding up carloads of grain, or disorganizing the activity of the railroads, telegraph, post office, and in general, any form of opposition to the great common cause of peace, of assuring to the worker control over the production and distribution of goods.

Comrades: workers, soldiers, peasants, all who toil! Put all the power in your districts into the hands of your Soviets. Preserve and guard as the apple of your eye, the land, grain, the factories, tools, products, transportation—all these are henceforth your common possession. Gradually, in agreement with the majority of the peasantry, and with their approval, as we learn the lessons of their practical experience and that of the workers, we shall advance steadfastly and unwaveringly to the realization of Socialism, in which we shall be aided by the advanced workers of the most civilized countries and which will give to the nations permanent peace and delivery from all oppression and from all exploitation.

III

DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND CIVIL WAR

The proletarian state, brought into being by the revolution of November 7 and by the fiat of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, was a state representing exclusively the producing masses, a state of the federated Soviets. It was, in its fundamentals, the expression of proletarian state requirements as determined by the prevailing revolutionary tasks, and as projected by the Paris Commune.¹

¹The working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes. . . . The Commune was formed of the various municipal councillors, chosen by universal suffrage in various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short terms. The majority of its members were naturally workmen, or acknowledged representatives of the working class. The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time. Instead of continuing to be the agent of the central Government, the police was at once stripped of its political attributes and turned into the responsible and at all times revocable agent of the Commune. So were the officials of all other branches of the administration. From the members of the Commune downwards, the public service had to be done at *workmen's wages*. The vested interests and the representation allowances of the high dignitaries of State disappeared along with the high dignitaries themselves. Public functions ceased to be the private property of the tools of the central Government. Not only municipal administration, but the whole initiative hitherto exercised by the State was laid into the hands of the Commune. . . . The Paris Commune was, of course, to serve as a model to all the great industrial centers of France. The communal regime once established in Paris and the secondary centres, the old centralized Government would in the provinces, too, have to give way to the self-government of the producers. In a rough sketch of national organization which the Commune had no time to develop, it is clearly stated that the Commune was to be the political form of even the smallest country hamlet, and that in the rural districts the standing army was to be replaced by a national militia, with an extremely short term of service. The rural communes of delegates in the central town, and these district assemblies were again to send deputies to the National Delegation in Paris, each delegate to be at any time revocable and bound by the *mandat impératif* (formal instructions) of his constituents. The few important functions which still would remain for a central government were not to be suppressed, as has intentionally been misstated, but were to be discharged by communal, and therefore strictly responsible, agents. The unity of the nation was not to be broken; but, on the contrary, to be organized by the Communal Constitution, and to become a reality by the destruction of the State power which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity independent of, and superior to, the nation itself, from which it was but a parasitic excrescence. . . . The Communal Constitution brought the rural

The new government was the Soviets, federated and assuming all the functions of the state,—the self-government of the producing class. The local Soviet was the local authority of government, elected directly by the suffrage of the workers in the factories and the peasants in the fields; these elections were frequent, and the representatives were at all times freely recallable by their constituents. The local Soviets elected delegates to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, on the basis of proportional representation, and this Congress was the supreme governing body of Russia. The Congress elected the members of the Council of People's Commissaires, and a Central Executive Committee, also on the basis of proportional representation; this Committee sat permanently during the intervals between sessions of the Congress, and directed the activity of the Council of People's Commissaires. At the session of the Congress, each Commissaire and the Central Executive Committee rendered reports; the decision of the Congress on all matters was supreme. The new regime abolished the parliamentary system and the complicated bureaucratic machinery of the bourgeois state; it united legislative and executive functions. This flexible system of government was instantly responsive to the will of the people; it was the utmost in democracy,—not that bourgeois democracy which is simply a form of authority of the appropriating over the producing class, but the free, conscious expression of the initiative, activity and interests of the organized producers.

The Soviet state presents, however, a dual character: it is a democracy in its attitude and relation to the producing class, but a stern and unrelenting dictatorship toward the bourgeoisie. This dual character is the expression of the *transition period* from Capitalism to Socialism, of the requirements of crushing the resistance of the counter-revolutionary elements, destroying the political power of the Capitalist Class, completing the destruction of the bourgeois regime, and gradually introducing the relations and institutions of Communist Socialism. In this transition period the state assumes the form of a dictatorship of the revolutionary proletariat, an instrument for the crushing of the bourgeoisie in the inevitable civil war.

Civil war ensued immediately upon the assumption of power by

producers under the intellectual lead of the central towns of their districts, and there secured to them, in the workingmen, the natural trustees of their interests. . . . It was essentially a working class government, the product of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labor.—Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France*.

the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry through the Soviets. The ultimate test of the proletarian revolution is the test of armed force, since the ruling class and its allies will resort to the desperation of revolt to crush the proletarian regime. The supremacy of the proletariat, accordingly, inevitably means civil war, more or less intense according to circumstances; the transition period being characterized by civil war, the proletarian state retains the repressive character of the old state *until the bourgeoisie is completely crushed*. The state is an instrument of coercion: the bourgeois state is an instrument for the coercion of the proletariat; the revolutionary proletarian state—the dictatorship of the proletariat—is an instrument for the coercion of the bourgeoisie, until the complete ascendancy of Socialism renders repression unnecessary, when the state as state, utterly disappears.

In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels projected a determining phase of the proletarian revolution: "The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees all capital from the bourgeoisie; to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state—that is, of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible. Of course, in the beginning this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionizing the mode of production." And in his *Criticism of the Gotha Program* Marx says: "Between the capitalist and the communist system of society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. This corresponds to a political transition period, whose state can be nothing else than the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat." The theory of Marx is the practice of the proletarian revolution in Russia. The dictatorship of the proletariat ruthlessly annihilates the rights and ideology of the old regime, and relentlessly crushes all counter-revolutionary movements.

Civil war being a phase of the transition from Capitalism to Socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat is constrained to use force in its struggle against the counter-revolution. But the use of force is not a finality: it is a process of revolutionary development. The use of force is as temporary as the dictatorship of the proletariat itself: a necessary means of pushing on the Revolution

to the point where force and dictatorship are each equally unnecessary because their functions have become unnecessary.

The first problem of the Soviet state, accordingly, was to emerge victorious out of the civil war which immediately broke loose. The defeat of Kerensky at Gatchina, on November 14, disposed of Kerensky, but it did not dispose of the efforts of the counter-revolution to crush the new proletarian regime.

Many of the revolts against the new regime were organized by the military clique, led by Kaledine, Kornilov & Co. The revolts of the Cossacks were particularly menacing, and were crushed only by the heroic activity of the Red Guards. The Red Guard played a very important role in the civil war during the Soviet regime. It consisted almost wholly of armed workingmen, militant class conscious, who thoroughly understood the Revolution, were willing to die for it, and acted as the dynamic centre of the revolutionary masses in action. But the military opposition to the Soviet government was almost negligible; the real opposition came from other sources, and in a more threatening manner.

The bourgeoisie and the propertied classes generally, including the *petite bourgeoisie*, were almost a solid mass in opposition to the Soviets. Of this opposition, that of the imperialistic bourgeoisie itself was the least important; it was the opposition of the middle class and the petty bourgeois *intelligentsia* which proved most formidable. And this opposition expressed itself in the form of sabotage; that is to say, the *intelligentsia* and the middle class generally refused to co-operate with the Soviets in the reconstruction of the country and did all in their power to hamper this reconstruction. Technicians refused their service in industry; school teachers went on strike; men and women of specialized ability refused to co-operate with the constituted bodies of reconstruction. Men and women of the bourgeoisie, in hospitals, in charity organizations, everywhere their service were needed, indulged in sabotage, either by open refusal of work or by cunningly interfering with the normal course of things. And the lies, the slanders—the output was enormous. The *intelligentsia*, the petty bourgeois intellectuals and professionals, constituted an active and venomous centre of resistance to the Workers' and Peasants' Government.

In this attitude, the *petite bourgeoisie* demonstrated in practice the revolutionary Socialist theory that it is the greatest enemy of the proletarian revolution, before and after the event. The proletarian revolution means the supremacy of the great mass of the people, of the propertiless workers and peasants; unless these great masses

appear upon the stage of events and determine the activity of the state, there is no proletarian revolution. In this sense, the proletarian revolution goes to the heart of things; it means a fundamental change, the reversal of relations in bourgeois society, where the "intellectuals" order and the masses obey. The masses in Russia had become conscious, determining the activity of the government and of the society. Against this new dispensation of things—surely "the end of the world!"—the *petite bourgeoisie* revolted in dismay and anger, refusing to have anything to do with masses that did not pay it homage. All the pettiness, all the arrogance, all the hypocrisy of the bourgeois system of things, which to the bourgeoisie itself are simply instruments of oppression, become in the souls of the *petite bourgeoisie* principles, ideals, aspirations of eternal fitness and beauty. "Since the masses refuse *our* tutelage, let us leave the masses to their fate!"

But the masses are determined, aggressive, uncompromising; Revolution has set loose their latent energy and initiative; they reveal unsuspected reserves of heroism, capacity and daring: the *intelligentsia* will yet submit to the authority of the masses. . . .

The moderate Socialists were equally active against the regime of the revolutionary workers and peasants; in fact, they constituted a merciless, inexorable opposition. The Mensheviks, including George Plekhanov, I. G. Tseretelli, and even the "internationalist" Martov, issued declarations branding the Revolution of November 7 and the assumption of power by the Soviets as a "crime." The Social-Revolutionists of the Right, during the week after the Bolshevik *coup* issued proclamations against the Bolsheviks. These moderate Socialists adopted the policy and attitude of the *petite bourgeoisie*, proving a relentless enemy of the proletarian revolution. Lenin had said that the institution of the Soviet Republic would pave the way for the peaceful, creative struggle of parties within the Soviets; but the moderates rejected the peaceful struggle within the Soviets, of party against party, program against program; they resorted to conspiracy, force, terrorism against the *revolutionary proletarian government* of the Soviets. The "old guard" of the struggle against Czarism, animated by the ideology of the *petite bourgeoisie*, resorted to similar tactics: Vladimir Burtsev conspired as in the old days; Boris Savinkov organized terrorist plots against the Soviet authority as he had organized terrorism against Czarism; Tschaikovsky declared at the Railway Workers' Convention in January that terrorism would be used against the Bolsheviks as in the days of Czarism. Nor was this mere threatening: terror-

ism was actually organized, and only the solidity of the Soviets, the support of the revolutionary masses, rendered the terrorist campaign unsuccessful.

Moderate Socialism has much to atone for. It is the arch-enemy of the proletariat and of Socialism. In all nations it is the curse of the revolutionary movement. Moderate Socialism in Russia might have been forgiven its attitude prior to November 7; its acts thereafter will be forever an indelible brand of shame. The international proletariat will learn from the history of the war, from the history of the Russian Revolution, *that the proletarian revolution must necessarily wage a merciless, uncompromising struggle against moderate Socialism*, which in its tendency is counter-revolutionary.

The Soviet government used drastic measures against the counter-revolution. Its policy was unwavering and stern; the hesitancy of the coalition regime was a thing of the past. The Provisional Government possessed no solidity because there was no solid class behind it, simply a fictitious unity of parties; it could not, under the conditions, determine upon and adhere to an uncompromising policy. But the Soviet Government was reared upon the solid basis of the revolutionary proletariat; it could, and did, adopt a consistent, courageous and uncompromising policy. The counter-revolutionary revolts were crushed ruthlessly, not simply by armed force, but by intensifying class antagonism and thereby splitting the opposition; as among the Cossacks, for example, where the solid support of Kaledine was divided by means of Cossacks' Soviets, organizing the propertiless Cossacks against those of property. Against the *intelligentsia* coercive measures were adopted, the only way to convince them of the futility of their course. The bourgeoisie was attacked by means of the expropriation of large enterprises and by a rigid workers' control of industry, the drastic regulation of the economic activity of the country. Perhaps the most effective measure against the opposition in general was the exclusion of the bourgeoisie from participation in the government,—which is another necessary feature of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And underlying all these measures was the Soviets' merciless use of *mass terror* against the counter-revolution.

The armed struggle against the counter-revolution raged throughout Russia, and spread into Finland and the Ukraine, where the struggle between the revolutionary workers and peasants and the bourgeoisie assumed a particularly violent form. The revolutionists in Finland and the Ukraine were assisted by the Bolsheviki

and the Red Guards, but were unsuccessful because of the intervention of Austro-German troops, who were invited to invade the country in order to strike at the Revolution. The attitude of the Bolsheviks toward Finland and the Ukraine was to grant them their independence, trusting to the natural affinity of proletarian governments to unite; and then did all in their power to produce the victory of the proletarian revolution in Finland and the Ukraine.

IV

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The Constituent Assembly was an important issue in the course of the Revolution. It represented an aspiration of democratic Russia, and particularly precious in the eyes of the *petit bourgeois* democracy. But Coalition Government after Coalition Government had postponed its convocation; Kerensky called conference after conference, and finally issued a call for the Constituent Assembly only under pressure. The Bolsheviks made much of the postponements of the Assembly, not because they considered it important in itself, but because its postponement was an expression of the counter-revolutionary character of the Provisional Government. *The Constituent Assembly was an expression of the bourgeois democratic revolution; after the proletarian revolution, it was superfluous.* The Soviet Government, however, allowed the Constituent Assembly to convene on January 18.

The situation was instinct with a fatal logic: if the Constituent Assembly accepted the authority of the Soviet Government, it was as an institution unnecessary, and after ratifying the accomplished fact of November 7 it would disperse; if it set itself against the Soviet authority, it was counter-revolutionary and would have to be dissolved by force, if necessary.

The Constituent Assembly was in session one day. It had a majority of Social-Revolutionists of the Right. The chairman of the All-Russian Soviet Executive Committee, Sverdlov, read a declaration declaring Russia a Federal Soviet Republic, and recognizing the authority and measures of the Soviet Government. The declaration was decisively defeated. The Bolsheviks and Social-Revolutionists of the Left, who were about a third of the delegates, thereupon withdrew from the Assembly, after reading the following proclamation:

"The great majority of toiling Russia, the workers, peasants and soldiers, have demanded that the Constituent Assembly recognize the results of the great November Revolution, the Soviets'

proclamation regarding land, peace and control of working conditions, and above all, that it should recognize the Soviet Government. Fulfilling this demand of the great majority of Russian working classes, the All-Russian Executive Committee has proposed to the Constituent Assembly that it should recognize this demand as binding. The majority of the Constituent Assembly has, however, in accordance with the demands of the bourgeoisie, refused to approve this proposition, thereby throwing a challenge of battle to all of toiling Russia. The Social-Revolutionary right wing, the party of Kerensky, Avksentyev and Chernov, has obtained the majority in the Constituent Assembly. This party, which calls itself a Social Revolutionary Party, is directing the fight of bourgeois elements against the workers' revolution and in reality is a bourgeois counter-revolutionary party. The Constituent Assembly in its present state is a result of the relative party power in force before the great November Revolution. The present counter-revolutionary majority of the Constituent Assembly, elected on the basis of the obsolete party lists, is trying to resist the movement of the workers and peasants. The day's discussions have clearly shown that the Social-Revolutionary Party of the Right Wing, as in the time of Kerensky, makes concessions to the people, promising them everything, but in reality has decided to fight against the Soviet Government, against the Socialistic measures to give the land and all its appurtenances to the peasants without compensation, to nationalize the banks and to annul the debts of the nation.

"Without wishing for a moment to conceal the crimes of the enemies of the people, we announce that we are withdrawing from the Constituent Assembly in order to let the Soviet power finally decide the question of its relation toward the counter-revolutionary part of the Constituent Assembly."

The very same day the Constituent Assembly was dispersed by the bayonets of the Red Guard; and on January 19 the Soviet Government issued a decree officially dissolving the Assembly. The Revolution, declared the decree of dissolution, created the Workers' and Soldiers' Soviet—the only organization able to direct the struggle of the exploited classes for *complete* political and economic liberation; this Soviet constituted a revolutionary government through the November Revolution, after perceiving the illusion of an understanding with the bourgeoisie and its deceptive parliamentary organization; the Constituent Assembly, being elected from the old election lists, and intended to be the crown of the bourgeois

parliamentary republic, necessarily became the authority of the bourgeois republic, setting itself against the Revolution of November and the authority of the Soviet Government; the old bourgeois parliamentarism has had its day and is incompatible with the tasks before Socialism; hence it was unavoidable that the Constituent Assembly, necessarily counter-revolutionary, should be dissolved.¹

Any other attitude of the Soviet Government would have been self-stultification. The proletarian revolution is relentlessly logical. It is a denial of bourgeois democracy. It is openly a dictatorship. Its practice must be in accord with its theory—otherwise the proletarian revolution limps, degrades itself, and prepares the forces for its destruction. The Soviet Government was organized not as a representative of all classes, but as the representative of the revolutionary masses, the dictatorship of the proletariat. It had to act accordingly.

All democracy is relative, is *class* democracy. As an historical category, democracy is the instrument of a class: bourgeois democracy is the form of expression of the tyranny of Capitalism, the form of authority of the oppressing class over the oppressed class. The democracy of Socialism annihilates the democracy of Capitalism—relative, authoritarian democracy is superseded by the actuality of the full and free democracy of Communist Socialism. The proletarian revolution does not allow the “ethical concepts” of bourgeois democracy to interfere in its course; it ruthlessly casts aside bourgeois democracy in the process of establishing proletarian democracy. Capitalism hypocritically insists upon a government *of all the classes*, which in reality is the government of one class, the capitalist class; the proletarian revolution frankly institutes the government of *one class—the proletariat*—which ultimately means the end of “government” as hitherto constituted. The state is an instrument of coercion; but where the bourgeois state considers itself as sacrosanct and eternal, the revolutionary proletarian state considers itself a temporary necessity that will gradually become superfluous in the measure that the process of reconstruction

¹It is said: if the Bolsheviks were right in dissolving the Constituent Assembly, why did they emphasize its convocation as one of their demands prior to the November Revolution? A measure may correspond to an earlier stage of the Revolution, and not to a later. Proposed measures are developmental, not static. The November Revolution having organized a revolutionary proletarian government, the Constituent Assembly corresponded to an older, outgrown set of facts, and was no longer necessary: it had to be dispersed.

emerges definitely into the Socialist Communist society of the organized, self-governing producers.

The Constituent Assembly was an expression of government of all the classes, of the bourgeois regime; it was, accordingly, necessarily and essentially a reaction against the proletarian revolution. Moreover, the Constituent Assembly was a phase of the parliamentary regime of the bourgeois republic. The parliamentary system is not an expression of fundamental democracy, but of the ruling requirements of Capitalism. Parliamentarism, presumably representing all the classes, actually represents the requirements of the ruling class alone,—with due consideration to “concessions” to the subject class. The division of functions in the parliamentary system into legislative and executive has for its direct purpose the indirect smothering of the opposition—the legislature talks and represents “democracy,” while the executive acts autocratically. Socialism can not conquer Capitalism by assuming control of and using the parliamentary system: the system must be destroyed; and Socialism, accordingly, actually or potentially, prepares the norms of the proletarian state, the state of the industrially organized producers. The proletarian revolution annihilates the parliamentary system and its division of functions, legislative and executive, being united into one working body,—as in the Soviets of Workers and Peasants. The parliamentary state is purely territorial; the proletarian state, during its period of dictatorship, is territorial and industrial, until it emerges definitely into Socialism, when the state disappears, being replaced by the “administration of things,” an industrial “state” functioning through the organized producers.

During its one day's session, the Constituent Assembly adopted a number of resolutions, declaring Russia a Democratic Federated Republic; abolishing “forever... the right to privately own land,” placing all land, mines, forests and waters under the control of the Republic, making the use of these “free to all citizens of the Russian Republic, regardless of nationality or creed.” Another resolution, “expressing the firm will of the people to immediately discontinue the war and conclude a just and general peace, appeals to the Allied countries proposing to define jointly the exact terms of a democratic peace acceptable to all the belligerent nations, in order to present these terms, in behalf of the Allies, to the Governments fighting against the Russian Republic and her Allies.” ... “Expressing, in the name of the people of Russia, its regret that the negotiations with Germany, which were started without a prelimi-

nary agreement with the Allied democracies, have assumed the character of negotiations for a separate peace, the Constituent Assembly, in the name of the peoples of the Russian Federal Republic, while continuing the armistice, accepts the further carrying on of the negotiations with the countries warring against us in order to work towards a general democratic peace which shall be in accordance with the people's will and protect Russia's interests."

Shortly after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the All-Russian Soviet Congress approved the action of its Executive Committee in dissolving the Assembly, and about the same time a Peasant's Assembly also ratified the dissolution. The peasants, through the Social-Revolutionists of the Left, now the dominant factor in the Social-Revolutionary Party and who accepted the program of the Bolsheviks and the Soviets, approved not only the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly but the general legislative measures of the Soviet regime.

* * *

Declaration of the Soviet Executive Committee, read at the opening session of the Constituent Assembly for adoption, and rejected:

I

1.—Russia is to be declared a Republic of the workers', soldiers' and peasants' Soviets. All power in the cities and in the country belongs to the Soviets.

2.—The Russian Soviet Republic is based on the free federation of free peoples, on the federation of National Soviet Republics.

II

Recognizing as its duty the destruction of all exploitation of the workers, the complete abolition of the class system of society, and the placing of society on a Socialistic basis, and the ultimate bringing about of a victory for Socialism in every country, the Constituent Assembly decides further:

1.—The socializing of land will be carried out, private ownership of land will be abolished, all the land is proclaimed to be the common property of the people and will be given to the toiling people without compensation on the principle of equal right to use the land.

All the forests, mines and waters, which are of social import-

ance, as also all living and other property, and all agricultural enterprises will be declared national property.

2.—To confirm the Soviets' law concerning the control of working conditions, the highest Council of National Economy, which is the first step in bringing about the ownership by the Soviets of the factories, mines, railroads and means of production and transportation as property of the Soviet Republic.

3.—To confirm the transferring of all banks over into the hands of the Soviet Republic, which is one of the steps in the freeing of the toiling masses from the yoke of Capitalism.

4.—To enforce general compulsory labor, in order to destroy the class of parasites and to organize economic life. In order to make the power of the toiling masses secure and to hinder the restoration of the rule of exploiters, the toiling masses will be armed and a Red Guard, composed of workingmen and peasants, formed, and the exploiting classes will be disarmed.

III

1.—Declaring its firm determination to free society from the claws of Capitalism and Imperialism, which have drenched the country in blood in this, the most criminal of all wars, the Constituent Assembly accepts completely the policy of the Soviets, whose duty it is to publish all secret treaties, to organize the most extensive fraternization among the workers and peasants of the warring armies, and to bring about by the use of revolutionary methods a democratic peace among the nations without annexations and indemnities, on the basis of free self-determination of the nations—at any price.

2.—For this purpose the Constituent Assembly demands complete separation from the brutal policy of the bourgeoisie, which is furthering the well-being of exploiters among a few selected nations by enslaving hundreds of millions of the toiling people, in colonies generally and in small countries.

The Constituent Assembly accepts the policy of the Council of People's Commissaires, which has given complete independence to Finland, begun the transferring of soldiers from Persia, and declared for Armenia the right of self-determination.

A first blow to international bank and finance capital, declares the Constituent Assembly, is a law which annuls those loans made by the governments of the Czar, of landowners and bourgeoisie; and that the Soviet Government is to continue firmly on this road

until the final victory from the yoke of capital is won through the international workers' revolt.

As the Constituent Assembly was elected on the basis of the lists of candidates nominated before the November Revolution, when the people as a whole could not yet rise against their exploiters, and did not know the extent of the latter's might of opposition in defending their own privileges, and had not yet begun to create a Socialistic society, the Constituent Assembly would consider it, even from a formal point of view, as unjust to put itself against the Soviet power. The Constituent Assembly is of the opinion that now, in the decisive moment of the struggle of the people against the exploiters, the exploiters cannot have any seat in any of the Government organizations. Power must completely and without exception belong to the people and to the authoritative representatives—to the workers', soldiers' and peasants Soviets.

Supporting the Soviet rule and accepting the orders of the Council of People's Commissaires, the Constituent Assembly acknowledges that its duty is to outline a form for the reorganization of society on a Socialistic basis.

Striving at the same time to organize a free and voluntary, and thereby also a complete and strong union among the toiling classes of all the Russian nationalities, the Constituent Assembly is content to outline the basis of the federation of Russian Soviet Republics, leaving to the people, to workingmen and soldiers, to decide for themselves in their own Soviet meetings, whether they are willing, and on what conditions, to join the federated government and other unions of the Soviet enterprises.

These great principles are to be published without delay and the official representatives of the Soviets are required to read them at the opening of the Constituent Assembly. These principles are the working basis of the Assembly.

* * *

Decree of the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets officially dissolving the Constituent Assembly:

The Russian Revolution has from the beginning put to the fore the workers' and peasants' Soviets as a mass organization of all workers and exploited classes, which is the only body capable of directing the struggle of these classes for their complete political and economic liberation. During the first period of the Revolution the Soviets increased, developed and were strengthened, on the

basis of their own experience, rejecting the idea of the possibility of a compromise with the bourgeoisie and rejecting the deceptive bourgeois democratic parliamentary formalities, coming, in practice, to the conclusion that the liberation of the oppressed classes is impossible unless all such formalities and compromises are rejected. These relations were finally broken by the November Revolution which gave complete power to the Soviets. The Constituent Assembly, elected on the basis of the lists prepared prior to the November Revolution, was the result of the relative party power in force at the time when the government was composed of men favoring a policy of compromise with the Cadets. The people could not at that time, when there were only Social-Revolutionary candidates, differentiate between the supporters of the Right Wing Social-Revolutionists, the supporters of the bourgeoisie, and the Left Wing, supporters of Socialism. Therefore, this Constituent Assembly which was intended to be the crown of the bourgeois parliamentary republic, because of its very composition, had to oppose the November Revolution and the Soviet Government. The November Revolution, which gave power to the Soviets and through them to the workers and exploited class, was strongly opposed by the exploiters. The crushing of this opposition clearly showed the beginning of a Socialist revolution. The working class became convinced by their experience that the old parliamentarism had outlived its time, that it could not comply with the realization of the tasks of Socialism, and that, not the social but only class institutions, such as the Soviets, are capable of crushing the opposition of the propertied classes and to lay the foundations of a Socialistic commonwealth.

The refusal of the Soviets to use their full power and to abandon the Soviet Republic, which is supported by the people, on behalf of bourgeois parliamentarism and of Constituent Assembly, would now be a step backward and lead to the destruction of the November Revolution.

The majority in the Constituent Assembly, which opened on the 18th of this month, is composed of the Social-Revolutionary Party's Right Wing, the party of Kerensky, Avksentyev and Chernov. It is but natural that this party refused to take under consideration the complete, exact and clear proposition of the highest body of the Soviet Government, which proposition in no way could have been misunderstood, and that it refused to accept the proclamation of the rights of the toiling and exploited people and to recognize the November Revolution and the Soviet Government. Thus the Constituent Assembly broke all its ties with Russian Soviet Republic. The

Bolsheviki and the left wing Social-Revolutionists, who are supported by the great majority of the workers and peasants, were under such conditions compelled to withdraw from this Constituent Assembly. Outside of the Constituent Assembly, the members of the Social-Revolutionary Right Wing and the Mensheviki, the majority in the Constituent Assembly, are openly fighting against the Soviet Government, agitating in their newspapers that their supporters overthrow this government, and thus they are supporting exploiters who are opposing the transferring of land and factories to the workers and peasants.

It is thus clear that the remaining part of the Constituent Assembly can give their support only to the bourgeois counter-revolution in its fight to crush the Soviets. Therefore, the Executive Committee of the Soviets has decided to dissolve the Constituent Assembly.

PART SIX

The Revolutionary Struggle for Peace

**By LEON TROTZKY
and N. LENIN**

INTRODUCTION

In the problem of peace the Soviet Government met a crucial test. As this problem had been a vital issue in the struggle against the Provisional Government, it was now a vital issue in the activity of the Workers' and Peasants' Government. The great masses of the people yearned for peace; and yet the problem was not as simple as all that. Peace had to be considered in relation to the Revolution, and the struggle for peace must be in accord with the policy of the Revolution.

The first move toward the conclusion of peace was the offer of the Soviet Government to all belligerents to declare an armistice on all fronts and open general peace negotiations. A day or two after this offer was made, Leon Trotsky, Commissaire of Foreign Affairs, delivered an address in Petrograd, to an audience of 12,000 people, in which he said:

"In this building on November 5 I spoke to a popular meeting at which the question of an All-Russian Congress was being discussed, and all voices were raised in favor of Soviet power. The question which has been most emphatically before the people in all the eight months of the Revolution is the question of war and peace, and we maintained that only a power basing its authority directly on the people could put an end to the slaughter. We maintained that the secret treaties must be published, and declared that the Russian people, not having made these treaties, could not be bound to carry out the conquests agreed upon therein. Our enemies answered that this was demagoguery. You would never dare, if you were in power, they said, to do this, for then the Allies would oppose us. But we maintained that the salvation of Russia was in peace. We pointed out that the prolonged character of the war was destroying the Revolution, was exhausting and destroying the country, and that the longer we should fight the more complete the slavish position we should then occupy, so that at last we should merely be left the choice of picking a master.

"We desire to live and develop as a free nation; but, for the conclusion of peace, we had to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie and of Kerensky. They told us we would be left without any supporters. But on November 7 the local Soviet of Petrograd took the initiative upon itself, as well as the responsibility; and, with the aid of the garrison and the workers, accomplished the *coup d'état*, appeared before the Congress of Soviets then in session, and said: 'The old power in the country is broken, there is no authority anywhere, and we are obliged to take it into our own hands.' We have said that the first obligation devolving upon the new power is the offering of peace parleys on all fronts, for the conclusion of a peace without annexations or indemnities on the basis of self-determination of peoples, that is, each people, through popular elections, must speak for itself the decisive word: Do they wish to enter into a confederation with their present

sovereign state, enjoying full autonomy under it, or do they wish to separate themselves from it and have full independence? We must put a stop to a condition in which the strong can, by force of arms, compel the weak to assume what conditions of life the strong may desire: every people, be it great or small, must be the master of its own fate. Now, this is the program not of a party, not of a Soviet, but of the whole people, excepting the predatory party which dares call itself the Party of Popular Liberty, but which in reality is an enemy of popular liberty, fighting against peace with all its might, and against which we have declared our implacable hostility—with the exception of this party, the whole Russian people has declared that it will not tolerate the use of force. And this is the spirit in which we issue our peace decree.

"On the day on which we passed this decree, Krasnov's Cossacks rebelled and danger threatened the very existence of the Soviet power. Yet, hardly had they been defeated and the Soviet authority strengthened, than our first act was to turn to the Allied and German authorities, simultaneously, with a proposition for peace parleys on all fronts. Our enemies, the Cadets and their appendages, said that Germany would ignore us—but it has turned out otherwise, and we already have the assent of Germany and Austria-Hungary to the holding of peace parleys and preliminary peace on the Soviet formula. And even before that, as soon as we obtained the keys to the case of secret diplomatic correspondence, we published the secret treaties, thus fulfilling an obligation that we had assumed toward the people when we were still an insignificant opposition party. We said then, and we say now, that a people cannot shed their blood and that of their brothers for treaties that they have not themselves concluded, have never read or even seen. To these words of mine the adherents of coalition made reply: Do not speak to us in this tongue: this is not the Modern Circus [a large hall for mass-meetings in Petrograd, where this particular address of Trotzky was delivered]. And I answered them, that I have only one tongue, the tongue of a Socialist, and I shall speak in this tongue to the country and to you, to the Allies and the Germans.

"To the adherents of coalition, having the souls of hares, it seemed that to publish the secret treaties was equivalent to forcing England and France to declare war on us. But they did not understand that their ruling circles throughout the duration of the war have been talking the people into the idea that the treacherous, cruel enemy is Germany, and that Russia is a noble land; and it is impossible within twenty-four hours to teach them the opposite. By publishing the secret treaties we have incurred the enmity of the governing classes in those countries, but their peoples we have won to our support. We shall not make a diplomatic peace; it will be a people's peace, a soldiers' peace, a real peace. And the outcome of our open policy was clear: Judson appeared at the Smolny Institute, and declared, in the name of America, that the protest to the Dukhonin staff against the new power was a misunderstanding, and that America had no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia; and, consequently, the American question is disposed of.

"But there is another conflict that is not yet settled. I must tell you about it. Because of their fight for peace, the English Government has arrested and is now detaining in concentration camp George Tchicherin,

[who was released, and subsequently became Commissaire of Foreign Affairs in the Soviet Government] who has devoted his wealth and his knowledge to the peoples of Russia, England, Germany and France, and the courageous agitator of the English workers, the emigrant Petroff. I communicated in writing with the English Embassy, saying that Russia was now permitting the presence within her borders of many wealthy Englishmen, who are engaged in counter-revolutionary conspiracies with the Russian bourgeoisie, and that we were therefore all the more disinclined to permit Russian citizens to be thrown into English prisons; that, consequently, all those against whom there were no criminal charges should be liberated at once. Failure to comply with this request will mean that we shall refuse passports to English subjects desiring to leave Russia. The People's Soviet Power is responsible for the well-being of the entire people; wherever its citizens may be, they shall enjoy its protection. If Kerensky spoke to the Allies like a shop-attendant to his boss, we are prepared to show that we shall live with them only on terms of equality. We have more than once said that anyone who counts on the support and friendship of the free and independent Russian people must approach them with respect for them and for their human dignity.

"As soon as the Soviets found themselves with power in their hands, we proposed peace parleys in the name of the Russian people. We had a right to speak in the name of the people, for everything that we proposed, as well as the whole program of the People's Commissaires, consists of doctrines and propositions voted on and passed in hundreds and thousands of Soviets, factories and works, that is, by the entire people. Our delegation will speak an open and courageous language: do you agree to the holding of an immediate peace conference on all the fronts? And if they say, Yes, we shall ask them to invite their governments and allies to send their delegates. Our second question will be: Do you mean to conclude peace on a democratic foundation? If we are forced to make peace alone, we shall declare to Germany that it is inadmissible to withdraw their troops from the Russian front to some other front, since we are offering an honorable peace and cannot permit England and France to be crushed by reason of it.

"Secret diplomacy shall not be tolerated for a single moment during the negotiations. Our flyers and our radio-service will keep all the nations informed of every proposition we make, and of the answers they elicit from Germany. We shall be sitting in a glass house, as it were, and the German soldiers, through thousands of newspapers, in German, which we shall distribute to them, will be informed of every step we take and of every German answer.

"We say that Lithuania and Courland must themselves decide the question, with whom they will join forces, and that Germany must, not in words only, but in deeds, heed the free expression of the will of the peoples. And if, after these frank and honorable declarations, the Kaiser refuses to make peace, if the banks and exchanges, which profit by the war, destroy our peace, the nations will see on whose side is the right, and we shall come out the stronger, the Kaiser and the financiers the weaker. We shall feel ourselves to be not the vanquished, but the victors, for peace hath its victories no less renowned than war. For a nation that has assumed power after having cast out its enemies, such a nation is victorious. We

know no other interests than those of the people, but these interests are identical with the interests of the peoples of all nations. We declare war upon war. The Czars are afraid of the conclusion of peace, are afraid that the peoples will ask for an accounting for all the great sacrifices they have made and the blood they have shed. Germany, in agreeing to peace negotiations, is heeding the will of her people; she knows that they want her to answer, and that if she does not answer the Russian Revolution will become the ally of the German people. France and England ought to come to the discussion on the conclusion of peace, but if they do not, their own peoples, who will know of the course of the transactions, will cast them out with rods. The Russian representatives at the peace table will be transformed into plaintiffs; the peoples will sit in judgment on their rulers. Our experience of the manner in which the rulers have treated their peoples in the forty months of the war has not been wasted. In your name we shall say to our brothers: Understand that in the moment you turn your revolutionary strength against your bourgeoisie, not one Russian soldier will shoot! This promise will be given in your name, and you will keep it."

The war was destroying the Revolution. Peace was a central problem of the Revolution. The moderates' policy of trying through diplomacy to influence the Entente governments collapsed, and collapsed miserably. The collapse was inevitable, and it did not even develop revolutionary reserves for action in the days to come; the class struggle method would, at least, develop these reserves. As a realistic necessity alone, peace was indispensable. The country was disorganized industrially; and should all energies be concentrated upon war, internal reconstruction could not be put through, the disorganization would become worse. Considering that war to-day is more a matter of the internal front than of actual fighting, less a military problem than a problem of intensive production, the economic disintegration prevailing in Russia was the decisive factor in war and peace. The Russian army was bled white, having had 8,000,000 casualties due to the criminal corruption of the Czar's regime. The disintegration of the army and the disorganization of industry were produced by the autocratic regime, and completed by the regime of Kerensky. When the Bolsheviki assumed power, virtual chaos was their inheritance.

In spite of all these disadvantageous conditions, the Bolsheviki made a bold and magnificent attempt to secure a general peace, in accord with Socialist policy. The policy of the Bolsheviki on peace may be summarized as follows:

The slogan of a "democratic peace" is a mockery, if the peace is to be concluded by bourgeois governments; a peace concluded in this way, on no matter what terms (even on terms of no annexations and no indemnities,) is in fact an imperialistic peace fundamentally, if it is not accompanied by the overthrow of Imperialism. A "democratic peace" means a peace largely on the *status quo ante*, an imperialistic status. Moreover, the prolongation of the war, and its sacrifices, compelled each government to strain for annexations and indemnities; only proletarian pressure could secure even an ordinary "democratic peace." All nations have imperialistic objectives of one sort or another, and military victory will reveal these objectives. Socialism, accordingly, aims at a revolutionary peace, a peace concluded by the revolutionary proletariat through its overthrow of Imperialism in all belliger-

ent nations, or through the acquisition of revolutionary reserves for action in the days to come. A peace of this character means the revolutionary waging of the international proletarian class struggle, the incessant fight for the proletarian revolution, which was given impetus by the proletarian revolution in Russia. The Bolsheviki, accordingly, determined to use their struggle for peace to develop the action of the proletariat in all belligerent nations, to appeal to the proletariat, particularly the proletariat of Germany, to act against their imperialistic governments for the Social Revolution. The struggle for peace was a means to an end: the proletarian revolution in Europe. The proposal for an armistice on all fronts was a means of developing proletarian action, by placing the question of peace before the people, getting the soldiers out of the trenches, encouraging fraternizing, and giving the soldiers opportunity to discuss and act on the problem of peace.

A revolutionary peace was an indispensable condition for the proletarian revolution in Russia. The moderates in the Soviets sensed this fact, hence the appeals to the German proletariat to revolt; but their policy, in accord with the Socialist moderates in the other belligerent nations, directly hampered the revolutionary action of the proletariat by arousing faith in diplomacy and in pro-government, imperialistic conferences at Stockholm and Paris. How could the proletariat of Germany be expected to revolt against its government, when revolutionary Russia was directed by a bourgeois government that could not conceal its imperialistic bias? That secretly plotted war and conspired against the Revolution? It was a psychological and political contradiction. In Germany, where bourgeoisie and autocracy are one, a revolution would from the start have to be a proletarian revolution. The first requisite for a real appeal to the proletariat to revolt was the complete success of the proletarian revolution in Russia. This was a crucial problem of revolutionary Russia: either the proletarian revolution in Europe, or the acute danger of a collapse of revolutionary hopes in Russia,—at the least, immensely complicating its problems of reconstruction and existence. The war was precipitated by Imperialism—it must be converted into a struggle against Imperialism; the war was directed against the proletariat, the proletariat must transform it into the Social Revolution.

Throughout the course of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, Trotzky and the Bolsheviki acted in accord with their revolutionary policy; they used Brest-Litovsk as a forum from which to address the proletariat and the Socialism of the world, particularly the Socialism and the proletariat of Germany. It was clear, from the start, that revolutionary Russia could not secure a just peace without the action of the belligerent proletariat.

But the proletariat did not immediately respond. And the proletariat did not respond largely because moderate Socialism, which dominated the stage, refused to accept the policy of revolutionary Russia, was part and parcel of the nationalistic and imperialistic forces of its own national bourgeoisie. Instead of developing proletarian action, moderate Socialism held the proletariat in leash—acted with imperialistic governments against the proletariat.

Austria and Germany accepted the proposal for an armistice, but the Allies refused, not even answering. This was a fatal error, which was intensified by the subsequent refusal to enter the general peace negotiations.

thereby permitting Germany to wreak her brutal purposes upon Russia. Nor did the Socialist movement respond to the opportunity of the armistice: on the whole, international Socialism, corrupt, hesitant, bourgeois, committed to a government policy, did nothing while revolutionary Russia in isolation struggled against desperate odds for a workers' peace.¹

The Soviet proposal was that general peace negotiations would be opened on the basis of an acceptance of the formula "no annexations and no indemnities." Austria and Germany accepted, but it was soon made clear by their plenipotentiaries that they were determined to interpret the formula to promote their imperialistic interests. The German proposal intensely brutal and hypocritical, was that self-determination had been already accomplished in the Russian territory occupied by Germany and Austria, by means of governments—set up by Germany and completely under German domination! Trotzky exposed the hypocrisy of this contention, and insisted that all German troops should evacuate the occupied provinces while a plebiscite was taken. The Austro-German diplomats refused. The Bolshevik representatives carried on a brilliant struggle, but the Austro-Germans were obdurate. The negotiations were temporarily broken off, while the armistice was extended for another period.

During this time, when the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk were making it amply clear that they were struggling for a just international peace, the Allied governments did nothing to support their efforts. The imperialistic policy of the bourgeois governments clashed with the revolutionary policy of the proletarian government.

In the meanwhile, the Bolsheviks were carrying on an intensive revolutionary propaganda in the armies of Germany and Austria, and in Germany and Austria itself. Through their bureau of International Propaganda, they

¹Not even the Socialist Party of the United States, which declared against the war, acted upon the armistice proposal. The Socialist Propaganda League alone in this country approved the armistice; at a mass meeting held in New York City December 20, it adopted the following resolution, which had been preceded for a month by a leaflet agitation:

"The workers of the world demand an immediate general peace, a peace that shall alter the imperialistic status quo ante in accord with the international aspirations of the revolutionary proletariat of Russia.

"The governments of the imperialistic belligerents are determined upon a continuation of the war in the interest of their particular Imperialism; the proletariat alone as a class is interested in and can hasten an immediate peace that shall promote civilization and progress.

"The class interests of the American proletariat make necessary the adoption of an immediate program of action:

"1.—We demand that the government accept the proposal of the de facto government of Russia for the immediate conclusion of an armistice on all belligerent fronts.

"2.—We demand that the government insist that Great Britain, France and Italy shall equally accept this armistice.

"3.—We demand that the negotiations for an armistice shall not include the discussion of peace terms, the discussion and formulation of those terms being left to the peoples of each belligerent nation.

"4.—We call upon the class conscious workers to prepare the organization of a proletarian peace congress, which shall discuss our action in co-operation with the international proletariat and in accord with the peace principles of revolutionary Socialism.

"The proletariat must organize as an independent factor in the process of securing peace, separate and distinct from all other groups. The proletariat alone is international in its interests, and it alone can determine the conclusion of an international peace upon the formula of revolutionary Russia.

"We affirm our solidarity with the proletariat of Russia, and express our fraternal appreciation of its intrepid class conscious activity."

printed millions of copies of newspapers in the German and Austrian language, which were circulated by means of aeroplanes, etc. This propaganda assumed enormous proportions, and seriously affected the morale of the Central Powers' troops,—how seriously only time can tell. At one of the sessions of the peace congress General Hoffman protested against the propaganda of the Bolsheviks, to which Trotzky retorted that neither the conditions of the armistice nor the character of the peace negotiations limited freedom of speech or press! An intensive propaganda was also carried on among the Austro-German war prisoners in Russia, resolutions were adopted repudiating the policy of their governments, and pledges made to fight in the cause of revolutionary Russia.

Upon the resumption of negotiations, Germany and Austria insisted upon their proposals, which amounted to annexations of the most brutal sort. A great strike movement, verging almost on a revolution, broke loose in Austria during the middle of January. In one district alone 90,000 workers went on strike, and the total must have been near a million. It was a spontaneous mass movement of a revolutionary character,—the dynamic mass action out of which revolutions arise. But the reactionary administrations of the imperialistic unions and of the government Social Democratic Party acted against the strikes. When the news of the strikes reached Trotzky, he badgered the Teuton diplomats into an adjournment of the sessions for a week, hoping that time would deepen the scope of the strikes. The great strike movement broke loose against the Socialist Party leaders, who were taken by surprise, but who immediately placed themselves at its head and led it astray. The movement spread to Germany, where hundreds of thousands of workers were involved, but where the unions acted against the strike; as the Berlin *Vorwärts* pleaded, "we don't want a revolution, we simply want the government to mediate its differences with the strikers."

The Scheidemann faction preached incessantly against a revolution, using the Russian situation to promote an imperialistic German peace. Moderate Socialism again betrayed the proletariat and the revolution, openly and shamelessly doing the vile counter-revolutionary work of their imperialistic governments. The unions refused to pay strike benefits and ordered the strikers back to work; the dominant moderate Socialism used its moral influence to terrorize the strikers and potential rebels into submission. The workers, betrayed and maligned by the very movement that should have directed them to victory, were beaten sullenly back.²

²After the strike movement was destroyed, Dr. Drews, Prussian Minister of the Interior, said the strikes served Germany's enemies, and accused the Social Democratic Party of encouraging the strikers. To this the Berlin "Vorwärts," organ of the government Socialists, answered by quoting Prime Minister von Dandl of Bavaria as having thanked the Social Democratic leaders in a speech in the Bavarian Chamber of Deputies for "assuring control of the strike movement, as thereby the strike would be forced into normal channels."

On the other hand, revolutionary Socialism in Germany distributed secretly many revolutionary appeals, of which this is one:

"The German government has demonstrated by means of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, that it wishes to throw dust in the eyes of the masses and to aggravate the death struggles of the warring peoples. Its pretended love for peace is merely a mask. Its statement, that a partial peace would bring us nearer to a general peace, is a lie and an imposture.

"A separate peace with Russia would increase the fury of the war on the other fronts and, consequently, increase the slaughter. The suffer-

The success of the Soviet peace policy did not depend alone upon the response of the German proletariat, but of all the belligerent proletariat, an international response. The Soviet's appeal to the Entente proletariat may be characterized by the following quotation from a declaration to British Labor issued by Maxim Litvinoff, Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain:

"Our revolutionary propaganda among the German soldiers on the western front and among the prisoners of war is undermining the strength of German autocracy and militarism more effectively than military victories could, and has already provoked a strong peace movement in Germany and Austria. But these endeavors meet with opposition not only from the capitalists in Russia, but from capitalists all the world over. The Russian Revolution, with its dash and vigor, has become the focus of the hatred of international Capitalism, and now the prolongation of the war, in addition to its former imperialistic aims, has another aim—to crush the Soviets and the Revolution.

"Realize this! The further prolongation of the war must lead to the defeat of the Russian Revolution and to the triumph of militarism and reaction everywhere. An immediate, just, democratic peace on its principle of no annexations, no indemnities, will spell the downfall of militarism in all countries. This peace can be achieved if only labor will speak in full voice and act with all its might. Workers of Britain, peace is in the balance! The Russian workers appeal to you to join them in their efforts to turn the scale. Labor—speak!"

But British labor did not speak. Socialism in Italy made a moral response, Deputy Morgari declaring in the Chamber that Italian Socialists favored an immediate general peace not only on the Bolshevik terms, but by Bolshevik methods. The French Socialists responded by ignoring the determined efforts of the Soviets for a general peace and covertly hurling slanders at the Bolsheviks. The Socialist group in the Chamber of Deputies issued a resolution addressed to the Russian Socialists, bearing twenty-eight signatures, among them Albert Thomas, Jules Guesde, Jean Longuet, Marcel Cachin, Comperc-Morel and Sembat, from which we quote:

"To-day it is with deep pain that we have seen some of you enter upon pour-parlers which may lead to a separate peace. Such a consummation would not only permit the Central Empires to prepare for, or to actually achieve, a military victory and finally to dictate their conditions in the name of force, it would even serve—it already serves—the machinations of all the enemies of democracy and Socialism in the world by permitting them to invoke the Russian Revolution as an example of disintegration and of demoralization.

"Has not Germany, followed by her allies, until now declined to make known her war aims? There is in war a terrible logic. The Soviets realize

ings of the German people would not be abated.

"It becomes the duty of the German working class to battle unceasingly for a general peace.

"There is only one means of putting an end to the present butchery and misery of the workers—the overthrow of the government and the bourgeois class, in the way that this was done in Russia. It is solely by mass effort, by the revolt of the masses, by a mass strike, paralyzing all economic activity and all war industries; it is solely by a revolution and the setting up of a people's republic in Germany by and for the working class, that an end may be put to the murder of the toilers of all lands, that a general peace can be achieved."

this, for, while affirming their desire for a general peace, they said: 'Let us ask Germany to make known her war aims and the German Socialists to have a revolution, just as we have.'

"The Soviets obtained neither one answer nor the other. Nevertheless, peace can be nothing but just, nothing but lasting. It can be both only by the democratic will of the people. A separate peace cannot be that. . . . It would be a moral disaster the burden of which would be borne everywhere by international Socialism as a perfectly natural consequence.

"But most of all, Russia should find at the earliest possible moment a stable government whence shall arise the new life. A Constituent Assembly alone can furnish it; it alone can end the conflicts which unseat dictators without giving them authority and security for the morrow; it alone can say that it governs for the people by the people. . . .

"And we French Socialists who find in the seriousness of events and in the consciousness of our responsibilities the inspiration for these friendly declarations, we do not hesitate to say to you: We also realize the extent of our duties. French Socialists will do nothing to weaken the resistance of the army and people of France, but rather strengthen the morale of both, and forcefully implore the allied governments that they clearly indicate by their actions their oft-repeated declarations that they are fighting because they are attacked and that they would obtain no peace other than that of right. Thus would a promise of revision of the aim of war be imposed upon the governments."

But the French Socialists did not "impose" a revision of the aims of the war upon the governments. They promised revolutionary Russia the same illusory hope against which the masses had revolted, and in the accomplishment of which Kerensky has egregiously failed. Moreover, it wasn't a matter of "revision of aims" or of government promises, each of which are inconsequential; the character of the peace will be determined by *class power*, by the relations of classes. The attitude of the French Socialists strengthened the power of the imperialistic bourgeoisie and weakened the revolutionary power of the proletariat. The proletarian class struggle alone, waged aggressively against all Imperialism, is the instrument with which to secure a peace of understanding between the workers. "It is with deep pain," says the French Socialist resolution, "that we have seen some of you enter upon *pour-parlers* that may lead to a *separate peace*." The resolution has the grace of not accusing the Bolsheviks of desiring or planning a separate peace. The offer for an armistice was on *all* fronts; the invitation to a peace conference was for *general* peace negotiations; *the Soviet delegation at Brest-Litovsk submitted proposals as a basis for a general peace*; it was largely the refusal of the Entente governments to participate, an abstention justified by the moderate Socialists, which provided Germany its opportunity to convert the conference into one for a separate peace. And all through the conference, even after it had become one for a separate peace, the Bolsheviks emphasized the necessity for a general peace, appealed to the Socialist conscience in all the belligerent nations for revolutionary action, and did not even receive moral support; aye, were reviled and slandered unmercifully by moderate Socialism.³

³Trotsky, answering the French Socialists, declared: "Experience has shown that the war cannot be solved by force of arms. On the mil-

made for resuming the war against German Imperialism on terms that were not hopeless, and acting to develop the proletarian revolution in Germany.

The discussion of the treaty in the Congress was extraordinarily violent, but Lenin's dominating personality and relentless logic carried conviction, and the treaty was ratified by an overwhelming majority. Germany imposed upon Russia an indemnity of 6,000,000,000 rubles, and virtually annexed 780,000 square kilometres of former Russian territory, including 56,000,000 inhabitants.

During the course of the peace negotiations, the German majority Socialists declared they would break with the Government should it impose an annexationist peace; and after such a peace was imposed, by means extraordinarily brutal and infamous, these "Socialists" did not break with the Government; indeed, they did not even vote against ratification in the Reichstag, abstaining from voting. On February 26, in a Reichstag address, Scheidemann had said: "Within a few days the curtain will fall upon the fifth act of that great tragedy, the Russian Revolution. What has happened was not the intention of the Social Democracy. Before the whole world we declare that the policies that were used against Russia were not our policies." Answering this hypocrisy, Dr. Hans Block, Independent Socialist, in an article *Pontius Pilate Scheidemann*, said: "There is something in the bitter tears of the Apostle Peter, in the repentance and suicide of the traitor Judas, that appeals to us. But in this great human tragedy of the past, neither the cowardly St. Peter, nor even the faithless Judas Iscariot are as contemptible as that great Pontius Pilate, the original cold 'politician,' who 'washed his hands in innocence.' Human repentance and human grief awaken sympathy, even for the faithless. But cold, self-satisfied self-justification can arouse only hatred and disgust. 'Before the whole world we declare that the policies that were used against Russia were not our policies.' They have voted for war loans, and will continue to vote for them; they have supported the government, and will continue to support it; they have sworn allegiance to the annexationist majority bloc,—but they wash their hands in innocence and declare, 'What has happened in Russia was not the intention of the German Social Democracy.'"

After this acceptance of an infamous peace, the revolutionary Soviet Government set itself to the task of reconstruction, industrial, political and military. Earnest efforts were made to organize a new army; Trotzky accepted the post of Commissaire of War; and the All-Russian Congress in July decided to introduce conscription, the unanimous opinion being that, considering the international situation, an active, efficient army was necessary to preserve the Revolution against any and all aggression. Imperialistic Germany and revolutionary Russia each realized that the "peace" was temporary, and each awaited the ultimate decision that was pending. Germany assumed that she could hold on the west, convince the Allies of the futility of Victory over the Central Powers, and thus be able to retain the conquests in the East. Revolutionary Russia assumed that during the period of the prolongation of war, she would recuperate, economically and militarily, and then strike a blow against Imperialism either at the moment of a German Revolution, or independently when Germany was exhausted by the sanguinary struggle on the western front.

In accepting the German peace, revolutionary Russia met its first defeat,

—a defeat for the cause of the proletariat throughout the world, a defeat in the great struggle for the only just peace that can end the war—a general peace of understanding by the workers, a democratic peace made and enforced by the proletariat in all belligerent nations. Not one title of the blame for this defeat, however, lies with the revolutionary proletariat of Russia. The bulk of the blame for the temporary defeat of the peace policy of revolutionary Russia lies with the Socialism and the proletariat of Germany and Austria, and the rest lies with the Socialism and the proletariat of France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States,—for nowhere was there an adequate response to the appeal of revolutionary Russia to the proletariat of the world.

But the struggle is not at an end. The Revolution is supreme, the power of the Soviets intact. Should the Soviets retain supremacy, the struggle will break out anew between the Revolution and all Imperialism, between the Revolution and German Imperialism in particular. The international revolution of the proletariat is a process in which temporary defeat simply paves the way for ultimate victory. In ending the military war against German Imperialism, the Soviet Republic started a new war—a class war, a war of propaganda to bring the proletarian revolution in Germany and Austria.

Should the Soviets have co-operated with the Allies in an imperialistic war upon Germany? But this was a political and psychological impossibility. The Allies flirted all along, and still flirt, with the counter-revolutionary forces in Russia; they supported Kerensky, sympathized with Kornilov, and refused to recognize the Soviet Government. They refused to participate in *general* peace negotiations. When Germany was ruthlessly invading Russia, after Trotzky had refused to sign the peace treaty, did the Allies offer aid to the Soviets? No! Great Britain, France and Italy agreed that Japan should "intervene" in Russia to "restore order"—the identical pretext used by Germany to justify its infamous invasion. This attitude of the Allies morally strengthened Germany in its aggression. "Why," said the German imperialists to the workers, "even our enemies refuse to recognize the Soviet Government and the Bolsheviki, even they are considering the necessity of intervening in anarchic Russia. Our invasion is not an invasion, it is a necessary measure in the interest of civilization." The proletarian revolution must expect bitter opposition from international Imperialism; and the history of revolutionary Russia's struggle for peace clearly illustrates that the proletariat must rely upon itself alone, that all non-proletarian forces are arrayed against it. Only through uncompromising class struggle can the proletariat conquer. True enough, this class struggle temporarily weakened Russia as against Germany, but this was unavoidable in order to crush the imperialistic and counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie; *and it must always be borne in mind that the overwhelming bulk of the territory annexed by Germany was conquered during the regime of the Czar.* Revolutionary Russia will yet, through the class struggle, conquer imperialistic Germany; the international proletariat will yet, through the class struggle, conquer all Imperialism.

The material comprised in Part Six consists of a pamphlet by Trotzky on Peace (Chapters I to V), a speech by Trotzky in February, Lenin's "theses" on peace read to the March All-Russian Soviet Congress, and an article by Lenin appearing in *Pravda* in April.

L. C. F.

I.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND REVOLUTION. (TROTZKY.)

Our adversaries accuse us, who stand on revolutionary internationalist ground, of having considered it possible to enter into peace negotiations with the monarchistic and capitalistic representatives of Germany, Austria and their allies. If this be a contradiction, it is brought about, not by the inconsistency of our tactics, but by the objective state of affairs in Europe. In Russia, the proletariat placed itself at the head of the state, whereas in the other warring countries the power of the state still remains in the hands of the capitalist classes, their bureaucracies and their monarchies. The negotiations of workmen with capitalists during a strike do not at all contradict the principle of the class struggle. The same may be said of the negotiations of a proletarian government with that of the bourgeoisie, as long as the peoples of Europe put up with such governments.

It is usually the same people who reproach us with "betraying" our allies and of "concluding peace" with the Central Powers. This reproach is founded on a quite different estimate both of the allied and of the enemy governments. The fact, however, is that we recognise, in principle, no difference in this respect. An understanding with the government of the German Kaiser weighs as much in the scales of the policy of the international proletariat as the understanding with the governments of the King of Great Britain or of the Mikado. The national differences of state form and of diplomatic usage are completely moved to the background by the uniformity of the imperialistic aims and the methods of the present world policies of the great powers. As to the small states, they play a purely passive role, compelled as they are to dangle in the trail of the great imperialistic States and their groupings.

We must open negotiations with those governments which at present exist. However, we are conducting these negotiations in a way affording the peoples the fullest possibility of controlling the crimes of their governments, and so as to accelerate the rising of

the working masses against the imperialistic cliques. We are ready to support this uprising with all the forces at our command. The official and semi-official French patriots, who a few months ago supported Romanoff against us, are now indignant at our negotiations with the Hohenzollerns. They very often summon against us the help of the spirits of their ancestors, the Jacobins, who conducted no negotiations with the "tyrants" but declared ruthless war against them.

This opposition, which aims at the glorifying of the petty bourgeois democracy of the 18th century at the expense of the proletarian democracy of the 20th century, is in every respect irrelevant.

Our Revolution was directly generated by the war. In France, on the contrary, at the close of the 18th century, the war was generated by the Revolution.

After the French masses, principally the peasantry, had achieved the greatest revolutionary conquests, the stress of feudal Europe forced them to defend these conquests by force of arms against the foreign enemy. The enthusiasm of the revolution passed immediately into the zeal of war, which only meant the conveyance of the revolution across its national borders.

Our people bled in the course of the last three years in the imperialistic murder campaign, and the revolution became first of all a means of freeing them from the horrors and sufferings of the war. The Jacobin Revolution of 1792 had a feudal Europe against it. The proletarian revolution of 1917 faces an imperialistic Europe, divided into two hostile camps. If to the "sanscullotte" the war was the direct continuation of the liberating revolution, then to the Russian soldier who has not yet left the trenches occupied by him for three years, the revolutionary war on an extensive scale would seem nothing else but a continuation of the preceding murder.

This by no means implies that we renounce the revolutionary war. On the contrary, we consider it the duty of the revolutionary classes to defend the cause of Socialism against the inner as well as the foreign class-enemies. Doubtless our revolutionary war can become popular provided there is an open revolutionary fight of the proletariat at least in one of the European countries. The powerful impulse which Europe has received from the Russian Revolution, must now come back from Europe, thus materializing the thought of an international revolution in the consciousness of the working class of Russia, and supplying the stimulus to rouse them for a

revolutionary war. We do not doubt for a moment that, in consequence of the present war, the workmen of Europe will repeat the fight of the Russian proletariat, a month sooner or later, on more powerful economic foundations and in a more perfect political form. If, in awaiting the imminent revolutionary flood in Europe, Russia should be forced to conclude peace with the present-day governments of the Central Powers, it would be a provisional, temporary, transitory peace, with the revision of which the European Revolution will have to concern itself in the first place.

Our whole policy is built on the calculation upon this revolution. The peace-program, as submitted by us, can be fully accomplished only by overthrowing the capitalist governments. By resisting the realization of the democratic peace-program, the present-day governments are all the more surely preparing their catastrophic collapse. Through our peace-negotiations we are trying to give them every possible support in this respect.

Into the peace-program we include also the "United States of Europe." This motto does not belong to the official program of the Government of Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils, nor has it as yet received recognition from our party. Nevertheless we believe that the program of democratic peace leads to a republican World Federation beyond a European one (and a considerable part of the pamphlet is devoted to the statement of this opinion). This question is practically put to the European proletariat by the further development of the Revolution.

II.

WHAT IS A PEACE PROGRAM?

(TROTSKY.)

What is a peace program? From the viewpoint of the ruling classes or of the parties subservient to them, it is the totality of the demands, the ultimate realization of which must be ensured by the power of militarism. Hence, for the realization of Milyukov's "peace-program" Constantinople must be conquered by force of arms. Vandervelde's "peace-program" requires the expulsion of the Germans from Belgium as an antecedent condition. Bethmann-Holweg's plans were founded on the geographical war-map. From this standpoint the peace clauses reflect but the advantages achieved by force of arms. In other words, the peace program is the war program.

Such is the case prior to the intervention of the third power, the Socialist International. For the revolutionary proletariat, the peace program does not mean the demands which national militarism must fulfill, but those demands which the international proletariat intends to enforce by dint of its revolutionary fight against militarism in all countries. The more the international revolutionary movement expands, the less will the peace questions depend on the purely military position of the antagonists, and the more will the danger disappear lest the conditions of peace be understood by the masses as war-aims.

This is rendered most clear to us by the question of the fate of small nations and weak states.

The war began with a devastating invasion of Belgium and Luxemburg by the German armies. In the echo created by the violation of the small country, besides the false and egotistic anger of the ruling classes of the enemy, there reverberated also the genuine indignation of the common masses whose sympathy was attracted by the fate of the small country, crushed only because it happened to lie between two warring giants. At that first stage of the war the fate of Belgium attracted attention and sympathy, owing

to its extraordinarily tragic nature. But thirty-four months of warfare proved that the Belgium episode constituted only the first step towards the solution of the fundamental problem of the imperialistic war, namely, *the suppression of the weak by the strong*.

Capitalism in its international relations pursued the same methods applied by it in "regulating" the internal economic life of the nations. Competition is the means of systematically annihilating the small and medium-sized enterprises, and of achieving the supremacy of Great Capital. World competition of the capitalistic forces means the systematic subjection of the small, medium-sized and backward nations by the great and the greatest capitalistic powers. The more developed the technique of Capital, the greater the role played by high finance, and the higher the demands of militarism, all the more grows the dependency of the small States on the Great Powers. This process, forming as it does an indispensable element of imperialistic mechanics, flourishes undisturbed also in times of peace by means of state loans, railway and other concessions, military-diplomatic agreements, etc. The war uncovered and accelerated this process, inasmuch as it introduced the factor of open violence. The war destroys the last shreds of the "independence" of small states, quite regardless of the military outcome of the conflict between the two enemy camps.

Belgium still groans under the pressure of German militarism. This, however, is but the visible and dramatic expression of the collapse of her independence. The "deliverance" of Belgium does not at all constitute the fundamental aim of the Allied Governments. Both in the further progress of the war and after its conclusion, Belgium will become but a pawn in the great game of the capitalist giants. Failing the interference of the third power, "Revolution," Belgium may as a result of the war either remain in German bondage, or fall under the yoke of Great Britain, or be divided between the powerful robbers of the two coalitions. Imperialistic supremacy decrees that the weak be subjugated.

The same applies to Serbia, whose national energy served as a weight in the imperialistic world scales whose fluctuations to one side or the other are least of all influenced by the independent interests of the Serbian people.

The Central Powers drew the Turks and Bulgarians into the whirlpool of the war. Whether both these countries will remain as the south-eastern organ of the Austro-German imperialistic bloc ("Central Europe"), or will serve as small change when the bal-

ance sheet is drawn up, the fact remains that the war is writing the last chapter of the history of their independence.

Before the Russian Revolution, the independence of Persia was most obviously liquidated as a direct result of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907.

Roumania and Greece furnish us with a sufficiently clear example of how limited a "freedom of choice" is given to small states by the struggle of the imperialistic trust companies. Roumania preferred a mere gesture to an apparently free choice, when she sacrificed her neutrality. Greece tried by means of passive opposition to "remain at home." Just as if to show most tangibly the futility of the whole neutralist struggle for self-preservation, the whole European war, represented by the armies of Bulgaria, Turkey, France, England, Russia and Italy, shifted on to Greek territory. Freedom of choice is at best reflected in the form of self-suppression. In the end, both Roumania and Greece will share the same fate: They will be the stakes in the hands of the great gamblers.

At the other end of Europe, little Portugal deemed it necessary to enter the war on the side of the Allies. Such a decision might remain inexplicable, if, in the question of participation in the muddle, Portugal, which is under English protection, had had greater freedom than the Government of Tver or Ireland.

The capitalistic captains of Holland and of the three Scandinavian countries, are accumulating mountains of gold, thanks to the war. However, these four neutral states of North Western Europe are the more aware of the illusory character of their "sovereignty," which, even if it survives the war, will nevertheless be subject to the settlement of the bills advanced by the peace conditions of the great powers.

"Independent" Poland will be able, in the midst of imperialistic Europe, to keep a semblance of independence, provided she submits to a slavish financial and military dependence on one of the great groups of the ruling powers.

The extent of the independence of Switzerland clearly appeared in the compulsory and restrictive measures adopted regulating her imports and exports. The representatives of this small federative republic, who, cap in hand, go begging at the entrances of the two warring camps, can well understand the limited measure of independence and neutrality possible for a nation which cannot command some millions of bayonets.

If the war becomes an indeterminate equation in consequence

of the ever-increasing number of combatants and of fronts, thus rendering it impossible for the different governments to formulate the so-called "war aims," then the small states will have the at all events doubtful advantage that their historical fate may be reckoned as pre-determined. No matter which side proves victorious, and however far-reaching the influence of such a victory may be, the fact remains that there can no longer be a return to independence for the small States. Whether Germany or England wins,—in either case the question to be determined is *who* will be the direct master over the small nations. Only charlatans or hopeless fools can believe that the freedom of the small nations can be secured by the victory of one side or the other.

A like result would follow the third solution of the war, viz., its ending in a draw. The absence of pronounced preponderance of one of the combatants over the other will only set off all the more clearly both the dominance of the strong over the weak within either one of the camps, and the preponderance of both over the "neutral" victims of Imperialism. The issue of the war without conquerors or conquered is no guarantee for anybody: All small and weak states will none the less be conquered, and the same applies to those who bled to death on the battlefield as to those who tried to escape that fate by neutrality.

The independence of the Belgians, Serbians, Poles, Armenians and others, is regarded by us not as part of the Allies' War Program (as treated by Guesde, Plekhanov, Vandervelde, Henderson and others), but belongs to the program of the fight of the International Proletariat against Imperialism.

III.

STATUS QUO ANTE BELLUM.

(TROTSKY.)

Now the question is, can the proletariat under the present circumstances set up an independent peace program, i. e., solutions of the problems which caused the war of today or which have in the course of this war been brought to light. It has been intimated that the proletariat do not now command sufficient forces to bring about the realization of such a program. Utopian is the hope that the proletariat could carry out its own peace program as to the issue of the present war. What alternative is there save the struggle for the cessation of the war and for a peace without annexations, i. e., a return to the status quo ante bellum, to the state of affairs prior to the war? This we are told is by far the more realistic program. In what sense, however, may the term realistic be applied to the fight for the close of the war by means of a peace without annexation? Under what circumstances, we ask, can the end of the war be brought about? Theoretically, three typical possibilities may here be considered. (1) A decisive victory of one of the parties. (2) A general exhaustion of the opponents without decisive sway of one over the other. (3) The interference of the revolutionary proletariat, which interrupts by force the development of military events.

It is quite obvious that in the first case, if the war is ended by a decisive victory of one side it would be naive to dream of a peace free of annexations. If the Scheidemanns and Landsbergs, the staunch supporters of the work of their militarism, insist in parliament upon an "annexationless" peace, it is only with the firmest conviction that such protests can hinder no "useful" annexation. On the other hand, one of our former Czarist commanders-in-chief, General Alexieff, who dubbed the annexationless peace as "an utopian phrase," thought quite correctly that the offensive is the chief thing, and that in case of successful war operations everything else would come of itself. In order to wrest annexations from the

hands of the victorious party, which is armed to the teeth, the proletariat would naturally be in need of a revolutionary force, which it will have to be ready to use openly. In any case, it possesses no "economic" means to compel the victorious party to renounce the advantage of the victory gained.

The second possible issue of the war, on which those who seek to promote the narrow program "annexationless peace and nothing more" principally depend, presupposes that the war, exhausting as it does all the resources of the warring nations, will, without being interrupted by the third, the revolutionary, power, end in general exhaustion, without conquerors or conquered. To this very state, where militarism is too weak for effecting conquests, and the proletariat for making a revolution, the passive Internationalists of the Kautsky type adapted their abbreviated program of "annexationless peace," which they not seldom denote as a return to the *status quo ante bellum*. Here, however, the apparent realism lays bare its Achilles heel, for as a matter of fact an undecided issue of the war, as already shown, does not at all exclude annexations, but on the contrary presupposes them. That neither of the two powerful groups wins, does not mean that Serbia, Greece, Belgium, Poland, Persia, Syria, Armenia and others would be left uninjured. On the contrary, it is precisely for the account of these weakest that annexations will in this case be carried out. In order to prevent these reciprocal "compensations" the International Proletariat must needs set afoot a direct revolutionary uprising against the ruling classes. Newspaper articles, Congressional resolutions, Parliamentary protests and even public manifestations have never prevented the rulers from acquiring territories or from oppressing the weak peoples either by way of victory or by means of diplomatic agreements.

As regards the third possible issue of the war, it seems to be the clearest. It presupposes that while the war is still on, the international proletariat rises with a force sufficient to paralyze and finally to stop from the bottom up, the war. Obviously, in this most favorable case, the proletariat, having been powerful enough to stop the progress of the war, would not be likely to limit itself to that purely conservative program which goes no farther than the renunciation of annexations.

A powerful movement of the proletariat is thus a necessary prerequisite of the actual realization of an annexationless peace. But again, while presupposing such a movement, the foregoing program remains quite inadequate in that it acquiesces in the restora-

tion of the order which prevailed prior to the war and out of which the war broke out. The European *status quo ante bellum*, a resultant of wars, robbery, violation, red tape, diplomatic stupidity and weakness of peoples, remains as the only positive content of the motto, "without annexations."

In its fight against Imperialism, the proletariat cannot set up as its political aim the return to the old European map: It must set up *its own program of State and National relations*, harmonizing with the fundamental tendency of economic development, with the revolutionary character of the age and with the Socialist interests of the proletariat.

The mere statement of the motto, "without annexations," gives above all no criterion for a political orientation in the several problems, brought forth during the course of the war. Assuming that France later on occupies Alsace-Lorraine, is the German Social Democracy together with Scheidemann bound to demand the return of this province to Germany? Shall we demand the restitution of the kingdom of Poland to Russia? Shall we insist upon Japan's giving Chio-Chau back to Germany? Or that Italy yields back to its owners that part of Trentino now occupied by her? That would be nonsense. We should be fanatics of legitimacy, i. e., defenders of dynastic and "historic" rights in the sense of the most reactionary diplomacy. Besides, this program also demands a revolution for its fulfillment. In all these enumerated and in other similar cases we, confronted with the stern reality, shall naturally advance only one principle, viz., consultation of the peoples interested. This is certainly no absolute criterion. The French "Socialists" of the majority reduce the consultation of the population (of Alsace-Lorraine) to an unworthy mummy-show:—First occupying (that is, acquisition by force of arms) and then asking the population's consent to be annexed. It is quite clear that a real consultation, presupposes a state of revolution whereby the population can give their reply without being threatened by a revolver, be it German or French.

The only acceptable content of the motto "without annexations" is a protest against new *violent acquisitions*, which only amounts to the negation of *the rights of nations to self-determination*. But we have seen that this democratically unquestionable "right" will necessarily lead to the right of strong nations to make acquisitions and impose oppression, whereas for the weak nations it will result in feebleness of will or in "scraps of paper." Such will be the case as long as the political map of Europe forces nations and their

fractions within the confines of States, separated by tariff barriers and continually impinging upon one another in their imperialistic fights.

It is possible to overcome this régime only by means of a proletarian revolution. *Thus, the centre of gravity lies in the union of the peace-program of the proletariat with that of the Social Revolution.*

IV

RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

(TROTSKY)

We saw above, that Socialism, in the solution of concrete questions in the field of national state-groups and organizations of a new kind, can make no step without the principle of national self-determination, which latter in its last instance appears as the recognition of the right of every national group to decide its national fate, hence as the right of peoples to sever themselves from a given state (as for instance Russia or Austria). The only democratic way of getting to know the "will" of a nation is the referendum. This democratic-obligatory reply will, however, in the manner described, remain quite formal. It does not enlighten us with regard to the real possibilities, ways and means of national self-determination under the present conditions of capitalistic management: And yet the crux of the matter lies in all this.

For many, if not for the majority of the oppressed nations, national groups and factions, the meaning of self-determination is the cancellation of the existing borders and the dismemberment of present states. In particular, this democratic principle leads to the deliverance of the colonies. Yet the whole policy of Imperialism aims at the *extension* of state borders regardless of the national principle of the compulsory incorporation of weak states within the customs border, and the acquisition of new colonies. Imperialism is by its very nature both expansive and *offensive*, and it is this qualification that characterizes Imperialism, and not the changeable maneuvers of diplomacy.

Whence the perennial conflict between the principle of national self-determination which in many cases leads to state and economic decentralization, and the powerful efforts at centralization on the part of Imperialism which has at its disposal the State organization and the military power. True, the national-separatistic movement very often finds support in the Imperialistic intrigue of *The Neighboring State*. This support, however, becomes decisive only in the application of war-might. As soon as there is an

V.

THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE (TROTSKY)

We tried to prove in the foregoing that the economic and political union of Europe appears to be the *sine qua non* of the possibility of national self-determination. As the slogan of "National independence" of Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks and others remains an empty abstraction without the supplementary motto, "Federative Balkan Republic", which plays such an important role in the whole policy of the Balkan Social Democracy; so on the grand European scale, the principle of the "right" to self-determination can be effectively realized only on the background of a European Federative Republic.

But if on the Balkan peninsula the slogan of a democratic federation has become purely proletarian, this refers all the more to Europe with her incomparably deeper capitalistic antagonisms.

To bourgeois politics the destruction of inner European customs houses appears to be an unsurmountable difficulty; but without this the inter-state courts of arbitration and international law codes will have no firmer duration than, for instance, Belgian neutrality. The effort towards unifying the European market, which, like the effort towards the acquisition of non-European backward lands, is caused by the development of Capitalism, conflicts with the powerful opposition of the landed and capitalistic gentry themselves, in whose hands the tariff apparatus joined with that of militarism constitutes an indispensable weapon for exploitation and enrichment.

The Hungarian financial and industrial bourgeoisie is hostile to the idea of a tariff union with the more powerful Germany. On the other hand, the German landowners will never willingly consent to the cancellation of grain duties. Furthermore, the economic interests of the propertied classes of the Central Empires cannot be so easily made to coincide with the interests of the English, French, Russian capitalists and landed gentry: The present war speaks eloquently enough on this score. Lastly, the irreconcilability of capitalistic interests between the Allies themselves is still more visible

than in the Central States. Under these circumstances, a half way complete and consistent economic union of Europe *coming from the top* by means of an agreement of the capitalistic governments is absolutely unattainable. Here the matter can go no farther than partial compromise and half measures. Hence it is that *the economic union of Europe*, which offers colossal advantages to producer and consumer alike, and in general to the whole cultural development, becomes the revolutionary task of the European proletariat in its fight with Imperialistic protectionism and militarism.

The United States of Europe—without monarchies, standing armies and secret diplomacy, appears as the most important feature of the proletarian peace-program.

The ideologists and politicians of German Imperialism frequently came forward, principally at the beginning of the war, with *their program* of a European or at least a Central European United States (without France, England and Russia). The program of a violent coalition of Europe is just as characteristic of the tendency of German Imperialism supported by powerful Capitalism, as it is of the tendency of the petty bourgeoisie of France whose program is the forcible dismemberment of Germany.

If the German armies achieved the decisive victory reckoned upon in Germany at the outset of the war, then German Imperialism would doubtless make the gigantic attempt of a compulsory war-tariff union of European States, which would be constructed completely of preferences, compromises and heaps of every kind of outworn stuff in conformity with the state-structure of present-day Germany. Needless to say, under such circumstances no talk would be possible of an autonomy of the nations, thus forcibly joined together as the caricature of the European United States. Let us for a moment admit that German militarism succeed in actually carrying out the compulsory half-union of Europe, just as Prussian militarism once achieved the half-union of Germany, what would then be the cardinal formula of the European proletariat? Would it be the dissolution of the forced European coalition and the return of all peoples under the roof of isolated national states? Or the restoration of "autonomic" tariffs, "national" coinage, "national" social legislation, and so forth? Certainly not. The slogan of the European revolutionary movement would then be: The cancellation of the compulsory anti-democratic form of the coalition, with the preservation and zealous furtherance of its foundations, in the form of complete annihilation of tariff barriers, the unification of legislation, and above all of labor laws, etc. In other words, the slogan

of the United States of Europe—*without monarchy and standing armies*—would under the foregoing circumstances become the unifying and guiding formula of the European revolution.

Let us assume the second possibility, namely, an "undecided" issue of the war. At the very beginning of the war, the well known professor Liszt, an advocate of "United Europe," proved that, should the Germans fail to conquer their opponents, the European Union would nevertheless be accomplished, and in Liszt's opinion, it would be even more complete than in the case of a German victory. By the evergrowing want for expansion, the European States, hostile against one another but unable to get equal with one another, would continue to hinder one another in the execution of their "mission" in the near East, Africa and Asia, and they would everywhere be forced back by the United States of America and by Japan. In the case of an "undecided" issue of the war, Liszt thinks the indispensability of an economic and militaristic understanding of the European Great Powers, would come to the fore against weak and undeveloped peoples, but above all, of course, against their own working masses. We pointed out above the colossal hindrances that lie in the way of realizing this program. The even partial overcoming of these hindrances would mean the establishment of an imperialistic Trust of European States, a predatory share-holding association. The proletariat will in this case have to fight not for the return to "autonomous" national states, but for the conversion of the imperialistic state trust into a Republican European Federation.

The further, however, the war progresses and reveals the absolute incapacity of militarism to cope with the question brought forward by the war, the less is spoken about these great plans for the uniting of Europe from the top down. The question of the imperialistic "United States of Europe" arose out of the plans, on the one side, of an economic union of Austria-Germany and on the other side of the quadruple alliance with its war-tariffs and duties supplemented with militarism directed against one another. After the foregoing it is needless to enlarge on the great importance which, in the execution of these plans, the policy of the proletariat of both State Trusts will assume in fighting against the established tariff and military-diplomatic fortress and for the economic union of Europe.

Now after the so very promising beginning of the Russian Revolution, we have every reason to hope that during the course of this present war a powerful revolutionary movement will be launched all over Europe. It is clear that such a movement can only succeed and develop as a *general European one*. Isolated with-

in national borders, it would be doomed to failure. Our social patriots point to the danger which threatens the Russian Revolution from the side of German militarism. English, French and Italian Imperialism is no less a dreadful enemy of the Russian Revolution than the war-machine of the Hohenzollerns. The salvation of the Russian Revolution lies in its propagation all over Europe. Should the revolutionary movement unroll itself in Germany, the German proletariat would look for and find a revolutionary echo in the "hostile" lands of the west, and if in one of the European countries the proletariat should snatch the power out of the hands of the bourgeoisie, it would be bound, be it only to retain the power, to place it at once at the service of the revolutionary movement in other lands. In other words, the founding of a stable régime of proletarian dictatorship would only be conceivable throughout Europe in the form of a European Republican Federation. The unification of the States of Europe, to be achieved neither by force of arms nor by industrial and diplomatic agreements, would then be the next task of the triumphant revolutionary proletariat.

The United States of Europe is the motto of the revolutionary age into which we have emerged. Whatever turn the war operations may take later on, whatever *facit* diplomacy may draw out of the present war, and at whatever tempo the revolutionary movement will progress in the near future, the formula, the United States of Europe, will in all events retain a colossal meaning as the political formula of the fight of the European proletariat for power. In this program that fact finds its expression, that the national state has outlived itself—as a frame for the development of all creative forces, as a basis for the class struggle, and thereby also as a state form of proletarian dictatorship. Over against the conservative defence of the antiquated national fatherland we place the progressive task, namely the creation of a new, higher "fatherland" of the Revolution, of the republican Europe, whence the proletariat alone will be enabled to revolutionize and to re-organize the whole world.

Of course the United States of Europe will be only one of the two axes of the "World re-organization" of Industry. The United States of America will constitute the other.

To view the perspectives of the Social Revolution within national bounds means to succumb to the same national narrowness that forms the content of social-patriotism. Vaillant, until the close of his life, regarded France as the chosen country of the Social Revolution, and precisely in this sense he insisted upon its defence to the utmost. Lentsch and others, some hypocritically, others conscientiously,

ously, believed that the defeat of Germany means above all the destruction of the very foundation of the Social Revolution. Lastly, our Tseretellis and Chernovs who, in our national conditions, repeated the very sad experiment of French ministerialism, swear that their policy serves the purpose of the revolution and therefore has nothing in common with the policy of Guesde and Sembat. Generally speaking, it must not be forgotten that in social-patriotism there is active, besides the most vulgar reformism, a national revolutionary messianism, which regards its national state as chosen for introducing to humanity "Socialism" or "democracy", be it on the ground of its industrial or of its democratic form and revolutionary conquests. Defending the national basis of the revolution with such methods as damage the international connections of the proletariat, really amounts to undermining the revolution, which cannot begin otherwise than on the national basis, but which cannot be completed on that basis in view of the present economic and military-political interdependence of the European States which has never been so emphatically pronounced as in this very war. The motto, the United States of Europe, gives expression to this inter-dependence, which will directly and immediately determine the concerted action of the European proletariat in the revolution.

Social-patriotism which is in principle, if not always in fact, the execution of social-reformism to the utmost extent and its adaptation to the imperialistic age, proposes to us in the present world catastrophe to direct the policy of the proletariat in the direction of the "lesser evil" by joining one of the two groups. We reject this method. We say that the war, prepared by antecedent evolution, has on the whole placed on edge the *Fundamental Problems* of the present capitalist development; furthermore, that the line of direction to be followed by the international proletariat and its national fighting-corps must not be determined by secondary political and national features nor by problematical advantages of militaristic preponderance of one side over the other (whereby these problematical advantages must be paid for in advance with absolute renunciation of the independent policy of the proletariat), but by the fundamental antagonism existing between the international proletariat and the capitalistic régime generally.

The democratic, republican union of Europe, a union really capable of guaranteeing the freedom of national development, is possible only by way of a revolutionary fight against the militaristic, imperialistic, dynastic Centralism, by means of revolts in individual countries, with the subsequent confluence of these upheavals into a gen-

eral European revolution. The victorious European Revolution, however, no matter how its course in the sundry countries may be fashioned, can, in consequence of the absence of other revolutionary classes, transfer the power only to the proletariat. Thus the United States of Europe represents the only conceivable form of the dictatorship of the European proletariat.

VI

AT BREST-LITOVSK.

(TROTZKY)

The Soviet Government of Russia must now not only build anew, but it must also close up the old accounts and, up to a certain and rather high degree, pay the old debts: first, those of the war which has lasted three and a half years. This war furnished the touchstone of the economic strength of the warring countries. The fate of Russia, a poor and backward country, was, in a war of long duration, a foregone conclusion. In the mighty collisions of war apparatus, the decision lay, in the last analysis, in the capacity of a country to adapt its industries to the needs of the war, to transform the same in the shortest possible time and to replace, in ever growing volume, engines of destruction that were used up with such rapidity in the course of this general butchery. Every country, or almost every country, even the most backward, could at the beginning of the war be in possession of the mightiest engines of destruction—or could import them. That was the case with all backward countries; even so in Russia. But war eats up quickly its dead capital and requires its constant renewal. The war capacity of each and every country drawn into this world massacre, could in truth be measured by its capacity to create anew and during the war, cannons, projectiles and other war material.

Had the war solved the problem of the relative relation of forces in a very short time, then it would have been possible, theoretically at least, for Russia to maintain behind the trenches the position that might have meant victory. But the war dragged on too long. And that was not due to accident. The fact that international diplomacy had for the last 50 years worked in the direction of creating a European so-called "balance of power," that is to say a condition wherein the opposing forces were to be about evenly balanced, that fact alone,—considered in the light of the power and wealth possessed by the modern bourgeois nations—would give the war a long-drawn-out character. And that, on the other hand, meant the exhaustion

of such countries as were weaker and, in an economic sense, less developed.

The strongest, in a military sense, proved to be Germany, due to the power of its industries and due also to the modern, rational character of these industries side by side with a time-worn, anachronistic political system. It was shown that France, largely because of its petty bourgeois economy, had fallen behind Germany; and even so powerful a colonial empire as England, because of the more conservative and routine-governed character of its industries, proved to be the weaker in comparison with Germany. When history placed the Russian Revolution face to face with the question of negotiating peace, we were not in doubt that we would have to settle the bill for the three and a half years of war—unless the power of the international revolutionary proletariat should decisively upset all calculations. We did not doubt that in German Imperialism we had to deal with an opponent thoroughly saturated with the consciousness of his colossal power, a power which, in the course of this war, has come so plainly to the fore.

All those arguments of bourgeois cliques, to the effect that we would have been much stronger had we conducted the negotiations in conjunction with our allies, do not meet the point. To be enabled to conduct negotiations together with our allies for an indefinite time we should, above all things, have been able to continue the war in conjunction with them; but, as our country was weakened and exhausted, it was the continuation, not the termination of the war, that would have still further weakened and exhausted it. And thus we would have been forced to quit, sooner or later, under conditions still more unfavorable to us. . . . If, therefore, we stand today, a weakened country, face to face with a world Imperialism, we surely have not been weakened because we have torn ourselves out of the fiery ring of war and out of the embrace of international war obligations—no, we have been weakened by the policies of Czarism and of the bourgeois classes, those policies which we have fought as a revolutionary party—before the war and during the war.

Do you remember, comrades, under what circumstances our delegation went direct from a session of the Third All-Russian Soviet Congress to Brest-Litovsk? At that time we rendered to you a report as to the state of the negotiations and the demands of the enemy. These demands, as you will recollect, ran along the line of masked, or rather half-masked annexationist desires, an annexation of Lithuania, Courland, a part of Livonia, the islands of the Moon Sound, as well as a half-veiled contribution which, at that time, we

estimated at from 6 to 8 and even 10 billion roubles. During a pause in the negotiations, which lasted about ten days, there developed in Austria a tremendous ferment and labor strikes broke forth. These strikes signified the first recognition of our method of conducting the peace negotiations, the first recognition we received from the proletariat of the central powers anent the annexationist demands of German militarism. As against that, how silly appear the claims of the bourgeois press that we had required two months to negotiate with Kuhlman in order to find out that German Imperialism was imposing robber conditions. No, we knew that from the very start. But by means of the "pourparlers" with the representatives of German Imperialism, we endeavored to find a means to strengthen those forces that oppose German Imperialism. We did not promise to perform miracles but we claimed that the road we were following was the only road left to a revolutionary democracy to secure for itself the possibility of future development.

Complaint might be made that the proletariat of other countries, more especially that of the Central Powers, moved too slowly along the road of the revolutionary struggle—true enough. The tempo of its development must be considered altogether too slow—but, nevertheless, in Austria-Hungary a movement began that spread over the entire country and which was a direct echo of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations.

When I left here, we were saying that we had no reason to suppose that this strike wave would wash away the militarism of Austria and Germany. Had we been so convinced we would, of course, gladly have made the promise that certain persons expected we should make, namely, that under no circumstances would we make a separate peace with Germany. I said then that we could not make such a promise. That would have meant to assume the task of overcoming German militarism. We do not possess the secret of accomplishing such a victory. And since we could not obligate ourselves to change in a short time the relative position of international forces, we declared, openly and honestly, that a revolutionary government may under certain conditions be compelled to accept an annexationist peace. The decline of such a government would have to begin at the moment it would try to hide before its own people the predatory character of such a peace—not because it might be compelled, in the course of such a struggle, to accept such a peace.

At the same time we pointed out that we were going to Brest-Litovsk for the continuance of the peace negotiations under conditions which were becoming better for ourselves but worse for our

enemies. We observed the movement in Austria-Hungary, and there was much to indicate—for that is what the Social Democratic deputies in the Reichstag had reference to—that Germany too was on the eve of such events. Filled with this hope, we departed. And even during the first days of our next stay at Brest, a radiogram via Vilna brought us the first news that in Berlin a tremendous strike movement had broken out, which, just as that of Austria-Hungary, was directly connected with the conduct of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. But, as is often the case in accordance with the dialectics of the class struggle, the very dimensions of this proletarian movement—never seen in Germany before—compelled a closing of the ranks of the propertied classes and forced them to even greater implacability. The German ruling class is saturated with a sufficiently strong instinct of self-preservation to realize clearly that any concessions made under the conditions it found itself in and pressed by the masses of its own people—that any, even partial, concessions would spell capitulation to the spirit of the revolution. And it was for this reason that Kuhlmann, during the first period of uncertainty, purposely delayed negotiations, either by not holding any sessions at all or by wasting time, when they were held, with purely secondary and formal questions. But as soon as the strike was liquidated, when he knew that his masters were no longer in danger of their lives, he again assumed the tone of complete self-possession and redoubled aggressiveness.

Our negotiations were complicated by the participation of the Kieff [bourgeois Ukrainian] Rada. We did report this the last time. The delegation of the Kieff Rada appeared at the moment when the Rada did have in the Ukraine a fairly strong organization and when the outcome of the struggle could not yet be foretold. At this very moment we made to the Rada an official proposition to enter with us into an agreement and, as the foremost condition of such agreement, we stipulated: that the Rada declare Kaledin and Kornilov counter-revolutionists and that it should not hinder us in fighting both. The delegation of the Kieff Rada arrived at Brest at a time when we hoped to attain our agreement with them and with the enemy. We declared to them that, so long as they were recognized by the people of the Ukraine, we regarded it as possible to admit them as independent participants in the negotiations. But the more events developed in Russia and the Ukraine, the more the antagonism between the people of the Ukraine and the Rada became manifest, all the greater became the willingness of the Rada to close with the governments of the Central Powers the first Brest treaty of

peace and, if need be, to enlist the services of German militarism for purposes of intervention in the internal affairs of the Russian Republic in order to sustain the Rada against the Russian Revolution.

On February 9 we learned that the negotiations carried on behind our backs between the Rada and the Central Powers had led to the signing of a peace treaty. February 9 is the natal day of King Leopold of Bavaria and, as is customary in monarchical countries, the consummation of the solemn, historic act—whether with the consent of the Kieff Rada I do not know—had been set for that day. General Hoffmann fired the salute in honor of Leopold of Bavaria—after he had asked the consent of the Kieff delegation, because, after the signing of the peace treaty, Brest-Litovsk passed over to the Ukraine. Events, however, took such a course that, when General Hoffmann asked the Kieff Rada's permission to fire the salute, the Rada, granting them Brest-Litovsk, did not have much more than that territory left. Upon the strength of despatches received from Petrograd, we informed the delegations of the Central Powers, officially, that the Kieff Rada no longer existed—a circumstance not without serious bearing upon the further course of the peace negotiations. We proposed to Count Czernin that he send representatives to the Ukraine, accompanied by our officers, so as to convince himself whether the "party of the second part"—the Kieff Rada—did or did not exist. It looked as though Czernin was willing to acquiesce; but when we submitted to him the question: does this mean that the treaty with the Kieff delegation will not be signed until your representatives return?—he was overcome by doubt and offered to inquire of Kuhlmann. After such inquiry he transmitted to us a negative answer. That was on February 8—on February 9 they had to have a signed treaty; that permitted of no delay. Not only because of the birthday of King Leopold of Bavaria but for a much weightier reason which Kuhlmann had doubtlessly made clear to Czernin: "If we now send our representatives to the Ukraine, they may find, indeed, that the Rada no longer exists, in which case we would have to deal with an All-Russian delegation and that would make worse our chances in the negotiations." . . . On the part of the Austrian delegation they told us: "Abandon the position of pure principle, put the question on a practicable basis and then the German delegation will be reasonable. . . . It is not possible for Germany to continue the war for the sake of the Moon Sound islands in case you present your demand in concrete form."

. . . We answered: "Very well, we are willing to test the

conciliatoriness of your colleagues of the German delegation. Thus far we have negotiated about the right of self-determination of the Lithuanians, Poles, Livonians, Letts, Esthonians and others, and we ascertained that with all these there was no room for self-determination. Now we want to see what is your attitude towards the self-determination of still another people, that of Russia, and what are your intentions and plans of military-strategic character hidden behind your occupation of the Moon Sound islands. For the Moon Sound islands, as a part of the independent Esthonian republic or as the property of the federated Russian republic, have a defensive importance; in the hands of Germany, however, they assume an offensive value and will menace the very life center of our country and, more especially, of Petrograd." But General Hoffman was unwilling to make the slightest concession. Then came the hour of decision. We could not declare war. We were too weak. The army had lost internal cohesion. For the salvation of our country and in order to overcome the process of disintegration, we were forced to re-establish the inner connection of the working masses. This psychological bond can be created by way of common productive effort in the fields, in the factories and in the workshops. We must bring the working masses, so long subjected to the terrible sufferings and catastrophic trials of the war, back to their acres and factories where they can again find themselves in their labor and enable us to build up internal discipline. This is the only way out for a country that must now do penance for the sins of Czarism and of the bourgeoisie. We are forced to give up this war and to lead the army out of this slaughter. But we declare at the same *time* and in the face of German militarism: The peace *you* have forced upon us is a peace of force and robbery. We shall not permit that you, diplomatic gentlemen, can say to the German workers: "You have called our demands conquests and annexations, but see: we bring to you, under these same demands, the signature of the Russian Revolution!"—Yes, we are weak; we can not now conduct a war, but we possess sufficient revolutionary force to prove that we shall not, voluntarily, place our signatures under a treaty that you write with your sword upon the bodies of living peoples. We refused our signatures!—I believe, comrades, that we acted rightly.

Comrades! I shall not claim that an attack upon us by Germany is impossible—such an assertion would be too risky if we visualize the power of the imperialist party in Germany. I believe, however, that the position we have taken in this question has made

attack more difficult for German militarism. But if Germany does attack nevertheless? As regards that, all we can say is: If in our country, exhausted and in the desperate condition that we are, it is possible to spur the courage of the revolutionary and vital elements, if with us the struggle for the protection of our Revolution and of the arena of the Revolution is possible—then it is so only because of the situation that has now been created, possible as the result of our exit from the war and of our refusal to sign the treaty of peace.

VII

WHY SOVIET RUSSIA MADE PEACE (LENIN)

"Theses" of Lenin arguing in favor of accepting the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

1. The present state of the Russian Revolution is such (since all the workers and the great majority of the peasants are in favor of putting all power into the hands of the Soviets, and in favor of the Social Revolution inaugurated by the Soviets) that the success of the Social Revolution in Russia seems to be assured.

2. Meanwhile, the civil war brought about by the desperate resistance of the possessing classes, who are well aware that this is to be the last, the determining conflict for the retention of private ownership of land and of the means of production, has not yet reached its climax. In this conflict the victory of the Soviets is certain, but for some time our intensest efforts will still be required. A period of disorganization is inevitable,—that is the case in all wars, all the more so in a civil war—before the resistance of the bourgeoisie is broken.

3. This resistance takes the form chiefly of passive manifestations, not of a military force: of the sabotage, bribery of vagrants, bribery of agents of the bourgeoisie, who permeate the ranks of the Socialists in order to compromise their cause, etc., etc. This resistance is so obstinate and assumes such varying forms, that the conflict must go on for some months, since the victory of Socialism is not possible until all the encumbrances have been removed.

4. Finally, the task of Socialist reorganization in Russia is so great and so difficult, both because of the *petit bourgeois* elements who are taking part in the Revolution, and because of the unsatisfactory level of the proletariat, that its solution still requires some time.

5. All this means that the success of the Russian Revolution will require, at least for some months, that the Russian Government shall have a free hand, in order to conquer the bourgeoisie in its own

country, in order then to undertake the great task of reconstruction.

6. The international policy of the Soviets must be based chiefly on the conditions of the revolution in Russia, for the international situation, in the fourth year, is such that in general, it is not possible to fix a time for the overthrow of imperialistic powers (including the German Government). There is no doubt that revolution must and shall break out in Europe. All our hope in a *decisive victory* of Socialism is based on this conviction, on this scientific hypothesis. Our propaganda in general, and that of fraternization in particular, must be deepened and extended. But it would be an error to base the tactics of the Soviet Government on the probability that the European Revolution, particularly the German, will take place within a few months. As prediction is here absolutely impossible, all efforts in this direction would be a mere gamble.

7. The negotiation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty has shown that the military party has gained the upper hand in the German Government, and that this party has its own way with the governments of the other countries in the Quadruple Alliance. The military party already has actually sent an ultimatum to Russia, the official form of which we may expect in a few days. This ultimatum means: either the continuation of the war or the conclusion of a peace by annexation, i. e., the Germans will retain all the districts occupied by them, while we must give up the districts occupied by Russian troops, and an indemnity will be imposed upon us (under the guise of a compensation for the maintenance of prisoners) of nearly three milliards, to be paid in a few years.

8. The Russian Government therefore has this pressing problem to solve: Must this annexation-peace be accepted at once, or must the revolutionary war be waged at once? There is no middle path in this question. The solution cannot be postponed, as we have already done all in our power to gain time and draw the thing out.

9. Among the arguments made use of to show that revolutionary warfare must be waged at once, there is, in the first place, the following: an immediate, separate peace, regardless of the intentions of those who conclude it would amount to an agreement with the German imperialists, and therefore, such a peace would be a breach of the principles of international Socialism.

This reasoning is all wrong. Workingmen who lose a strike and are compelled to accept conditions favorable to the capitalists and unfavorable to themselves, do not betray Socialism. Only those betray the interests of the proletariat, who betray Socialism, who accept inadmissible conditions.

Those who call the war with Germany a righteous and defensive war are the real betrayers of Socialism, because they are in reality supporting French and English Imperialism and concealing the secret treaties from the people. These, on the other hand, who conceal nothing from the people and make no secret treaties with the capitalists,—they are by no means betraying Socialism when they conclude a peace which is disadvantageous for a weak people and advantageous for the capitalists of one group, at a moment when there is no possibility of continuing to wage war.

10. In the second place, we are reproached with becoming, through the conclusion of a separate peace, agents of the German Government against our will, since we are giving to it the possibility of withdrawing troops from our front and are liberating millions of their prisoners of war. But this argument also proves nothing, since a revolutionary war *against* Germany would make us agents of Anglo-French Imperialism. The English promised outright to Krylenko, the commander of our army, one hundred roubles a month for each soldier if we should continue to wage war. And even if we should not accept a penny from the Entente, we should yet, as far as the outcome is concerned, have become their agents in holding a portion of the German troops at the front.

On this point: We can free ourselves as little in one case as in the other, entirely from the imperialistic shackles, for that is impossible without the annihilation of world-Imperialism. It therefore follows that after the victory of Socialism in one country, these questions must not be decided from the standpoint of a preference for one Capitalism, but from that of developing and strengthening under the most favorable conditions the social revolution that has already begun.

In short, our policy must be based, not on a choice between two Imperialisms, but on the possibility of strengthening the Socialist revolution, or at least, on the necessity of enabling it to offer resistance until the other countries join the revolutionary movement.

11. It is maintained that the German Socialist minority has asked us not to yield to German Imperialism. But we do not consider this a good interpretation. We have always fought our own Imperialism, but the overthrow of the Imperialism of one country by means of an alliance with the Imperialism of another is a line of action that we reject both on reasons of principle and because we consider it inadmissible. This argument, therefore, is really only a repetition of the former one. If the International Socialists of Germany should ask us to postpone the conclusion of peace for a time,

and should guarantee us the outbreak of the revolution in Germany by a fixed time, we might *eventually* take the matter under consideration. But the German International Socialists *not* only do not say this to us, but they actually *are* saying, formally, "Offer as much resistance as you can, but decide on this point in agreement with the interests of the *Russian* Revolution, for it is impossible at present to make any definite promises with regard to the *German* Revolution."

12. It is maintained that we had promised to wage revolutionary warfare and that the conclusion of a separate peace was a betrayal of our own promise. This is not true. We spoke of the *necessity of preparing and waging revolutionary warfare* in the epoch of Imperialism. We said this in contradiction of the theory of abstract pacifism, the total negation of "national defense," in the epoch of Imperialism and we said this in order to resist the merely physical instincts of some of the soldiers; but we have never assumed the obligation of waging a revolutionary war without asking ourselves whether it was possible to wage it at a given moment.

And now it is our duty to prepare the revolutionary war. We are keeping this promise, just as we have kept all promises that circumstances have permitted us to keep: we have published the secret treaties, we have offered a righteous peace to all nations, we have drawn out the peace conference in order to give all the peoples an opportunity to join us. But the question of the present possibility of waging a revolutionary war can be decided only from the standpoint of its material possibility, and from the standpoint of the Russian Revolution that has already begun.

13. Considering the arguments in favor of an immediate revolutionary war, as a whole, it is evident that they constitute a policy that may perhaps be in line with a fine gesture, but they have absolutely no relation with the material and class conditions of the present moment.

14. It is beyond doubt that our army can neither now, nor at any time within the next few weeks or even months, resist or push back the German offensive, in the first place because of the fatigue and exhaustion of most of our soldiers and the total disorganization of the provision supply, in the second place because of the absolute insufficiency of horses which makes defeat for our artillery a certainty, in the third place because it is impossible to defend the Riga coast, thus assuring the enemy of the conquest of the rest of Livland, and facilitating the occupation of Petrograd.

15. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the majority of the peasants in our army would now be in favor of a peace of annexa-

tions by the Germans and not a revolutionary war, while the organization of a revolutionary army and the forming of a Red Guard have hardly been begun.

It would be a serious business to wage war against the will of the majority of our soldiers, now that the entire army is demoralized; and it will be many months before a truly proletarian army, Socialistic through and through, can be formed.

16. The poorest section of the Russian peasants would be ready to support a revolution headed by the working class, but they are not ready to support a revolutionary war at present. It would be a serious error to overlook this state of things.

17. The question of revolutionary war therefore stands as follows: if revolution should break out in Germany within the next three or four months, the revolutionary war tactic, for immediate action, would not be fatal to our Russian Revolution.

If the German Revolution does not take place in a few months, the continuation of the war would have the consequence that still greater defeats would force Russia to accept a still more onerous peace; and peace would not be concluded by a Socialist, but by a mixed government, for example, by a coalition between the adherents of Chernov and of the bourgeois party or something of the sort, for the peasant army, sick and tired of the war, would overthrow the Socialist government in a few weeks.

18. Conditions being as indicated above, it is intolerable thus to jeopardize the fate of the Russian Revolution.

19. The German Revolution will absolutely not be made more difficult by the conclusion of a separate peace. It will probably be weakened for a time by chauvinism, but the conditions in Germany will remain very critical. The war with America and England will last long and Imperialism will finally be unmasked completely, on both sides. The example of the Russian Revolution will continue to inspire the peoples of the world, and its influence will be enormous. On the one side will be the bourgeois system and war for conquest waged by two imperialistic groups, on the other peace and the Socialist Republic.

20. By a separate peace we free ourselves, in so far as present conditions will permit, from the two imperialist coalitions; by taking advantage of their warfare and their mutual enmity preventing them from uniting against us, we shall utilize the time so gained, in order to strengthen the Socialist Republic in Russia.

The reorganization of Russia, based on the dictatorship of the proletariat, the nationalization of banks and of big industry, the ex-

change of the products of the cities with the cooperatives of small peasants in the country, is economically quite feasible, provided we have a few months to devote energetically to the job. Such an organization will make Socialism unconquerable in Russia, and will provide a permanent basis for the formation of a powerful red army of peasants and workers.

21. A truly Socialistic war could not, at this moment, have any other character than that of a war between the Socialistic republic and the bourgeois countries, with the distinct object, approved by the red army, of overthrowing the bourgeoisie in the other countries.

But we cannot at present attack this object. In reality, we should now fight for Livland and Courland. No Marxist, no Socialist of any kind, can deny, without contradicting the basic principles of Socialism, that the interests of Socialism transcend the right of self-determination of a nation. Our republic has done and continues to do all in its power to obtain for Finland and for the Ukraine the right to determine their own lot. But, granting that the existence of the Socialist Republic is threatened by the violation of the right of Poland, Lithuania, and Finland to determine their own fate, it is nevertheless self-evident that the interests of the Socialist Republic transcend all other considerations. We are not enthusiastic about the peace based on the liberation of Poland, making German Imperialism *stronger* as opposed to England, Belgium, Serbia, etc. The peace based on the liberation of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland would be a patriotic peace from the standpoint of Russia, but it would none the less be a peace with the German annexationists and imperialists.

VIII

PEACE—AND OUR TASK.

(LENIN)

This article was written early in April, after the Soviet acceptance of the Brest-Litovsk peace at the All-Russian Soviet Congress in Moscow, March 18, 1918.

The history of mankind is at present passing through one of its greatest and most difficult crises; a crisis that, without exaggeration, may be said to possess a world-wide liberating significance. From war to peace, from a war between beasts of prey who have sent to the slaughter millions of the toiling and exploited, with the object of securing a redivision of spoils already acquired among the strongest of the robbers, to a war of the oppressed against the oppressors for freedom from capitalist tyranny; from the abyss of suffering, pain and hunger to the resplendent communistic society of the future, to general well-being and permanent peace,—it is no wonder that at the most acute points of such a tremendous transformation, when the old is going to pieces with frightful noise and crash, and the new is being born in indescribable pain, that some should be seized with despair, and that others should seek relief from reality, which is at times too bitter, in the magic of fair, enchanting phrases.

Yet it was necessary to feel vividly what was occurring, to live through, in the most excruciating and painful manner, this sharpest of all sharp turns in history, turning us out of Imperialism into the Communistic Revolution. In a few days we destroyed one of the oldest, most powerful, most savage and barbarous monarchies. In a few months we passed through a series of agreements with the bourgeoisie, of realizing the emptiness of *petit bourgeois* illusions, for which other countries have required decades. In a few weeks, after having overthrown the bourgeoisie, we defeated its opposition in a civil war. In a victorious, triumphal progress of Bolshevism, we have passed from one end of our great country to the other. We have raised to liberty and to independent life the lowest sections of the toiling masses that have been oppressed by Czarism and by the bourgeoisie. We have introduced and strengthened the Soviet Republic, a new type of government, immeasurably higher and more

democratic than the best of the bourgeois parliamentary republics. We organized a dictatorship of the proletariat, supported by the poorest peasants, and inaugurated a widely-planned system of Socialistic reconstruction. In millions and millions of workers in all countries we have awakened faith in their powers and kindled the fires of their enthusiasm. We have sent out in all directions the call of the workers' international revolution. We have thrown down the gauntlet to the imperialistic robbers of all countries.

And in a few days an imperialistic robber, falling upon us, who are unarmed, has cast us to the ground. He has forced us to sign an incredibly oppressive and humiliating peace,—our punishment for having dared, if only for one short moment, to free ourselves from the iron bonds of the imperialistic war. The robber strangles and chokes and dismembers Russia with all the greater fury, the more threatening he perceives rising before him in his own country the spectre of the impending workers' revolution.

We were forced to sign a "Peace of Tilsit." There is no reason for deceiving ourselves as to that. We must have the courage to look straight in the face of this bitter truth. We must sound to the depths, completely, the whole abyss of defeat and humiliation into which we have now been cast. The better we understand this, the harder and firmer will become our will to free ourselves, to rise again from slavery to independence; the more determined will become our unbending resolve, at whatever cost, to raise Russia from her present poverty and weakness, to make her rich and powerful in the true sense of the words.

And this Russia may become, for we still have left enough territory and natural resources to supply each and every one of us, if not with a super-abundance, yet with a sufficient supply of the means of subsistence. We have enough in natural riches and in labor-power, as well as in the impetus that our great revolution has communicated to our national productive forces—to create a really rich and powerful Russia.

Russia may become such if we cast aside all discouragement and all oratory, if we strain every nerve and tighten every muscle, if we understand that salvation is possible only by the path of international Socialist Revolution on which we have entered. To advance on this road, undaunted by defeat, to build up, stone by stone, the firm foundation of the Socialist society, to work with untiring hand at the creation of discipline and self-discipline, at strengthening, at all times and in all places, the organization, orderliness, efficiency and harmonious co-operation of the forces of the entire nation, a central

supervision and control of the production and distribution of products,—such is the path to power, whether it be power in the military sense or power in the Socialist sense.

It is unbecoming in a Socialist, when he has suffered a defeat, to protest his victory loudly or to droop into despair. It is not true that we have no other alternative than that between an "inglorious" death, which is what this terrible peace amounts to, and a "heroic" death in a hopeless war. It is not true that we have betrayed our ideals by signing this "Peace of Tilsit." We have betrayed nothing and no one, we have neither sanctioned nor conceded a single falsehood; to no single friend and companion in misfortune have we refused all the aid in our power. A commander-in-chief, who withdraws the remains of his army, defeated and afflicted with a panic flight, into the interior of the country, who defends this withdrawal in a case of extremity, with an intolerable and humiliating peace, is not perpetrating treason against those sections of the army which he can no longer assist and which have been cut off by the enemy. Such a commander is doing his duty when he chooses the only way that is open for saving what can still be saved, consenting to no gambles, disguising no sad truths in the eyes of the people, "giving up territory in order to gain time," utilizing every breathing-spell, no matter how short, in order to collect his forces, in order to provide repose and healing for his army, which has become sick with disintegration and demoralization.

We have signed a "Peace of Tilsit." When Napoleon I forced Prussia in 1807 to make such a peace, he destroyed all the German armies, occupied the capital and all the large cities, introduced his police system, compelled the vanquished to provide an auxiliary army for new wars of conquest waged by the victor, dismembered Germany, and concluded with certain German states alliances against other German states. Yet, in spite of this severe peace, the German people succeeded in maintaining themselves, in gathering their forces, and in attaining for themselves the rights of freedom and independence. To all those who are willing and able to think, the example of the Peace of Tilsit—which was only one of the many oppressive and humiliating treaties forced upon the Germans at that time—shows clearly how childishly naive is the thought that under all circumstances a most cruel peace is the depth of degradation, while war is the path of heroism and salvation. Warlike eras have frequently shown that peace may often discharge the function of a breathing-spell for the gathering of forces for new battles. The Peace of Tilsit was the greatest humiliation of Germany, and, at the

same time, the point of departure for a great national awakening. Historical circumstances at that time provided no other way out than through the bourgeois state; for, a century or more ago, history was created by a band of noblemen and the cliques of bourgeois intellectuals, while the great masses of workers and peasants lay slumbering and unobserving. History at that time, therefore, moved with frightful slowness.

Capitalism has now considerably raised culture in general, and particularly that of the masses. The war has shaken up the masses, awakened them with unparalleled terrors and sufferings. The war has accelerated the march of history until it now flies with the speed of a locomotive. History is now made by the independent action of millions and tens of millions of people. Capitalism has reached the stage of Socialism.

And therefore, if Russia now can pass, as she indisputably is passing, from a Peace of Tilsit to a period of national awakening, to a great war of national defense, the result of this transition will not be the bourgeois state, but the international Socialist revolution. We have therefore become, since November 7, 1917, "defenders"; we are for the "defense of the fatherland," but the fatherland that we are defending is the Socialist fatherland. We are defending our Socialism, which is a section of the universal army of Socialism.

"Hatred of the Germans, down with the Germans!"—such was the cry and remains the cry of the ordinary, that is, bourgeois, patriotism. And we say: "Hatred to the imperialist robbers, hatred to Capitalism, death to Capitalism;" and, together with this: "We must learn from the Germans! Remain faithful to the fraternal union with the German workers. They have been late in coming to our assistance. We shall wait for their coming, we shall gain time; they will come to our assistance."

Yes, learn from the Germans! History moves in zig-zags and in round-about paths. It so happens that the German at present simultaneously personifies, together with savage Imperialism, the beginnings of discipline, organization, harmonious co-operation, on the basis of the modern machine industry, and strict accountability and supervision.

And that is precisely what we lack. That is just what we must learn. That is exactly what our Revolution must have in order to proceed from a victorious beginning, through a series of difficult trials, to a victorious conclusion. That is exactly what the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic needs in order to cease being poor and weak, and to become, once for all, rich and mighty.

PART SEVEN

The Soviet Republic and its Problems

By

N. LENIN

INTRODUCTION

The central feature of reconstruction in Russia is that it proceeds upon the basis of a proletarian state, functioning through a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat. The policy of the Bolsheviki, in complete harmony with Marxism, is that the first requirement of Socialism in action is the conquest of power by the proletariat, after which accomplishment reconstruction becomes fundamental reconstruction and assumes the tendency of making for Socialism, instead of promoting Capitalism.

The dictatorship of the proletariat, the dynamic mechanism of the introduction of Socialism, may be described as having three functions:

1. The annihilation of the political power of the bourgeoisie in all its ramifications. The assumption of state power by the revolutionary proletariat disposes of the bourgeoisie temporarily as a political force; the bourgeoisie must be disposed of permanently. This is accomplished in two ways: the political expropriation of the bourgeoisie and its complete exclusion from participation in politics and government; and then its economic expropriation. In the measure that the process of reconstruction absorbs the bourgeoisie into the ranks of the producers, will they again be allowed—as workers—to participate in politics and government.

2. The introduction of measures of temporary reconstruction. The transition from Capitalism to Socialism is not accomplished in a day: it is a process. But while the moderate and the revolutionary Socialist agree that the transition to Socialism is a process, there is violent disagreement as to the character of the process. The moderate Socialist assumes that it is a process operating upon the basis of Capitalism and the bourgeois state; a gradual penetration of Socialism into Capitalism; but this is a process that cannot and never will emerge into Socialism, being the process of petty bourgeois collectivism, and making for State Capitalism. The revolutionary Socialist assumes that the process must be a revolutionary process operating upon the basis of the proletarian state—a process of reconstruction which alone annihilates Capitalism and introduces Socialism. Moreover, the transition, the overthrow of the political power of the bourgeoisie, necessarily disorganizes industry, and creates a measure of demoralization; many of the measures of the dictatorship of the proletariat, accordingly, must be of a temporary nature in order to overcome this demoralization, and increase productive capacity. The rapid increase of production, a vital task of the proletarian state, is accomplished also by all the measures of reconstruction, by means of a dictatorial regulation of production.

3. But these temporary measures must be, and are, in accord with the fundamental tendency making for Socialism. Measures of reconstruction to solve immediate problems of disorganization may assume a

capitalist or a Socialist character, dominantly; and these measures of the dictatorship of the proletariat are decisively of a Socialist character. This, accordingly, is the fundamental task of the proletarian dictatorship: to initiate the tendency towards the complete transformation of Capitalism into communist Socialism. The forms of this tendency assume a character that logically and inevitably emerge into the definite forms of a Socialist society.

The Soviet government annihilated the political power of the bourgeoisie by completely excluding it from participation in politics and government, by the abolition of the parliamentary state and bourgeois democracy. The Soviet state is a state of the organized producers, representing exclusively the interests of the proletariat and proletarian peasantry. The political expropriation of the bourgeoisie was complete; but its economic expropriation was not pushed to the final point. This temporary cessation of the economic expropriation of capital is based upon a number of factors, chief among them being the incomplete industrial development of Russia, but most important the necessity of emphasizing temporary measures in order to solve the pressing immediate problems of the resumption of economic activity.

These temporary measures assumed a much more important character in Russia than is typical of the transition toward Socialism upon the basis of a dictatorship of the proletariat. The Soviet regime inherited chaos, a chaos produced by Czarism and intensified by the bourgeois republic of the Provisional Government, of Kerensky. The war, the cutting off of communications with the outside world (the Allies completely isolated the Soviet Republic), the pressing starvation, the encroachments of Germany and other nations, determined to crush the proletarian revolution—all these factors, and more, emphasized the importance of temporary measures out of all proportion to the general tendency of a dictatorship of the proletariat.

But the chief, the all-determining problem was met, and met adequately: the participation in the government, dominantly and dynamically, of the lowest section of the proletariat and proletarian peasantry, the emergence upon the stage of government of the masses of the people, the initiation definitely of the tendency toward the complete socialization of industry and society. The conscious activity of the masses, the development of its capacity for self-government and administrative control of industry and society, determine the rapidity of the measures toward complete Socialism introduced by the dictatorship of the proletariat—and these requirements were swiftly developed.

The unifying characteristic of all measures, temporary and permanent, introduced by the Soviet government, is that they started from the bottom, and not from the top; that the center of reconstruction was the activity of the organized producers, and not the activity of the state. The local initiative and self-government of the producers had to be developed as the only basis for the fundamental industrial democracy of communist Socialism. This initiative, this self-government, and not the bureaucratic state, is the dominant factor in the process of reconstruction. The proletarian state constituted a unifying expression and acceleration of the activity of the masses. The old state, equally the bourgeois parliamen-

tary state and the Czarist state, has been completely overthrown, with all its machinery of repression of the masses, its bureaucracy, and its anti-proletarian character. The new state is the state of the organized producers; as the old state was an instrument for the coercion of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, so the new state is an instrument for the coercion of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat—with this fundamental difference: that where the old state considered itself sacrosanct and eternal, the new state considers itself a temporary necessity that will gradually become superfluous in the measure that the process of reconstruction emerges definitely into the Socialist communist society of the organized producers.

As an historical category, the Soviets are not peculiarly Russian products, but class organizations characteristic of the proletarian revolution. They constitute a dictatorship in relation to the bourgeoisie, but a democracy in relation to the workers and peasants—the real, the fundamental democracy of oncoming Socialism.

The agrarian problem in revolutionary Russia plays a much more important part than would obtain in a proletarian revolution in a nation where industrialization has proceeded further. The peasantry, the mass of agricultural workers and expropriated peasants as against the peasant bourgeoisie, has accepted, at least for the present, the tutelage of the proletarian dictatorship, is a phase of this dictatorship. Private ownership of land has been abolished, the land being nationalized and distributed to the peasants on the basis of agricultural communism. Local land committees take charge of production and distribution of agricultural products, inventory the land in a particular district, allot land to the villages, regulate agricultural labor, control forests, etc., and receive the rental for the use of the land, which is turned over to the central government. The land committees of the rural districts are unified into the county committees, which in turn elect delegates to a provincial committee, the provincial land committees being organized into the Main Land Committee acting for all Russia. On this central agricultural body are represented the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Peasants and Workers, the Commissaire of Agriculture, etc. The abolition of private ownership in land includes city real estate and buildings, which are declared public property.

Industry has not been completely socialized, although a drastic workers' control has been established over all industry. Not all capitalists have been expropriated, the employer or owner in many cases being retained as a director, but his rights as owner have been abrogated and his "profits" rigidly limited. Workers' control of industry starts with factory and works committees, elected by the employees and the technical staffs, and having almost complete jurisdiction over internal questions, wages, hours, etc. In each important industrial district, town or province, is instituted a local workmen's organ of control, acting in accord with the local Soviet, and comprised of representatives of the factory and works committees, labor unions and workmen's co-operative societies. This control of industry is centralized in the All-Russian Workmen's Council of Control, acting for the whole of Russia.

The supreme factor in the control and regulation of economic activity is the Superior Council of National Economy, which unifies and directs industrial and agricultural production, and to which the specific agricultural and industrial councils are subsidiary, all in turn being responsible to the central organ of government, the Council of People's Commissaires. The Council of National Economy regulates the state finances, has authority to confiscate, requisition, sequester and syndicate any industrial establishments, the right to reform and re-organize all other existing institutions for the regulation of production, and supervises and directs the work of all economic departments of the Soviets. The Council of National Economy is composed of representatives of the All-Russian Workmen's Council of Control, each commissariat of the Soviet government, and specially selected persons. The Council is divided into several sections, each of which deals with a particular phase of economy; and it must submit all bills and important measures to the Council of People's Commissaires.

In these measures for workers' control of industry temporary requirements are fused with ultimate purposes: the forms are not in any sense final, although latent in the general tendency of the measures. While the representation on the local and district organs of control is industrial, the whole system functions territorially and is not yet wholly and integrally industrial. The ultimate form of organization is the unification of all the separate parts of a particular industry in all Russia into one integrated industrial department, having immediate and particular direction of its industry; and the unification of all industrial departments into one central and inclusive industrial administration—as provided in the theory of industrial unionism and the facts of production. This is precisely what should emerge from the present incomplete forms of workers' control, together with the complete expropriation of capital. Proletarian Russia is constructing the industrial state, preparing the conditions for the final abolition of the state and the institution of Engels' "administration of things." Two circumstances determined the temporarily incomplete forms of workers' control of industry: the immediate necessity to resume production and crush the industrial sabotage practised by the bourgeoisie, which had to be done immediately even if functioning through incomplete forms; and the fact that Russia is not as completely industrialized as other nations, consequently much of the material for an integrated industrial administration is missing. But the tendency has been initiated out of which inevitably emerge the higher forms, as the dictatorship of the proletariat completes its task of annihilating the bourgeoisie and increasing the totality of the productive forces. The tendency, moreover, is wholly in accord with the ultimate purposes of communist Socialism.

The nationalization of the banks was a crucial measure. It was, perhaps, the most difficult and adventurous of all the measures introduced by the Soviet state, but inescapable. Monopolistic finance is the heart of Capitalism and Imperialism, and to strike at this heart is to deal a mortal blow at the bourgeoisie. The expropriation of the banks, accordingly, is necessarily one of the first measures of the proletarian revolution. This measure is a most difficult and dangerous one, and latent with infinite complications, since it is the most definite step toward the abolition of

Capitalism, and financial administration is highly technical in scope. By means of the nationalization of the banks, finance becomes exclusively a means for the development of industry, and not dominantly a means of exploitation as under the bourgeois regime. The control of finance, moreover, is an irresistible instrument for the complete annihilation of the economic and social relations of Capitalism, the complete achievement of which means the end of finance and money in their expression as relations of private property.

Together with these general and fundamental measures, more temporary measures were introduced, such as unemployment insurance, obligatory labor (directed particularly at the bourgeois classes), and systematic and intensive labor legislation, to improve the workers' conditions at the expense of the bourgeoisie and complete the expropriation of capital. Labor legislation, introduced during the transition period from Capitalism to Socialism, and on the basis of the proletarian state, becomes a means for the expropriation of capital, not a means to strengthen the domination of capital.

Through all the reconstruction activity of the Soviet Republic runs the thread of developing a sense of discipline and responsibility in the masses. There was the tremendous industrial and social disorganization; the conscious efforts of the bourgeois hirelings to create confusion and disorder; the intoxicating effect among the workers of the newly-won freedom; and the psychology of irresponsibility in the workers inherited from the old regime. All these factors necessarily produced a certain amount of license. An intense struggle had to be waged against the ideology implanted in the minds of the workers by the bourgeois order. It is not sufficient that the administrative norms of the new order shall be introduced; there must develop a new ideology, the ideology of self-mastery and social discipline, of responsibility to one's self and to one's associates, of administrative competency and management among the workers,—the ideology of the joy of work, since one now works for himself, and not for a master. The development of this ideology was a task stressed by the Soviet officials; and it is a task, international complications aside, upon the success of which depends the immediate success of the proletarian revolution and the Socialist Republic in Russia.

The proletarian revolution in Russia initiates the epoch of the international Social Revolution. Not alone in the tactics and policy used in the conquest of power by the proletariat are the Bolsheviks the masters of the revolution, the symbol of the emerging revolutionary Socialism of the international proletariat; in their measures and tendency of action after the conquest of power, the Bolsheviks are teaching the international proletariat how to use power after its acquisition, developing the administrative norms of the oncoming Socialist Republic.

* * *

Part Seven consists wholly of a long article by Lenin appearing in *Pravda* early in May, 1918. It has already appeared in an English pamphlet, *The Soviets at Work*, issued by The Rand School of Social Science. But it is not clearly understandable without the other material that precedes it in this book.

L. C. F.

THE PROBLEM OF ORGANIZATION

Thanks to the peace secured — in spite of all its oppressiveness and insecurity — the Russian Soviet Republic is now able, for a certain time, to concentrate its efforts on the most important and most difficult phase of the Socialist revolution, on the problem of organization.

This problem is presented clearly and precisely to all toiling and oppressed masses in the fourth section of the resolution adopted on March 16, 1918, at the Moscow All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in the section which speaks of the self-discipline of the toilers and of the merciless struggle against chaos and disorganization.

The uncertainty of the peace secured by the Russian Soviet Republic is not determined, of course, by the fact that the Republic is now considering the renewal of military activity. With the exception of the bourgeois counter-revolutionists and their aids (the Mensheviki, etc.), no sensible statesman thinks of that. The insecurity of the peace is determined by the fact that in the imperialistic nations on the West and on the East of Russia, and possessing enormous military power, the upper hand may at any moment be gained by the military party, which is tempted by the temporary weakness of Russia and incited by the Socialism-hating capitalists.

Under such conditions our real, and not paper, guarantees or peace lie exclusively in the antagonisms between the imperialistic powers, which have reached the highest point,—manifested, on the one hand, in the renewal of the imperialistic slaughter of the peoples on the West; and, on the other, in the extremely keen imperialistic rivalry between Japan and America for supremacy on the Pacific and its coasts.

It is obvious that, in view of the weakness of such guarantees, our Socialist Soviet Republic is in an extremely precarious, undoubtedly critical international position. We must strain all our strength in order to utilize the respite granted us by this situation to cure the most severe wounds inflicted on the social organism of

Russia by the war, and economically rehabilitate the country, without which there can be no serious improvement in our ability to offer resistance.

It is also obvious that we can give serious aid to the Socialist revolution in the West, which has been delayed on account of a number of causes, only in so far as we are successful in solving the problems of organization that confront us.

A fundamental condition for the successful solution of our most urgent problems of organization is the complete comprehension by the political leaders of the people, that is, by the members of the Russian Communist Party (the Bolsheviks), and then by all conscious representatives of the toiling masses, of the basic difference between the earlier bourgeois revolutions and our Socialist revolution, with respect to the problem under consideration.

In the bourgeois revolutions the main task of the toiling masses consisted in performing the negative, destructive work—the destruction of feudalism and monarchy. The positive, constructive work of organizing a new society was performed by the propertied bourgeois minority of the population. And they accomplished this task, in spite of the resistance of the workers and the poorest peasants, with comparative ease, not only because the resistance of the exploited masses was then, on account of their unorganized state and their ignorance, extremely weak, but also because the fundamental organizing force of the anarchic structure of capitalist society is provided by the natural, extensive and intensive development of the national and international market.

In every Socialist revolution, however, the main task of the proletariat, and of the poorest peasantry accepting its leadership,—and hence also in the Socialist revolution in Russia inaugurated by us on November 7, 1917—consists in the positive and constructive work of establishing an extremely complex and delicate net work of newly organized relationships covering the systematic production and distribution of products which are necessary for the existence of tens of millions of people. The successful realization of such a revolution depends on the original, historical and creative work of the majority of the population, and first of all, of the majority of the toilers. The victory of the Socialist revolution will not be assured, unless the proletariat and the poorest peasantry will manifest sufficient consciousness, idealism, self-sacrifice, and persistence. With the creation of a new—the Soviet—type of state, offering to the oppressed toiling masses the opportunity to partici-

pate actively in the free construction of a new society, we have solved only a small part of the difficult task. The main difficulty is in the economic domain—to raise the productivity of labor, to establish strict and universal accounting and control of production and distribution, and *actually to socialize production*.

The evolution of the Bolshevik party, which is today the government party of Russia, shows with great clearness the nature of the historical crisis characterizing the present political situation and demands a new orientation by the Soviet authority, that is, new methods applied to new problems.

The first problem of any rising party consists in convincing the majority of the population that its program and policies are correct. This was the most important problem during Czarism and during the period of compromise of the Chernovs and Tseretellis with Kerensky and Kishkin. At present this problem, which is, of course, far from solution or immediate solution, is, in the main, solved, since the majority of the workers and peasants of Russia, as was shown beyond doubt by the last Congress of the Soviets in Moscow, are definitely with the Bolsheviks.

The second problem of our party was the conquest of political power and the suppression of the resistance of the exploiters. This problem as well is not yet completely solved, and we cannot ignore that fact, for the Monarchists and Cadets, on the one hand, and the Mensheviks and right Social Revolutionists—who echo and follow them—on the other, continue their attempts to unite for the overthrow of the Soviet power. But, in the main, the problem of the resistance of the exploiters was already solved in the period between November 7, 1917, and (approximately) February, 1918—the time of the surrender of the Cossack Bogajevsky.

We are now confronted by the third problem, which is the most urgent and which characterizes the present period: to organize the *management* of Russia. Of course, we had to deal with this problem and have been at it ever since November 7, 1917. But heretofore, as long as the resistance of the exploiters manifested itself in open civil warfare, the problem of management *could not become the principal*, the *central* problem.

At present it has become the central problem. We, the Bolshevik party, have *convinced* Russia. We have *won* Russia from the rich for the poor, from the exploiters for the toilers. And now it is up to us to *manage* Russia. The special difficulty of the present period consists in comprehending the peculiarities of the transition

from the principal problem of convincing the people and suppressing the exploiters by force to the now principal problem of *management*.

For the first time in the history of the world the Socialist party has succeeded in completing, essentially, the task of securing power and suppressing the exploiters, and in coming *close* to the problem of *management*. We must prove worthy of this, the most difficult (and most promising) problem of the Socialist revolution. We must not fail to see that, *besides* the ability to convince and to win in civil war, successful management depends on the ability for practical *organization*. This is the most difficult problem,—it means the organization, on a new basis, of the deepest foundations—the economic—of the life of tens and tens of millions. And it is the most promising problem, for only *after* its essential solution shall we be able to say that Russia *has become* not only a Soviet, but a Socialist republic.

This objective situation, which was created by the extremely oppressive and insecure peace, by the terrible disorganization, unemployment and starvation, which we have inherited from the war, and from the rule of the bourgeoisie (represented by Kerensky and his supporters, the Mensheviki and right Social-Revolutionists),—all this has inevitably produced an extreme weariness and even an exhaustion of the toiling masses. It is but natural that they insistently demand some rest. The restoration of the productive forces destroyed by the war and by the mismanagement of the bourgeoisie; the curing of wounds inflicted by the war, defeats in the war, speculation, and the attempts of the bourgeoisie to establish the overthrown power of the exploiters; the economic rehabilitation of the country; the maintenance of elementary order;—these are the urgent problems to which we must turn. It may seem paradoxical, but the fact is that in view of objective conditions, there can be no doubt that at the present moment the Soviet power cannot make secure the transformation of Russia toward Socialism, unless it can solve in a practical way these most elementary problems of social life—in spite of the resistance of the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviki and the right Social-Revolutionists. In view of the concrete peculiarities of the present situation and in view of the existence of the Soviet power with its laws on socialization of the land, on workers' control of industry, etc., the practical solution of these elementary problems would mean that we will have overcome the organization difficulties of the first steps toward Socialism.

Keep accurate and conscientious accounts, conduct business

economically, do not loaf, do not steal, maintain strict discipline at work,—these slogans, which were justly ridiculed by revolutionary proletarians when they were used by the bourgeoisie to assure their domination as a class of exploiters, have now, after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, become urgent and fundamental slogans. And the practical realization of these slogans by the toiling masses, is, on the one hand, the *sole* condition for the salvation of the country, which has been shattered by the imperialistic war and by the imperialists (headed by Kerensky); and, on the other, the practical realization of these slogans by the *Soviet* power, with its own methods, and on the basis of its own laws, is necessary and *sufficient* for the final victory of Socialism. This, however, is not comprehended by those who contemptuously refuse to urge such “common” and “trivial” ideas. In our agricultural country, which only a year ago overthrew Czarism and less than half a year ago freed itself from the Kerenskys, there remained, naturally, a good deal of unconscious anarchism, which is increased by the bestiality and barbarity accompanying every prolonged and reactionary war, and a good deal of despair and aimless anger has accumulated. If we should add to this the treasonable policy of the servants of the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviks, right Social-Revolutionists, etc., it will become clear what energetic and persistent efforts must be exerted by the best and most conscious workers and peasants to effect a complete change in the mood of the masses and to turn them to regular, uninterrupted and disciplined labor. Only such a change, accomplished by the masses of proletarians and semi-proletarians can complete the victory over the bourgeoisie, and, especially, over the more persistent and numerous peasant bourgeoisie.

II

A NEW PHASE OF THE REVOLUTION

We have defeated the bourgeoisie, but it is not yet destroyed and not even completely subjugated. We must, therefore, resort to a new and higher form of the struggle with the bourgeoisie, we must turn from the very simple problem of continuing the expropriation of the capitalists to the more complex and difficult problem—the problem of creating conditions under which the bourgeoisie can neither exist nor come into existence again. It is clear that this problem is infinitely more important and that we shall have no Socialism until it is solved.

Comparing our revolution with the revolutions of Western Europe, we are now approximately at the point which was reached in 1793 and 1871 in France. We have a right to be proud of the fact that we have reached this point and that in one respect we have, undoubtedly, gone somewhat further, as we have decreed and established throughout Russia a higher *type* of state—the Soviet government. But we cannot possibly rest satisfied with these achievements, for we have only begun the transformation toward Socialism, and in *this* respect we have not *yet* accomplished anything decisive.

Of decisive importance is the organization of strict and universal accounting and control of production and distribution. But, we have not yet effected accounting and control in those enterprises and in those branches and departments of economic effort which we have taken away from the bourgeoisie, and without this there can be no question of the second, just as essential, condition for the establishment of Socialism, viz: to increase the productivity of labor on a national scale.

It would therefore be impossible to formulate the problem of the present period in the simple sentence: continue the offensive against capital. In spite of the fact that we have, undoubtedly, not conquered capital—and that it is absolutely necessary to continue the attack on this enemy of the toilers,—such a proposal would be vague and not concrete, it would not indicate the peculiarity of the

present period, when, in the interests of a successful *final* offensive, it is necessary to "halt" the offensive *for the present*.

This can be explained by comparing our position in the war against capital with the position of a victorious army which has captured, let us say, half or two thirds of the enemy's territory and is compelled to halt the offensive in order to recuperate, to increase the supply of ammunition, to repair and to strengthen the communication lines, to build new store-houses, to bring up new reserves, etc. A halt in the offensive of the victorious army under such conditions is necessary in the interests of conquering the remaining territory from the enemy, that is, in the interests of complete victory. Whoever fails to understand that just such a "halt" in the offensive against capital is dictated to us by the objective situation of the present period does not understand anything of this situation.

Of course, we can speak only metaphorically of a "halt" in the offensive against capital. In an ordinary war it is possible to issue a general order to halt the offensive, it is possible actually to stop the forward movement. In the war against capital the movement forward cannot be stopped, and there can be no question of our renouncing any further expropriation of capital. We are considering here changing the *centre of gravity* of our economic and political work. Heretofore measures for the immediate expropriation of the expropriators were prominent. At present prominence must be given to the organization of accounting and control in those enterprises in which the capitalists have already been expropriated.

Were we to attempt now to continue the expropriation of capital with the same intensity as heretofore, we would surely be defeated, for our work in the organization of proletarian accounting and control has—it is clear and obvious to every thinking person—not kept pace with the work of the direct "expropriation of the expropriators." If we will now turn all our efforts to the work of the organization of accounting and control, we shall be able to solve this problem, we shall overcome our shortcomings and win our "campaign" against capital.

But is not the admission that we have shortcomings to overcome, equivalent to an admission that some mistake has been committed? Not at all. We will again use a military example. If the enemy can be defeated and forced back by the use of light cavalry only, this should be done. And if this can be done successfully only up to a certain line, it is quite conceivable that beyond this line it becomes necessary to bring up the heavy artillery. Admitting that it is

now necessary to overcome our shortcomings in bringing up the heavy artillery, we do not at all admit that the victorious cavalry attack was a mistake.

We were frequently reproached by the servants of the bourgeoisie for conducting a "Red Guard" attack on capital. An absurd reproach, worthy indeed of the servants of the money pouch. For the "Red Guard" attack on capital was *at that time* absolutely dictated by the circumstances.

First, capital was offering military resistance through Krensky and Krasnov, Savinkov and Gotz, (Gegechkori is even now offering such resistance), Dutoff and Bogajevsky. Military resistance can be crushed only by military means, and the Red Guards were contributing to the noblest and greatest historical cause, the cause of the emancipation of the exploited toilers from the oppression of the exploiters.

Second, we did not at that time give preeminence to the method of management over the method of suppression for the additional reason that the art of management is not an inherent quality, but is gained through experience. At that time we did not have this experience. But now we have it.

Third, then we would not have had at our disposal specialists in different branches of knowledge and technology, for they were either fighting in the ranks of the Bogajevskys, or were still in a position to offer systematic and persistent passive resistance through *sabotage*.

Does this mean that the "Red Guard" attack on capital is the right method always and in all circumstances, and that we have no other methods of fighting capital? To think so would be very naive. We have won with light cavalry, but we also have heavy artillery at our disposal. We have won thus far by the method of suppression. We shall be able to win also by methods of management. We should be able to change our fighting methods with the changing circumstances. We do not for a moment reject the "Red Guard" suppression of the Savinkovs and Gegechkoris as well as of any other bourgeois counter-revolutionist. But we will not be so stupid as to give exclusive preference to the "Red Guard" methods.

At present, when the epoch of the necessity of "Red Guard" attacks is, in the main, past (and completed victoriously), it is becoming urgent for the proletarian state authority to make use of

the bourgeois specialists for the purpose of re-plowing the soil so that no bourgeoisie may ever grow on it.

This is a peculiar epoch, or rather period of development, and in order definitely to defeat capital, we should be able to adapt the forms of our struggle to the peculiar conditions of the period.

Without the direction of specialists in different branches of science, technique and experience, the transition to Socialism is impossible, for Socialism demands a conscious mass movement toward a higher productivity of labor in comparison with Capitalism and on the basis which has been attained by Capitalism. Socialism must accomplish this movement forward *in its own way*, by its own methods; we shall be more explicit, by *Soviet* methods. But the specialists are inevitably bourgeois, on account of the whole environment of social life which made them specialists. If our proletariat, having obtained power, could have rapidly solved the problems of accounting, control and organization on a national scale (this was impossible on account of the war and the backwardness of Russia)—then, having crushed sabotage, we should have obtained through universal accounting and control the complete submission of the bourgeois specialists. In view of the considerable delay in installing a system of accounting and control in general, although we have succeeded in defeating sabotage, we have *not yet* created an environment which would put at our disposal the bourgeois specialists. Many saboteurs are coming into our service, but the best organizers and the biggest specialists can be gained by the state either in the old bourgeois way (that is for a higher salary) or in the new proletarian way (that is by creating such an environment of universal accounting and control which would inevitably and naturally win the approval and attract the services of specialists). We have now been forced to make use of the old bourgeois method and consent to a very high remuneration for the services of the biggest of the bourgeois specialists. All those who are acquainted with the facts understand this, but not all give sufficient thought to the significance of such a measure of the proletarian state. It is clear that this measure is a compromise, that it is a defection from the principles of the Paris Commune and of any proletarian rule, which demands the reduction of salaries to the standard of remuneration of the average worker,—principles which demand that “careerism” be fought by deeds, not by words.

Furthermore, it is clear that such a measure is not merely a halt in a certain part and to a certain degree of the offensive against

capital (for capital is not a quantity of money but a definite social relationship) but also a *step backward* by our Socialist Soviet state which has from the very beginning proclaimed and carried on a policy of reducing high salaries to the standard of wages of the average worker.

Of course the servants of the bourgeoisie, particularly of the petty kind, like the Mensheviki and the Right Social-Revolutionists, will chuckle at our admission that we are taking a backward step. But we should pay no attention to their glee. We must study the peculiarities of the highly difficult and new road to Socialism without concealing our mistakes and weaknesses, but trying to overcome deficiencies in time. To conceal from the masses the fact that to attract bourgeois specialists by extremely high salaries is a defection from the principles of the Commune, would mean that we had lowered ourselves to the level of bourgeois politicians and were deceiving the masses. To explain openly how and why we have taken a backward step and then to discuss publicly the means we have to overcome our deficiencies—this means educating the masses and learning from experience, learning together with them how to build up Socialism. There has been hardly a single victorious military campaign in history in which the victor has not chanced to make individual mistakes, to suffer partial defeats, to temporarily retreat somewhere. And the “campaign” against Capitalism which we have undertaken is a million times more difficult than the most difficult military campaign, and it would be foolish and disgraceful to become dejected because of a particular and partial retreat.

Let us take up the question from the practical side. Let us assume that the Russian Soviet Republic must have a thousand first class scientists and specialists in various departments of science, technique and practical experience to direct the work of the people in order to accomplish most quickly the economic rehabilitation of the country. Let us assume that these great “stars” must be paid twenty-five thousand rubles each. Let us assume that this sum (25,000 rubles) must be doubled (assuming premiums granted for particularly successful and rapid accomplishment of the most important tasks of organization and technique) or even made four times as large (assuming that we must get several hundred better paid foreign specialists). Well, then, can this expenditure of 100,000,000 rubles a year for reorganizing the work of the people according to the last word of science and technique be considered excessive or unbearable for the Soviet Republic? Of course

not. The vast majority of the conscious workers and peasants will approve such an expenditure, knowing from practical life that our backwardness compels us to lose billions, and that we have *not yet* attained such a high degree of organization, accounting and control which would cause the universal and voluntary participation of these "stars" of the bourgeois *intelligentsia* in *our* work.

Of course, there is another side to this question. The corrupting influence of high salaries is beyond dispute—both on the Soviets (the more so, since the rapidity of the Revolution made it possible for a certain number of adventurers and loafers' to join the Soviets, together with the incapable and dishonest among certain commissaires, who would not mind becoming "star grafters") and on the mass of workers. But all thinking and honest workers and peasants will agree with us and will admit that we are unable to get rid at once of the evil heritage of Capitalism; that the Soviet Republic can be freed from this "tribute" of fifty or a hundred millions of rubles (a tribute for our own backwardness in the organization of *universal* accounting and control *from the bottom up*) only by organization, by increasing discipline among ourselves, by getting rid of all those who "maintain the traditions of Capitalism," that is, of loafers, parasites and grafters. If the conscious workers and peasants will succeed, with the help of Soviet institutions, in organizing and disciplining themselves, and in creating powerful labor discipline in one year, then we will in one year do away with this "tribute" (which may be reduced even sooner) depending on the measure of success attained in creating labor discipline and organization among the workers and peasants. The sooner we ourselves, workers and peasants, shall learn better labor discipline and a higher technique of labor, making use of the bourgeois specialists for this purpose, the sooner we get rid of paying tribute to these specialists.

III

MANAGEMENT AND PRODUCTION

Our work, under the direction of the proletariat, of organizing a universal accounting and control of production and distribution is considerably behind our work on the direct expropriation of the expropriators. To understand this is fundamentally necessary for a comprehension of the peculiarities of the present period and of the problem dictated to the Soviets by these peculiarities. The centre of gravity of the struggle with the bourgeoisie is shifted to the organization of accounting and control. This must be taken into account in order to determine correctly the urgent economic and financial problems with regard to the nationalization of the banks, nationalization of foreign trade, state control of currency, the introduction of a satisfactory (from the proletarian standpoint) wealth and income tax, and the introduction of obligatory labor service.

We are extremely backward in regard to Socialist reforms in these fields (and they are very important fields), and we are backward for no other reason than this—that accounting and control, in general, are not sufficiently organized. Of course, this problem is one of the most difficult, and in view of the economic disorganization produced by the war, its solution must take a long time, and it should not be overlooked that just here the bourgeoisie—and especially the numerous petty and peasant bourgeois—gives us a good deal of trouble, disturbing the establishment of control, disturbing, for instance, the grain monopoly, making opportunities for speculation and speculative trade. What we have already decreed is yet far from adequate realization, and the main problem of today consists precisely in concentrating all efforts upon the actual, practical *realization* of the measures which have already become law, but have not yet become reality.

In order to continue further the nationalization of the banks and to move steadily toward the transformation of the banks into centres of social bookkeeping under Socialism, we must first of

all be successful in increasing the number of branches of the People's Bank, in attracting deposits, in making it easier for the public to deposit and withdraw money, in getting rid of the "waiting lines," in discovering and executing the grafters and crooks, etc. We must first actually accomplish the simplest tasks, organize what is already in our possession—and only then prepare for the more complex tasks.

We must improve and regulate the state monopolies (on grain, leather, etc.) which we have already established—and thereby prepare for the state monopolization of foreign trade; without such a monopoly we will not be able to "settle" with foreign capital by the payment of a "tribute." And the possibility of Socialist reconstruction depends on whether we shall be able to protect our internal economic independence during a certain transition period by paying some "tribute" to foreign capital.

We are also extremely backward in the collection of taxes, in general, and of wealth and income taxes, in particular. The levying of contributions on the bourgeoisie—a measure which in principle is undoubtedly acceptable and deserving proletarian approval—shows that we are in this respect still nearer to the methods of conquest (of Russia) from the rich for the poor, than to the methods of management. But, to become stronger and to make our position firm, we must adopt the latter methods, we must substitute for the contribution exacted from the bourgeoisie steady and regularly collected wealth and income taxes, which will give more to the proletarian state and which requires of us greater organization, and better regulated accounting and control.

The delay in introducing obligatory labor service is another proof that the most urgent problem is precisely the preparatory organization work, which, on the one hand, should definitely secure our gains, and, on the other hand, is necessary to prepare the campaign to "isolate capital" and "compel its surrender." The introduction of obligatory labor service should be started immediately, but it should be introduced gradually and with great caution, examining every step in practical experience, and, of course, introducing first of all obligatory labor service *for the rich*. The introduction of a labor record book and a consumption-budget record book for every bourgeois, including the village bourgeois, would be a serious step forward toward a complete "siege" of the enemy and toward the creation of a really universal accounting and control of production and distribution.

The state, an organ of oppression and robbery of the people, left to us, as a heritage, the greatest hatred and distrust of the people toward everything connected with the state. To overcome this is a very difficult task, which only the Soviets can master, but which requires even from them considerable time and tremendous perseverance. This "heritage" has a particularly painful effect on the question of accounting and control—a fundamental problem for the Socialist revolution after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. It will inevitably take some time before the masses will begin to feel themselves free, after the overthrow of the land owners and the bourgeoisie, and will comprehend—not from books, but from their own, *the Soviet*, experience—will comprehend and come to feel that without thorough state accounting and control of production and distribution the authority of the toilers, and their freedom, cannot last, and a return to the yoke of Capitalism is *inevitable*.

All the habits and traditions of the bourgeoisie, and especially, of the petty bourgeoisie, are also opposed to *state* control, are for the inviolability of "sacred private property" and of "sacred" private enterprise.

It is especially clear to us now how correct is the Marxian proposition that anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism are *bourgeois* tendencies, irreconcilable with Socialism, with a proletarian dictatorship and with Communism. The struggle to install in the masses the idea of *Soviet* state control and accounting, for the realization of this idea, for a break with the accursed past, which accustomed the people to look upon the work of getting food and clothing as a "private" affair and on purchase and sale as something that "concerns only myself,"—this is the most momentous struggle, of universal historical significance, a struggle of Socialist consciousness against bourgeois-anarchistic "freedom." We have introduced workers' control as a law, but it is barely beginning to be realized or even penetrating the consciousness of the proletarian masses. That lack of accountability in production and distribution is fatal for the first steps toward Socialism, that it means corruption, that carelessness in accounting and control is a direct assistance to the German and Russian Kornilovs, who can overthrow the authority of the toilers *only* in case we do not solve the problem of accounting and control, and who with the aid of the peasant bourgeoisie, the Cadets, the Mensheviks and the Right Wing Social-Revolutionists are watching us, waiting for their opportunity,—this is not adequately emphasized in our agitation, and is not given sufficient

thought or sufficient exposition by the advanced workers and peasants. And as long as workers' control has not become a fact, as long as the advanced workers have not carried out a successful and merciless campaign against those who violate this control or who are careless with regard to control,—until then we cannot advance from the first step (from workers' control) to the second step toward Socialism, that is, to the regulation of production by the workers.

A Socialist state can come into existence only as a system of production and consumption Communes, which keep conscientious accounts of their production and consumption, economize labor, and steadily increase productivity, thus making it possible to lower the work-day to seven, six or even fewer hours. Anything less than rigorous, universal, thorough accounting and control of *grain* and of the *production of grain*, and later of all other necessary products, will not do. We have inherited from Capitalism mass organizations, which facilitate the transition to mass accounting and control of distribution—the consumers' cooperatives. They are developed in Russia less than in the advanced countries, but they comprise more than 10,000,000 members. The decree on consumers' associations which was recently issued is extremely significant, showing clearly the peculiarity of the position and of the problem of the Socialist Soviet Republic at this time.

The decree is an agreement with the bourgeois cooperatives and with the workmen's cooperatives adhering to the bourgeois standpoint. The agreement or compromise consists, first, in the fact that representatives of these institutions not only participated in the deliberations on this decree, but practically obtained a deciding control, for parts of the decree which met determined opposition from these institutions were rejected. Secondly and essentially, the compromise consists in the rejection by the Soviet authority of the principle of voluntary admission to the cooperatives (the only consistent principle from the proletarian standpoint) uniting the whole population of a given locality in a *single* cooperative. The defection from this, the only Socialist principle, which is in accord with the problem of abolishing classes, allows the existence of "workmen's class cooperatives" (which, in this case, call themselves "class" cooperatives only because they submit to the class interests of the bourgeoisie). Lastly, the proposition of the Soviet government to completely exclude the bourgeoisie from the administration of the cooperatives was also considerably weakened,

and only owners of capitalistic commercial and industrial enterprises are excluded from the administration.

If the proletariat, acting through the Soviets, would successfully establish accounting and control on a national scale, there would be no need for such compromises. Through the Food Departments of the Soviets, through their organs of supply, we would unite the population in one cooperative directed by the proletariat, without assistance from bourgeois cooperatives, without concessions to the purely bourgeois principle which compels the labor cooperatives to remain side by side with the bourgeois cooperatives instead of wholly subjecting these bourgeois cooperatives and uniting both.

Entering into such an agreement with the bourgeois cooperatives, the Soviet authority has concretely defined its tactical problems and characteristic methods of action for the present stage of development,—by directing the bourgeois elements, using them, making certain individual concessions to them, we are creating conditions for a forward movement which will be slower than we at first supposed, but at the same time more steadfast, with a more solidly protected base and line of communications, and with better fortification of the conquered positions. The Soviets can (*and should*) now measure their successes in the work of Socialist reconstruction, among others, by very simple and practical tests; in exactly what number of communities (communes, or villages, blocks, etc.) and to what extent does the development of the cooperatives approach the state when they will comprise the whole population?

In every Socialist revolution,—after the proletariat has solved the problem of conquest of power, and to the extent to which the problem of expropriating the expropriators and suppressing their resistance is in the main and fundamentally solved,—it becomes necessary to turn first of all to the fundamental problem of the creation of a social system, higher than Capitalism, namely: to raise the productivity of labor and, in connection with this (*and for this*), its higher organization. Our Soviet power is in just such a position, now that, thanks to its victories over the exploiters from Kerensky to Kornilov, it has become possible for it to approach this problem directly and to take hold of it. And here it becomes at once clear that, if it is possible to seize the central state power in a few days, if it is possible to suppress the military resistance and the sabotage of the exploiters even in the remote corners of a large country in several weeks, a final solution of the problem

of increasing the productivity of labor requires at least several years (especially after a most distressing and destructive war). The decisive character of this work is determined by purely objective circumstances

To increase the productivity of labor we must first of all secure the material basis of large industry: the development of the production of fuel, iron, machinery and of the chemical industry. The Russian Soviet Republic is in such an advantageous position that it possesses, even after the Brest-Litovsk peace, colossal stores of ore (in the Ural); of fuel, in Western Siberia (hard coal); in Caucasia and in the Southeast (petroleum); in central Russia (pasture); vast resources of lumber, water-power and raw material for the chemical industry (Karabugas) and so on. The exploitation of these natural resources by the latest technical methods will furnish a basis for an unprecedented development of production.

Higher productivity of labor depends, firstly, on the improvement of the educational and cultural condition of the masses of the population. This improvement is now taking place with unusual swiftness, but is not perceived by those who are blinded by the bourgeois routine and are unable to comprehend what a longing for light and initiative is now pervading the masses of the people, thanks to the Soviet organizations. Secondly, economic improvement depends on higher discipline of the toilers, on higher skill, efficiency and intensity of labor and its better organization.

In this respect our situation is especially bad and even hopeless,—if we should take the word of those who are frightened by the bourgeoisie or who are paid to serve it. These people do not understand that there has never been, nor can there ever be, a revolution in which the adherents of the old regime would not wail about disorganization, anarchy, etc. It is natural that among the masses who have just overthrown an incredibly barbarous oppression, there is a profound and widespread unrest and ferment, that the development of a new basis of labor discipline is a very long process; that before the land owners and the bourgeoisie had been overcome, such a development could not even begin.

But, without being influenced by this despair, often pretended, which is spread by the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals (who have given up hope of retaining their old privileges), we should by no means conceal any manifest evils. On the contrary, we will expose them and improve the Soviet methods of combating

them, for the success of Socialism is inconceivable without the victory of conscious proletarian discipline against the instinctive petty bourgeois anarchy, this real guarantee of a possible restoration of Kerenskyism and Kornilovism.

The most conscious vanguard of the Russian proletariat has already turned to the problem of strengthening labor discipline. For instance, the central committee of the Metallurgical Union and the Central Council of the Trade Unions have begun work on respective measures and drafts of decrees. This work should be supported and advanced by all means. We should immediately introduce piece work and try it out in practice. We should try every scientific and progressive suggestion of the Taylor system, we should compare earnings with the general total of production or the operation results of railroad and water transportation, and so on.

The Russian is a poor worker in comparison with the advanced nations and this could not be otherwise under the regime of the Czar and other remnants of feudalism. To learn how to work—this problem the Soviet authority should present to the people in all its aspects. The last word of Capitalism in this respect, the Taylor system—as well as all progressive measures of Capitalism—combines the refined cruelty of bourgeois exploitation and a number of most valuable scientific achievements in the analysis of mechanical motions during work, in dismissing superfluous and useless motions, in determining the most correct methods of work, the best systems of accounting and control, etc. The Soviet Republic must adopt all valuable scientific and technical advances in this field. The possibility of Socialism will be determined by our success in combining the Soviet rule and the Soviet organization of management with the latest progressive measures of Capitalism. We must introduce in Russia the study and the teaching of the Taylor system and its systematic trial and adaptation. While working to increase the productivity of labor, we must at the same time take into account the peculiarities of the transition period from Capitalism to Socialism which require, on the one hand, that we lay the foundation for the Socialist organization of emulation, and, on the other, that we use compulsion so that the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat may not be weakened by the practice of a too mild proletarian government.

Among the absurdities which the bourgeois is fain to spread about Socialism is the one that Socialists deny significance of

emulation. In reality Socialism, by destroying classes and, hence, the enslavement of the masses, for the first time opens up the road for emulation on a really mass scale. And only the Soviet organization, passing from the formal democracy of a bourgeois republic to the actual participation of the toiling masses in *management*, for the first time allows emulation on a broad basis. It is much easier to organize emulation in the political than in the economic field, but for the success of Socialism the latter is the more important.

Let us take publicity as a means for the organization of emulation. A bourgeois republic establishes this only formally, actually subjecting the press to capital, amusing the "mob" with spicy political trifles, concealing the occurrence, in the factories, commercial transactions, etc., as a "business secret," protecting "sacred property." The Soviets abolished commercial secrecy and started on a new road, but have done hardly anything to make use of publicity in the interest of economic emulation. We must systematically endeavor,—along with the merciless suppression of the thoroughly false and insolently calumnious bourgeois press,—to create a press which shall not amuse and fool the masses with spicy political trifles, but which will bring to the attention of the masses and help them to study seriously the questions of every-day economics. Every factory, every village is a production and consumption Commune having the right and duty to apply the general Soviet regulations in its own way (not in the sense of violating the regulations, but in the sense of a diversity of forms in carrying them out), to solve in its own way the problem of accounting in production and distribution. Under Capitalism this was the "private affair" of the individual capitalist or land owner. Under the Soviets this is not a private affair, but a most important public concern.

And we have hardly begun the immense and difficult, but also promising and important work of organizing emulation between the Communes, of introducing reports and publicity in the process of the production of bread, clothing, etc., of transforming the dry, dead bureaucratic reports into living things—either repulsive or attractive.

Under the capitalistic system of production the significance of an individual example, say, of some group of producers, was inevitably extremely limited, and it was only a petty bourgeois illusion to dream that Capitalism could be "reformed" by the influence of models of virtuous establishments. After political power has

passed into the hands of the proletariat and after the expropriation of the expropriators has been accomplished, the situation is radically changed, and—as was many times pointed out by the most eminent Socialists—the force of an example can then for the first time exert a mass effect. Model Communes should and will serve the purpose of training, teaching and stimulating the backward Communes. The press should serve as a weapon of Socialist construction, giving publicity in all details to the success of the model Communes, studying the principles of their success, their methods of economy, and, on the other hand, “blacklisting” those Communes which persist in keeping the “traditions of Capitalism,” that is, anarchy, loafing, disorder and speculation. Statistics under Capitalism were used exclusively by government employes or narrow specialists,—we must bring them to the masses, we must popularize them so that the toilers may gradually learn to understand and to see for themselves what work and how much work is needed, and how much rest they can have; so that a comparison between the results of the enterprise of different Communes may become a subject of general interest and study; that the foremost Communes may be immediately rewarded (by reducing the workday for a certain period, raising the wages, granting a larger measure of cultural or historical privileges and treasures, and so forth).

The appearance on the historical stage of a new class in the *role* of a leader of society never occurs without a period of upheavals, struggles and storms, on the one hand,—and, on the other, without a period of false steps, experiments, wavering and hesitation with regard to the choice of new methods that will fit the new objective circumstances. The perishing feudal nobility was accustomed to false revenge on the bourgeoisie, which was conquering and displacing them, not only by conspiracies, attempts at insurrections and restoration, but also by torrents of ridicule at the inability, clumsiness, and blunders of the “insolent upstarts” who dared to take hold of the “sacred helm” of the state without the ancient training for this work, of the princes, barons, nobility and aristocracy,—quite like the revenge of the Kornilovs and Kerenskys, Gotz and Martovs, all those heroes of bourgeois morality or bourgeois scepticism, on the working class of Russia for its “insolent” attempt to seize power.

Of course, many months and years must pass before the new social class, a class heretofore oppressed and crushed by want and ignorance, can become accustomed to the new situation, can take

account of everything, regulate its work and produce its own organizers. It is self-understood that the party which leads the revolutionary proletariat could not gain the practical experience of large organizations and enterprises counting on millions and tens of millions of citizens; that to change the old, almost exclusively agitational habits must take a good deal of time. But it is not impossible, and—provided we have a clear understanding of the necessity of the change, a firm determination to accomplish it, and persistence in pursuing a great and difficult end,—we will attain it. There is a great deal of organizing talent in the “people,” among the workers and among the peasants who are not exploiters; they had been oppressed, ruined and discarded by the thousands, by capital; we do not as yet know how to find them, how to encourage, assist them and give them prominence. But we will learn it, provided we start learning with the full revolutionary zeal without which no revolution can be victorious.

No profound and powerful popular movement in history ever escaped paying a price to the scum—the inexperienced innovators are preyed upon by adventurers and crooks, boasters and shouters; there will be stupid confusion, unnecessary bustle; individual “leaders” will undertake twenty tasks at once, accomplishing none of them. Let the poodles of bourgeois society scream and bark because of each additional splinter going to waste while the big old forest is cut down. It is their business to bark at the proletarian elephant. Let them bark. We will go ahead, trying very cautiously and patiently to test and discover real organizers, people with sober minds and practical sense, who combine loyalty to Socialism with the ability to organize quietly (and in spite of confusion and noise) the efficient and harmonious team work of a large number of people under the Soviet organization. *Only* such persons should, after many trials, advancing them from the simplest to the most difficult tasks, be promoted to responsible posts to direct the work of the people, to direct the management. We have not yet learned this. We will learn.

IV

DEMOCRACY AND PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP

The resolution of the March Congress of the Soviets advocates, as the most important problem at present, the creation of "efficient organization" and higher discipline. Such resolutions are now readily supported by everybody. But that their realization requires compulsion, and compulsion in the form of a dictatorship, is ordinarily not comprehended. And yet, it would be the greatest stupidity and the most absurd opportunism to suppose that the transition from Capitalism to Socialism is possible without compulsion and dictatorship. The Marxian theory long ago condemned in no uncertain terms this petty bourgeois-democratic and anarchistic nonsense. And the Russia of 1917-1918 confirms in this respect the Marxian theory so clearly, palpably and convincingly that only those who are hopelessly stupid or who have firmly determined to ignore the truth can still err in this respect. Either a Kornilov dictatorship (if Kornilov be taken as the Russian type of a bourgeois Cavaignac), or a dictatorship of the proletariat,—no other alternative is possible for a country which is passing through an unusually swift development with unusually difficult transitions and which suffers from desperate disorganization created by the most horrible war. All middle courses are advanced—in order to deceive the people—by the bourgeoisie, who are not in a position to tell the truth and admit openly that they need a Kornilov, or—through stupidity—by the petty bourgeois democrats, the Chernovs, Tseretellis and Martovs, prattling of a united democracy, of the dictatorship of democracy, of a single democratic front, and similar nonsense. Those who have not learned even from the course of the Russian revolution of 1917-1918 that middle courses are impossible, must be given up as hopeless.

On the other hand, it is not hard to see that during any transition from Capitalism to Socialism a dictatorship is necessary for two main reasons or in two main directions. In the first place, it is impossible to conquer and destroy Capitalism without the merci-

less suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, who cannot be at once deprived of their wealth, of their advantages in organization and knowledge, and who will, therefore, during a quite long period, inevitably attempt to overthrow the hateful (to them) authority of the poor. Secondly, every great revolution, and especially a Socialist revolution, even if there was no external war, is inconceivable without an internal war, thousands and millions of cases of wavering and of desertion from one side to the other, and a state of the greatest uncertainty, instability and chaos. And, of course, all the decadent elements of the old order, inevitably very numerous and connected largely with the petty bourgeoisie (for the petty bourgeoisie is the first victim of every war and every crisis) cannot fail to "show up" during such a profound transformation. And these elements of decay *cannot* "show up" otherwise than through the increase of crimes, hooliganism, bribery, speculation and other indecencies. It takes time and *an iron hand* to get rid of this.

There never was a great revolution in history in which the people did not instinctively feel this and did not display salutary firmness, shooting down thieves on the spot. The trouble with previous revolutions was this—that the revolutionary zeal of the masses, which kept them vigilant and gave them strength to mercilessly suppress the elements of decay, did not last long. The social, the class causes of such weakness of revolutionary zeal lay in the weakness of the proletariat, which is the *only* class capable (if sufficiently numerous, conscious and disciplined) of attracting the majority of the exploited toilers (the majority of the poor, if we should use a simpler and more popular expression) and of retaining power for a sufficiently long time to completely suppress both all exploiters and all elements of decay.

This historical experience of all revolutions, this universal historical—economic and political—lesson was summed up by Marx in his brief, sharp, exact and vivid formula: the dictatorship of the proletariat. And that the Russian revolution correctly approached this universal historical problem has been proven by the victorious march of the Soviet organization among all peoples and tongues of Russia. For the Soviet rule is nothing else than the organized form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the dictatorship of the class conscious proletariat, rousing to a new democracy, to independent participation in the administration of the state, tens and tens of millions of exploited toilers, who through their

experience are discovering that the disciplined and class conscious vanguard of the proletariat is their most reliable leader.

But "dictatorship" is a great word. And great words must not be used lightly. A dictatorship is an iron rule, with revolutionary daring, and swift and merciless in the suppression of the exploiters as well as of the hooligans. And our rule is too mild, quite frequently resembling jam rather than iron. We must not for a moment forget that the bourgeois and petty bourgeois environment is offering resistance to the Soviet rule in two ways: on the one hand, by external pressure—by the methods of the Savinkovs, Gotz, Gegetchkoris and Kornilovs, by conspiracies and insurrections, with their ugly "ideologic" reflection, by torrents of falsehood and calumny in the press of the Cadets, Right Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks; and, on the other, this environment exerts internal pressure, taking advantage of every element of decay, of every weakness, to bribe, to increase the lack of discipline, dissoluteness, chaos. The nearer we get to the complete military suppression of the bourgeoisie, the more dangerous become for us the petty bourgeois anarchic inclinations. And these inclinations cannot be combatted only by propaganda and agitation, by the organization of emulation, by the selection of organizers; they must also be met with force.

To the extent to which the principal problem of the Soviet Republic changes from military suppression to administration, suppression and compulsion will, as a rule, be manifested in trials, and not in shooting on the spot. And in this respect the revolutionary masses have taken, since November 7, 1917, the right road, and have proven the vitality of the Revolution, in starting to organize their own—workmen's and peasants'—tribunals, before any decrees were issued dismissing the bourgeois-democratic judicial apparatus. But our revolutionary and popular tribunals are excessively and incredibly weak. It is apparent that the masses' view of courts,—inherited from the regime of the land-owners and the bourgeoisie,—as not their own, has not yet been completely destroyed. It is not sufficiently appreciated that the courts serve to attract all the poor to administration (for judicial activity is one of the functions of state administration); that the court is an *organ* of the rule of the proletariat and of the poorest peasantry; that the court is a *means of training in discipline*. There is a lack of appreciation of the simple and obvious fact that, if the chief misfortunes of Russia are famine and unemployment, these mis-

fortunes cannot be overcome by any outbursts of enthusiasm, but only by thorough and universal organization and discipline, in order to increase the production of bread for men and bread for industry (fuel), to transport it in time and to distribute it in the right way. That therefore *responsibility* for the tortures of famine and unemployment falls on *everyone* who violates labor discipline in any enterprise and in any business. That those who are responsible should be discovered, tried and punished without mercy. The petty bourgeois environment, which we will now have persistently to combat, is reflected particularly in the lack of comprehension of the economic and political connection between famine and unemployment and the prevailing dissolution in organization and discipline,—in the firm hold of the view of the small proprietor: nothing matters, if only I gain as much as possible.

This struggle of the petty bourgeois environment against proletarian organization is expressed with particular force in the railway industry, which embodies, probably most clearly, the economic ties created by large Capitalism. The "office" element furnishes saboteurs and grafters in large numbers; the proletarian element, its best part, is fighting for discipline. But between these two elements there are, of course, many who waver, who are "weak," who are unable to resist the "temptation" of speculation, bribery and personal advantage, at the expense of the functioning apparatus, the uninterrupted work of which is necessary to overcome famine and unemployment.

A characteristic struggle occurred on this basis in connection with the last decree on railway management, the decree which granted dictatorial (or "unlimited") power to individual directors. The conscious (and mostly, probably, unconscious) representatives of petty bourgeois disintegration contended that the granting of "unlimited" (i. e. dictatorial) power to individuals was a defection from the principle of Commissariat administration, from the democratic and other principles of the Soviet Republic. Some of the Left Social-Revolutionists carried on a plainly demagogic agitation against the decree on dictatorship, appealing to evil instincts and to the petty bourgeois desire for personal gain. The question thus presented is of really great significance: first, the question of principle—is, in general, the appointment of individuals, endowed with unlimited power, the appointment of dictators, in accord with the fundamental principles of the Soviet rule; secondly, in what relation does this action,—this precedent, if you

wish,—stand to the special problems of the Soviet rule during the present concrete period? Both questions deserve serious consideration.

That the dictatorship of individuals has very frequently in the history of the revolutionary movements served as an expression and a means of realization of the dictatorship of the revolutionary classes, is confirmed by the undisputed experience of history. With bourgeois democratic principles, the dictatorship of individuals has undoubtedly been compatible. But this point is always treated adroitly by the bourgeois critics of the Soviet Government and by their petty bourgeois allies. On the one hand, they declare Soviet rule to be simply something absurd and anarchically wild, carefully avoiding all our historical comparisons and theoretical proofs that the Soviets are a higher form of democracy; nay, more, they are the beginning of a *Socialist* form of democracy. On the other hand, they demand of us a higher democracy than the bourgeois democracy and argue: with your Bolshevik (i. e. Socialist, not bourgeois) democratic principles, with the Soviet democratic principles, individual dictatorship is absolutely incompatible.

Extremely poor arguments, these. If we are not anarchists, we must admit the necessity of a state; that is, of *force*, for the transition from Capitalism to Socialism. The form of compulsion is determined by the degree of development of the particular revolutionary class, then by such special circumstances as, for instance, the heritage of a long and reactionary war, and finally by the forms of resistance of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. There is therefore absolutely no contradiction in principle between the Soviet (Socialist) democracy and the use of dictatorial power of individuals. The distinction between a proletarian and a bourgeois dictatorship consists in this: that the first directs its attacks against the exploiting minority in the interests of the exploited majority; and, further, in this,—that the first is accomplished (also through individuals) not only by the masses of the exploited toilers, but also by organizations which are so constructed that they arouse these masses to historical creative work (the Soviets belong to this category of organization).

With respect to the second question, the significance of individual dictatorial power from the standpoint of the specific problems of the present period, we must say that every large machine industry—which is the material productive source and basis of Socialism—requires an absolute and strict unity of the will which

directs the joint work of hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands of people. This necessity is obvious from the technical, economic and historical standpoints and has always been recognized by all those who had given any thought to Socialism as its pre-requisites. But how can we secure a strict unity of will? By subjecting the will of thousands to the will of one.

This subjection, if the participants in the common work are ideally conscious and disciplined, may resemble the gentle leadership of an orchestra conductor; but may take the acute form of a dictatorship,—if there is no ideal discipline and consciousness. But at any rate, complete submission to a single will is absolutely necessary for the success of the process of work which is organized on the type of large machine industry. This is doubly true of the railways. And just this transition from one political problem to another, which in appearance has no resemblance to the first, constitutes the peculiarity of present period. The Revolution has just broken the oldest, the strongest, and the heaviest chains to which the masses were compelled to submit. So it was yesterday. And today the same Revolution—and indeed in the interests of Socialism—demands the *absolute submission* of the masses to the *single will* of these who direct the labor process. It is self-understood that such a transition cannot take place at once. It is self-understood that it can be realized only after great upheavals, crises, returns to the old; only through the greatest strain on the energy of the proletarian vanguard which is leading the people to the new order. This is ignored by those who vacillate and drop completely into the hysterics of the *Novaya Zhizn*, *Vperiod*, *Dielo Naroda* and *Nash Volk*.

Take the psychology of the average, ordinary type of the toiling and exploited masses and compare this psychology with the objective, material conditions of their social life. Before the November revolution they had never seen the possessing exploiting classes sacrifice in their favor anything that was really of value to them. The proletarian had not seen that he would be given the often promised land and liberty, that he would be given peace, that they would sacrifice the interests of a "greater Russia" and of the secret treaties aiming at a "greater Russia," that they would sacrifice capital and profits. He saw this only after November 7, 1917,—when the proletarian took these things himself by force and when he had to defend them by force against the Kerenskys, Gotz, Gegetchkoris, Dutoffs, and Kornilovs. It is natural that for a cer-

tain time all attention of the proletarian, all his thoughts, all his energy are turned in one direction—to breathe freely, to straighten out, to expand, to enjoy such immediate benefits of life as can be taken away and which were denied him by the overthrown exploiters. It is natural that it must take some time before the ordinary representative of the masses will not only see and become convinced, but will come to feel that he must not just simply “seize,” grab, snatch,—and that this leads to greater disorganization, to ruin, to the return of the Kornilovs. A corresponding change in the environment (and, hence, in the psychology) of the rank and file of the toiling masses is barely beginning. And we, the Communist Party (the Bolsheviki), who give conscious expression to the aspirations of the exploited masses for emancipation, should fully comprehend this change and its necessity, should be in the front ranks of the weary masses which are seeking a way out, and should lead them along the right road—the road of labor discipline, harmonizing the problem of “holding meetings” to discuss the conditions of work with the problem of absolute submission to the will of the Soviet director, of the dictator, *during* work.

The “meeting-holding” is ridiculed, and more often wrathfully hissed at by the bourgeois, Mensheviki, etc., who see only chaos, senseless bustle and outbursts of petty bourgeois egoism. But without the “meeting-holding” the oppressed masses could never pass over from the discipline forced by the exploiters to a conscious and voluntary discipline. “Meeting-holding” is the real democracy of the toilers, their straightening out, their awakening to a new life, their first steps on the field which they themselves have cleared of reptiles (exploiters, imperialists, landed proprietors, capitalists), and which they want to learn to put in order themselves in their own way, for themselves, in accord with the principles of their, “Soviet,” rule, and not the rule of the nobility and bourgeoisie. The November victory of the toilers against the exploiters was necessary, it was necessary to have a whole historical period of elementary discussion by the toilers themselves of the new conditions of life and of the new problems to make possible a secure transition to higher forms of labor discipline, to a conscious assimilation of the idea of the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to absolute submission to the personal orders of the representatives of the Soviet rule during work.

This transition has now begun.

We have successfully solved the first problem of the Revolution.

We saw how the toiling masses constituted in themselves the fundamental condition of a successful solution: united effort against the exploiters, to overthrow them. Such stages as October, 1905, and March and November, 1917, are of universal historical significance.

We have successfully solved the second problem of the Revolution: to awaken and arouse the downtrodden social classes which were oppressed by the exploiters and which only after November 7, 1917, have obtained the freedom to overthrow the exploiters and to begin to take stock and to regulate their life in their own way. The "meeting-holding" of the most oppressed and downtrodden, of the least trained, toiling masses, their joining the Bolsheviks, their creating everywhere Soviet organization,—this is the second great stage of the Revolution.

We are now in the third stage. Our gains, our decrees, our laws, our plans must be secured by the solid forms of *every day labor discipline*. This is the most difficult, but also the most promising problem, for only its solution will give us Socialism. We must learn to combine the stormy democracy of the meetings, overflowing with fresh energy, breaking all restraint, the democracy of the toiling masses—with *iron discipline* during work, with *absolute submission* to the will of one person, the Soviet director, during work.

We have not learned this, but we will learn.

The restoration of bourgeois exploitation threatened us yesterday through the Kornilovs, Gotz, Dutoffs, Bogayevskys. We defeated them. This restoration, the very same restoration is threatening us today in a different form, through the environment of petty bourgeois dissoluteness and anarchism, in the form of ordinary, small, but numerous attacks and aggressions of this environment against proletarian discipline. This environment of petty bourgeois anarchy we must and will conquer.

V

THE OLD ORDER AND THE NEW

The Socialist character of the Soviet democracy—that is, of proletarian democracy in its concrete particular application—consists, firstly, in this: that the electorate comprises the toiling and exploited masses,—that the bourgeoisie is excluded. Secondly, in this: that all bureaucratic formalities and limitations of elections are done away with,—that the masses themselves determine the order and the time of elections with complete freedom of recall. Thirdly, that the best possible mass organization of the vanguard of the toilers,—of the industrial proletariat,—is formed, enabling it to direct the exploited masses, to attract them to active participation in political life, to train them politically through their own experiences, that in this way a beginning is made for the first time to get actually the *whole* population to learn how to manage and to begin managing.

Such are the principle distinctive features of the democracy which is being tried in Russia, and which is a higher *type* of democracy, which breaks away from its bourgeois distortion, and which is a transition to Socialist democracy and to conditions which will mean the beginning of the end of the state.

Of course, the elemental petty bourgeois disorganization (which will inevitably manifest itself in one or another degree during every proletarian revolution, and which in our Revolution, on account of the petty bourgeois character of the country, its backwardness and the consequences of reactionary methods, manifests itself with special strength) cannot but leave its mark on the Soviets.

We must work unceasingly to develop the organization of the Soviets and the Soviet rule. There is a petty bourgeois tendency to turn the members of the Soviets into "parliamentarians" or, on the other hand, into bureaucrats. This should be combatted by attracting *all* members of the Soviets to practical participation in management. The departments of the Soviets are turning in many

places into organs which gradually merge with the commissariats. Our aim is to attract *every* member of the *poorer* classes to practical participation in management, and the different steps leading toward this end (the more diverse the better), should be carefully registered, studied, systematized, verified on broader experience and legalized. It is our object to obtain the *free* performance of state obligations by *every* toiler after he is through with his eight hour "lesson" of productive work. The transition to this end is especially difficult, but only this transition will secure the definite realization of Socialism. The novelty and the difficulty of the change naturally causes an abundance of steps made, so to speak, in the dark, an abundance of mistakes and hesitation. Without this, no sudden forward movement is possible. The originality of the present situation consists, from the standpoint of many who consider themselves Socialists, in this—that people have been used theoretically to contrast Capitalism and Socialism, and between one and the other they profoundly put the word "leap" (some, recalling Engels, quote more profoundly this: "a leap from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom"). That the word "leap" was used by the Socialist teachers to denote the crisis of an historical transformation, and that leaps of this kind comprise periods of tens of years—this cannot be understood by most of the so-called Socialists who study Socialism "from books," but have never given serious thought to this matter. It is natural that the so-called *intelligentsia* furnishes during such times an infinite number of criers after the dead; one bewails the Constituent Assembly, another bourgeois discipline, a third the capitalist order, a fourth the cultured aristocrat, a fifth the imperialistic "greater Russia," and so on, and so forth.

The real interest of an epoch of great leaps consists in this: that the abundance of fragments of the old order, which sometimes accumulate more rapidly than the germs of the new order (which are not always immediately discernible), requires ability to distinguish the most essential in the line or chain of development. There are historical periods when it is most important for the success of the revolution to pile up as many fragments as possible,—that is, to blow up as many old institutions as possible. But there are periods when enough has been blown up, and it becomes necessary to turn to the "prosaic" (to a petty bourgeois revolutionist, "uninteresting") work of clearing the ground of the fragments. And there are periods when it is most important carefully

to nourish seeds of the new order, growing under the fragments, on the soil that is yet full of rubbish.

It is not enough to be a revolutionist and an adherent of Socialism or, in general, a Communist. One must be able to find at any moment the particular link in the chain which must be grasped with all one strength in order to hold the whole chain and to assure the passage to the next links, and the order of the links, their form, their connections, their distinction, from one another in the historical chain of events is not as simple and obvious as in an ordinary chain which is made by a blacksmith.

The struggle with the bureaucratic distortion of the Soviet organization is insured by the firm bond of the Soviets with the "people," in the sense of the exploited toilers, by the flexibility and elasticity of this bond. The bourgeois parliaments, even in the most democratic capitalist republics, are never looked upon by the poor as "their" institutions. But the Soviets are for the masses of the workers and peasants, "their own" and not alien institutions. The model "Social-Democrats" of the Scheidemann type or, what is almost identical, of the Martov type, are just as averse to the Soviets, and just as much attracted to the well-behaving bourgeois parliament or to the Constituent Assembly, as Turgenev was attracted sixty years ago to a moderate monarchist and aristocratic constitution, as he was averse to the peasant democracy of Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky.

The proximity of the Soviets to the toiling "people" creates special forms of recall and other methods of control by the masses which could now be developed with special diligence. For instance, the councils of popular education as periodical conferences of the Soviet workers and their delegates, to discuss and to control the activity of the Soviet authorities of the particular region, deserve the fullest sympathy and support. Nothing could be more foolish than to turn the Soviets into something settled and self-sufficient. The more firmly we now have to advocate a merciless and firm rule and dictatorship of individuals *for definite processes of work* during certain periods of *purely executive* functions, the more diverse should be the forms and means of mass control in order to paralyze every possibility of distorting the Soviet rule, in order repeatedly and tirelessly to remove the wild grass of bureaucratism.

In an unusually grave, difficult and dangerous international situation, the necessity to be cautious and to retreat, a period of

waiting for new outbursts of revolution in the West, painfully slow in ripening; within the country, a period of slow constructive work and of merciless rigor, of a long and persistent struggle of proletarian discipline with the threatening elements of petty bourgeois dissoluteness and anarchy,—such, in short, are the distinctive features of the special stage in the Socialist revolution that we are passing through. Such is the link in the historical chain of events which we must now grasp with all our strength to come out with honor, before we pass to the next link,—which draws on by its particular glow, by the glow of the victories of the international proletarian revolution.

Try to compare with the ordinary, popular idea of a "revolutionist," the slogans which are dictated by the peculiarities of the present situation: to be cautious, to retreat, to wait, to ~~wait~~ ^{advance} slowly, to be mercilessly rigorous, to discipline sternly, to attack disintegration.

It is surprising that some "revolutionists," hearing this, become full of noble indignation and begin to "attack" us for forgetting the traditions of the November revolution, for compromising with bourgeois specialists, for compromising with the bourgeoisie, for petty bourgeois tendencies, for reformism, etc.

The trouble with these woe-revolutionists is this: that even those of them who are actuated by the best motives in the world,—and are absolutely loyal to the cause of Socialism,—fail to comprehend the particular and "particularly unpleasant" stage that must inevitably be passed through by a backward country which has been shattered by a reactionary and ill-fated war and which has started the Socialist evolution long before the more advanced countries. They lack firmness in difficult moments of a difficult transition. It is natural that this kind of "official" opposition to our party comes from the Left Social-Revolutionists. Of course there are, and always will be, individual exceptions to group and class types. But social types remain. In a country where the petty bourgeois population is vastly predominant in comparison with the purely proletarian, the difference between the proletarian and the petty bourgeois revolutionist will inevitably appear, and from time to time very sharply. The petty bourgeois revolutionist hesitates and wavers at every turn of events, passes from a violently revolutionary position in March 1917, to lauding "coalition" in May, to hatred of the Bolsheviki (or to bewailing their "adventurousness") in July, to cautiously drawing away from them in Nov-

ember, to supporting them in December and finally in March and April, 1918, such types usually turn up their noses scornfully and say, "I am not of those who sing hymns to organic work, to being practical and gradual."

The social source of such types is the small proprietor who has been maddened by the horrors of the war, by sudden ruin, by the unheard of torments of starvation and disorganization; who is tossing hysterically, seeking a way out, seeking salvation, hesitating between confidence and support of the proletariat, on the one hand, and fits of despair, on the other. We must clearly comprehend and firmly remember that Socialism cannot be built on such a social base. Only a class that marches along its road without hesitation, that does not become dejected and does not despair at the most difficult and dangerous crossings, can lead the toiling and exploited masses. We do not need hysterical outbursts. We need the regular march of the iron battalions of the proletariat.

SUPPLEMENTARY

Foreign Relations

I

SOCIALIST AND IMPERIALIST DIPLOMACY

Tschitcherin's Report to the Fifth Soviet Congress, July, 1918.

During the period that followed the signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace, we find that our foreign policy developed along different lines than those followed during the first few months after the November Revolution. The basis of our foreign policy since the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 has been a revolutionary offensive.

This policy kept step with an immediately expected World Revolution for which the Russian November Revolution would have been the signal. It was especially meant to reach the revolutionary proletariat of all countries and to arouse them to combat Imperialism and the present capitalist system of society. (We remind our readers that at this time until the peace of Brest-Litovsk, not Tschitcherin, but Trotzky, was People's Commissaire for Foreign Affairs.)

After the proletariat of other countries refused their direct support for the destruction of revolutionary Russia, our foreign policy was radically changed through the occupation of Finland, the Ukraine, the Baltic Provinces, Poland, Lithuania and White Russia by the armies of German-Austrian Imperialism. In the last four months (March to June, 1918) we were compelled to make it our object to avoid all the dangers which menaced us from all sides and to gain as much time as possible: in the first place, to assist the growth of the proletarian movements in other countries, and in the second place, to establish more firmly the political and social ideals of the Soviet government amongst the broad masses of the people of Russia and to bring about their united support for the program of the Soviets.

Soviet Russia, with as yet no force sufficient to protect its own boundaries, surrounded by enemies waiting for its downfall, suffering from a period of unbelievable deterioration caused by the war and Czarism, and always cognizant of the dangers which threatened it at every step, had to be constantly vigilant in its foreign policy. The policy of delay was possible thanks to the diversity of interest, not only of both coalitions (the Central Powers and the Allied Powers), but also within each of these groups and in the respective Imperialism of all the warring countries. The position on the Western Front (Belgium-France) bound the powers of both coalitions temporarily to such an extent that neither of the two decided to aim at the direct and entire destruction of Russia.

A section of these imperialistic groups in both coalitions thinks of the future, of after the war, of economic relations with Russia, with this world market so especially ripe for development. This element in both coalitions would prefer a compromise instead of an annexation policy for the sake of economic advantages. The hope to embroil Russia in the war, while her

army is not built up, plays a part in the calculations of both coalitions. The military party in each group would prefer an attack for the suppression of the Soviet government of Russia.

The Soviet government, although it had decided upon a waiting policy because it did not strive for a war of revenge, was, nevertheless, compelled, after the peace of Brest-Litovsk, to work for armed resistance and at the same time to reckon with those elements who were opposing the war parties. These elements are as yet weak and we are not able to strengthen them through our own military power. The ever-growing proletarian movement has not as yet come to a climax and therefore our report is a grave and serious one. A report about our retreat, about the great sacrifices which we make in order to give Russia an opportunity to get on her feet, to organize her forces and to wait for the moment when the proletariat of other countries will help us to bring the Socialist Revolution of November, 1917, to a successful conclusion.

The period following the signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace is characteristic because the German offensive was not marked on the whole Eastern Front by a distinct line. Finland and the Ukraine were free of Soviet troops, but the masses of these parts continued the struggle. The Entente Powers withdrew during this time their entire military support, at the same time remaining as ruler in places from which they should have withdrawn. As a momentary proof that the relations between Russia and the Central Powers were changed to ordinary peaceful relations, we must point to the arrival of Count von Mirbach [who was afterwards assassinated by Russian counter-revolutionists] in Moscow on April 23, 1918, and the arrival of our Russian comrade, Joffe, in Berlin on April 20, 1918.

Concerning the former allies of Russia, we must look upon the landing of Japanese troops in Vladivostok on April 5, which landing was, nevertheless, accompanied by assurances from Japan's allies that this fact was not meant as an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia. In the meantime a great section of the English and French press was carrying on propaganda for the occupation of Russia under the slogan that such intervention was meant for the saving of Russia. But the governments of the Entente Powers adhered to a very careful policy regarding Russia, especially did the government of the United States of America adopt a decidedly friendly attitude.

The time which now followed was indeed critical with regard to Germany. The German-Finnish and the German-Austrian armies after having occupied the whole of Finland and the Ukraine, invaded the territory of the Soviet government and came face to face with Soviet troops, so that there were continuous skirmishes along the whole line of demarkation and Petrograd was directly menaced. The White Guards (Finnish counter-revolutionists) led by Germans drove into Murman territory and Port Ino, the key to Petrograd, was in grave danger. At the same time the German army continued its march on the Ukraine front into the governments of Kursk and Woronesj, into the Donnetz basin and on the river Don. In the south the Germans occupied the Crimea and, continuing their march beyond the Don, attacked Batoisk (opposite Rostov on the Don valley, near Azof). Counter-revolutionary lands forced their way into the Don and Kuban districts (the western part of the north Caucasus) under the protection of the Germans.

At last the German troops landed in the vicinity of Porte (harbor in the South Caucasus on the Black Sea) while the Finnish troops on the other side began their march in the Caucasus in the direction of Baku (on the Caspian Sea). This critical period was settled on the Finnish frontier by an agreement between the German and the Russian governments concerning a basis for a treaty between Russia and Finland. A gradual relaxing of military skirmishes on the Ukraine front was directly noticeable, caused by the beginning of peace negotiations in Kiev between Russia and the Hetman government.

The result of our so sharply conducted political dealing was: the retreat of that part of the Russian fleet (the Black Sea fleet) to Sebastopol and from there it sailed to Noworossysk (the harbor of the German menaced Kuban district). The demand for the return of this district was considered as an indispensable condition to territorial, as well as political and economic relations between Soviet Russia and German Ukraine.

Up to this moment (beginning of July, 1918) the most critical question seems to concern the Caucasus and can be attended by grave consequences, also the crisis in the Don, where counter-revolutionary activity is not yet settled. But the retreat of the fleet to Sebastopol made it possible for the mixed commission in Berlin to commence its work. This commission was made up of two parts: one a financial and judicial committee whose work consisted in planning a basis for peaceful economic relations between Russia and Germany; the other, a political committee whose task it was to solve the questions arising out of the Brest-Litovsk treaty.

n The new negative moment in the relation between Russia and her former Allies was the uprising of the Czecho-Slovaks. In this case it developed that the governments of the Entente stood with those elements who, like the Czecho-Slovaks, served to support the counter-revolution in Russia.

Directly after these events followed the landing of English troops on the Murman Coast and in the press and the declaration of the diplomats the question of intervention becomes more pronounced. But those elements in the Entente countries whose aim is to reach a complete and friendly relation with Soviet Russia continue their struggle, and reveal at the same time the extraordinary shortsightedness of the policy of attacking Russia. Thus we see how complicated the problems are that the Soviet Commissaires are called upon to solve; we have been careful in our deliberations to avoid all dangers which would lead to irreparable actions from the side of our opponents, and have taken all possible steps to bring about a peaceful solution of our difficulties with both coalitions.

The relations of Russia to the states of Central Europe were determined by the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the principal part of our policy in relation to Germany was to execute this treaty. The indistinctness, the as yet undecided agreements and the imperfection of the treaty of Brest encouraged the exponents of the annexationist policy to develop this policy still further, with regard to Russia.

The treaty of Brest is not distinct as to the boundaries of the territory occupied by Germany, and yet it determined that at the moment of the signing of the treaty all further progress should cease. The treaty leaves the situation of territories occupied by Germany an open question. The territory of the Ukraine is not defined, and the question of the boundaries of the Ukraine,

together with the uncertainty of where the German troops would stop, was an extremely dangerous one. The indistinct, contradictory, and somewhat impracticable stipulations concerning the Russian ships create the possibility for new demands from Germany and the Ukraine upon Russia. Besides there was the possibility of going still further than the stipulations, under the pretext of "self-determination."

The simplest method was to accept a fictitious "right of self-determination" in the regions occupied by Germany. In fact, we had already received a report concerning the "self-determination" of Dvinsk (on the railroad from Warsaw to Petrograd and from Riga to Moscow, Warsaw in Poland and Riga in Courland being under German control) who desired to become part of Courland. We also heard from the delegation in the White Ruthenian regions (the governments of Grodno, Vilna, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Mohilef and Minsk—the region between Warsaw to a short distance from Moscow) that they wished to withdraw from the sovereignty of Russia.

Section 7 of the treaty of Brest provides that a special commission determine the boundaries of those regions that withdrew from Russia. When this commission convened at Pskov (between Dvinsk and Petrograd) it was empowered, by the consent of both governments to determine definitely the boundaries of the regions occupied by Germany. However, after the first session of this commission, their work was interrupted, and has not been continued since.

The following proposition was submitted by the Germans: *that the basis for the right of self-determination be established on the boundaries of German occupation; that every landowner whose land was bounded by the German line of occupation should have the privilege of deciding to which side (Germany or our side) his property should belong in the future.* The solution of this question of principle was referred to Berlin, where the Political Commission (a mixed commission of Soviet representatives and Germans) will be occupied with it.

The position of the occupied regions is not as yet clear. The German government informed us that the railroad employees would retain their former wages, and enjoy all advantages as to the division of the necessities of life and that malicious agitators were spreading rumors amongst the employees that all those who continued their work under German occupation would lose their employment, their pension, and all their savings when later the now occupied territories were restored to Russia. Therefore, the German government requested us to send a public notice to the occupied districts containing the information that these rumors were baseless and that the Russian government recommended that the railroad employees continue with their work. However, we found upon direct information that the wages of the railroad employees were reduced fifty per cent, and that these employees and all other officers were subjected to all kinds of persecution and that they did not enjoy advantage in regard to the necessities of life.

We informed the German government that we could not take any part in the responsibility of the administration of the occupied district as long as the German government insisted upon deposing all Soviets and continued to destroy traces of the Soviet system. The question of the internal administration of the occupied sections had also to be referred to the Political Commission in Berlin.

The military advance of the Germans after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk occurred in two directions: in Finland and in the Ukraine. After the Russian Republic had submitted to the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk and had recalled her troops from Finland, there remained in Finland but few Russian citizens who, upon their own responsibility, took part in the struggle of the Finnish working class. At the moment of the invasion of German troops into Finland, and after, we received continual threatening notes from the German Government claiming that we had sent troops and munitions to Finland. But every time when the occupations complained in the notes were investigated we found that in reality they did not exist. They merely served the Germans as a pretext for delaying the cessation of military measures. The notes served to justify the government of the Finnish White Guards when they refused to liberate the Russian citizens, Kameniev, Sawitski and Wolf, who were returning from Sweden and were arrested at the Aland Islands. The Finns pointed out our violations of the Brest-Litovsk treaty when bands of White Guards invaded Karelie and the Murman regions, the south-west half of the former having been a part of Russia for two hundred years, and the later being wholly Russian.

The German government constantly reminded us that we are compelled, according to the treaty of Brest, to reach an agreement with Finland, and the Russian Soviet Government declared their willingness time and time again, despite the extreme provocative acts of the Finnish White Guards. I remind you of the shooting of thousands of Russians in Wyborg, of the many executions of Russian citizens, even of official members of the Soviets in Finland. I remind you of the arrest of Kowanko, the commander of Sveaborg, the Russian fortress of the Island of Helsingfors, the capital of Finland, of whose appointment Finland was duly informed through our representative ad interim and the agency of the German government. Kowanko was arrested immediately afterwards and had to submit to an investigation, and up to this date, July 19, 1918, has not yet been liberated. I remind you also of the violent seizure of the Russian ships by the Finns, of the seizure of the hospital ships, also of the enormous sums of money, amounting to many billions, taken from the safes of the fortress and the vaults of the Russian exchequer. Notwithstanding, the Russian government declared itself willing time and time again to negotiate, not only as an answer to the German demands, but the Russian government addressed itself directly to Finland with a proposition which was never answered.

The question of our relations to Finland was especially acute when an important German-Finnish army on one side advanced towards the Russian frontier near Bieloostrov (directly northwest of Petrograd) and the German government on the other side questioned us concerning the presence of English troops in the Murman district (which territory, as mentioned above, the German-Finnish White Guards had invaded) in this inquiry, the number of English troops was grossly exaggerated by the German government. In May, the question of Fort Ino became the most prominent, when the German government followed the example set by the Finnish High Commander and demanded the surrender of this Russian fort to Finland. This took place in the general critical period of the advance of the Germans, after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, when the German troops advanced into the governments of Woronesj and Koorsk (in which governments the rivers Donetz and Don

enter the Azov Sea) and the end of this advance could not be foreseen. Our notes to the German government at the later part of April and the beginning of May, containing pressing inquiries as to their exact intentions in relation to Fort Ino, resulted in the commencement of negotiations to reach a compromise. (Note: Fort Ino is one of those forts which threaten Petrograd).

• When, despite the negotiations, the Finnish troops demanded the immediate surrender of Fort Ino, and the Fort was destroyed by the retreating Russian troops, the German government at last proposed as a basis for an agreement with Finland: the return of the town Ino, upon the condition that this place and the district Ravoli (on the railroad, exactly N. W. of Petrograd) in the vicinity of Bjeloostrov should not be enforced by the Russians, and upon the condition that we abandon the western part of the Murman regions, which the Germans and Finns had invaded, to Finland. Our acceptance of this as a basis for an agreement led to the discontinuation of the critical situation of May. However, notwithstanding this, Finland still continued to refuse to answer our proposal to enter into mutual negotiations.

The separation of Esthonia and of the northern part of Courland from Russia is in no way the result of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, because this treaty only provided for the temporary occupation by Germany of these parts. Already on the 28th of January there was delivered to our representative Worofski in Stockholm a declaration from the land owners and barons of Esthonia and Courland concerning the independence of these provinces. After that, meetings of the landowners and barons were held in Esthonia and Courland, and in Riga, the capital of Livonia, on March 22, and at Reval, the capital of Esthonia, on March 28, they decided on the convocation of congresses. These congresses were held in Riga and Reval on April 9-10, and they accepted the declaration as to the separation from Russia. On the 19th of May, our representative Joffe received notice to that effect through the office of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In his note of May 28th, addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joffe called attention to the fact that the action taken in Riga and Reval was in reality but the expression of a comparatively small part of the people of Courland and Esthonia and that only by a real and general unhampered expression of all the people, under the condition, could the basis of self determination and separation be decided.

The Russian government was but lately confronted with the question of its relations to Poland, when the representative of the Polish Council of Regents, Mr. Lednitzki, came to Moscow, and in his position as representative of Poland, desired to enter into relation with the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. On his first visit, we found his credentials unintelligible, but when he came the second time, he came with the formal authority of the Council of Regents to negotiate with us, concerning matters regarding Poland. However, we do not recognize the present situation in Poland as politically independent, and therefore cannot consider the Polish government as expressing the will of the people.

We entered therefore into relations with Mr. Lednitzki, but, as is self explanatory, only in essential, not in diplomatic relations, and then only when Count Mirbach, who was at that time the German ambassador in Moscow,

informed us that by maintaining such relations we would gratify an expressed wish of the German government.

A more intense German offensive on the Ukraine side would have been more threatening than the advance upon the side of Finland. Directly after the conclusion of the treaty of Brest the troops of the Central Soviet government were ordered to withdraw from Ukraine. The Soviet government was maintained within the borders of the Ukraine, which, after the second congress formed itself into the government of the independent Soviet Republic of Ukraine. After the German troops had occupied all points belonging to the Ukraine, they continued to advance still further in the direction of Moscow and even occupied the southern part of the Russian governments of Tversk and Woronesj.

Therefore, the question of determining a line of demarkation on the Ukrainian front, which would determine the limits of the German advance, was quite acute, especially on the front near Woronesj, where Germany first demanded the occupation of some districts, but later only the occupation of the Wologodski district, with the important strategic railroad junction of Woronesj. The question of the line of demarkation was closely connected with the question of cessation of hostilities, and this was the beginning of negotiations with the Ukraine.

On March 30, the Ukrainian Rada addressed us with the proposition to commence negotiations, and the German government repeatedly pointed to our obligations as laid out in the treaty of Brest to conclude a peace with the Ukraine. From our side, we proposed opening negotiations at Smolensk (between Moscow and Brest). Although we sent our proposition directly to the Rada in Kief, and also to Berlin, our proposition did not reach the Rada in Kief soon enough, and it was not until April 16th that the Rada sent us a courier with a note proposing to conduct the negotiations at Tversk (halfway between Moscow and Kief), to where our delegates rapidly departed.

The peace delegation of the Ukraine came but to Worosjby (half way between Tversk and Kief), but the constant hostilities made it impossible for the delegates to meet. At this time, the Kief Rada was displaced by the government of Skoropadski, and Germany insisted that the negotiation be transferred to Kief, where they commenced on May 22nd.

The first question to be acted upon was the question of an armistice. The most important question, however, was the determination of a line of demarkation. We had repeatedly in the past made the question of determination of the boundaries of the Ukraine a topic for discussion as we considered this matter as most important, having to reckon with far reaching consequences in case of an unfavorable conclusion.

On March 29, we received a telegram from the German assistant secretary Busche, in answer to our queries, explaining that the territory of the Ukraine was temporarily determined upon, nine governments being added to the Ukraine.

When the negotiations concerning an armistice started, the Ukrainians demanded much more. They demanded that the line of demarkation be extended further to the North and to the East, so that they occupy eight more districts. They wanted especially the government of Woronesj, making fourteen districts, with a population of three million, to be given them.

The extreme moment in the negotiations occurred simultaneously with the critical moment in the South, with the critical moment upon the Black Sea, when Germany demanded that the Russian fleet near Novorossisk return to Sebastopol. The Germans did not limit their military forces to the nine governments added to the Ukraine on March 29th, but occupied Taganrog and Rostov on the Don (both of the Sea of Azof) on May 6. Their further advance came to a halt at the important railroad junction Batarsk (opposite Rostov on the Don), which was occupied by a Soviet army.

On April 22, the German troops had already invaded the Crimea and had more extensively occupied the peninsula of Tauri, while a certain part of our Black Sea fleet had time to leave for Novorossisk. We received a number of notes from Germany, wherein she complained of hostile treatment in different places upon the Black Sea, where ships belonging to our Black Sea fleet were destroyed. a

On the South, the Turkish army advanced into the Caucasian regions, occupied Alexandropol (south of Tiflis) and threatened Baku, while southern Trans-Caucasia sent troops against Soviet Russia, against the adherents of the Soviet movement in the vicinity of Suchum (in South Caucasia on the Black Sea), and in the entire Abchasia (South Caucasian Mountain region). a1 The advance of the Germans and their allies in the Kuban regions (the western part of North Caucasus) had already started.

And in this critical moment the demand was made of us to order the return of the Black Sea fleet from Novorossisk to Sebastopol.

As a result of further negotiations, we received the guarantee from Germany that the ships would not be used during the war and after the conclusion of a general peace they would be returned to Russia. At the same time, the troops would not advance further upon the entire line of demarkation on the Ukrainian front, which was similar to the real position of the occupation at the beginning of the Ukrainian negotiations, which did not extend beyond Walveki upon the Woronesj frontier at Batasjk (opposite Rostov) upon the Southwest frontier. In case we refused, the advance to Kuban would continue, and besides we were told that the possibility of economic and political agreements, the order to cease all advances upon Ukrainian frontier, and even the beginning of the work of the joint commission in Berlin, depended upon our consent to the return of the Black Sea fleet from Novorossisk to Sebastopol.

The question of the return of the fleet thus became the centre of the whole German diplomacy against us, so that they might influence the whole further progress of our relations. The return of a part of the fleet to Sebastopol on June 18 and the sinking of the rest on June 19 made an end of this critical event.

Quickly upon this, the commission in Berlin, which had not convened for a long time, began to hold sessions, and the advance of the German troops upon the Ukrainian front ceased. The negotiations progressed even more rapidly. Three days after our consent was obtained for the return of our fleet, on June 12, a general armistice with the Ukraine was concluded. On June 17, an agreement concerning the line of demarkation of the Northern Ukrainian front was arrived at, and representatives were sent to Vitebsk to determine upon this line of demarkation. The most important point in the peace negotiations was the question of the boundaries of the Ukraine. It

was agreed that the fate of those parts over which no agreement could be reached should be decided by a referendum, held under conditions that would guarantee the free and unhampered expression of the people.

The advance of the Turks, and later, of the Germans, in the South, was made easy through the policy of the Trans-Caucasian government (Social Revolutionary and Menshevik) a government supported by the privileged classes of the population, who had adopted a hostile attitude toward Soviet Russia. After the attempts of the Russian Soviet government to enter into communications with the Trans-Caucasian government did not materialize, Germany offered her mediation for "regulating" the relations between us. After we had agreed to this, Count Mirbach proposed that we send our delegation to Kief for the negotiations with the Trans-Caucasian government. However, we proposed that we meet in Vladikavkas (in Caucasia) and we insisted that the negotiations be directly between the Russian Soviet Republic and the Trans-Caucasian government. Finally Count Mirbach informed us that the representatives of the Trans-Caucasian government, Vatsbelli and Tseretelli, were on their way to Moscow, and that the German government cherished the urgent wish that the negotiations between us commence.

But the Trans-Caucasian government collapsed. The Georgian National Council, which took the place of the government of Tseretelli, sent a representative, Mr. Khvendadze, to Moscow, with whom, however, we did not start negotiations. We knew that the government of the independent Georgians represented only the privileged class and that the masses did not wish nor recognize the separation from Russia. We also received the report that fictitious representatives of the Mussalmen of Askhabad (the Trans-Caucasian region bounded by Persia) represented themselves as an independent government, while we knew very well that the masses of the people did not wish to separate from Russia. The German government also informed us of the contents of a manifesto of a government of the Union of Mountain Tribes of North Caucasia, with the proclamation of their independence, while in reality, North Caucasus was in the control of the adherents of Soviet Russia, who rejected the proposition.

The independent Georgians permitted Germany to transport her troops over the Georgian railroad, which opened the way to Baku, on the Caspian Sea, for Germany.

The Turkish troops were, as we know, in the Armenian regions, in the beginning of July, 1918, where a strong Armenian movement was operating against them.

The question of the Caucasus was placed upon the order of the day of the Political Commission convened at Berlin (German and Soviet representatives). The question of economic relations between Germany and Russia was determined on one side by the necessity for the liquidation of losses through Czaristic war measures and through the social legislation of the November revolution in regard to German property in Russia, and on the other by the necessity for the creation of mutual economic relations in both countries. The treaty of Brest-Litovsk obligated us to pay indemnity for the losses of German citizens during the war through the liquidation of their undertakings, or through the cessation of payments of dividends and interest on loans. The execution of these obligations demanded from us the

creation of a department that should investigate the German claims. This department is now in existence as the Liquidation Department of the People's Commissariat of Trade and Industries, and functions with success.

If, therefore, the settlement of such obligations, caused by the Czaristic war measures, occurs less rapidly than we wish, which gives the German government occasion for constant complaints, then this is not caused by the partial defects of our department alone (these defects are now eliminated), but by the fact that the Russian bourgeoisie strives to take advantage of our obligations to the Central Powers, and endeavors by all kinds of fictitious contracts to make demands upon us. The question of payments of interest on old loans, dividends, etc., cannot be separated from the question of interest obligations, caused by social legislation, and, likewise, cannot be separated from our duty to support our prisoners of war in Germany.

Our social legislation endeavors to unite the principal sources of the economic life of the country and place them in the hands of the Workers' and Peasants' Soviet. Many of these sources are in the hands of foreign subjects. If we nationalize these branches of industry, then we are compelled to compensate the German subjects for their losses. Our local Soviets do not always understand that the interests of the State of Workers and Peasants does not demand the indiscriminate confiscation of everything that happens to be there, but a suitable nationalization of such industries as are necessary for us, from the standpoint of the general economic plans of the state.

The indiscriminate nationalization of all possible kinds of moving picture houses and apothecary shops, requisition of foreign property without plan, without direct necessity, caused the State of Workers and Peasants to pay damages which run into hundreds of millions.

All such impracticable actions give cause for protest from the German government and also cause for conflicts which increase the obligations excessively. The question of computation of the damage caused by us, the question of the financial liquidation of our obligations which were caused by these actions and the question of the regulation of our social legislation relative to foreign subjects, demand immediate decision.

The joint Commission of German and Soviet representatives, who are at this moment in session in Berlin, is confronted by an extremely complicated problem. Our representative, Bronsky, proposed the following conditions for an agreement, in the name of the People's Commissaire of Trade and Industry:

1. Russia must, for the sake of economic restoration, take up her economic relations with the Central Powers again, and at the same time continue her relations with the Entente Powers as far as possible.

2. To meet our obligations to the Central Powers, according to the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, we are compelled to conclude a loan, whereby the total amount of these obligations shall be turned into a state debt. The payments of interest shall be partly in products of our country, and timber, and partly in gold and in German securities in possession of the Russian government.

3. As a guarantee for this debt, and also for the payment of the more necessary products for the economic reconstruction of Russia now being bought in Germany, we propose to give certain concessions for the exploitation of natural resources in Russia. The condition of these concessions

are within the existing Social and Trade laws of Russia and provide that we take part in the exploitation of these resources, retain a part of the proceeds and reserve the right of control.

4. The concessions cover the following branches of the State's economy: (a) The production of oil. (b) The building of railroads. (c) The preparation and exploitation of certain branches of agriculture by introducing more scientific and technical methods of agriculture, under the condition that Germany will receive a certain part of the products resulting from such methods. (d) The production of artificial fertilizer. (e) The exploitation of the gold fields.

5. For the realization of these measures all the productive forces of Russia must be mobilized.

The following are the necessary conditions under which the agreement is sanctioned:

(a) No interference whatsoever by Germany in our internal politics.
(b) No intervention by Germany in those countries with which she was formerly united, by the conclusion of mutual economic treaties, to wit: Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic Provinces (Estland) and the Caucasus.

(c) Recognition by Germany of the nationalization of foreign trade and the banks.

(d) Guarantee from Germany of the continuation of the supply of ore to Soviet Russia from Krivoi Rog in the Kherson government, and from the Caucasus, from which districts Russia has hitherto received at least half of the total ore production.

(e) Ratification of the boundary between Ukraine and the Don region whereby Russia shall be awarded the Donetsk coal mines, as at present this boundary line runs through the center of the mines.

Concerning the demand that we meet our obligations by payment with products, we call attention to the fact that our decided refusal to agree with these claims does not mean that we refuse, for, as far as our position as a neutral nation makes this possible to supply Germany with raw materials and products, we are willing to deliver to her what we can without injury to our own interests, without conflicting with the situation of our country as a neutral nation.

But our interests, the interests of an exhausted nation, make it necessary that we receive in return for products which are expensive in Europe at present such products as are absolutely necessary for the restoration of the country.

Relative to the opinions existing in the capitalistic centres of Germany, that our social experiments make the concessions worthless, that the nationalization excludes the possibility of making profits for foreign capitalists, we declare: Our country is in a state of deterioration; every other form of restoration, except the form which is pointed out by the German capitalists as a Socialistic experiment, would be resisted by strong opposition of the masses, as the people have learned by grave experience of many years never to submit again to the uncontrolled capitalistic mix-up of restoration. If German Capitalism would reckon with this fact,—and a fact it surely is—then the German capitalistic centres would understand that we have, after the inevitable period of confusion, reached the work of organization, and

that we require for this work the assistance of foreign economic apparatus, as long as we can not depend upon the assistance of a Socialistic Europe. We are prepared to pay for such assistance: yes, *to pay*. We declare it openly, as we are not to blame.

The nationalization of the principal branches of industry, the nationalization of foreign trade, do not exclude these payments; they but determine the form and manner of payment which foreign capital shall demand.

The question of the return of the prisoners of war and civil prisoners, and the maintenance of them until their return to their countries, played a great part in our relations to Germany and Austria-Hungary. Between Russia and Austria-Hungary, the question of the number of war prisoners to be transported presented no difficulties, as the number of prisoners on both sides was less than a million. There was difficulty with Germany, as the number of our war prisoners in Germany was more than a million, while the number of German prisoners in Russia was but little more than a hundred thousand. As the Russian-German commission in Moscow could not come to an agreement on this question of the basis for an exchange of war prisoners between Russia and Germany, it was referred to the Russian-German commission in Berlin, who adopted the principle of exchanging man for man, in accordance with an ultimatum of the German authorities on June 24. We had to accommodate ourselves to this demand. We are yet facing a severe struggle for the improvement of the conditions of our war prisoners in Germany, where the majority of them labor under extraordinary severe conditions. We must labor unceasingly so that when the German prisoners of war shall have returned to their country the future return of Russian prisoners occurs in the same period.

The relations with Austria-Hungary are less vital than those with Germany, as the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was only lately ratified by Austria-Hungary. In the beginning, there was only the question of the exchange of prisoners of war, but later a financial commission arrived in Moscow from Vienna, with the object of regulating the mutual financial obligations of both states upon a basis similar to that of the Russian-German commission in Berlin. Kameniev was appointed as our representative to Vienna. But we have not as yet received his recognition by the Austro-Hungarian government. We expect the appointment of representatives of Austria-Hungary to Moscow in the near future (this report was made in the beginning of July) which will greatly improve the relations between both countries.

The Turkish ambassador, Thalib-Kemal-Bey, came to Moscow with the German ambassador, Count Mirbach, but the establishment of friendly relations between the peoples of Russia and Turkey, which country is also the object of exploitation by World Capital, was prevented by the aggressive policy of Turkey in the Caucasus, where the Turkish army, after having occupied Batoum, Kars and Ardahan, commenced to advance further, occupied Alexandropol and threatened Baku. The horrible treatment of the Mussulmen in the Caucasus was always pointed to by the Turkish ambassador as an answer to our protest.

The lately arrived Bulgarian ambassador, Mr. Tajaprasjnikof, pointed constantly to the absence of any cause that could interrupt the friendly relations of the peoples of Bulgaria and Russia, while at the same time, the total absence of all aggressive endeavors in our policy, to which we called

the attention of the Bulgarian ambassador, makes it possible to maintain friendly relations in both countries.

The most favorable attitude to Soviet Russia among the Entente Powers was adopted by the United States of North America. (We remind our readers that this report was made in the beginning of July, 1918.) We want to remind you of the telegram of greetings to the Emergency Congress by President Wilson in March.

It is a public secret that at the moment when many voices were raised in favor of intervention by Japan in Siberia, the principal obstacle to intervention was the negative position of the government of the United States of North America. Our plan is to offer an economic agreement to the United States of North America, besides our negotiations for an agreement with Germany, and to Japan, as well, with which country, despite the landing of Japanese troops in Vladivostok and despite the campaign of a part of the Japanese press in favor of intervention, we hope to maintain friendly relations.

A great number of the French people adopted an unfriendly attitude towards Soviet Russia, caused by the annulment of the State debt. When the question of a possible armed invasion of Japan and may be of its allies in the Soviet domain became acute, the interview of the French ambassador in regard to the possibility of armed intervention, eventually even against the Soviet government, served as an alarming sign of a coming crisis. When the Russian government demanded the recall of the ambassador, whose declaration would prejudice the friendly relations of both countries, the French government gave no answer, and at this moment (beginning of July) the French ambassador is still present in Vologda, although the Russian government considers him merely an ordinary individual. On the other side, the French government refused to allow admission to France of Kamienev, who is traveling on a special mandate of the Russian government. Despite our continuous demands for the return of our troops stationed in France, only the invalids were sent home. Constant pressure was brought to bear in different ways upon our soldiers to induce them to continue the war in the ranks of the Russian legions. The great majority of the soldiers refused because they recognized the authority of the Soviet and approved the withdrawal of Russia from the war. On account of this, many were persecuted or were sent to the African penal camp.

In the beginning of the year (1918), when the negotiations concerning the return of our troops from France were started, France proposed, as an indispensable condition, the return of the Czecho-Slovak division to France, as France was very much concerned with their fate. When the Czecho-Slovaks started their rebellion, the representative of France in Moscow declared that the disarmament of the Czecho-Slovak soldiers would be considered as an unfriendly act of the Soviet government towards France, in which opinion he was supported by the representatives of England, Italy and the United States of North America.

The English government has, on the other hand, kept its frontiers open to the agents of the Soviet government (this was, to remind the readers again, reported before the conspiracy of Lockhart, which caused the change in attitude of the English government) but also commenced negotiations with the authorized representative, Litvinof, of the Russian Soviet Republic. He

was allowed the right to send and receive couriers, and to use the code, but notwithstanding this, the attitude of the English Government towards him is, in many respects, not in conformity with the dignity of the Russian Republic. After he had rented a house for the embassy of the Russian diplomats, the owner, without any cause, declared the contract void, and the court has evidently sustained the illegal action of the owner, the court embellishing its decision with comments which were offensive to the Soviet government. Our couriers were admitted but were subject to a careful investigation. When Kamienev and Zalkind arrived in England, all their diplomatic documents were taken away from them, and only returned when they left England. They were compelled to leave England at the first opportunity and the police who accompanied them treated them shamefully. A few people who were working in the bureau of our diplomatic staff were expelled from England, and were not even allowed to confer with Litvinof.

The English government maintains friendly relations with the old Czaristic embassy and consulate, as well as with the so-called Russian Governments and the English government consults them on all subjects which concern military service, Russian prisoners of war, Russian steamers in English harbors, and other general interests of Russia. Consul McLean in Glasgow and Simonof in Australia, appointed by Russia, were not recognized. The situation was most difficult right after the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. The yellow press insulted McLean viciously.

The position of Russian citizens in England is, in general, very difficult; the pogrom agitation seems to continue in the newspapers. The return of Russian citizens is made very difficult for them. The old military agreement concluded by Kerensky, which gave the English government the right to draft Russian citizens in the English army, is still made use of. In the beginning of 1918, we declared to the government of Great Britain that we do not recognize this Kerensky agreement. Comrade Litvinof demanded the liberation of those citizens who were drafted into the English army upon the basis of this agreement, but received the answer that foreigners could not live in England without performing work in the interest of the nation and that those Russian citizens would be drafted in the workers' division for the production of munitions for the army.

Soon after this many were transported into Egypt to be drafted in the Jewish legion in Palestine. The drafting of Russian citizens in the English army was temporarily discontinued, but afterwards renewed, with the difference that those who were called in the service were not put in the army in the field but in the above-mentioned workers' division.

When, on April 5, a detachment of Japanese troops landed in Vladivostok, fifty English regiments also landed. A large section of the English press, particularly those controlled by the Northcliffe syndicate and the war industries, for a long time insisted upon further intervention by Japan in Siberia. Not only was this opposed by progressive elements in the labor movement, but also by a large number of liberals and even some of the far-sighted among the conservatives. The position of the government in regard to this question was not officially determined. The further course of the relations between Russia and England will be decided by England's attitude toward intervention.

While Russia was in the war together with the Entente Powers, English war vessels were always at Murmansk. The Murmansk road played an extraordinarily important part in the military traffic between Russia and its Allies. After the conclusion of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, there departed by way of Murmansk for the west the military experts and emergency expeditions of the Allies formerly in Russia. This could not continue. Frequently we addressed the English representative with the demand that the war ships should be withdrawn from Murmansk. When the Murmansk situation became apparently a permanent relation of the present international position of Russia, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on June 14 demanded of England, France and the United States the withdrawal of their war ships. Ten days after this demand the British landed 1100 men in Murmansk. Our answer to this armed invasion was to demand the withdrawal of the Allied troops, and to send our own troops to Murmansk. The agents of Great Britain explain the presence of English troops in Murmansk as an endeavor of the English government to protect this region against a German-Finnish advance. At a moment when the Entente powers declare their sympathy with the Czecho-Slovak divisions which are openly engaged in counter-revolutionary activity, it is a vital necessity for the Soviet Government to completely restore its power in Murmansk. We are now trying to accomplish this, and we hope for a favorable result.

It is the intention of Soviet Russia to arrive at an economic agreement with Germany and the United States for the exchange of products, and it is equally our intention to conclude a similar agreement with England. It depends entirely on England to utilize this opportunity. Among the ruling class of England there are elements endeavoring to establish friendly relations, and we have many friends among the working class of England. As the English government's spokesmen in the labor movement refrain from expressions of friendship for Soviet Russia, we can find solace in the support of the as yet not powerful Socialist parties; the British Socialist Party constantly gives proof of its enthusiastic solidarity with Soviet Russia, as well as the constantly developing movement of the spokesmen of the workers in the factories. This Shop-Stewards movement is a new expression of the independent mass movement of the workers of England, representing at this moment the most powerful and the most progressive factor in the English labor movement.

England, as well as Italy, the United States and France, participated in the declaration favoring the Czecho-Slovaks. Until this, the Italian representatives had always emphasized the friendly attitude of Italy toward our people.

The unfortunate people of Serbia are, on account of their general conditions, much more inclined to show its solidarity with the heavily-burdened proletariat of Russia. Contrary to this was the attitude of the official representatives of Serbia, who were always under the influence of the policy of the Entente Powers.

Our relations with the Rumanian Government must not be confused with our relations with the Rumanian people, among whom the Russian Revolution had already begun to make inroads in the South when the revolutionary movement was violently stopped. At this moment our relations

with the Rumanian Government are not settled. The annexation of Bessarabia to Rumania was accomplished through a fictitious right of self-determination by a small group of the population and accompanied by unparalleled violence.

Concerning the neutral powers, Sweden protected the interests of the German subjects, Denmark those of Austria-Hungary. The questions concerning the German and Austrian prisoners of war were always a subject of very animated discussion between ourselves and Sweden and Denmark.

We intended to establish economic relations with the three Scandinavian states. The interests of our citizens, and thus of our prisoners in Germany, were taken care of by Spain, but the Spanish Government adopted an extremely reticent attitude toward Soviet Russia. The Spanish Embassy has delivered only the keys of our Embassy in Berlin to the German Government, but it refused to deliver to us the administration of our prisoners of war. The Spanish Government also refused to allow our citizens to leave Spain. The Swiss Government, after acknowledging our authorized representative, Comrade Bersine, did not immediately admit his staff and his couriers are always meeting difficulties in their travels to the Swiss Republic. Our relations to all these states, and the foreign states in general, affect the existence of our Worker's and Peasants' Dictatorship. Our inroads on the rights of private property are of great influence. Insofar as these inroads are legal in method, under the power to tax, the foreigners are subject to our measures. Insofar as irregularities occur which do not come within the scope of our regulated economic policy, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs has always exercised its influence upon the local Soviets to regulate the situation of the foreigners; and at this moment instructions are being worked out in conformity with all the other People's Commissaires. Nevertheless, we inform the foreign Governments that our social reforms cannot end at the door steps of those who consider themselves foreign subjects.

Our policy in the Eastern countries is determined by the peace measure adopted at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants, November 7, 1917.

Imperialism has created in the East a special kind of veiled annexations. This is the so-called right of European Concessions and Capitulations, which determines that citizens of imperialistic countries are subject to the administrative powers and not the local laws. The imperialistic governments have been relying upon their armed power to coerce these Oriental countries, consisting partly of their own troops and partly of native elements ambitious for conquest. These governments have pursued in the Oriental countries a policy which places their subjects and their interests in extraordinarily favorable circumstances, to the disadvantage of the native peoples. They have established settlements, within which the natives are slaves, and within which they are sometimes not even allowed to live. They have by their absolute independence of the native government protected themselves, created an impregnable citadel from which they gradually extend their power over the oppressed people of the East.

Socialist Russia cannot reconcile itself with such a situation, despite its existence for centuries. Socialist Russia, since the November Revolution, has declared to the Oriental peoples that it is not only willing to abandon

these "privileges," but to endeavor with all means at its command, together with the peoples of the East, to demand the abolition of this crying injustice, and to give to the peoples of the East the opportunity to re-gain their lost liberty. We have abandoned all secret treaties, by which the ruling classes of the Oriental countries, either out of motives of aggrandizement or of fear, allied themselves with the Czarist Government, and by so doing enslaved their peoples for centuries. We have recalled our troops from the conquered territory of Persia, and also recalled our military instructors, whose task it was to create an army of the natives to protect the interests of the Russian capitalists and support the Persian absolutism. We have notified China that we relinquish the conquests of the Czarist Government in Manchuria, and that we recognize Chinese rights in this territory, where the principal trade-route runs, namely, the Eastern-Siberian Railroad. This railroad is the property of the Chinese and Russian people, which has already devoured millions of the money of these peoples, and therefore of right belongs to these peoples and to nobody else. More than this: we are of the opinion that as the Russian people advanced funds to defray part of the expenses of this railroad, these could be repaid and China buy the railroad outright, without waiting for the terms embodied in this particular treaty violently imposed upon China. We have recalled from China all troops for the protection of consulates, troops which were sent by Czarist Russia and the Government of Kerensky to protect the power of the Russian bureaucracy.

We are prepared to relinquish the right of extra-territoriality (institution of capitulation, etc.) of our citizens in China, Mongolia and Persia. We are prepared to relinquish the tribute imposed upon the peoples of China, Mongolia and Persia under different pretexts by the former Russian Government. We only wish, that all those millions would be used in behalf of the cultural development of the broad masses, and for the solidarity of the Oriental and Russian democracy.

We can very well imagine what impression the November Revolution has created upon the masses of the East. The events in Russia resounded especially among our Asiatic neighbors. The great revolution has awakened in them a desire to a new free existence. And this could not be hidden from us, not even by the representatives of the Capitalistic Governments. The party which accomplished the revolution in Russia is called in China the *party of World Humanism*.

In Persia which is being rent to pieces, and is not able to fight for its existence, a movement has started for the establishment of democratic organizations, after the example of the Soviets, which are the only salvation against suppression by foreigners. In South China with its more enlightened population, there rages open revolution, and we have only lately heard confession of the leaders of this movement, that the fact of Russia being a Socialist Republic for 8 months offers the East the assurance and possibility of establishing similar republics in the East.

In the Far-East there is a struggle by the people against secret treaties. The open declaration of South China, that it does not recognize the alliance with bordering State, the alliance which deprives the Chinese people of the right of self-determination and is dragging them inevitably to the bloody

war, this open declaration was presented to us and to the whole democratic world by the representatives of revolutionary China.

You may realize what impression the Russian Revolution created upon the Capitalistic Governments. In February, 1918, an uprising of the proletarian masses in Tokio took place, an uprising which was immediately suppressed by the Japanese Government. Five of the most prominent representatives of the lately organized Social-Democratic Party were arrested. The war censor suppressed carefully all reports from Russia.

Revolutionary Siberia is in danger of foreign intervention. On April 5 the Japanese troops landed in Vladivostok and remained there uninterrupted. And yet there begins in Japan slowly but surely the struggle for the right of self-determination of the people. And this struggle is especially noticeable in the question of interference in Russian affairs. The man who is the representative of the dying but still powerful feudal regime in Japan, Count Motono, former ambassador in Russia and who was closely connected with the Russian reactionaries in hiding in Japan, was compelled to resign. At present a struggle is going on in Japan between the representatives of the reactionary military party, who endeavor by all means to provoke a conflict with the Russian people, and to utilize our weakness for their own advantage, and the representatives of the more moderate liberal opinion who desire certain advantages in a peaceful manner, without making an enemy of Russia, as they know very well, that the encroachment of Japan in Russian affairs would determine our mutual relations and possibly the whole further history of the Far East for the immediate future.

We are prepared to assist to a great extent Japanese citizens who wish to develop the natural resources of Siberia in a peaceful way, and to allow them to take part in our industrial and business life. We are willing in case China gives her consent, to relinquish some of our rights in the East-Siberian railway and to grant Japan the Southern branch of this railroad, and to extend to Japan other advantages by the importation of Japanese products to Russia. We are willing to renew with Japan the trade treaty and the fishing agreement, which agreement was always a source of prosperity for the people of Japan, because the Russian fish is not only the principal food of the Japanese but also serves as fertilizer for the rice-fields. We have communicated this to the Japanese Government, and we have started with this Government unofficial discussions. The people of Japan must know this and must know the value of these concessions, concessions which even as other things which happen in Russia are kept secret for these people, as for instance the fact that Russia would extend the hand of friendship to the people of Japan and offers to establish mutual relations with these people upon a healthy and permanent basis. The people must know, that if they refuse to grasp the hand of friendship, the responsibility rests upon those classes in Japan who in the interest of their own greediness have kept these things secret for the people of Japan. If the destiny of history should bring forth that Japan, misguided and blinded, would decide upon the insane step of trying to strangle the Russian Revolution then the working classes of Russia will arise as *one* for the protection of that which is most cherished and valuable to them namely: the protection of the results of the Social Revolution.

CONCLUSION

As we now review our whole international policy of the last 4 months, we must acknowledge that Soviet Russia stands as an alien among the capitalistic governments of the world. These governments conduct themselves in general in regards to Soviet Russia, in such a way as to make any other attitude impossible. The condition of Soviet Russia, that in regards to the imperialistic coalitions stands between two fires, is extraordinarily difficult. We can say, however, with absolute assurance, that the best, yes the only way to extricate ourselves from this situation is: our internal strengthening, the development of our internal life upon the basis of the Soviet policy, our economic restoration upon the basis of communist production, restoration of our defensive powers for the protection of the results of our Revolution. The more this is accomplished the better will be our situation from without. Our foreign policy depends upon our domestic policy.

II INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA

I

Appeal to the proletariat of the Entente nations, issued August 1, 1918, by Lenin, Chicherin and Trotsky.

The entire capitalist press of your countries is howling with a hoarse voice, like a dog loosened from his chains, for the "intervention" of your governments in the internal affairs of Russia; they cry: "Now or never!" But at the very moment that these hirelings of your exploiters are throwing off all disguise and speaking openly of an attack on the workers and peasants of Russia, they are still shamefully lying and deceiving you outrageously, for while uttering their threats of "intervention," they are already conducting military operations against the Russia of the workers and peasants.

You who are shedding your blood on the Marne and on the Aisne in the interests of Capital, in the Balkans, in Syria, in Mesopotamia, you are now also to lie in the snows of northern Finland and in the mountains of the Ural. In the interests of Capital, you are to be the hangman of the Russian Revolution. In order to disguise this crusade against the Russian Workers' Revolution, your capitalists also explain that the expedition is not to be undertaken against the Russian Revolution, but against German Imperialism, to which we are said to have sold ourselves. We were forced, however, to divide Russia, because your governments, which knew very well that Russia could fight no longer, would not enter into peace negotiations, at which their strength would have saved Russia and assured us an acceptable peace. Now Russia, exhausted by 3 1-2 years of war, has betrayed your cause; rather have your governments thrown Russia under the feet of German Imperialism. They think only of squeezing out the interest on the old loans advanced by French capital to Czarism. The Allies warned us, that the Germans would occupy the Siberian and Murman Railways; these two direct lines, they said, which connect us with the outer world, must not come under German control. But in the end it was not the Germans who actually took possession of the railroads, which was impossible for them, at their distance from the railroad, but the Allies themselves. They are thus pursuing three objects: 1) the occupation of as much Russian territory as possible, in order, by holding its resources, to secure the payment of the interest on the loans made by French and English capital; 2) the suppression of the Workers' Revolution; 3) the erection of a new eastern front, in order to divert the Germans from the western front to fight on Russian soil.

The agents of your Capitalism also explain that in this way they will lessen the pressure of the German arms upon you, and hasten the victory over German Imperialism. But German Imperialism can only be crushed if the Imperialism of all governments is defeated by the simultaneous revolt of the world-proletariat. The attempts to draw Russia into the war will not save you from the shedding of blood: they can only deliver up the Revolution to the sword. We have endured all too long the encroachments of the representatives of Entente Imperialism, we have allowed those who lay at the feet of the Czar, to remain in Russia, although they did not recognize the Soviets. And even now, when French officers are recommending the Czecho-Slovaks, now that the horrors of the Murman coast have begun, even now we have not uttered a word of protest against the presence of your diplomats in the territory of the Soviet Republic, not recognized by them; we have only demanded their removal from Vologda to Moscow in order that we might protect them against the attacks of a people deeply enraged by their criminal enterprises. And now, after the departure of the Entente ambassadors, not a hair on the heads of the citizens of your countries who are living with us, will be touched, provided they obey the laws of the Soviet Republic. We are convinced that if we had returned two blows for each one received from the Entente usurpers, you would have witnessed not only an act of lawful self-defense, but also the defense of your own best interests; for the salvation of the Russian Revolution constitutes a common interest of the proletariat of all countries. Forced to war against Entente capital, which wishes to add new chains to the chains already imposed upon us by Germany, we turn to you with the cry:

Longlive the solidarity of the workers of the whole world! Long live the French, English, American, and Italian proletariat, together with the Russian! Down with the robbers of International Imperialism! Long live the International Revolution! Long live the Peace of the Peoples!

II

Resolution adopted, shortly after the landing of Allied troops in Vladivostok, by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workmen's, Peasants', Cossacks' and Red Guard Delegates of All Siberia.

The Central Executive Committee of the All-Siberian Soviets appeals to the toiling masses of the whole world and in the name of millions of the toilers of Siberia, in the name of all workers, peasants and Cossacks declares its indignation and resolute protest against the plan of seizure of Siberia which is the aim of the imperialistic governments of Japan, France, England and America. For some months there has been in those countries an agitation for intervention in the internal affairs of Siberia. The chief pretext for such intervention was the conclusion of peace between Russia and Germany, which peace was falsely proclaimed as strengthening German influence in Russia, the lying provocative reports concerning the arming of some hundred thousand of war prisoners in Siberia, and finally the seizure by the war prisoners of the government in Siberia. The reptile press shamelessly invented all sorts of lying re-

ports about Russia in order to guarantee the success of the agitation. The counter-revolutionists banished from Russia came to the aid of the foreign imperialists. Being driven out of Russia by the mighty wave of the revolution, they appealed abroad to foreign Powers to intervene in Russia and Siberia for the purpose of crushing the Soviet Government and the establishment of their anti-people government.

Everything was done to realize intervention in a most convenient manner through the Czecho-Slovak troops that were passing through Siberia. A sufficient number of pretexts were found to set armed Czecho-Slovaks against the Soviet government. The Soviets' attempts to negotiate with the Czecho-Slovaks and satisfy their demands, and thus peacefully end the conflict at the beginning, were resolutely rejected by the army command of the Czecho-Slovaks. The Czecho-Slovaks in Vladivostok continued to remain there, and finally also arrayed themselves against the Soviet government in Siberia. It has become clear to us, workers, peasants and Cossacks of Siberia, that the Czecho-Slovaks instead of following their former purpose, to move toward France, had another task—to establish the domination of foreign powers in Siberia. We are in possession of documents which show definitely that the foreign powers utilize the Czecho-Slovaks as an element most suitable for purposes of occupation. We were forced to offer armed resistance against these troops. But, evidently, the Czecho-Slovak forces were too weak for the carrying out of the task they had on hand; to their aid British, French and Japanese troops have been rushed, once more under the imaginary pretext of defending the Czecho-Slovaks against the Germans.

We declare that the reptile press of the imperialists will always be able to invent sufficient lying information to justify the actions of the imperialists, and we are not inclined to prove the absurdity of all these inventions. We repeat again that all the provocative information concerning the mass arming of the war prisoners, the seizure by the latter of Siberia, were at the time given the lie by the official representatives of America and England, and that at any moment the Czecho-Slovaks would be given permission to pass through Siberia, should they desire so. But we must emphatically protest against the intentions of Japan, France, England and America to occupy Siberia with their troops, and protest against the actions of Russian counter-revolutionists, who appeal to the Allies to intervene in Siberian affairs.

We declare that Allied intervention in Siberia will inevitably result in the strengthening of German influence in Russia against the will of the toilers of Russia, and thus such an action would mean in fact a division of Russia and Siberia between the Allies and Germany.

We declare that the plotting of the Russian counter-revolutionists in appealing for Allied intervention provokes the wrath and indignation of the Russian workers and peasants—any government in Siberia and Russia that might be established with the aid of foreign bayonets is more repugnant to the masses of the Russian people than the absolutism of Nicholas Romanov destroyed by the Revolution, and therefore is doomed to the same fate as the absolutism of Nicholas Romanov. Let the governments of Japan, France, England and America not forget the armed struggle of workers and peasants in the Ukraine against the government

of Ukrainian land-owners, and their hatred of Austria, which has played the role of restorer of reaction and the gendarme of the Revolution, a role now threatened to be assumed by their governments. We remind them about the disgraceful role played by the German soldiers during the Paris Commune of 1871, and we demand of them that they refuse to carry out the role of hangman of the Revolution now, in 1918, in Siberia and Russia.

The toiling masses of Japan, France, England and America ought to make clear to their imperialistic governments that they will not tolerate shooting, gallows and prisons for the Russian workers, peasants, Cossacks; that they will not allow the Russian revolution and freedom to be crushed. They must rise against the attempt by their governments to chain the Russian proletariat.

In the name of the workers, peasants and Cossacks, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets declares that the Russian masses will not stand for foreign domination in Siberia and will throw off the yoke which is being prepared for them by foreign imperialists in co-operation with the Russian counter-revolutionists. Russian workers, peasants and Cossacks will fight arms in hands to the last drop of their blood against armed foreign invasion in Russia and Siberia, in order to preserve their revolutionary conquests. Only over the corpses of the Russian people will foreign Imperialism march into Siberia, only by wading through the rivers of blood of Russian workers and peasants will the imperialistic counter-revolutionists be able to erect again the throne of reaction.

III

*From the People's Commissaire for Foreign Affairs Chicherin
to the Russian plenipotentiary in Berlin,—Moscow, September 2, 1918.*

A plot was unearthed to-day which had been engineered by foreign diplomats led by the head of the English mission, Mr. Lockhart, the French Consul-General and some others. Their aim was, after bribing certain detachments of the Soviet's troops, to overthrow the Council of the People's Commissaires and to proclaim in Moscow a military dictatorship. This was a regular conspiracy relying for its success on forged documents and bribes. Among other documents brought to light there was a statement to the effect that if the revolt was successful, forged letters alleged to have passed between the Russian and German governments would be published, and also forged copies of treaties, whereby a sentiment would be created favorable to the declaration of a new war against Germany. The plotters took advantage of their diplomatic immunity and were protected by certificates personally signed by the head of the English Mission in Moscow, Lockhart. Several copies of the documents are already in the hands of the investigating committee. It has been proved that in the past fortnight one million two hundred thousand rubles had been distributed for the purpose of bribery by the English lieutenant Reilly, one of Lockhart's agents. An Englishman arrested in the plotters' secret meeting place and brought before the investigating committee was found to be the English diplomatic representative Lockhart. He was released as soon as his identity was established. Unsuc-

cessful attempts to bribe certain corps commanders brought about the exposure of the plot. Investigations will be continued with all possible thoroughness.

IV

"What the Plotters Were Planning to Do"—From the Moscow "Pravda," September 3, 1918.

Lockhart and an officer of the Soviet's troops met for the first time at a private house on August 4th. They discussed the feasibility of arranging an uprising against the Soviet authorities in Moscow about September 10th, at which time the English troops would be advancing in the Murman region. The date of September 10 was considered as very important owing to the fact that Lenin and Trotzky were to attend a meeting of the People's Commissaires on that day. It was also planned to seize the Imperial Bank, the Central Telephone Exchange and the Telegraph station. A military dictatorship was to be established and all meetings prohibited pending the arrival of the English troops.

The Russian officer received from Lockhart the sum of 700,000 rubles to be spent in preparing the uprising. On August 22 another conference was held at which he received another 200,000 rubles and at which plans were elaborated for seizing all the papers in Lenin's and Trotzky's offices. On August 28 the Russian officer received another 200,000 rubles and it was agreed that he should go to Petrograd and enter into communications with the English military group and the White Guards.

The threads of the entire conspiracy converged in the British mission, the second in authority being the French Consul General Gresnard; then came General Lavergne, a French officer and several other French and English officers.

The negotiations between the Russian officer and the foreign plotters took place on August 29. The possibility of starting simultaneous movements in Nijny Novgorod and Tambov was discussed. Negotiations were carried on with the representatives of a number of allied powers with a view to paralyzing the resistance of the Soviet authorities to the Czecho-Slovaks and the Anglo-French forces, especially by bringing about an acute food shortage in Petrograd and Moscow. Plans were likewise laid for blowing up bridges and railroad tracks, for incendiary fires and the destruction of stores of foodstuffs.

V

"The Arrests at the British Embassy"—from the "Pravda" of Moscow, September 3, 1918.

The investigation commission holds 40 men, most of them Englishmen, who were arrested on August 31 in the British Embassy. Dzershinsky, chairman of the commission, had received important information on the relations existing between various counter-revolutionary organizations and the representatives of the British government.

Hiller, a member of the commission, was authorized to search in the

British Embassy and to make arrests if necessary. Accompanied by Commissaire Polisensko and his assistants, Hiller arrived at the Embassy at five o'clock in the evening. They surrounded the building and gained access to the ground floor. But when they proceeded on their way to the floor above, shots were fired from there. Shenkman, one of the Commissaire's assistants, fell with a wound in his chest. Lisson, a scout, was killed on the spot. Hiller with a detachment of scouts forced his way into the rooms on the second floor and arrested the men he found there, all of them held up their hands. The fight went on in the corridor, the scouts returned the fire, killing one of the men they had come to arrest. It was learned later that he was the naval attache Cromie, who had fired the first shot. Among the prisoners is Prince Shakhovskoy.

In the course of the search letters were found which contain damaging evidence against the British Embassy, and also a large number of weapons.

VI

An Editorial of the Moscow "Isvestia," the Official Organ of the Soviet, on Chicherin's Telegram to Joffe.

It was planned to seize the People's Commissaires at one of the Council's meetings at which important questions were to be discussed. The guards of the Kremlin were to receive bribes in consideration of which they would allow themselves to be also arrested. The members of the People's Council were to be sent to Archangel. At least such was the first plan. Soon afterward, Reilly expressed doubts about the advisability of sending Lenin to Archangel. Through his ability to make friends with simple people, Lenin might on the way to Archangel win the sympathy of his guards and prevail upon them to let him escape. Reilly declared it would be safer to shoot Lenin and Trotzky as soon as they were arrested.

During the night of August 31, members of the investigating commission entered the plotters' meeting place. Among the men who were arrested there was an Englishman who refused to give his name. Brought before the commission he declared that he was Lockhart. After Peters had verified the truth of that assertion he asked Lockhart to explain the attempt made to bribe the commander of the Soviet's troops. Lockhart denied categorically having ever had anything to do with that officer. When the exact dates on which he had met him were mentioned and other documents were produced, Lockhart declared excitedly that as a diplomatic representative he could not be subjected to any examination. It was then explained to him that the question had been put to him to enable him to prove that the Lockhart who had organized the plot and the English representative of the same name were two different persons.

The Fried brothers, one a major, the other a colonel, who were also arrested, were in the employ of the Soviet government. They had for some time been stealing documents and reports on conditions at the front and the movements of troops. Their reports were made in several copies and delivered to the English and French missions. An actress of the Art Theatre acted as go-between.

VII

The Allied diplomats in Russia, famine and counter-revolutionary plots.

A striking light is thrown on the cause of food difficulties which are experienced by Soviet Russia, by a letter written on September 4th, 1918, by M. Rene Marchand, the well known Figaro correspondent in Russia to President Poincare, the original of which was discovered during a search made in his house by the agents of the Extraordinary Commission for Fighting the Counter-Revolution, and which was published by the Moscow *Izvestia*. In the course of his letter, M. Marchand deplored the fact that—"Of late we have allowed ourselves to be drawn exclusively into a fight against Bolshevism thus engaging, without any advantage whatsoever to the interests of the Entente, in a policy which can have no other result than intensifying unnecessarily the sufferings and despair of the Russian people, to aggravate the existing anarchy and to accentuate the famine and civil war as well as the party feuds."

M. Marchand then reports a secret conference at the American Consulate-General at the end of August last, which was attended, in addition to the American Consul-General Poole, by all the other representatives of the Allied Governments and by himself.

"I then learned that the British Agent was preparing the destruction of the railway bridge over the river Volkhoff. A glance at the map will show that the destruction of this bridge would be equivalent to the delivery of Petrograd to death by starvation. The British agent added the information that he had already made an attempt to blow up the Tcherpoff Viaduct which would have had the same disastrous effect on the food supply of Petrograd. The conversation then turned on the subject of the destruction of the various railway lines. One of the agents mentioned that he had secured the valuable assistance of the railway employees, who, however, were opposed to destruction on a large scale; the corrupted employees were only prepared to assist in the blowing-up of trains carrying war materials. I do not want to dwell upon details but I am profoundly convinced that these were not isolated acts on the part of individual agents. But even if they were isolated acts their effect would be equally pernicious; they are calculated to draw Russia into an endless and even bloodier political fight and to deliver it to inhuman sufferings by death and starvation. Moreover, the sufferings would affect almost entirely the poor and the middle classes of the population, while the richer people and the bourgeoisie would always be able to find the means of escaping to the Ukraine or abroad."

M. Marchand notes that throughout the conference, not a single word was uttered about fighting Germany and expresses his profound conviction that the Soviet Government would not call in Germany to its assistance.

VIII

Letter to Romain Rolland by Capt. Jacques Sadoul, of the French Military Mission in Moscow, July 14, 1918.

At the hour when Republicans of the whole world, celebrating the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, pay homage to the French Revolu-

tion and declare their indestructible faith in an early realization of a life of brotherhood, the Telegraph informs us that the governments of the Entente Allies have resolved to crush the Russian Revolution.

Awakened through the fight against the dispossessed classes, a hostile aristocracy, against a bourgeoisie anxious above all to reconquer their privileges and their capital, more than half strangled through German Imperialism, the power of the Soviets is in danger of annihilation to-day through the offensive begun by the Entente.

Senseless are those who do not see that this armed intervention—persistently demanded for some time by certain Russian circles which have lost all political influence—will have the result of awakening the indignation of the invaded nation. Irrespective of what is being said, and without showing any partisanship for the Soviets, the fact is that this intervention is against the entire Russian people, against their will for peace, and their ideal of social justice. The day will come, when through the uprising of this nation, which is still capable of great things, the invaders who have violated it, will be expelled. That day, Frenchmen and Germans, Austrians and English, will all equally be the object of hatred in Russia.

The free men of Europe, those who through the turmoil have conserved their opinions honestly, and who know, or at least guess the immense value to humanity of the Communist experiment which is being tried out by the Russian proletariat, will they allow the accomplishment of this detestable injustice?

What is the Bolshevik Revolution? What did it want? What has it done up to to-day? What will it be able to realize to-morrow? Is it worth being defended? The documents which I am sending you will contribute, I feel sure, to make known the truth. I happen to be in a position nearer than anybody else, to the events which have taken place in Russia during the past nine months. I have taken daily, short notes of my impressions. They were written in a hurry—necessarily incomplete, sketchy, and often contradictory. I send you enclosed a copy of the notes which I could find, that is nearly all those which I have sent to France.

I am not a Bolshevik.

I know the great mistakes that have been committed by the Maximalists.

But I also know that before signing the treaty of Brest, the Commissaires of the people did not cease to solicit the Allies for military help which would have permitted the Bolsheviks to resist the abominable demands of the Central Empires, and have saved them from having to submit to a shameful peace of which they knew the dangers.

I also know that since Brest, Trotzky and Lenin have multiplied their efforts to induce the powers of the Entente to collaborate loyally in the economic and military reorganization of Russia.

Finally, I know that these desperate appeals to the Allies, contrary to their best interests, have been opposed by a non possumus—disdainful indifference.

Forgetting the teachings of history, and erring to the point of believing that the dismembered parts of Russia would continue the war aban-

done by Russia, they have created the Ukraine, to the great benefit of Austria and Germany; they have pushed with all their might the separatist tendencies of Finland, Poland, Lithuania and the Caucasus, and with a Rumanian army they have fought the Russian army. These states as soon as created, have fallen into the arms of our enemies, as it was easy for me to predict, while the Russian government, although weakened, lost in the conferences of Brest, a great part of its authority and prestige. In the Interior where the Allies have played the game of counter-revolution, they have aggravated the general disorder and precipitated the disorganization of this unfortunate country.

Before Brest, their indifference made Russia defenceless against the ignoble appetites of the Pan-Germans. After Brest, the hostility of the Allies is bound to push this nation, which does not want to die, into the camp of the enemy of yesterday who knows admirably well how to take advantage of our numerous errors. The Conservatives approached with enthusiasm the Austro-German governments from which they rightly expect the restoration of the old regime. The parties of the extreme Left, with a heavy heart, have to consent to this provisional reconciliation which necessarily must bring about their destruction, but which, prolonging their agony, maintains their hope for existence.

In spite of the modifications imposed by the censor you will find in the pages which I send you, abundant proof of what I say here.

These notes have been sent from Petrograd and from Moscow. Given to the care of the official Courier who left for France weekly, they have been addressed regularly to Albert Thomas, Jean Longuet, Ernest Lafont. Many of them have also been sent to other friends, to the Deputy Pressemane, to Pierre Hamp, Henri Barbusse, etc. Some of them must have been intercepted or gone astray. The majority reached their destination. I can see this from their answers dated as late as March. Since then communication by mail with the West has become extremely precarious.

Among these notes you will not find a single line which could form an official reproach as an indiscretion against an officer and member of the French Military Mission in Russia. As a matter of fact they contain nothing but the personal observations of a French citizen interested in observing the facts only as an impartial, open-minded witness. They are extracts of my conversations with leaders of Bolshevism and of the Opposition, which I could not pass by in silence.

I have a deep conviction that in giving you these documents, I am strictly doing my duty as a Socialist and a Frenchman. In doing this I have faith that you will not abuse my confidence.

I pray you to run through these notes and to communicate them to political men, to the philosophers and to the thinkers of France who in your opinion will be interested in reading them. Men such as Aulard, Gabriel Seailles, Maeterlinck and many others who after they know the truth, will be capable of enlightening our dear country. They will know how to prevent the sons of the great French Revolution from staining their names forever with such a crime as suppressing the great Russian Revolution, which in spite of many blunders, is still an admirable force of idealism and progress.

We will not win the war by killing the Russian Revolution. By committing such a crime we shall not accomplish the task towards civilization which the Allies have set before them, and we shall not realize a democratic and just peace, the principles of which have been enunciated by our Socialist Party and so eloquently developed by Wilson.

The Ministers of the Entente, misinformed through the blindness of their Intelligence Service, were in a position to easily delude the masses of workingmen, and now direct them against the power of the Soviets. But the day will come when the lies will be swept aside and the truth proclaimed. What bitter reproaches will then be addressed to the guilty governments for not having known better, or not having wanted to know better.

What resentment, what hatred will accumulate, and what terrible and unnecessary fights are in store for the future! But the crime will be irreparable! New ruins will not make old ruins look less ugly.

Men like you who have helped so forcefully in the intellectual and moral development of my generation, have the power to prevent this. It is also their duty.



III

THE TERROR IN RUSSIA

Answer of Soviet Commissaire of Foreign Affairs Chicherin to a protest of the Diplomatic Corps in Petrograd concerning the terror in Russia.

To the Gentlemen representing the Capitalist Neutral Nations:

The note presented to us on the 5th of September by the gentlemen representing the neutral powers represents an act of gross interference in the inner affairs of Russia. The Soviet Government would be justified in ignoring this act. But the Soviet Government is glad to grasp any opportunity of explaining the nature of its political tactics to the masses in all countries, for it is the spokesman not only of the Russian working-class, but of exploited humanity all over the earth. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs therefore gives answer, hereby, to the matter in question.

In their description of the treatment that is being accorded to the suppressed Russian bourgeoisie, the neutral powers are plainly trying to arouse the sympathy of the bourgeoisie all over the world. We do not propose to disprove the fiction of the gentlemen who represent the neutral nations. In their note they repeat all the slander that has been invented by the Russian bourgeoisie to discredit the Red Army. We will not refute individual occurrences, first of all because the gentlemen who represent the neutral powers have presented absolutely no concrete occurrences, secondly, because every war—and we are in the midst of a civil war—brings with it excesses on the part of individuals.

The gentlemen representing the neutral powers did not protest against the individual misdeeds of irresponsible persons, but against the regime that is being carried out by the Government of the Workmen and Peasants against the exploiting class.

Before entering into the reasons why the Government of the Workers and peasants uses the Red Terror that has called forth the protest of the gentlemen representing the neutral powers, permit us to ask a few questions.

Do the representatives of the neutral nations know that an international war has been raging for almost five years, into which a small clique of bankers, generals and bureaucrats precipitated the masses of the civilized nations of the world? That in this war these masses are destroying each other, cutting each other's throats that Capitalism may earn new millions thereby? Do they know that in this war not only millions of men were killed at the front, but that both belligerent parties have attacked open cities with bombs, killing unarmed women and children? Do they know that in this war one of the belligerent parties

doomed millions of human beings to death by starvation by cutting off their food supply in direct contradiction to the tenets of international law, that the belligerent party hopes to force the other, by starving its children, to surrender to the victor? Do they know that the belligerent powers have imprisoned hundreds of thousands of unarmed, peaceable citizens in the enemy's country, sending them to places far from home into involuntary servitude, depriving them of every right of self-defense? Do they know that in all belligerent nations the ruling capitalist clique has deprived the masses of the right of free press and assemblage and the right to strike? That workingmen are being imprisoned for every attempt to protest against the White Terror of the bourgeoisie, that they are sent to the front that every last thought of human rights may be killed within them?

All of these instances of the destructive force that is being directed against the working-class in the name of capitalist interests, all these pictures of the White Terror of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat are more than familiar to the neutral nations and their representatives in Russia. Nevertheless, either they forgot their high ideals of humanity or they forgot in these cases to remind the blood-dripping belligerent nations of their misdeeds.

The so-called neutral nations did not dare to utter a word of protest against the White Terror of the capitalist class, nay, more, they did not wish to protest, for the bourgeoisie in all neutral nations have helped the capitalist powers of the capitalist nations to carry on the war because they are earning billions in war contracts with the belligerent nations.

We beg leave to ask another question. Have the gentlemen representing the neutral powers heard of the crushing of the Sinn Feiners in Dublin, of the shooting to death, without due process of the law, of hundreds of Irishmen, with Skeffington at their head? Have they heard of the White Terror in Finland, of the tens of thousands of dead, of the tens of thousands of men and women who are languishing in jail, against whom no charges have ever been, or ever will be made? Have they never heard of the mass murder of workmen and peasants in the Ukraine? Of the mass murder of workmen by the brave Czecho-Slovaks, these hirelings of French capital? The governments of the neutral nations have heard of all these things, but never before did it occur to them to protest against the despotism of the bourgeoisie when it oppresses the working class movement. For they themselves are ready, at any moment, to shoot down workingmen who fight for their rights. In their own countries they stand ready, in the name of the bourgeoisie, and in defense of its interests, to crush out every vestige of working-class uprising.

It is sufficient to recall that labor demonstrations were recently routed by military force in Denmark, Norway, Holland, Switzerland, etc. The workers of Switzerland, Holland and Denmark have not yet revolted, but already the governments of these countries are mobilizing their military forces against the weakest protest of the working-class. When the representatives of the neutral nations threaten us with the indignation of the entire civilized world, and protest against the Red Terror in the

name of humanity, we respectfully call their attention to the fact that they were not sent to Russia to defend the principles of humanity, but to preserve the interests of the capitalist State; we would advise them further not to threaten us with the indignant horror of the civilized world, but to tremble before the jury of the masses who are arising against a civilization that has thrust humanity into the unspeakable misery of endless slaughter.

In the entire capitalist world the White Terror rules over the working-class. In Russia the working-class destroyed that Czarism whose bloody regime brought no protests from the neutral nations. The working-class of Russia put an end to the rule of the bourgeoisie who, under the flag of the Revolution, again amidst the deep silence of the neutral powers, slaughtered soldiers who refused to shed their blood in the interests of war speculators, killed peasants because they claimed the land they had cultivated for centuries in the sweat of their brow.

The majority of the Russian people, in the person of the second Congress of the Workmen's, Peasants', Cossacks' and Soldiers' Council, placed the power into the hands of the Workmen's and Peasants' Government. A small handful of capitalists who desired to regain the factories and the banks that were taken from them in the interests of the people, a small handful of landowners who wished to take back the land that had been given to the peasants, a small handful of generals who wished again to teach the workmen and the soldiers obedience with the whiplash, refused to recognize the decision of the Russian people. With the money of foreign capital they mobilized counter-revolutionary hordes with whose assistance they tried to cut off Russia from its food supply in order to choke the Russian Revolution with the bony hand of hunger. After they became convinced of the futility of their attempts to overthrow the working-class republic that enjoyed the unbounded confidence and support of the working-class, they arranged counter-revolutionary uprisings in the attempt to crowd the Workmen's and Peasants' Government from its positive work, to hinder it in its task of ridding the country of anarchy that had taken hold of the country in consequence of the criminal policies of former governments. They betrayed Russia on the South, North and East into the hands of foreign imperialistic states, they called foreign bayonets, wherever they could muster them, into Russia. Hidden behind a forest of foreign bayonets they are sending hired murderers to kill the leaders of the working-class, in whom not only the proletariat of Russia but all the massacred humanity sees the personification of its hopes. The Russian working-class will crush without mercy this counter-revolutionary clique, that is trying to lay the noose around the neck of the Russian working-class with the help of foreign capital and the Russian bourgeoisie.

In the face of the proletariat of the whole world we declare that neither hypocritical protests nor pleas will protect those who take up arms against the workers and the poorest farmers, who would starve them and embroil them in new wars in the interests of the capitalist class. We assure equal rights and equal liberties to all who loyally do their duty as citizens of the Socialist Workmen's and Peasants' Government. To them we bring peace, but to our enemies we bring war with-

out quarter. We are convinced that the masses in all countries who are writhing under the oppression of a small group of exploiters will understand that in Russia force is being used only in the holy cause of the liberation of the people, that they will not only understand us, but will follow our example.

We decidedly reject the interference of neutral capitalist powers in favor of the Russian bourgeoisie, and declare that every attempt on the part of the representatives of these powers to overstep the boundaries of legal protection for the citizens of their own country, will be regarded as an attempt to support the counter-revolution.

IV

INTERVENTION, ARMISTICE, PEACE

Note of Soviet Commissaire of Foreign Affairs Chicherin to President Woodrow Wilson, transmitted through the Norwegian Attache in Moscow, October 24, 1918.

Mr. President:

In your message of January 8th to the Congress of the United States of North America, in the sixth point, you spoke of your profound sympathy for Russia, which was then conducting, single-handed, negotiations with the mighty German Imperialism. Your program, you declared, demands the evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her political development and national policy, and assure her a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. And you added that "the treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy."

The desperate struggle which we were waging at Brest-Litovsk against German Imperialism apparently only intensified your sympathy for Soviet Russia, for you sent greetings to the Congress of the Soviets, which under the threat of a German offensive ratified the Brest peace of violence—greetings and assurances that Soviet Russia might count upon American help.

Six months have passed since then, and the Russian people have had sufficient time to get actual tests of your Government's and your Allies' good will, of their comprehension of the needs of the Russian people, of their intelligent unselfish sympathy. This attitude of your Government and of your Allies was shown first of all in the conspiracy which was organized on Russian territory with the financial assistance of your French Allies and with the diplomatic co-operation of your Government as well—the conspiracy of the Czecho-Slovaks to whom your Government is furnishing every kind of assistance.

For some time attempts had been made to create a pretext for a war between Russia and the United States by spreading false stories to the effect that German war prisoners had seized the Siberian railway, but your own officers, and after them Colonel Robins, the head of your Red Cross Mission, had been convinced that these allegations were abso-

lutely false. The Czecho-Slovak conspiracy was organized under the slogan that unless these misled unfortunate people be protected, they would be surrendered to Germany and Austria; but you may find out, among other sources, from the open letter of Captain Sadoul, of the French Military Mission, how unfounded this charge is. The Czecho-Slovaks would have left Russia in the beginning of the year had the French Government provided ships for them. For several months we have waited in vain for your Allies to provide the opportunity for the Czecho-Slovaks to leave. Evidently these Governments have very much preferred the presence of the Czecho-Slovaks in Russia—the results show for what object—to their departure for France and their participation in the fighting on the French front. The best proof of the real object of the Czecho-Slovak rebellion is the fact that although in control of the Siberian railway, the Czecho-Slovaks have not taken advantage of this to leave Russia, but by the order of the Entente Governments, whose directions they follow, have remained in Russia to become the mainstay of the Russian counter-revolution. Their counter-revolutionary mutiny, which made impossible the transportation of grain and petroleum on the Volga, which cut off the Russian workers and peasants from the Siberian stores of grain and other materials and condemned them to starvation—this was the first experience of the workers and peasants of Russia with your Government and with your Allies after your promises of the beginning of the year. And then came another experience: an attack on North Russia by Allied troops, including American troops, their invasion of Russian territory without any cause and without a declaration of war, the occupation of Russian cities and villages, executions of Soviet officials and other acts of violence against the peaceful population of Russia.

You have promised, Mr. President, to co-operate with Russia in order to obtain for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her political development and her national policy. Actually this co-operation took the form of an attempt of the Czecho-Slovak troops, and later, in Archangel, Murmansk and the Far East, of your own and your Allies' troops, to force the Russian people to submit to the rule of the oppressing and exploiting classes, whose dominion was overthrown by the workers and peasants of Russia in November, 1917. The revival of the Russian counter-revolution which has already become a corpse, attempts to restore by force its bloody domination over the Russian people—such was the experience of the Russian people, instead of co-operation for the unembarrassed expression of their will which you promised them, Mr. President, in your declarations.

You have also, Mr. President, promised to the Russian people to assist them in their struggle for independence. Actually this is what has occurred: While the Russian people were fighting on the Southern front against the counter-revolution, which has betrayed them to German Imperialism and was threatening their independence, while they were using all their energy to organize the defense of their territory against Germany at their Western frontiers, they were forced to move their troops to the East to oppose the Czecho-Slovaks who were bringing them slavery and oppression, and to the North—against your Allies

and your own troops, which had invaded their territory, and against the counter-revolutions organized by these troops.

Mr. President, the acid test of the relations between the United States and Russia gave quite different results from those that might have been expected from your message to the Congress. But we have reason not to be altogether dissatisfied with even these results, since the outrages of the counter-revolution in the East and North have shown the workers and peasants of Russia the aims of the Russian counter-revolution, and of its foreign supporters, thereby creating among the Russian people an iron will to defend their liberty and the conquests of the revolution, to defend the land that it has given to the peasants and the factories that it has given to the workers. The fall of Kazan, Symbyrsk, Syzran and Samara should make clear to you, Mr. President, what were the consequences for us of the actions which followed your promises of January 8. Our trials helped us to create a strongly united and disciplined Red Army, which is daily growing stronger and more powerful and which is learning to defend the revolution. The attitude toward us which was actually displayed by your Government and by your Allies could not destroy us; on the contrary, we are now stronger than we were a few months ago, and your present proposal of international negotiations for a general peace finds us alive and strong and in a position to give in the name of Russia our consent to join the negotiations. In your note to Germany you demand the evacuation of occupied territories as a condition which must precede the armistice during which peace negotiations shall begin. We are ready, Mr. President, to conclude an armistice on these conditions, and we ask you to notify us when you, Mr. President, and your Allies intend to remove your troops from Murmansk, Archangel and Siberia. You refuse to conclude an armistice unless Germany will stop the outrages, pillaging, etc., during the evacuation of occupied territories. We allow ourselves, therefore, to draw the conclusion that you and your Allies will order the Czecho-Slovaks to return the part of our gold reserve fund which they seized in Kazan, that you will forbid them to continue as heretofore their acts of pillaging and outrages against the workers and peasants during their forced departure (for we will encourage their speedy departure, without waiting for your order).

With regard to your other peace terms, namely, that the Governments which would conclude peace must express the will of their people, you are aware that our Government fully satisfies this condition. Our Government expresses the will of the Councils of Workmen's, Peasants' and Red Army Deputies, representing at least eighty per cent. of the Russian people. This cannot, Mr. President, be said about your Government. But for the sake of humanity and peace we do not demand as a prerequisite of general peace negotiations that all nations participating in the negotiations shall be represented by Councils of People's Commissaires elected at a Congress of Councils of Workmen's, Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies. We know that this form of Government will soon be the general form, and that a general peace, when nations will no more be threatened with defeat, will leave them free to put an end to the system and the cliques that forced upon mankind this universal slaughter,

and which will, in spite of themselves, surely lead the tortured peoples to create Soviet Governments that give exact expression to their will.

Agreeing to participate at present in negotiations with even such Governments as do not yet express the will of the people, we would like on our part to find out from you, Mr. President, in detail what is your conception of the League of Nations, which you propose as the crowning work of peace. You demand the independence of Poland, Serbia, Belgium, and freedom for the peoples of Austria-Hungary. You probably mean by this that the masses of the people must everywhere first become the masters of their own fate in order to unite afterward in a league of free nations. But strangely enough, we do not find among your demands the liberation of Ireland, Egypt or India, nor even the liberation of the Philippines, and we would be very sorry if these peoples should be denied the opportunity to participate together with us, through their freely elected representatives, in the organization of the League of Nations.

We would also, Mr. President, very much like to know, before the negotiations with regard to the formation of a League of Nations have begun, what is your conception of the solution of many economic questions which are essential for the cause of future peace. You do not mention the war expenditures—this unbearable burden which the masses would have to carry, unless the League of Nations should renounce payments on the loans to the capitalists of all countries. You know as well as we, Mr. President, that this war is the outcome of the policies of all capitalistic nations, that the governments of all countries were continually piling up armaments, that the ruling groups of all civilized nations pursued a policy of annexations, and that it would, therefore, be extremely unjust if the masses, having paid for these policies with millions of lives and with economic ruin, should yet pay to those who are really responsible for the war a tribute for their policies which resulted in all these countless miseries. We propose, therefore, Mr. President, the annulment of the war loans as the basis of the League of Nations. As to the restoration of the countries that were laid waste by the war, we believe it is only just that all nations should in this respect aid the unfortunate Belgium, Poland and Serbia; and however poor and ruined Russia seems to be, she is ready on her part to do everything she can to help these victims of the war, and she expects that American capital, which has not at all suffered from this war and has even made many millions in profits out of it, will do its part to help these peoples.

But the League of Nations should not only liquidate the present war, but also make impossible any wars in the future. You must be aware, Mr. President, that the capitalists of your country are planning to apply in the future the same policies of encroachment and of super-profits in China and in Siberia; and that, fearing competition from Japanese capitalists, they are preparing a military force to overcome the resistance which they may meet from Japan. You are no doubt aware of similar plans of the capitalists and ruling circles of other countries with regard to other territories and other peoples. Knowing this, you will have to agree with us that the factories, mines and banks must not be left in the hands of private persons, who have always made use of the vast means

of production created by the masses of the people to export products and capital to foreign countries in order to reap super-profits in return for the benefits forced on them, their struggle for spoils resulting in imperialistic wars. We propose, therefore, Mr. President, that the League of Nations be based on the expropriation of the capitalists of all countries. In your country, Mr. President, the banks and the industries are in the hands of such a small group of capitalists that, as your personal friend, Colonel Robins, assured us, the arrest of twenty heads of capitalistic cliques and the transfer of the control, which by characteristic capitalistic methods they have come to possess, into the hands of the masses of the world is all that would be required to destroy the principal source of new wars. If you will agree to this, Mr. President—if the sources of future wars will thus be destroyed, then there can be no doubt that it would be easy to remove all economic barriers and that all peoples, controlling their means of production, will be vitally interested in exchanging the things they do not need for the things they need. It will then be a question of an exchange of products between nations, each of which produces what it can best produce, and the League of Nations will be a league of mutual aid of the toiling masses. It will then be easy to reduce the armed forces to the limit necessary for the maintenance of internal safety.

We know very well that the selfish capitalist class will attempt to create this internal menace, just as the Russian landlords and capitalists are now attempting, with the aid of American, English and French armed forces, to take the factories from the workers and the land from the peasants. But, if the American workers, inspired by your idea of a League of Nations, will crush the resistance of the American capitalists as we have crushed the resistance of the Russian capitalists, then neither the German nor any other capitalists will be a serious menace to the victorious working class, and it will then suffice, if every member of the commonwealth, working six hours in the factory, spends two hours daily for several months in learning the use of arms, so that the whole people will know how to overcome the internal menace.

And so, Mr. President, though we have had experience with your promises, we nevertheless accept as a basis your proposals about peace and about a League of Nations. We have tried to develop them in order to avoid results which would contradict your promises, as was the case with your promise of assistance to Russia. We have tried to formulate with precision your proposals on the League of Nations in order that the League of Nations should not turn out to be a league of capitalists against the nations. Should you not agree with us, we have no objection to an "open discussion of your peace terms," as the first point of your peace program demands. If you will accept our proposals as a basis, we will easily agree on the details.

But there is another possibility. We have had dealings with the president of the Archangel attack and the Siberian invasion, and we have also had dealings with the president of the League of Nations Peace Program. Is not the first of these—the real president—actually directing the policies of the American capitalist Government? Is not the American Government rather a government of the American corporations, of the

American industrial, commercial and railroad trusts, of the American banks—in short, a government of the American capitalists? And is it not possible that the proposals of this government about the creation of a League of Nations will result in new chains for the peoples, in the organization of an international trust for the exploitation of the workers and the suppression of weak nations? In this latter case, Mr. President, you will not be in a position to reply to our questions, and we will say to the workers of all countries: Beware! Millions of your brothers, thrown at each other's throats by the bourgeoisie of all countries, are still perishing on the battle fields, and the capitalist leaders are already trying to come to an understanding for the purpose of suppressing with united forces those that remain alive, when they call to account the criminals who caused the war!

However, Mr. President, since we do not at all desire to wage war against the United States, even though your government has not yet been replaced by a Council of People's Commissaries and your post is not yet taken by Eugene Debs, whom you have imprisoned; since we do not at all desire to wage war against England, even though the Cabinet of Mr. Lloyd George has not yet been replaced by a Council of People's Commissaries with MacLean at its head; since we have no desire to wage war against France, even though the capitalist government of Clemenceau has not yet been replaced by a workmen's government of Merheim; just as we have concluded peace with the imperialist government of Germany, with Emperor William at its head, from whom you, Mr. President, feel as alien as we, the Workmen's and Peasants' Revolutionary Government, from you—we finally propose to you, Mr. President, that you take up with your Allies the following questions and give us precise and definite replies: Do the governments of the United States, England and France consent to cease demanding the blood of the Russian people and the lives of Russian citizens, if the Russian people will agree to pay them a ransom such as a man who has been suddenly attacked pays to the one who attacked him? If so, just what tribute do the governments of the United States, England and France demand of the Russian people? Do they demand concessions, that the railways, mines, gold deposits, etc., shall be handed over to them on certain conditions, or do they demand territorial concessions, some part of Siberia or Caucasia, or perhaps the Murmansk Coast? We expect from you, Mr. President, that you will definitely state just what you and your Allies demand, and also whether the alliance between your government and the governments of the other Entente Powers is in the nature of a combination which could be compared with a corporation for drawing dividends from Russia, or does your government and the other governments of the Entente Powers have each separate and special demands, and what are they? Particularly are we interested to know the demands of your French allies with regard to the three billions of rubles which the Paris bankers loaned to the government of the Czar—the oppressor of Russia and the enemy of his own people. And you, Mr. President, as well as your French allies, surely know that even if you and your Allies should succeed in enslaving and covering with blood the whole territory of Russia—which will not be allowed by our heroic revolutionary Red

Army—that even in that case the Russian people, worn out by the war and not having had sufficient time to take advantage of the benefits of the Soviet rule to elevate their national economy, will be unable to pay to the French bankers the full tribute for the billions that were used by the government of the Czar for purposes injurious to the people. Do your French allies demand that a part of this tribute be paid in installments, and if so—what part, and do they not anticipate that their claims will result in similar claims by other creditors of the infamous government of the Czar which has been overthrown by the Russian people? We can hardly think that your government and your Allies are without a ready answer, when your and their troops are trying to advance on our territory with the evident object of seizing and enslaving our country. The Russian people, through the people's Red Army, are guarding their territory and are bravely fighting against your invasion and against the attacks of your Allies. But your government and the governments of the other Powers of the Entente, undoubtedly, have well prepared plans, for the sake of which you are shedding the blood of your soldiers. We expect that you will state your demands very clearly and definitely. Should we, however, be disappointed, should you fail to reply to our quite definite and precise questions, we will draw the only possible conclusion—that we are justified in the assumption that your government and the governments of your Allies desire to get from the Russian people a tribute both in money and in natural resources of Russia, and territorial concessions as well. We will tell this to the Russian people as well as to the toiling masses of other countries, and the absence of a reply from you will serve for us as a silent reply. The Russian people will then understand that the demands of your government and of the governments of your Allies are so severe and vast that you do not even want to communicate them to the Russian Government.

V

THE INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION

Address delivered by N. Lenin, before the All-Russian Soviet Executive Committee, October 22, 1918.

I believe our present situation, despite all the contradictions it contains, can be characterized by two theses: First, that we never before stood so near to the international proletarian revolution as at present; second, that we on the other hand never found ourselves in a more dangerous position than now.

And the most serious part of our situation consists in the fact that the broad masses of the people are hardly aware of the danger that menaces us. Therefore, it must be one of the principal tasks of the Soviet representatives to make the present situation entirely clear to the broad masses—no matter how difficult this task may sometimes be. The weightiest objection that was raised against the Soviet Government, not only by the bourgeoisie but also from the ranks of the lower middle class that had lost faith in Socialism, was that we allegedly had begun the Socialist revolution in Russia in a reckless manner, as the revolution in Western Europe was not yet due.

Comrades, now in the fifth year of the world war the general collapse of Imperialism is an evident fact; now it is clear that the revolution in all the belligerent countries is unavoidable. We, however, whose existence at the beginning was counted by days or weeks, at the most, have done more in this year of the revolution than ever has been done by any other proletarian party in the world. The bourgeoisie no longer denies that Bolshevism is now an international phenomenon. Of course, you know that the revolution has broken out in Bulgaria and that the Bulgarian soldiers are organizing councils, or Soviets, after the Russian model. Now comes the news that similar Soviets are in the process of being organized also in Serbia. The national bourgeoisie of the various small States of Austria will not be able to hold out. In Austria, too, the revolution of the workers and peasants is knocking at the door everywhere.

In Germany the press already talks openly of the abdication of the Kaiser and the Independent Social Democratic Party now dares to speak of the German republic. This certainly means something! The German revolution is already a fact. The military party talks about it openly. In East Prussia revolutionary committees have been formed; revolutionary slogans are being uttered. The Scheidemann gang will not remain at the helm very long; it does not represent the broad masses of the people.

So far as Italy is concerned, the revolutionary sentiment of the proletariat of that country is evident to us. When Gompers, the social patriot who has turned himself over to the bourgeoisie, visited the cities of Italy and preached patriotism to the workers he was hissed out everywhere. During the war the Italian Socialist Party has taken a big step toward the Left. In France at the beginning of the war the number of patriots among the workers was only too great, for it was declared that the soil of France and Paris was menaced. But there, too, the attitude of the proletariat is changing. When a letter was read to the last convention telling what mischief the Entente was up to in Russia there were shouts of "Long live the Russian Socialist Republic" and "Long live the Soviets!" Yesterday we got word that at a meeting held in Paris 2,000 metal workers greeted the Soviet Republic.

And in England it is true that the so-called Independent Labor Party has not openly entered into an alliance with the Bolsheviks, but its sympathies for us are constantly on the increase. The Socialist Labor Parties of Scotland have even come out openly for the Bolsheviks.

This fact looms up before us entirely on its own initiative: Bolshevism has become a world theory and the tactics of the international proletariat. And the workingmen of all countries, who formerly read only the lying and calumnious articles and news reports of the bourgeois press, are now beginning to take stock of what is happening in Russia. And when last Wednesday a demonstration took place in Berlin, and the workers—in order to show their ill-will toward the Kaiser—wanted to march in front of his palace, they then went to the Russian Embassy in order thus to announce their solidarity with the facts of the Russian Proletarian Government.

So, Europe has got this far in the fifth year of the war. Therefore, we also declare that we never were so near to the world-wide revolution as we are today. Our allies are millions and millions of proletarians in all the countries of the world. But for all that, I repeat that our situation never before was so precarious as it is at present, because in Europe, as well as in America, Bolshevism is being reckoned with as a world power and a world danger.

Immediately following the conclusion of the peace of violence [Brest-Litovsk] we began the positive work of building up the Socialist republic. As soon as we gave an opportunity to the peasants actually to get along without the land owners, and a chance to the industrial workers to arrange their own life without the capitalists, as soon as the people understood that it could manage the State itself, without slavery and exploitation, then it became clear to everyone, and also manifested itself in practice, that no power and no counter-revolution in the world would be able to overthrow the Soviet power, i. e., the government of the workers and peasants. It required many months for us to come to this conviction in Russia.

In the cities the revolution began to consolidate itself already in November, 1917, but in the country it did not do so until the Summer of 1918. In the Ukraine, on the Don, and in various other places, the peasants have had occasion to feel the power of the Constituents and the Czecho-Slovaks in their own affairs. This required many, many

months, but our agricultural population comes out of the struggle hardened. The peasants finally became aware of the danger menacing them from the side of the capitalists and the land owners, but were not frightened, and merely said to themselves: "We have learned much in a single year, but we shall learn still more."

The West European bourgeoisie, that up to now has not taken the Bolsheviki seriously, is now becoming aware that in Russia a power has arisen and stands there alone which is able to arouse true heroism and a genuine spirit of self-sacrifice in the masses. When this proletarian power began to infect Europe the bourgeoisie of the world noted that it, too, must reckon with this enemy. And so the bourgeoisie began to unite more closely in proportion as we drew nearer to the proletarian world revolution which flared up, now here, now there.

Now the situation for us, for the Russia of the Soviets, has changed and events are following their course at a quickened pace. Before, we had to deal with two groups of imperialistic robber States, that were striving to destroy each other. But now they have noticed, especially by the example of German Imperialism, that their principal enemy is the revolutionary proletariat. By reason of this fact a new danger for us has now arisen, a danger that as yet has not quite unfolded itself, and is not yet fully visible—the danger that the Anglo-French Imperialists are quietly preparing for us. We must keep this danger clearly before our eyes so that we, with the aid of the leaders of the masses, with the help of the representatives of the workers and peasants, may make the broad masses of the people aware of this danger.

In German Government circles we may now observe two lines of thought, two plans for salvation, as it were, if there can be any talk at all of salvation. One group says: "We want to gain time and hold out until Spring; perhaps we may succeed in winning by arms!" The other says that it is of the greatest importance to arrive at an agreement with England and France at the expense of the Bolsheviki. In this connection one might believe that between the English and French on the one side, and Germany on the other a tacit agreement something like this exists: "Don't you Germans leave the Ukraine so long as we have not arrived there. See to it that the Bolsheviki don't get in, then everything else will be adjusted." And the Germans take great care to do so, for they know that for proved service they, too, will get some of the loot.

That is the judgment of the Anglo-French imperialists, for they very well understand that the bourgeoisie of the occupied districts—Finland, the Ukraine, or Poland—will not be able to hold its ground a single day after the withdrawal of the German garrisons. And the bourgeoisie of these countries, who only yesterday sold their territory to the Germans, are today offering their fatherland to the English and the French. This conspiracy of the bourgeoisie of all countries against the revolutionary workers and the Bolsheviki is constantly becoming more clearly outlined and becomes cynically apparent. So it is our direct duty to point out this danger to the workers and peasants of all the belligerent countries.

But for us, comrades, the German revolution is favorable. Considering the power and the degree of organization of the German proletariat,

we may believe that the German revolution will develop such power and will be so well organized that it will solve a hundred international problems. Only we must know how to march in line with the German revolution, not to run ahead of it and injure it, but to help it. And our comrades, the communists of the Ukraine, must bear this in mind. Our principal work must be carrying on propaganda, but a daring, persistent propaganda.

We must not forget that Germany forms the most important link in the revolutionary chain. The success of the world revolution depends to the greatest degree upon Germany. We must not fail to consider the changes and excrescences accompanying every revolution. In every country the revolution follows its particular ways and these ways are so different and tortuous that in many countries the revolution can be delayed one or two years. Every country must pass through definite political stages in order to arrive at the very same point—the inevitable proletarian revolution. And although the international proletariat is now awakening and making important progress, we must confess that our position is particularly difficult because our enemies direct their attacks against us as their principal enemy. Now they are preparing to fight, not against the hostile armies, but against international Bolshevism.

We must direct our entire attention at present to our southern front, where the fate, not only of Russia, but also of the international revolution, is to be decided. We have many prospects of victory. But what favors us most of all is the fact that a change has taken place in the popular feeling. The people have grasped the fact that in defending Soviet Russia it is not defending the interests of the capitalists, but its own interests, its own country and desires, its factories and shops, its life and liberty. The discipline of the Red Army is gaining, but it is not a discipline of the club, but the discipline of Socialism, the discipline of a society of equals.

The army is turning out thousands of officers who have gone through the course of study in the new proletarian military schools, and other thousands who have only gone through the hard school of war itself. Our southern front is the front against the whole Anglo-French Imperialism, against the most important opponent we have in the world. But we do not fear this opponent, for we know that it will soon face the struggle with its "internal enemy." Three months ago it was said that only the half-crazy Bolsheviki could believe in the German revolution; but today we see how in the course of a few months Germany has changed from a mighty empire to a rotten tree trunk. The force that has overthrown Germany is also working in England. It is only weak today, but with every step that the English and French advance in Russia this force will steadily rise to power and will even become more terrible than the Spanish influenza.

The seriousness of the situation must be apparent to every worker who knows what he is aiming at and he must make the masses see it, too. The mass of workers and peasants is mature enough to be allowed to know the whole truth. The danger is great, but we must, and shall overcome it, and for this purpose we must develop and solidify the Red Army without halting. We must make it ten times as strong and large

as it is. Our forces must grow with every day, and this constant growth will give us the guarantee, as before, that international Socialism will be the victor.

[Lenin's speech was greeted with tremendous enthusiasm, and a resolution was passed embodying his recommendations.]

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